Accelerated issuance and deployment of local construction bonds for infrastructure capexA ramp-up of the consumer goods trade-in program, 加快发行和部署地方建设债券用于基础设施资本开支，启动消费品以旧换新计划
potentially via broader coverage or more generous subsidiesModest monetary easing, including a 50bp RRR cut and a 15bp policy rate cutRollout of national fertility subsidies as part of broader structural supportGovernment purchase of housing inventory 通过更广泛的覆盖面或更丰厚的补贴，适度货币宽松，包括下调 50 个基点准备金率和 15 个基点政策利率，推出国家生育补贴作为更广泛的结构性支持的一部分，政府购买住房库存
2H25 - Additional Stimulus 2025 年下半年 - 额外刺激措施
Expanded quotas for trade-in subsidies and targeted support for services consumptionEnhanced infrastructure and tech investment support 扩大以旧换新补贴额度和针对服务消费的支持，增强基础设施和科技投资支持
Tariffs 关税
Faster and Sharper Tariffs 更快且更尖锐的关税
Source: CENSUS, UN Comtrade, White House, Morgan Stanley Research. *Including 34% initial reciprocal tariffs and 71%71 \% tariff escalations later on. 资料来源：美国人口普查局、联合国商品贸易统计数据库、白宫、摩根士丹利研究
Tariffs 关税
Responses from Major Economies (ex. China) 主要经济体（不包括中国）的响应
EU has announced 25%25 \% tariffs on a range of US products, which will take effect in stages on April 15^("th ")15^{\text {th }}, May 16^("th ")16^{\text {th }}
and December 1^("st ")1^{\text {st }}.
Canada has imposed 25% tariff on US autos.
EU has announced 25% tariffs on a range of US products, which will take effect in stages on April 15^("th "), May 16^("th ")
and December 1^("st ").| Canada has imposed $25 \%$ tariff on US autos. |
| :--- |
| EU has announced $25 \%$ tariffs on a range of US products, which will take effect in stages on April $15^{\text {th }}$, May $16^{\text {th }}$ |
| and December $1^{\text {st }}$. |
The government is assessing all potential responses to the US tariffs, and its Congress approved a bill outlining the
framework for trade retaliation. But it said no need to announce countermeasures for now.
The government is assessing all potential responses to the US tariffs, and its Congress approved a bill outlining the
framework for trade retaliation. But it said no need to announce countermeasures for now.| The government is assessing all potential responses to the US tariffs, and its Congress approved a bill outlining the |
| :--- |
| framework for trade retaliation. But it said no need to announce countermeasures for now. |
Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba said he was disappointed that Japan didn't win an exemption from the US, and urged
the US to review its measures. But Ishiba said he wouldn't rule out countermeasures previously.
Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba said he was disappointed that Japan didn't win an exemption from the US, and urged
the US to review its measures. But Ishiba said he wouldn't rule out countermeasures previously.| Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba said he was disappointed that Japan didn't win an exemption from the US, and urged |
| :--- |
| the US to review its measures. But Ishiba said he wouldn't rule out countermeasures previously. |
Member countries generally favor negotiations over retaliation. Specifically, Vietnam has offered to cut import tariff
on US goods to 0%, and Thailand said they will boost US imports, lower some tariffs and address non-tariff barriers.
Member countries generally favor negotiations over retaliation. Specifically, Vietnam has offered to cut import tariff
on US goods to 0%, and Thailand said they will boost US imports, lower some tariffs and address non-tariff barriers.| Member countries generally favor negotiations over retaliation. Specifically, Vietnam has offered to cut import tariff |
| :--- |
| on US goods to 0%, and Thailand said they will boost US imports, lower some tariffs and address non-tariff barriers. |
India 印度
政府一直在考虑提振美国进口的措施，代理总统表示韩国不会像中国那样对美国关税采取反制措施。
The government has been mulling measures to boost US imports and the acting President said Korea will not
follow China in countermeasures against US tariffs.
The government has been mulling measures to boost US imports and the acting President said Korea will not
follow China in countermeasures against US tariffs.| The government has been mulling measures to boost US imports and the acting President said Korea will not |
| :--- |
| follow China in countermeasures against US tariffs. |
The government said it was assessing the tariff impact and vowed to push for a trade deal this year 政府表示正在评估关税影响，并发誓今年将推进贸易协议
Economies Response
Canada "Canada has imposed 25% tariff on US autos.
EU has announced 25% tariffs on a range of US products, which will take effect in stages on April 15^("th "), May 16^("th ")
and December 1^("st ")."
Brazil "The government is assessing all potential responses to the US tariffs, and its Congress approved a bill outlining the
framework for trade retaliation. But it said no need to announce countermeasures for now."
Japan "Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba said he was disappointed that Japan didn't win an exemption from the US, and urged
the US to review its measures. But Ishiba said he wouldn't rule out countermeasures previously."
Korea "Member countries generally favor negotiations over retaliation. Specifically, Vietnam has offered to cut import tariff
on US goods to 0%, and Thailand said they will boost US imports, lower some tariffs and address non-tariff barriers."
India "The government has been mulling measures to boost US imports and the acting President said Korea will not
follow China in countermeasures against US tariffs."
The government said it was assessing the tariff impact and vowed to push for a trade deal this year | Economies | Response |
| :---: | :--- |
| Canada | Canada has imposed $25 \%$ tariff on US autos. <br> EU has announced $25 \%$ tariffs on a range of US products, which will take effect in stages on April $15^{\text {th }}$, May $16^{\text {th }}$ <br> and December $1^{\text {st }}$. |
| Brazil | The government is assessing all potential responses to the US tariffs, and its Congress approved a bill outlining the <br> framework for trade retaliation. But it said no need to announce countermeasures for now. |
| Japan | Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba said he was disappointed that Japan didn't win an exemption from the US, and urged <br> the US to review its measures. But Ishiba said he wouldn't rule out countermeasures previously. |
| Korea | Member countries generally favor negotiations over retaliation. Specifically, Vietnam has offered to cut import tariff <br> on US goods to 0%, and Thailand said they will boost US imports, lower some tariffs and address non-tariff barriers. |
| India | The government has been mulling measures to boost US imports and the acting President said Korea will not <br> follow China in countermeasures against US tariffs. |
| The government said it was assessing the tariff impact and vowed to push for a trade deal this year | |
Tariffs 关税
More Meaningful Response from China 中国的更有意义的回应
Tariffs 关税
Evaluating Large Trading Partners' Prospects for A Trade Deal 评估大型贸易伙伴达成贸易协议的前景
-Tariffs stay on with few exemptions: higher bar to clear for negotiations, core to campaign
Trade tensions have escalated with China's tit-for-tat approach
China restricting local firms investing in US could be a negotiation leverage point
-Key risk to view: narrower deal for targeted relief
-Path to a deal: TikTok/Panama canal ports/fentanyl
-Tariffs stay on with few exemptions: higher bar to clear for negotiations, core to campaign
Trade tensions have escalated with China's tit-for-tat approach
China restricting local firms investing in US could be a negotiation leverage point
-Key risk to view: narrower deal for targeted relief
-Path to a deal: TikTok/Panama canal ports/fentanyl| -Tariffs stay on with few exemptions: higher bar to clear for negotiations, core to campaign |
| :--- |
| Trade tensions have escalated with China's tit-for-tat approach |
| China restricting local firms investing in US could be a negotiation leverage point |
| -Key risk to view: narrower deal for targeted relief |
| -Path to a deal: TikTok/Panama canal ports/fentanyl |
EU
19%
(207)
2 H (maybe some specific sectors and/or exemptions earlier) 2H（可能某些特定行业和/或更早的豁免）
-Certain sectors will be more difficult to negotiate, like food/agriculture
-Involving multiple countries could be complex and take time
-Complexity in certain sectors' negotiations, in particular around non-tariff barriers
-Key risk to view: more severe retaliation vis-à-vis digital services taxes (invoking EU countermeasures including DSA/DMA), further countermeasures
-Certain sectors will be more difficult to negotiate, like food/agriculture
-Involving multiple countries could be complex and take time
-Complexity in certain sectors' negotiations, in particular around non-tariff barriers
-Key risk to view: more severe retaliation vis-à-vis digital services taxes (invoking EU countermeasures including DSA/DMA), further countermeasures| -Certain sectors will be more difficult to negotiate, like food/agriculture |
| :--- |
| -Involving multiple countries could be complex and take time |
| -Complexity in certain sectors' negotiations, in particular around non-tariff barriers |
| -Key risk to view: more severe retaliation vis-à-vis digital services taxes (invoking EU countermeasures including DSA/DMA), further countermeasures |
Vietnam 越南
4%
(105)
YE2025+ 2025 年末以后
-关税将持续，几乎没有豁免 -有意愿，但鉴于起点困难，几乎没有"方式"：对美国有大额贸易顺差；难以增加国防支出；多项研究表明通过越南转移中国贸易；政治杠杆有限 -贸易逆差是 GDP 的 27%27 \% -关键风险观点：强烈的行业反对可能推动提前谈判，但未解决贸易重新路由问题 -达成协议的路径：降低关税并监控越南产品中的中国商品/内容
-Tariffs stay on with little to no exemptions
-There's a will, but little "way" given difficult starting point: large trade surplus against the US; difficult to increase defense spending; multiple studies show trade rerouting from China through Vietnam; limited political leverage
-Trade deficit is 27%27 \% of GDP
-Key risk to view: strong industry pushback drives earlier negotiations without resolution of trade re-routing issue
-Path to a deal: lower tariffs and monitor Chinese goods/content in Vietnamese products
-Tariffs stay on with little to no exemptions
-There's a will, but little "way" given difficult starting point: large trade surplus against the US; difficult to increase defense spending; multiple studies show trade rerouting from China through Vietnam; limited political leverage
-Trade deficit is 27% of GDP
-Key risk to view: strong industry pushback drives earlier negotiations without resolution of trade re-routing issue
-Path to a deal: lower tariffs and monitor Chinese goods/content in Vietnamese products| -Tariffs stay on with little to no exemptions |
| :--- |
| -There's a will, but little "way" given difficult starting point: large trade surplus against the US; difficult to increase defense spending; multiple studies show trade rerouting from China through Vietnam; limited political leverage |
| -Trade deficit is $27 \%$ of GDP |
| -Key risk to view: strong industry pushback drives earlier negotiations without resolution of trade re-routing issue |
| -Path to a deal: lower tariffs and monitor Chinese goods/content in Vietnamese products |
-Deal outcome due to high strategic importance and good relationship
-Strong retaliation seems lower probability event at the moment
-Key risk to view: policymakers have stated that they will not rule out the use of countermeasures
-Path to a deal: Japan has put forward plans to increase defense spending in the coming years; agricultural market access
-Deal outcome due to high strategic importance and good relationship
-Strong retaliation seems lower probability event at the moment
-Key risk to view: policymakers have stated that they will not rule out the use of countermeasures
-Path to a deal: Japan has put forward plans to increase defense spending in the coming years; agricultural market access| -Deal outcome due to high strategic importance and good relationship |
| :--- |
| -Strong retaliation seems lower probability event at the moment |
| -Key risk to view: policymakers have stated that they will not rule out the use of countermeasures |
| -Path to a deal: Japan has put forward plans to increase defense spending in the coming years; agricultural market access |
Korea 韩国
4%
(51)
2 H 下半年
-较低的关税，汽车除外 -战略重要性 -在该地区，日本、新加坡和韩国对美国的外国直接投资流入占 GDP 的比例最高 -关键风险观点：韩国有增加国防支出的空间，但存在特定的经济挑战将阻碍其达到美国要求的水平 -达成协议的路径：购买美国军事硬件/防务承诺
-Lower tariffs except autos
-Relevant strategic importance
-Within the region, FDI flows into the US as a percentage of GDP are highest for Japan, Singapore, and Korea
-Key risk to view: Korea has room to increase defense spending, but there are economy-specific challenges that will be hurdles to raising it to levels asked by the US
-Path to a deal: purchases of US military hardware/defense commitments
-Lower tariffs except autos
-Relevant strategic importance
-Within the region, FDI flows into the US as a percentage of GDP are highest for Japan, Singapore, and Korea
-Key risk to view: Korea has room to increase defense spending, but there are economy-specific challenges that will be hurdles to raising it to levels asked by the US
-Path to a deal: purchases of US military hardware/defense commitments| -Lower tariffs except autos |
| :--- |
| -Relevant strategic importance |
| -Within the region, FDI flows into the US as a percentage of GDP are highest for Japan, Singapore, and Korea |
| -Key risk to view: Korea has room to increase defense spending, but there are economy-specific challenges that will be hurdles to raising it to levels asked by the US |
| -Path to a deal: purchases of US military hardware/defense commitments |
-Semis are currently excluded, and Taiwan central bank has noted that tariffs may not have as big of an impact as anticipated
-Contingent upon the US' conclusion of Sec 232 studies
-If no semi tariffs, these likely stay on longer
-If semi tariffs, maybe quick agreement/intent to move chip production/investment in fabs
-Key risk to view: larger and earlier semiconductor-specific tariffs; Taiwan unable to meet defense spending required by US; trade surplus against US
-Path to a deal: investment in semi production in the US, but time lag is critical
-Semis are currently excluded, and Taiwan central bank has noted that tariffs may not have as big of an impact as anticipated
-Contingent upon the US' conclusion of Sec 232 studies
-If no semi tariffs, these likely stay on longer
-If semi tariffs, maybe quick agreement/intent to move chip production/investment in fabs
-Key risk to view: larger and earlier semiconductor-specific tariffs; Taiwan unable to meet defense spending required by US; trade surplus against US
-Path to a deal: investment in semi production in the US, but time lag is critical| -Semis are currently excluded, and Taiwan central bank has noted that tariffs may not have as big of an impact as anticipated |
| :--- |
| -Contingent upon the US' conclusion of Sec 232 studies |
| -If no semi tariffs, these likely stay on longer |
| -If semi tariffs, maybe quick agreement/intent to move chip production/investment in fabs |
| -Key risk to view: larger and earlier semiconductor-specific tariffs; Taiwan unable to meet defense spending required by US; trade surplus against US |
| -Path to a deal: investment in semi production in the US, but time lag is critical |
-Strong willingness and action by Indian government, as well as personal relationship among Trump & Modi
-Strategically important alliance
-India has limited growth downside due to uplift from broader supply chain realignment
-Key risk to view: higher tariff rates for specific products prove difficult to lower
-Path to a deal: lowering tariffs on a product-by-product basis, as government is considering selective further tariff cuts & increased energy imports from US
-New trade deal possible by the end of the year
-Strong willingness and action by Indian government, as well as personal relationship among Trump & Modi
-Strategically important alliance
-India has limited growth downside due to uplift from broader supply chain realignment
-Key risk to view: higher tariff rates for specific products prove difficult to lower
-Path to a deal: lowering tariffs on a product-by-product basis, as government is considering selective further tariff cuts & increased energy imports from US| -New trade deal possible by the end of the year |
| :--- |
| -Strong willingness and action by Indian government, as well as personal relationship among Trump & Modi |
| -Strategically important alliance |
| -India has limited growth downside due to uplift from broader supply chain realignment |
| -Key risk to view: higher tariff rates for specific products prove difficult to lower |
| -Path to a deal: lowering tariffs on a product-by-product basis, as government is considering selective further tariff cuts & increased energy imports from US |
-Challenging starting point with large trade surplus & re-routing of Chinese products, as cited by third parties studies
-USTR has cited issues like imposition of non-tariff barriers vis-a-vis import restrictions and barriers to investment with foreign ownership limits
-Key risk to view: strong industry pushback drives earlier negotiations without resolution of trade re-routing issue (auto parts in particular)
-Path to a deal: lowering non-tariff barriers and monitor Chinese goods/content in Thai products; increase certain purchases
-Tariffs stay on with little to no exemptions
-Challenging starting point with large trade surplus & re-routing of Chinese products, as cited by third parties studies
-USTR has cited issues like imposition of non-tariff barriers vis-a-vis import restrictions and barriers to investment with foreign ownership limits
-Key risk to view: strong industry pushback drives earlier negotiations without resolution of trade re-routing issue (auto parts in particular)
-Path to a deal: lowering non-tariff barriers and monitor Chinese goods/content in Thai products; increase certain purchases| -Tariffs stay on with little to no exemptions |
| :--- |
| -Challenging starting point with large trade surplus & re-routing of Chinese products, as cited by third parties studies |
| -USTR has cited issues like imposition of non-tariff barriers vis-a-vis import restrictions and barriers to investment with foreign ownership limits |
| -Key risk to view: strong industry pushback drives earlier negotiations without resolution of trade re-routing issue (auto parts in particular) |
| -Path to a deal: lowering non-tariff barriers and monitor Chinese goods/content in Thai products; increase certain purchases |
Switzerland 瑞士
2%
(24)
2 H 下半年
-Eventual deal to lower tariff rate; lower priority given higher strategic relevance of other economies -最终达成降低关税的协议；考虑到其他经济体具有更高的战略相关性，这一问题优先级较低
-We see 10%10 \% staying on potentially with some exemptions
-Have previously negotiated around steel and aluminum
-Key risk to view: if the US does not want to make tariff rates lower than 10%10 \% across the board -Path to a deal: recent headlines suggest directionally lower barriers
-We see 10% staying on potentially with some exemptions
-Have previously negotiated around steel and aluminum
-Key risk to view: if the US does not want to make tariff rates lower than 10% across the board -Path to a deal: recent headlines suggest directionally lower barriers| -We see $10 \%$ staying on potentially with some exemptions |
| :--- |
| -Have previously negotiated around steel and aluminum |
| -Key risk to view: if the US does not want to make tariff rates lower than $10 \%$ across the board -Path to a deal: recent headlines suggest directionally lower barriers |
Economy % of Total US Imports US Trade Balance ($bn) Timeline for Potential Resolution Rationale
China 13% (279) YE2025+ "-Tariffs stay on with few exemptions: higher bar to clear for negotiations, core to campaign
Trade tensions have escalated with China's tit-for-tat approach
China restricting local firms investing in US could be a negotiation leverage point
-Key risk to view: narrower deal for targeted relief
-Path to a deal: TikTok/Panama canal ports/fentanyl"
EU 19% (207) 2 H (maybe some specific sectors and/or exemptions earlier) "-Certain sectors will be more difficult to negotiate, like food/agriculture
-Involving multiple countries could be complex and take time
-Complexity in certain sectors' negotiations, in particular around non-tariff barriers
-Key risk to view: more severe retaliation vis-à-vis digital services taxes (invoking EU countermeasures including DSA/DMA), further countermeasures"
Vietnam 4% (105) YE2025+ "-Tariffs stay on with little to no exemptions
-There's a will, but little "way" given difficult starting point: large trade surplus against the US; difficult to increase defense spending; multiple studies show trade rerouting from China through Vietnam; limited political leverage
-Trade deficit is 27% of GDP
-Key risk to view: strong industry pushback drives earlier negotiations without resolution of trade re-routing issue
-Path to a deal: lower tariffs and monitor Chinese goods/content in Vietnamese products"
Japan 5% (71) 1 H "-Deal outcome due to high strategic importance and good relationship
-Strong retaliation seems lower probability event at the moment
-Key risk to view: policymakers have stated that they will not rule out the use of countermeasures
-Path to a deal: Japan has put forward plans to increase defense spending in the coming years; agricultural market access"
Korea 4% (51) 2 H "-Lower tariffs except autos
-Relevant strategic importance
-Within the region, FDI flows into the US as a percentage of GDP are highest for Japan, Singapore, and Korea
-Key risk to view: Korea has room to increase defense spending, but there are economy-specific challenges that will be hurdles to raising it to levels asked by the US
-Path to a deal: purchases of US military hardware/defense commitments"
Taiwan 3% (48) 2 H "-Semis are currently excluded, and Taiwan central bank has noted that tariffs may not have as big of an impact as anticipated
-Contingent upon the US' conclusion of Sec 232 studies
-If no semi tariffs, these likely stay on longer
-If semi tariffs, maybe quick agreement/intent to move chip production/investment in fabs
-Key risk to view: larger and earlier semiconductor-specific tariffs; Taiwan unable to meet defense spending required by US; trade surplus against US
-Path to a deal: investment in semi production in the US, but time lag is critical"
India 3% (44) 2 H "-New trade deal possible by the end of the year
-Strong willingness and action by Indian government, as well as personal relationship among Trump & Modi
-Strategically important alliance
-India has limited growth downside due to uplift from broader supply chain realignment
-Key risk to view: higher tariff rates for specific products prove difficult to lower
-Path to a deal: lowering tariffs on a product-by-product basis, as government is considering selective further tariff cuts & increased energy imports from US"
Thailand 2% (41) YE2025+ "-Tariffs stay on with little to no exemptions
-Challenging starting point with large trade surplus & re-routing of Chinese products, as cited by third parties studies
-USTR has cited issues like imposition of non-tariff barriers vis-a-vis import restrictions and barriers to investment with foreign ownership limits
-Key risk to view: strong industry pushback drives earlier negotiations without resolution of trade re-routing issue (auto parts in particular)
-Path to a deal: lowering non-tariff barriers and monitor Chinese goods/content in Thai products; increase certain purchases"
Switzerland 2% (24) 2 H -Eventual deal to lower tariff rate; lower priority given higher strategic relevance of other economies
UK 2% 10 1 H "-We see 10% staying on potentially with some exemptions
-Have previously negotiated around steel and aluminum
-Key risk to view: if the US does not want to make tariff rates lower than 10% across the board -Path to a deal: recent headlines suggest directionally lower barriers"| Economy | % of Total US Imports | US Trade Balance ($bn) | Timeline for Potential Resolution | Rationale |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| China | 13% | (279) | YE2025+ | -Tariffs stay on with few exemptions: higher bar to clear for negotiations, core to campaign <br> Trade tensions have escalated with China's tit-for-tat approach <br> China restricting local firms investing in US could be a negotiation leverage point <br> -Key risk to view: narrower deal for targeted relief <br> -Path to a deal: TikTok/Panama canal ports/fentanyl |
| EU | 19% | (207) | 2 H (maybe some specific sectors and/or exemptions earlier) | -Certain sectors will be more difficult to negotiate, like food/agriculture <br> -Involving multiple countries could be complex and take time <br> -Complexity in certain sectors' negotiations, in particular around non-tariff barriers <br> -Key risk to view: more severe retaliation vis-à-vis digital services taxes (invoking EU countermeasures including DSA/DMA), further countermeasures |
| Vietnam | 4% | (105) | YE2025+ | -Tariffs stay on with little to no exemptions <br> -There's a will, but little "way" given difficult starting point: large trade surplus against the US; difficult to increase defense spending; multiple studies show trade rerouting from China through Vietnam; limited political leverage <br> -Trade deficit is $27 \%$ of GDP <br> -Key risk to view: strong industry pushback drives earlier negotiations without resolution of trade re-routing issue <br> -Path to a deal: lower tariffs and monitor Chinese goods/content in Vietnamese products |
| Japan | 5% | (71) | 1 H | -Deal outcome due to high strategic importance and good relationship <br> -Strong retaliation seems lower probability event at the moment <br> -Key risk to view: policymakers have stated that they will not rule out the use of countermeasures <br> -Path to a deal: Japan has put forward plans to increase defense spending in the coming years; agricultural market access |
| Korea | 4% | (51) | 2 H | -Lower tariffs except autos <br> -Relevant strategic importance <br> -Within the region, FDI flows into the US as a percentage of GDP are highest for Japan, Singapore, and Korea <br> -Key risk to view: Korea has room to increase defense spending, but there are economy-specific challenges that will be hurdles to raising it to levels asked by the US <br> -Path to a deal: purchases of US military hardware/defense commitments |
| Taiwan | 3% | (48) | 2 H | -Semis are currently excluded, and Taiwan central bank has noted that tariffs may not have as big of an impact as anticipated <br> -Contingent upon the US' conclusion of Sec 232 studies <br> -If no semi tariffs, these likely stay on longer <br> -If semi tariffs, maybe quick agreement/intent to move chip production/investment in fabs <br> -Key risk to view: larger and earlier semiconductor-specific tariffs; Taiwan unable to meet defense spending required by US; trade surplus against US <br> -Path to a deal: investment in semi production in the US, but time lag is critical |
| India | 3% | (44) | 2 H | -New trade deal possible by the end of the year <br> -Strong willingness and action by Indian government, as well as personal relationship among Trump & Modi <br> -Strategically important alliance <br> -India has limited growth downside due to uplift from broader supply chain realignment <br> -Key risk to view: higher tariff rates for specific products prove difficult to lower <br> -Path to a deal: lowering tariffs on a product-by-product basis, as government is considering selective further tariff cuts & increased energy imports from US |
| Thailand | 2% | (41) | YE2025+ | -Tariffs stay on with little to no exemptions <br> -Challenging starting point with large trade surplus & re-routing of Chinese products, as cited by third parties studies <br> -USTR has cited issues like imposition of non-tariff barriers vis-a-vis import restrictions and barriers to investment with foreign ownership limits <br> -Key risk to view: strong industry pushback drives earlier negotiations without resolution of trade re-routing issue (auto parts in particular) <br> -Path to a deal: lowering non-tariff barriers and monitor Chinese goods/content in Thai products; increase certain purchases |
| Switzerland | 2% | (24) | 2 H | -Eventual deal to lower tariff rate; lower priority given higher strategic relevance of other economies |
| UK | 2% | 10 | 1 H | -We see $10 \%$ staying on potentially with some exemptions <br> -Have previously negotiated around steel and aluminum <br> -Key risk to view: if the US does not want to make tariff rates lower than $10 \%$ across the board -Path to a deal: recent headlines suggest directionally lower barriers |
Source: Morgan Stanley Research 资料来源：摩根斯坦利研究
Tariffs 关税
The US Has Also Ramped Up Investment Restrictions on China 美国还加大了对中国的投资限制
Tariffs 关税
China Still Dominates Global Supply Chains... 中国仍然主导全球供应链...
Lenses, Mirrors and other glass instruments 镜头、镜子和其他玻璃仪器
1.3
NI
NI
N
Germany 德国
China 中国
Japan 日本
Taiwan 台湾
Hong Kong 香港
73%
17%
5%
0%
Parts and Accessories related to Computers 计算机配件和附件
1.3
NI
NE
N
China 中国
Hong Kong 香港
Taiwan 台湾
USA
Korea 韩国
77%
25%
12%
2%
Rechargeable batteries 可充电电池
1.2
NI
NE
NI
China 中国
Poland 波兰
Hungary 匈牙利
Korea 韩国
Germany 德国
73%
46%
4%
2%
Primary Cells and Batteries 原生电池和电池
1.2
NI
ne 一个
NI
China 中国
USA
Singapore 新加坡
Germany 德国
Indonesia 印度尼西亚
60%
30%
10%
1%
Monitors and projectors 监视器和投影仪
1.1
NI
Ne 氖
NE
China 中国
Mexico 墨西哥
Poland 波兰
Slovakia 斯洛伐克
Netherlands 荷兰
69%
39%
3%
14%
Optical fibers and optical fiber bundles 光纤和光纤束
1.0
NE
NI
ne 不
China 中国
USA
Japan 日本
Korea 韩国
Germany 德国
54%
17%
11%
3%
Semiconductor devices including photovoltaic cells 包括光伏电池在内的半导体器件
0.8
NI
NE
NI
China 中国
Hong Kong 香港
Singapore 新加坡
Malaysia 马来西亚
Germany 德国
69%
39%
5%
0%
Display Modules 显示模组
0.8
NI
NE
NI
China 中国
Korea 韩国
Hong Kong 香港
Taiwan 台湾
Japan 日本
95%
51%
0%
0%
Transmission apparatus 传输设备
0.8
NI
NE
N
China 中国
Germany 德国
USA
Thailand 泰国
Japan 日本
60%
27%
9%
2%
Headphones, earphones and microphones 耳机、耳塞和麦克风
0.7
NI
NE
NE
China 中国
USA
Germany 德国
Hong Kong 香港
Mexico 墨西哥
65%
41%
7%
5%
Tempered or Laminated Glass 钢化玻璃或夹层玻璃
0.6
NI
NE
NE
China 中国
Germany 德国
Poland 波兰
Czechia 捷克
Italy 意大利
60%
35%
3%
3%
Mobile and Computer Cases 移动和电脑保护壳
0.6
NI
NE
NI
China 中国
Germany 德国
USA
Italy 意大利
France 法国
60%
33%
9%
3%
Product Complexity NE: Net Exporter NI: Net Importer Largest Exporters Market Shares
USA China Mexico 1 2 3 4 5 Exporters China USA Mexico
Computers and Laptops 1.1 NI NE NE China Taiwan USA Mexico China, Hong 70% 38% 8% 7%
Smartphones and other Telecommunication Devices 1.2 NI NE NI China China, Hong K kUSA Netherlands Singapore 68% 41% 7% 3%
Intermediate Inputs
Electronic integrated circuits* 1.1** NI NI NI Hong Kong Taiwan China Singapore Korea 73% 15% 5% 0%
Other Semiconductor Manufacturing Machines 2.0 NI NE N Japan Netherlands Singapore USA Korea 80% 4% 16% 0%
CNC, Water or laser-based metal cutting tools 2.0 N NE N China Germany Japan Switzerland USA 70% 27% 6% 0%
Lathes and Turning Centers 1.7 NI NE NI Japan China Korea Germany Taiwan 68% 13% 5% 0%
Plastic forming machinery 1.7 N NE N Germany China Italy Japan USA 68% 22% 6% 0%
Sensors and Measurement Instruments 1.6 NE NI NI Germany USA China Japan Korea 57% 12% 12% 1%
Specialized Glass Manufacturing Machinery 1.6 Ne NE NI Singapore Germany USA Korea Belgium 52% 7% 10% 1%
Solid Disks and Tapes 1.6 NI NE N Taiwan USA Korea China Malaysia 54% 9% 13% 1%
Ventilating Hoods and Vacuum Pumps 1.3 NI NE NI China Germany USA Japan Italy 58% 27% 8% 4%
Lenses, Mirrors and other glass instruments 1.3 NI NI N Germany China Japan Taiwan Hong Kong 73% 17% 5% 0%
Parts and Accessories related to Computers 1.3 NI NE N China Hong Kong Taiwan USA Korea 77% 25% 12% 2%
Rechargeable batteries 1.2 NI NE NI China Poland Hungary Korea Germany 73% 46% 4% 2%
Primary Cells and Batteries 1.2 NI ne NI China USA Singapore Germany Indonesia 60% 30% 10% 1%
Monitors and projectors 1.1 NI Ne NE China Mexico Poland Slovakia Netherlands 69% 39% 3% 14%
Optical fibers and optical fiber bundles 1.0 NE NI ne China USA Japan Korea Germany 54% 17% 11% 3%
Semiconductor devices including photovoltaic cells 0.8 NI NE NI China Hong Kong Singapore Malaysia Germany 69% 39% 5% 0%
Display Modules 0.8 NI NE NI China Korea Hong Kong Taiwan Japan 95% 51% 0% 0%
Transmission apparatus 0.8 NI NE N China Germany USA Thailand Japan 60% 27% 9% 2%
Headphones, earphones and microphones 0.7 NI NE NE China USA Germany Hong Kong Mexico 65% 41% 7% 5%
Tempered or Laminated Glass 0.6 NI NE NE China Germany Poland Czechia Italy 60% 35% 3% 3%
Mobile and Computer Cases 0.6 NI NE NI China Germany USA Italy France 60% 33% 9% 3%| Product | Complexity | NE: Net Exporter NI: Net Importer | | | Largest Exporters | | | | | Market Shares | | | |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| | | USA | China | Mexico | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | Exporters | China | USA | Mexico |
| Computers and Laptops | 1.1 | NI | NE | NE | China | Taiwan | USA | Mexico | China, Hong | 70% | 38% | 8% | 7% |
| Smartphones and other Telecommunication Devices | 1.2 | NI | NE | NI | China | China, Hong K | kUSA | Netherlands | Singapore | 68% | 41% | 7% | 3% |
| Intermediate Inputs | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Electronic integrated circuits* | 1.1** | NI | NI | NI | Hong Kong | Taiwan | China | Singapore | Korea | 73% | 15% | 5% | 0% |
| Other Semiconductor Manufacturing Machines | 2.0 | NI | NE | N | Japan | Netherlands | Singapore | USA | Korea | 80% | 4% | 16% | 0% |
| CNC, Water or laser-based metal cutting tools | 2.0 | N | NE | N | China | Germany | Japan | Switzerland | USA | 70% | 27% | 6% | 0% |
| Lathes and Turning Centers | 1.7 | NI | NE | NI | Japan | China | Korea | Germany | Taiwan | 68% | 13% | 5% | 0% |
| Plastic forming machinery | 1.7 | N | NE | N | Germany | China | Italy | Japan | USA | 68% | 22% | 6% | 0% |
| Sensors and Measurement Instruments | 1.6 | NE | NI | NI | Germany | USA | China | Japan | Korea | 57% | 12% | 12% | 1% |
| Specialized Glass Manufacturing Machinery | 1.6 | Ne | NE | NI | Singapore | Germany | USA | Korea | Belgium | 52% | 7% | 10% | 1% |
| Solid Disks and Tapes | 1.6 | NI | NE | N | Taiwan | USA | Korea | China | Malaysia | 54% | 9% | 13% | 1% |
| Ventilating Hoods and Vacuum Pumps | 1.3 | NI | NE | NI | China | Germany | USA | Japan | Italy | 58% | 27% | 8% | 4% |
| Lenses, Mirrors and other glass instruments | 1.3 | NI | NI | N | Germany | China | Japan | Taiwan | Hong Kong | 73% | 17% | 5% | 0% |
| Parts and Accessories related to Computers | 1.3 | NI | NE | N | China | Hong Kong | Taiwan | USA | Korea | 77% | 25% | 12% | 2% |
| Rechargeable batteries | 1.2 | NI | NE | NI | China | Poland | Hungary | Korea | Germany | 73% | 46% | 4% | 2% |
| Primary Cells and Batteries | 1.2 | NI | ne | NI | China | USA | Singapore | Germany | Indonesia | 60% | 30% | 10% | 1% |
| Monitors and projectors | 1.1 | NI | Ne | NE | China | Mexico | Poland | Slovakia | Netherlands | 69% | 39% | 3% | 14% |
| Optical fibers and optical fiber bundles | 1.0 | NE | NI | ne | China | USA | Japan | Korea | Germany | 54% | 17% | 11% | 3% |
| Semiconductor devices including photovoltaic cells | 0.8 | NI | NE | NI | China | Hong Kong | Singapore | Malaysia | Germany | 69% | 39% | 5% | 0% |
| Display Modules | 0.8 | NI | NE | NI | China | Korea | Hong Kong | Taiwan | Japan | 95% | 51% | 0% | 0% |
| Transmission apparatus | 0.8 | NI | NE | N | China | Germany | USA | Thailand | Japan | 60% | 27% | 9% | 2% |
| Headphones, earphones and microphones | 0.7 | NI | NE | NE | China | USA | Germany | Hong Kong | Mexico | 65% | 41% | 7% | 5% |
| Tempered or Laminated Glass | 0.6 | NI | NE | NE | China | Germany | Poland | Czechia | Italy | 60% | 35% | 3% | 3% |
| Mobile and Computer Cases | 0.6 | NI | NE | NI | China | Germany | USA | Italy | France | 60% | 33% | 9% | 3% |
Source: Growth Lab at Harvard University, United Nations, UN Comtrade, Morgan Stanley Research. Note: *Electronic Integrated Circuits include a wide range of chips, and older chips tend to be less complex to manufacture. However, manufacturing of the latest chips used in laptops and computers is highly complex and concentrated. 来源：哈佛大学增长实验室，联合国，联合国商品贸易数据库，摩根斯坦利研究。注：*电子集成电路包括广泛的芯片类型，老一代芯片制造相对简单。然而，用于笔记本电脑和计算机的最新芯片制造高度复杂且集中。
Slow Reflation 缓慢通胀
NPC Stimulus Was Modest and Still Supply-Centric 全国人大的刺激政策规模 modest 且仍以供给侧为中心
NPC announced a modest Rmb2trn fiscal package… 全国人大宣布了规模为 2 万亿元人民币的财政刺激计划...
A comprehensive LGFV debt resolution plan to evenly share the burden among central government, local governments, PBoC and banks 一个全面的地方政府融资平台债务化解方案，在中央政府、地方政府、人民银行和银行之间均匀分担负担
SOE reforms to improve public sector productivity 国企改革以提高公共部门生产力
Fiscal reforms to alleviate funding pressure for local governments 财政改革，缓解地方政府的资金压力
Clearer signals to end the regulatory reset since 2021 自 2021 年以来监管重置的信号更加清晰
More efforts to invigorate the capital markets 更多努力振兴资本市场
Further service sector opening-up 进一步开放服务业
Slow Reflation 缓慢的通货再膨胀
Broader Consumption Recovery Requires Further Policy Easing 更广泛的消费复苏需要进一步的政策放松
Wage deflation continued 工资通缩持续
China New Economy Avg. Monthly Entry-Level Salaries 中国新经济平均月度入门级薪资
Slow Reflation 缓慢的通货再膨胀
Pathways Towards Reflation #1: Housing Inventory Digestion 通货再膨胀的路径 #1：住房库存消化
1mn units cash resettlement program for urban village redevelopment is a positive step 城中村改造 100 万套单元现金安置计划是一个积极的步骤
Unlike tier 1-2 cities, lower-tier cities will face more pressure, given still elevated inventory 与一二线城市不同，低线城市将面临更大压力，因为库存仍处于高位
Source: Government websites, CEIC, CREIS, CRIC, Morgan Stanley Research. *Here we assume the newly announced 1 mn unit urban village renovation would be completed within 1 year, with 100%100 \% cash settlement. 资料来源：政府网站、CEIC、CREIS、CRIC、摩根斯坦利研究。*这里我们假设新宣布的 100 万个城中村改造单元将在 1 年内完成，并进行现金结算。
Slow Reflation 缓慢复苏
Pathways Towards Reflation #2: Social Welfare Reform 复苏路径之二：社会福利改革
China’s social welfare spending is relatively low 中国的社会福利支出相对较低
Increasing social welfare spending would help to unleash precautionary savings 增加社会福利支出将有助于释放预防性储蓄
China’s private-consumption-to-GDP ratio has been low at ∼38%\sim 38 \% over the past decade with a high saving rate. 过去十年中，中国的私人消费与 GDP 比率一直处于较低水平，储蓄率较高
Slow Reflation 缓慢通胀
Fragmented and Unbalanced Social Welfare System 分散且不平衡的社会福利系统
Social welfare system is fragmented and unbalanced 社会福利系统分散且不平衡
Insufficient social safety net for rural residents and migrant workers 农村居民和农民工社会安全网不足
Pension (2023)
"Urban Employee
Basic Pension" "Urban and Rural Resident
Basic Pension"
"Insured Population
(person mn)" 521 545
Average Payout (Rmb) 44,912 2,671
Replacement Ratio 44% (as of 2020) 12.5% (as of 2018)
"Accumulated Balance
(Rmb trn)" 6.4 1.5
Medical Insurance (2023)
"Insured Population
(person mn)" "Urban Employee
Basic Medical Insurance" "Urban and Rural Resident
Basic Medical Insurance"
"Average Expenditure
per year (Rmb)" 371 963
"Accumulated Balance
(Rmb trn)" 3.785 1,086 | Pension (2023) | | | |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| | Urban Employee <br> Basic Pension | Urban and Rural Resident <br> Basic Pension | |
| Insured Population <br> (person mn) | 521 | 545 | |
| Average Payout (Rmb) | 44,912 | 2,671 | |
| Replacement Ratio | $44 \%$ (as of 2020) | $12.5 \%$ (as of 2018) | |
| Accumulated Balance <br> (Rmb trn) | 6.4 | 1.5 | |
| Medical Insurance (2023) | | | |
| Insured Population <br> (person mn) | Urban Employee <br> Basic Medical Insurance | Urban and Rural Resident <br> Basic Medical Insurance | |
| Average Expenditure <br> per year (Rmb) | 371 | 963 | |
| Accumulated Balance <br> (Rmb trn) | 3.785 | 1,086 | |
Slow Reflation 缓慢通胀
Potential Social Welfare Spending 潜在社会福利支出
Cyclical: Exemption of individual social security contributions 周期性：个人社会保障缴费豁免
Number in brackets represents the % share in total social security contribution 括号中的数字代表在总社会保障缴费中的百分比份额
Structural: Strong commitment required as social security is already burdened by an aging population 结构性问题：鉴于人口老龄化已经给社会保障体系带来负担，需要强有力的承诺
Slow Reflation 缓慢通货再膨胀
Pathways Towards Reflation #3: Birth Subsidies 通货再膨胀路径之三：生育补贴
Number of new births has plunged, with less willingness 新生儿数量已经大幅下降，意愿也更少
among households to bear a second child 家庭中生育第二个孩子的意愿
Financial pressure is one major concern 财务压力是一个主要担忧
behind low childbirth 导致生育率低的原因
Tech 科技
Top Leadership Has Struck A Modestly Supportive Tone On The Private Sector 高层领导对私营部门持适度支持态度
President Xi's Remarks at the Symposium with Private Firms 习近平在与民营企业座谈会上的讲话
Nov-2018 2018 年 11 月
Feb-2025 2025 年 2 月
Overall Stance 整体立场
The notion that "private sector has fulfilled its purpose" is against national policy. All private enterprises can rest assured and pursue growth with a peace of mind. "私营部门已经完成其使命"的观念违背国家政策。所有私营企业都可以安心并怀着平和的心态追求发展。
The private economy still has promising room for development, and is well positioned to make contribution to China's modernization. 私营经济仍有很大的发展空间，并且已经很好地定位于为中国的现代化做出贡献。
Economic and Social Responsibilities 经济和社会责任
Promote entrepreneurship, improve competitiveness, and give back to society. 促进创业精神，提高竞争力，回馈社会。
Promoting tech innovation; strengthen supply chains; get rich first and promote common prosperity 推动技术创新；加强供应链；先富起来，然后促进共同富裕
Enforcement of Laws and Regulations 执法和遵守法规
Past behaviors that are deemed non-compliant by today's standards should be dealt with from a developmental perspective. 从发展的角度处理那些按照当今标准被视为不合规的过去行为。
Illegal activities of enterprises of all ownership should not evade investigation and punishment. 不论所有制形式的企业的非法活动都不应逃避调查和惩处。
Policy Guidance 政策指导
- 减税降费 - 保障企业家的人身和财产安全。
- Cut tax and fees
- Ensure entrepreneurs' personal and property safety.
- Cut tax and fees
- Ensure entrepreneurs' personal and property safety.| - Cut tax and fees |
| :--- |
| - Ensure entrepreneurs' personal and property safety. |
- 解决拖欠民营企业的款项 - 促进基础设施的平等准入 - 优化执法以减少过度罚款和检查。
- Resolve overdue payment to private enterprises
- Promote equal access to basic infrastructure
- Optimize law enforcement to reduce excessive fines and inspections.
- Resolve overdue payment to private enterprises
- Promote equal access to basic infrastructure
- Optimize law enforcement to reduce excessive fines and inspections.| - Resolve overdue payment to private enterprises |
| :--- |
| - Promote equal access to basic infrastructure |
| - Optimize law enforcement to reduce excessive fines and inspections. |
- Cultivate a level playing field for SOEs and POEs
- Establish a cordial and clean relationship between government and business, with government proactively facilitating business activities
- Improve financing and lower financing costs
- Cultivate a level playing field for SOEs and POEs
- Establish a cordial and clean relationship between government and business, with government proactively facilitating business activities| - Improve financing and lower financing costs |
| :--- |
| - Cultivate a level playing field for SOEs and POEs |
| - Establish a cordial and clean relationship between government and business, with government proactively facilitating business activities |
President Xi's Remarks at the Symposium with Private Firms
Nov-2018 Feb-2025
Overall Stance The notion that "private sector has fulfilled its purpose" is against national policy. All private enterprises can rest assured and pursue growth with a peace of mind. The private economy still has promising room for development, and is well positioned to make contribution to China's modernization.
Economic and Social Responsibilities Promote entrepreneurship, improve competitiveness, and give back to society. Promoting tech innovation; strengthen supply chains; get rich first and promote common prosperity
Enforcement of Laws and Regulations Past behaviors that are deemed non-compliant by today's standards should be dealt with from a developmental perspective. Illegal activities of enterprises of all ownership should not evade investigation and punishment.
Policy Guidance "- Cut tax and fees
- Ensure entrepreneurs' personal and property safety." "- Resolve overdue payment to private enterprises
- Promote equal access to basic infrastructure
- Optimize law enforcement to reduce excessive fines and inspections."
"- Improve financing and lower financing costs
- Cultivate a level playing field for SOEs and POEs
- Establish a cordial and clean relationship between government and business, with government proactively facilitating business activities" | President Xi's Remarks at the Symposium with Private Firms | | |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| | Nov-2018 | Feb-2025 |
| Overall Stance | The notion that "private sector has fulfilled its purpose" is against national policy. All private enterprises can rest assured and pursue growth with a peace of mind. | The private economy still has promising room for development, and is well positioned to make contribution to China's modernization. |
| Economic and Social Responsibilities | Promote entrepreneurship, improve competitiveness, and give back to society. | Promoting tech innovation; strengthen supply chains; get rich first and promote common prosperity |
| Enforcement of Laws and Regulations | Past behaviors that are deemed non-compliant by today's standards should be dealt with from a developmental perspective. | Illegal activities of enterprises of all ownership should not evade investigation and punishment. |
| Policy Guidance | - Cut tax and fees <br> - Ensure entrepreneurs' personal and property safety. | - Resolve overdue payment to private enterprises <br> - Promote equal access to basic infrastructure <br> - Optimize law enforcement to reduce excessive fines and inspections. |
| | - Improve financing and lower financing costs <br> - Cultivate a level playing field for SOEs and POEs <br> - Establish a cordial and clean relationship between government and business, with government proactively facilitating business activities | |
Tech 科技
Animal Spirits Are Making A Partial Comeback 动物精神部分回归
Tech 科技
Faster Adoption Of AI With Cost-efficient LLMs 通过成本高效的方式加速 AI 采用 LLMs
Source: Company disclosures, Morgan Stanley Research. Please see report: Tech Bytes: How Will DeepSeek Impact Technology? (2 February 2025) 来源：公司披露，摩根士丹利研究。请参阅报告：技术专题：DeepSeek 将如何影响技术？（2025 年 2 月 2 日）
Tech 技术
Competitive Edge in Other Emerging Tech 其他新兴技术的竞争优势
China’s share in global patent applications related to “humanoid”* has increased notably since 2023 自 2023 年以来，中国在与"人形机器人"相关的全球专利申请中的份额明显增加
Auto-driving: Chinese local suppliers dominate domestic C-DCU market 自动驾驶：中国本地供应商主导国内 C-DCU 市场
Source: Google Patents, Gasgoo, Morgan Stanley Research. *Ordered by publishing date. We included latest data available via Google Patents, which is as of November 2024. Note: C-DCU = cockpit domain control units. 来源：谷歌专利，盖世汽车网，摩根士丹利研究。*按发布日期排序。我们包含了通过谷歌专利提供的最新数据，截至 2024 年 11 月。注：C-DCU = 驾驶舱域控制单元。
Tech 技术
But Technology Innovation Alone Is Not Enough To Reflate The Economy 但技术创新本身并不足以促进经济反弹
Housing Market 房地产市场
Property Sector Adjustment Amid An Aging Population 人口老龄化背景下的房地产行业调整
Population growth has slowed sharply since 2018 and is now negative 自 2018 年以来，人口增长已经急剧放缓，现已转为负增长
China Total Population Growth 中国总人口增长
Real estate investment to GDP is now in line with post-bubble Japan and the US 房地产投资占 GDP 的比重现在与后泡沫时期的日本和美国相当
Housing Market 房地产市场
Housing Recovery Still Elusive... 房地产复苏仍遥不可及...
Housing supply/demand balance have improved significantly in tier-1 cities 一线城市的住房供需平衡已显著改善
Housing Market 房地产市场
...with Housing Deleveraging Yet To Be Backstopped 房地产去杠杆尚未得到有效支撑
Housing investment has completed the bulk of its adjustment… 房地产投资已完成大部分调整…
Housing New Starts (peak = 100) 住房新开工（峰值 = 100）
Quarters before/after bubble burst 泡沫破裂前后的季度
…but the outlook for housing prices remains uncertain ……但房价前景仍不确定
Housing Market 房地产市场
But Equilibrium Housing Demand Is Still Healthy 但住房需求的平衡仍然健康
Decent housing outlook backed by upgrade demand… 升级需求支撑的良好住房前景……
Laying the Foundation for the Next Industrial Upgrade Cycle 为下一轮产业升级周期奠定基础
Each industrial upgrade cycle has boosted China’s importance within the world economy 每一轮产业升级周期都提升了中国在世界经济中的重要性
China’s manufacturing sector has laid the foundations for its next upgrade cycle: 中国制造业为其下一个升级周期奠定了基础：
Economies of Scale 规模经济
China has the large and integrated supply chain to drive efficiency gains and cost reductions. 中国拥有庞大且一体化的供应链，可推动效率提升和成本降低。
Adaptability 适应性
China is the only economy that covers all traditional and emerging manufacturing sectors. 中国是唯一覆盖所有传统和新兴制造业部门的经济体。
Rapid Green Transition 快速绿色转型
China has been the key driver of decarbonization globally. 中国一直是全球减碳的关键推动者。
Swift Adoption of Automation and AI 迅速采用自动化和人工智能
Leverage automation and digital technology to facilitate cost reduction and process refinement. 利用自动化和数字技术促进成本降低和流程优化。
Large Talent Pool 庞大的人才库
China has large talent pool to support broad exploration of different technological routes across various industries. 中国拥有庞大的人才库，可支持跨多个行业的不同技术路线的广泛探索。
Long-term Structural Opportunities - AI 长期结构性机遇 - 人工智能
In the Early Innings of AI Diffusion; 2025 Will Be the Year of the Adopters 处于人工智能扩散的早期阶段；2025 年将是采用者的年份
Global top 3 largest market cap companies by decade 按十年划分的全球市值前三大公司
Long-term Structural Opportunities - AI 长期结构性机遇 - 人工智能
Phases of AI-Driven Productivity 人工智能驱动生产力的阶段
Nams sumg iow 南姆松艾奥
Before 2024:
Adoption of generic off-the-shelf Al tools such as ChatGPT 2024 年之前：采用通用的现成人工智能工具，如 ChatGPT
without modification 无需修改
2024-25:
More proprietary tools/models (i.e. Microsoft Co-Pilot) 更多专有工具/模型（即微软 Co-Pilot）
Still years away: 还需要几年
Custom models/agents that take action on behalf of users 代表用户采取行动的自定义模型/代理
Long-term Structural Opportunities - AI 人工智能的长期结构性机遇
Early Evidence of Productivity Uplift from Generative AI 生成式人工智能提高生产力的早期证据
Customer Support 客户支持
美国国家经济研究局
National
Bureau of Economic Research
National
Bureau of Economic Research| National |
| :--- |
| Bureau of Economic Research |
Access to Al-based conversational assistants increases productivity, as measured by issues resolved per hour, by 14%\mathbf{1 4 \%} on average, with the greatest impact on novice and low-skilled workers, and minimal impact on experienced and highly skilled workers 使用基于人工智能的对话助手可以平均提高每小时解决问题的效率 14%\mathbf{1 4 \%} ，对新手和低技能工作者的影响最大，而对经验丰富和高技能工作者的影响最小
Al-Assisted Coding 人工智能辅助编码
GitHub Copilot
"我们现在看到，使用 GitHub Copilot 的开发者在任务中的生产力提高了 55%55 \% "--微软云计算和人工智能执行副总裁 Scott Guthrie
"We're now seeing that the developers using GitHub Copilot are 55%55 \% more productive on tasks."
--Scott Guthrie, Microsoft EVP of Could & AI
"We're now seeing that the developers using GitHub Copilot are 55% more productive on tasks."
--Scott Guthrie, Microsoft EVP of Could & AI| "We're now seeing that the developers using GitHub Copilot are $55 \%$ more productive on tasks." |
| :--- |
| --Scott Guthrie, Microsoft EVP of Could & AI |
AMZN Code Whisperer AMZN 代码助手
"内部测试显示，任务完成速度提高了 57%，成功可能性提高了 27%。" --AWS 首席执行官 Adam Selipsky
"Internal test showed 57% faster task completion and 27% higher likelihood of success."
--Adam Selipsky, AWS CEO
"Internal test showed 57% faster task completion and 27% higher likelihood of success."
--Adam Selipsky, AWS CEO| "Internal test showed 57% faster task completion and 27% higher likelihood of success." |
| :--- |
| --Adam Selipsky, AWS CEO |
PayPal
"人工智能已经让编码开发团队 30%30 \% 变得更加高效，我们预期前台和后台也会有类似改进。" --PayPal 首席执行官 Dan Schulman
"Al is already making the coding development team 30%30 \% more productive and we expect similar improvement across front office and back office."
--Dan Schulman, PayPal CEO
"Al is already making the coding development team 30% more productive and we expect similar improvement across front office and back office."
--Dan Schulman, PayPal CEO| "Al is already making the coding development team $30 \%$ more productive and we expect similar improvement across front office and back office." |
| :--- |
| --Dan Schulman, PayPal CEO |
"I think our employees could easily be, especially our developers, 30%\mathbf{3 0 \%} more productive in the short to medium term and this will allow significantly greater throughput through tools like GitHub's Copilot."
--Brian Chesky, Airbnb CEO
"I think our employees could easily be, especially our developers, 30% more productive in the short to medium term and this will allow significantly greater throughput through tools like GitHub's Copilot."
--Brian Chesky, Airbnb CEO| "I think our employees could easily be, especially our developers, $\mathbf{3 0 \%}$ more productive in the short to medium term and this will allow significantly greater throughput through tools like GitHub's Copilot." |
| :--- |
| --Brian Chesky, Airbnb CEO |
Writing Productivity 写作生产力
MIT Study MIT 研究
Study of 453 college-educated professionals show that ChatGPT raises the average productivity of those who used the technology and increased job satisfaction. Average time taken for a writing task decreased by 40%40 \% and output quantity rose by 18%. 一项对 453 名受过大学教育的专业人士的研究显示，ChatGPT 提高了使用该技术者的平均生产力，并增加了工作满意度。完成写作任务的平均时间减少，输出数量增加了 18%。
General Productivity 总体生产力
HBS Study HBS 研究
Study of 758 BCG consultants highlights GPT4 productivity gains. Consultants using AI completed 12.2%\mathbf{1 2 . 2 \%} more tasks on average, 25.1%more\mathbf{2 5 . 1 \%} \mathbf{~ m o r e} quickly, and produced significantly higher quality results (more than 40%\mathbf{4 0 \%} higher quality compared to a control group). 对 758 名 BCG 咨询顾问的研究突显了 GPT4 的生产力提升。使用 AI 的咨询顾问平均完成了更多任务， 12.2%\mathbf{1 2 . 2 \%} 更快速，并产生了显著更高质量的结果（与对照组相比质量提高了超过 40%\mathbf{4 0 \%} ）。
Unity
"现在，一个可能需要艺术家团队 3\mathbf{3} 个月完成的任务，现在可以由服务器在大约 10 分钟内完成。这不仅仅是生产力的提升……最初，大多数人看到创建新的 3D 内容需要 3 个月的挑战，会说'我们负担不起'，所以他们根本不会去做。生成式 AI 将使所有从未开始的人能够在 10 分钟内完成；这意味着市场的扩张。"——Marc Whitten，Unity Create 总裁
"Now, something that might have taken a group of artists 3\mathbf{3} months can now take a server run about 10 minutes. And it is not just a productivity uplift per se...originally most people would have looked at the challenge to create new 3D content taking 3 months and go, 'we can't afford that' and so they didn't do it. Generative Al will allow all those who never started to get there in 10 minutes instead; market expansion."
--Marc Whitten, Unity Create President
"Now, something that might have taken a group of artists 3 months can now take a server run about 10 minutes. And it is not just a productivity uplift per se...originally most people would have looked at the challenge to create new 3D content taking 3 months and go, 'we can't afford that' and so they didn't do it. Generative Al will allow all those who never started to get there in 10 minutes instead; market expansion."
--Marc Whitten, Unity Create President| "Now, something that might have taken a group of artists $\mathbf{3}$ months can now take a server run about 10 minutes. And it is not just a productivity uplift per se...originally most people would have looked at the challenge to create new 3D content taking 3 months and go, 'we can't afford that' and so they didn't do it. Generative Al will allow all those who never started to get there in 10 minutes instead; market expansion." |
| :--- |
| --Marc Whitten, Unity Create President |
Adobe
Early customer feedback suggests 20%\mathbf{2 0 \%} productivity gains from Firefly, saving ∼8hrs\boldsymbol{\sim} \mathbf{8 h r s} per week and freeing up time for more high value-added work. 早期客户反馈表明 20%\mathbf{2 0 \%} 通过 Firefly 提高了生产力，每周节省 ∼8hrs\boldsymbol{\sim} \mathbf{8 h r s} ，并为更高价值的工作腾出时间。
Customer Support "National
Bureau of Economic Research" Access to Al-based conversational assistants increases productivity, as measured by issues resolved per hour, by 14% on average, with the greatest impact on novice and low-skilled workers, and minimal impact on experienced and highly skilled workers
Al-Assisted Coding GitHub Copilot ""We're now seeing that the developers using GitHub Copilot are 55% more productive on tasks."
--Scott Guthrie, Microsoft EVP of Could & AI" AMZN Code Whisperer ""Internal test showed 57% faster task completion and 27% higher likelihood of success."
--Adam Selipsky, AWS CEO"
PayPal ""Al is already making the coding development team 30% more productive and we expect similar improvement across front office and back office."
--Dan Schulman, PayPal CEO"
Airbnb ""I think our employees could easily be, especially our developers, 30% more productive in the short to medium term and this will allow significantly greater throughput through tools like GitHub's Copilot."
--Brian Chesky, Airbnb CEO"
Writing Productivity MIT Study Study of 453 college-educated professionals show that ChatGPT raises the average productivity of those who used the technology and increased job satisfaction. Average time taken for a writing task decreased by 40% and output quantity rose by 18%.
General Productivity HBS Study Study of 758 BCG consultants highlights GPT4 productivity gains. Consultants using AI completed 12.2% more tasks on average, 25.1%more quickly, and produced significantly higher quality results (more than 40% higher quality compared to a control group).
Unity ""Now, something that might have taken a group of artists 3 months can now take a server run about 10 minutes. And it is not just a productivity uplift per se...originally most people would have looked at the challenge to create new 3D content taking 3 months and go, 'we can't afford that' and so they didn't do it. Generative Al will allow all those who never started to get there in 10 minutes instead; market expansion."
--Marc Whitten, Unity Create President"
Adobe Early customer feedback suggests 20% productivity gains from Firefly, saving ∼8hrs per week and freeing up time for more high value-added work. | Customer Support | National <br> Bureau of Economic Research | Access to Al-based conversational assistants increases productivity, as measured by issues resolved per hour, by $\mathbf{1 4 \%}$ on average, with the greatest impact on novice and low-skilled workers, and minimal impact on experienced and highly skilled workers | | |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Al-Assisted Coding | GitHub Copilot | "We're now seeing that the developers using GitHub Copilot are $55 \%$ more productive on tasks." <br> --Scott Guthrie, Microsoft EVP of Could & AI | AMZN Code Whisperer | "Internal test showed 57% faster task completion and 27% higher likelihood of success." <br> --Adam Selipsky, AWS CEO |
| | PayPal | "Al is already making the coding development team $30 \%$ more productive and we expect similar improvement across front office and back office." <br> --Dan Schulman, PayPal CEO | | |
| | Airbnb | "I think our employees could easily be, especially our developers, $\mathbf{3 0 \%}$ more productive in the short to medium term and this will allow significantly greater throughput through tools like GitHub's Copilot." <br> --Brian Chesky, Airbnb CEO | | |
| Writing Productivity | MIT Study | Study of 453 college-educated professionals show that ChatGPT raises the average productivity of those who used the technology and increased job satisfaction. Average time taken for a writing task decreased by $40 \%$ and output quantity rose by 18%. | | |
| General Productivity | HBS Study | Study of 758 BCG consultants highlights GPT4 productivity gains. Consultants using AI completed $\mathbf{1 2 . 2 \%}$ more tasks on average, $\mathbf{2 5 . 1 \%} \mathbf{~ m o r e}$ quickly, and produced significantly higher quality results (more than $\mathbf{4 0 \%}$ higher quality compared to a control group). | | |
| | Unity | "Now, something that might have taken a group of artists $\mathbf{3}$ months can now take a server run about 10 minutes. And it is not just a productivity uplift per se...originally most people would have looked at the challenge to create new 3D content taking 3 months and go, 'we can't afford that' and so they didn't do it. Generative Al will allow all those who never started to get there in 10 minutes instead; market expansion." <br> --Marc Whitten, Unity Create President | | |
| | Adobe | Early customer feedback suggests $\mathbf{2 0 \%}$ productivity gains from Firefly, saving $\boldsymbol{\sim} \mathbf{8 h r s}$ per week and freeing up time for more high value-added work. | | |
Source: Morgan Stanley Research, company data, National Bureau of Economic Research, Erik Brynjolfsson, MIT (Evidence on the Productivity Effects of Generative Artificial Intelligence), Harvard Business School 资料来源：摩根士丹利研究、公司数据、国家经济研究局、埃里克·布林约尔夫松，麻省理工学院（关于生成式人工智能的生产力影响的证据），哈佛商学院
Cheaper Clean Electricity to Overtake Fossil-based Generation by 2030 到 2030 年，清洁电力将以更低的成本取代化石燃料发电
We estimate the energy transition to low carbon fuels and technological upside will drive over US$500bn of cumulative cost savings through 2030 and get us closer to net zero targets. 我们估计，能源向低碳燃料的转型和技术进步将在 2030 年前带来累计超过 5000 亿美元的成本节省，并使我们更接近净零排放目标。
Exporter Burden: Exporter has higher carbon intensity than the EU, and product is highly price-elastic 出口商负担：出口商的碳强度高于欧盟，且产品价格高度弹性
Exporter Benefits: Exporter has lower carbon intensity than the EU 出口商利益：出口商的碳强度低于欧盟
Minimal Burden: Little trade exposure to the EU 最小负担：对欧盟贸易暴露很小
Burden Shared: For products that are neither highly elastic nor highly inelastic 共同承担：对于既不高度弹性也不高度非弹性的产品
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securities/instruments. 证券/金融工具 markets transactions performed by Morgan Stanley or the profitability or revenues of particular trading desks. 市场交易由摩根士丹利执行，或特定交易台的盈利能力或收入 been reviewed by, and may not reflect information known to, professionals in other Morgan Stanley business areas, including investment banking personnel. 尚未经过审查，可能未反映摩根士丹利其他业务领域专业人士所知晓的信息，包括投资银行人员
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Source: NBS, Morgan Stanley Research estimates. 来源：国家统计局，摩根士丹利研究部估计。
Source: CEIC, Morgan Stanley Research estimates 来源：CEIC，摩根士丹利研究部估计
Source: Reuters, Bloomberg, Morgan Stanley Research 来源：路透社、彭博社、摩根士丹利研究部
Source: UN Comtrade, Government Websites, Morgan Stanley Research 来源：联合国商品贸易统计数据库、政府网站、摩根士丹利研究部
Source: White House, Morgan Stanley Research. 来源：白宫、摩根士丹利研究
Source: Government websites, Morgan Stanley Research. 来源：政府网站、摩根士丹利研究
Source: OECD, CEIC, Morgan Stanley Research. *We use 2021 data if 2022 data is not available. 来源：经合组织、CEIC、摩根士丹利研究。*如果 2022 年数据不可用，我们使用 2021 年数据。
Source: CEIC, National Healthcare Security Administration, Morgan Stanley Research. 来源：CEIC、国家医疗保障局、摩根士丹利研究
Source: OECD, CEIC, Ministry of Finance, Morgan Stanley Research (E) estimates. 来源：经合组织、CEIC、财政部、摩根士丹利研究(估计)
Source: CEIC, NHC, CASS, Morgan Stanley Research. 来源：CEIC、NHC、CASS、摩根士丹利研究
Source: Government website, Morgan Stanley Research. 来源：政府网站、摩根士丹利研究
Source: Government disclosure, Morgan Stanley Research estimates 来源：政府披露、摩根士丹利研究估算
Source: Haver, Japan Industrial Partners database, Morgan Stanley Research 来源：Haver、日本产业合作伙伴数据库、摩根士丹利研究
Source: CRIC, NBS, Morgan Stanley Research 来源：CRIC、国家统计局、摩根士丹利研究
Source: BIS, Centaline Property, Haver, Morgan Stanley Research. 来源：国际清算银行、中原地产、Haver、摩根士丹利研究
Source: CEIC, Morgan Stanley Research (E) estimates. 来源：CEIC、摩根士丹利研究（预测）
Source: CEIC, Haver, Morgan Stanley Research estimates 来源：CEIC、Haver、摩根士丹利研究估计
Source: Bloomberg, Morgan Stanley Research estimates 来源：彭博社、摩根士丹利研究估计
Source: CEIC, Morgan Stanley Research 来源：CEIC、摩根士丹利研究
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Morgan Stanley Research 来源：美国劳工统计局，摩根士丹利研究
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Morgan Stanley Research 来源：美国劳工统计局，摩根士丹利研究
Source: Morgan Stanley Research estimates 来源：摩根士丹利研究估算
Source: IEA, Morgan Stanley Research estimates 来源：国际能源署，摩根士丹利研究估算
securities/instruments. 证券/金融工具
markets transactions performed by Morgan Stanley or the profitability or revenues of particular trading desks.
been reviewed by, and may not reflect information known to, professionals in other Morgan Stanley business areas, including investment banking personnel.
any part of it is intended as, or shall constitute, provision of any consultancy or advisory service of securities investment as defined under PRC law. Such information is provided for your reference only.