Vanguard economic and market outlook for 2025: Beyond the landing Vanguard 2025 年經濟與市場展望：超越著陸
The global monetary easing cycle will be in full swing in 2025, with inflation in most developed economies now within touching distance of central banks’ targets. The good fortune of high productivity growth and a surge in available labor has propelled the U.S. economy, while other economies have been less lucky. The potential for these positive supply-side factors to wane is a key risk to our U.S. outlook, though expansionary fiscal policy may cushion any negative impact on growth. 全球貨幣寬鬆週期將於 2025 年全面展開，多數已開發經濟體的通貨膨脹目前與中央銀行的目標相距不遠。高生產力成長和可用勞動力激增的好運氣推動了美國經濟，而其他經濟體就沒那麼幸運了。儘管擴張性的財政政策可能緩和對經濟成長的負面影響，但這些正面的供應方因素可能減弱，是美國經濟前景的主要風險。
We reemphasize the view we put forth a year ago, that an era of sound moneywith interest rates above the rate of inflation-lives on. That said, markets face a growing point of tension: Assets with the strongest fundamentals have the most stretched valuations, and vice versa. Short-term economic and policy risks will help determine whether momentum or valuations dominate investment returns in 2025. 我們再次強調一年前提出的觀點：利率高於通貨膨脹率的穩健貨幣時代仍然存在。儘管如此，市場仍面臨一個日益緊張的問題：基本面最強勁的資產，估值卻最為緊張，反之亦然。短期經濟與政策風險將有助於決定 2025 年的投資回報是由動能還是估值主導。
Still-sound money 仍然穩健的資金
As interest rates return toward neutral, we expect them to settle at higher levels than in the 2010s. This environment sets the foundation for solid cash and fixed income returns over the next decade. 隨著利率回復中性，我們預期利率將較 2010 年代為高。這種環境為未來十年穩健的現金與固定收益回報奠定基礎。
Page 6. 第 6 頁。
U.S. economic resilience 美國經濟復甦力
Positive labor supply and productivity developments drove U.S. growth in 2024. Whether these drivers wane or accelerate, coupled with demand factors such as fiscal stimulus, holds the key in 2025. Page 7. 積極的勞動力供應和生產力發展推動了美國 2024 年的經濟增長。2025 年的關鍵在於這些驅動力是減弱還是加速，再加上需求因素（如財政刺激）。第 7 頁。
Growing market tension 日益緊張的市場
The possibility that we are experiencing a valuationsupporting productivity boom must be balanced by the risk that economic developments could expose the vulnerability of stretched equity valuations. Page 17. 我們正經歷估值支持生產力蓬勃發展的可能性，必須與經濟發展可能暴露股票估值捉襟見肘的脆弱性的風險相平衡。第 17 頁。
Notes: Forecasts are as of December 2, 2024. For the U.S., GDP growth is defined as the year-over-year change in fourth-quarter GDP. For all other countries/ regions, GDP growth is defined as the annual change in GDP in the forecast year compared with the previous year. Unemployment rate forecasts are the average for the fourth quarter of 2025. NAIRU is the nonaccelerating inflation rate of unemployment, a measure of labor market equilibrium. Core inflation excludes volatile food and energy prices. For the U.S., euro area, U.K., and Japan, core inflation is defined as the year-over-year change in the fourth quarter compared with the previous year. For China, core inflation is defined as the average annual change compared with the previous year. For the U.S., core inflation is based on the core Personal Consumption Expenditures Index. For all other countries/regions, core inflation is based on the core Consumer Price Index. For U.S. monetary policy, Vanguard’s forecast refers to the top end of the Federal Open Market Committee’s target range. China’s policy rate is the seven-day reverse repo rate. The neutral rate is the equilibrium policy rate at which no easing or tightening pressures are being placed on an economy or its financial markets. 註釋：預測截至 2024 年 12 月 2 日。對於美國，GDP 增長定義為第四季度 GDP 的同比變化。對於所有其他國家/地區，GDP 增長定義為預測年份 GDP 與前一年相比的年度變化。失業率預測為 2025 年第四季的平均值。NAIRU 為非加速膨脹的失業率，是衡量勞動市場平衡的指標。核心通貨膨脹不包括波動性較大的食品和能源價格。對於美國、歐元區、英國和日本，核心通脹率定義為第四季度與前一年相比的同比變化。對中國而言，核心通膨指的是與前一年相比的平均年度變化。對於美國，核心通貨膨脹是基於核心個人消費支出指數。對於所有其他國家/地區，核心通脹是基於核心消費物價指數。對於美國的貨幣政策，Vanguard 的預測是指聯邦公開市場委員會目標範圍的上限。中國的政策利率為七天期逆回購利率。中性利率是指一個經濟體或其金融市場沒有受到寬鬆或緊縮壓力時的均衡政策利率。
Source: Vanguard. 來源：Vanguard.
Notes on asset-return distributions 資產回報分派說明
The asset-return distributions shown here represent Vanguard’s view on the potential range of risk premiums that may occur over the next 10 years; such long-term projections are not intended to be extrapolated into a short-term view. These potential outcomes for long-term investment returns are generated by the Vanguard Capital Markets Model ^(®){ }^{\circledR} (VCMM) and reflect the collective perspective of our Investment Strategy Group. The expected risk premiums-and the uncertainty surrounding those expectations-are among a number of qualitative and quantitative inputs used in Vanguard’s investment methodology and portfolio construction process. 此處顯示的資產報酬率分佈代表 Vanguard 對於未來 10 年可能出現的風險溢價潛在範圍的看法；這些長期預測並不打算推斷為短期看法。這些長期投資回報的潛在結果是由 Vanguard 資本市場模型 ^(®){ }^{\circledR} (VCMM) 所產生，並反映我們投資策略小組的集體觀點。預期的風險溢價以及圍繞這些預期的不確定性，是 Vanguard 投資方法和投資組合建構過程中使用的許多定性和定量輸入之一。
IMPORTANT: The projections and other information generated by the VCMM regarding the likelihood of various investment outcomes are hypothetical in nature, do not reflect actual investment results, and are not guarantees of future results. Distribution of return outcomes from the VCMM are derived from 10,000 simulations for each modeled asset class. Simulations are as of November 8, 2024. Results from the model may vary with each use and over time. For more information, please see “About the Vanguard Capital Markets Model” on page 23. 重要事項： VCMM 就各種投資結果的可能性所產生的預測及其他資訊屬於假設性質，不反映實際投資結果，且並非未來結果的保證。來自 VCMM 的回報結果分佈是來自每個模擬資產類別的 10,000 次模擬。模擬截至 2024 年 11 月 8 日。模擬結果可能因每次使用及時間而異。如需詳細資訊，請參閱第 23 頁「關於 Vanguard 資本市場模型」。
Global outlook summary 全球展望摘要
Global inflation has slowed sharply in the last two years and is now within touching distance of 2%2 \%. But the path to disinflation has been uneven across countries and regions, with most developed markets enduring monetary-policyinduced slowdowns to get there. The United States is a notable exception, having experienced accelerating economic growth and full employment with no discernible effect from restrictive monetary policy. 全球通貨膨脹在過去兩年大幅放緩，目前已接近 2%2 \% 。但是，不同國家和地區通往通貨緊縮的道路並不平坦，大多數發達市場都經歷了由貨幣政策引起的經濟放緩。美國是一個明顯的例外，其經歷了經濟加速增長和充分就業，而限制性貨幣政策並沒有帶來明顯的影響。
Has the U.S. achieved a soft landing? Or will the impact of high interest rates eventually lead to a hard landing? These questions have dominated the market narrative over the last two years, with the focus on whether the U.S. Federal Reserve can perfectly time the rate-cutting cycle to achieve painless disinflation. 美國是否已實現軟著陸？還是高利率的影響最終會導致硬著陸？這些問題在過去兩年主導了市場的敘述，焦點在於美國聯儲局是否能完美掌握降息週期的時機，以達到無痛的去通貨膨脹。
Yet this emphasis on the “landing” may not fully explain the pairing of exceptionally strong growth and falling inflation that we’ve witnessed in the U.S. The forces that do explain it suggest a new narrative for the economy and markets. 然而，強調「著陸」可能無法完全解釋我們在美國所見的強勁成長與通貨膨脹下降的現象。
In our 2025 outlook, we adopt a framework centered on the supply-side forces that have shaped the U.S. economy. These include a surge in both labor productivity and available labor. Supply-side forces offer a more satisfying explanation for the positive growth and inflation dynamic. Emerging risks-such as those related to immigration policies, geopolitics, or potential tariffs-also fit more naturally into this supply-side-aware framework. 在我們的 2025 年展望中，我們採用了一個以塑造美國經濟的供應方力量為中心的框架。這包括勞動生產力和可用勞動力的激增。供給端力量為正成長與通貨膨脹動態提供了更令人滿意的解釋。新興風險，例如與移民政策、地緣政治或潛在關稅相關的風險，也能更自然地融入這個以供應為主的框架。
U.S. economic resilience has not been driven by Fed policy 美國經濟復甦力並非由美聯儲政策所推動
Against the backdrop of restrictive monetary policy, the U.S. economy has had the favorable combination of strong real GDP growth, loosening of overly tight labor markets, and falling inflation. It may be tempting to attribute this good fortune to a “soft landing” engineered by the Fed. However, a closer look suggests that this interpretation may be insufficient. 在限制性貨幣政策的背景下，美國經濟結合了強勁的實際 GDP 增長、過度緊縮的勞動力市場放鬆以及通貨膨脹下降等有利因素。我們很容易將這份好運歸功於美聯儲所設計的「軟著陸」。然而，仔細觀察就會發現，這種解釋可能並不足夠。
Rather, continued U.S. robustness may owe more to fortuitous supply-side factors, including higher productivity growth and a surge in available labor. Higher output and lower inflation can generally coexist only when the supply-side forces are in the driver’s seat. These dynamics have altered our baseline U.S. economic outlook and point to the primary risks on the horizon. 相反，美國經濟持續強勁，可能更多是由於供應方面的偶然因素，包括較高的生產力成長和可用勞動力激增。一般而言，只有當供應方力量佔據主導地位時，較高的產出與較低的通貨膨脹才能並存。這些動力改變了我們對美國經濟前景的基本看法，並指出地平線上的主要風險。
While these positive supply-side drivers of growth may continue in 2025, emerging policy risks such as the implementation of trade tariffs and stricter immigration policies may offset gains. Under such a scenario, U.S. real GDP growth would cool from its present rate of around 3%3 \% to closer to 2%2 \%. These offsetting policy risks may also increase inflationary pressures. Therefore, we anticipate that core inflation will remain above 2.5%2.5 \% for most of 2025. Although we expect the Fed to reduce its policy rate to 4%4 \%, cuts beyond that would prove difficult as any weakening of growth would have to be weighed against a potential inflation revival. 雖然這些正面的供應方經濟增長動力在 2025 年可能會持續，但新出現的政策風險（如貿易關稅的實施和更嚴格的移民政策）可能會抵消經濟增長。在這種情況下，美國的實際 GDP 增長率將從目前的 3%3 \% 左右降至 2%2 \% 附近。這些相互抵消的政策風險也可能會增加通脹壓力。因此，我們預計 2025 年的大部分時間核心通脹率將保持在 2.5%2.5 \% 以上。儘管我們預期聯儲局會將其政策利率降至 4%4 \% ，但此後將很難再降息，因為任何經濟增長的減弱都必須與潛在的通脹復甦進行權衡。
Less good fortune outside the U.S. 美國境外的好運較少
Economies outside of the United States have been less lucky on the supply side, and thus unable to achieve the same combination of strong growth alongside significantly reduced inflation. While inflation is now close to target in the euro area, that has come at the price of stagnation in 2023 and 2024, with muted external demand, weak productivity, and the lingering effects of the energy crisis holding activity back. Growth is expected to remain below trend next year, as a slowdown in global trade represents a key risk. Expect the European Central Bank to cut rates below neutral, to 1.75%1.75 \%, by the end of 2025. 美國以外的經濟體在供給方面就沒那麼幸運了，因此無法實現同樣的強勁成長與大幅降低通貨膨脹。雖然目前歐元區的通貨膨脹已接近目標，但這是以 2023 年和 2024 年的停滯為代價的，因為外部需求疲弱、生產力不振，以及能源危機的餘波影響，使得經濟活動停滯不前。由於全球貿易放緩是主要風險，預期明年的成長率仍將低於趨勢。預期歐洲央行將於 2025 年底前將利率降至中性以下，至 1.75%1.75 \% 。
In China, policymakers still have work to do despite their coordinated policy pivot in late 2024. Growth should pick up in the coming quarters as financing conditions ease and fiscal stimulus measures kick in. But more decisive and aggressive measures are needed to overcome intensifying external 在中國，儘管決策者在 2024 年底協調了政策軸心，但仍有工作要做。隨著融資條件的緩和以及財政刺激措施的啟動，未來幾個季度的經濟增長應該會有所回升。但是，要克服不斷加劇的外部挑戰，還需要採取更果斷、更積極的措施。
headwinds, structural issues in the property sector, and weak confidence in both the household and business sectors. We maintain our weaker-than-consensus secular view on Chinese growth, and thus expect additional monetary and fiscal loosening in 2025. 我們對中國經濟增長的長期看法仍弱於普遍看法，因此預期 2025 年會有更多的貨幣和財政寬鬆措施。我們對中國經濟增長的長期看法仍維持弱於共識的看法，因此預期 2025 年會有更多的貨幣和財政寬鬆措施。
The era of sound money lives on, with a new point of tension emerging 穩健貨幣時代仍在繼續，新的緊張點正在出現
Although central banks are now easing monetary policy, we maintain our view that policy rates will settle at higher levels than in the 2010s. This environment sets the foundation for solid cash and fixed income returns over the next decade, but the equity view is more cautious. This structural theme holds even in a scenario where central banks briefly cut rates below neutral to allay temporary growth wobbles. The era of sound money-characterized by positive real interest rates-lives on. 雖然各國央行目前正在放寬貨幣政策，但我們仍維持政策利率將落在高於 2010 年代水平的看法。這種環境為未來十年穩健的現金與固定收益回報奠定基礎，但股票的觀點則較為審慎。即使央行短暫將利 率降至中性水平以下，以紓緩短暫的成長動盪，此結構性主題仍然成立。以正實際利率為特徵的穩健貨幣時代仍將持續。
The investment challenge is a growing point of tension in risk assets between momentum and overvaluation. Assets with the strongest fundamentals have the most stretched relative valuations, and vice versa. The economic and policy risks for 2025 will help determine whether momentum or valuations dominate investment returns in the coming year. 投資面臨的挑戰是，風險資產在動能與估值過高之間的矛盾點越來越大。基本面最強勁的資產，其相對估值卻最為捉襟見肘，反之亦然。2025 年的經濟與政策風險將有助於決定來年是動能還是估值主導投資回報。
The balance of risks favors bonds 風險平衡有利於債券
Higher starting yields have greatly improved the risk-return tradeoff in fixed income. Bonds are still back. Over the next decade, we expect 4.3%-5.3%4.3 \%-5.3 \% annualized returns for both U.S. and global ex-U.S. currency-hedged bonds. This view reflects a gradual normalization in policy rates and yield curves, though important near-term risks remain. 較高的起始收益率大大改善了固定收益的風險收益權衡。債券仍然回歸。在未來十年，我們預期美國及全球（美國除外）貨幣對沖債券的年化報酬率為 4.3%-5.3%4.3 \%-5.3 \% 。這個觀點反映出政策利率和孳息曲線逐漸正常化，儘管近期仍存在重大風險。
We believe that yields across the curve are likely to remain above 4%4 \% in the U.S. A scenario where supply-side tailwinds persist will be supportive for trend growth and thus real rates. Alternatively, the emerging risks related to global trade and immigration policies would also keep rates high due to increased inflation expectations. These 我們認為，美國整個曲線的孳息率可能會維持在 4%4 \% 以上。供應端尾風持續的情況將支持趨勢成長，進而支持實際利率。另外，與全球貿易和移民政策相關的新興風險也會因通脹預期增加而使利率保持在高位。這些
risks must be balanced with the possibility that a growth shock, and any associated monetary easing or “flight to safety,” would cause yields to fall meaningfully from current levels. 我們必須平衡經濟成長衝擊與任何相關的貨幣寬鬆政策或「逃往安全市場」可能導致殖利率從目前水平大幅下降的風險。
Higher starting yields, which imply a “coupon wall,” mean that future bond returns are less exposed to modest increases in yields. In fact, for investors with the time horizon to see coupon payments catch up, interest rates that rise further would improve their total returns despite some near-term pain. We continue to believe fixed income plays an important role as a ballast in long-term portfolios. The greatest downside risk to bonds also pertains to stocks-namely, a rise in long-term rates due to continued fiscaldeficit spending or removal of supply-side support. These are the dynamics we are most closely monitoring. 較高的起始孳息率意味著「息票牆」，這意味著未來債券回報受孳息率溫和上升的影響較小。事實上，對於有時間觀察票息追上的投資者來說，儘管短期內會有一些痛苦，但利率進一步上升將改善他們的總回報。我們仍然相信固定收益在長期投資組合中扮演重要的壓艙磚角色。債券最大的下行風險也與股票有關，即持續的財政赤字支出或供應方支持的取消導致長期利率上升。這些都是我們最密切關注的動態。
Rational or irrational exuberance: Only time will tell 理性或非理性的亢奮：只有時間才能證明
U.S. equities have generally delivered strong returns in recent years. 2024 was no exception, with both earnings growth and price/earnings ratios exceeding expectations. The key question for investors is, “What happens next?” 美國股票近年來普遍帶來強勁的回報。2024 年也不例外，盈利成長率和市盈率都超出預期。投資人的關鍵問題是：「接下來會發生什麼？」
In our view, U.S. valuations are elevated but not as stretched as traditional metrics imply. Despite higher interest rates, many large corporations insulated themselves from tighter monetary policy by locking in low financing costs ahead of time. And more importantly, the market has been increasingly concentrated toward growthoriented sectors, such as technology, that support higher valuations. 我們認為，美國的估值雖然偏高，但並不如傳統指標所暗示的那麼緊張。儘管利率上升，許多大型企業仍透過提前鎖定低融資成本，使自己不受貨幣政策收緊的影響。更重要的是，市場愈來愈集中於成長型產業，例如科技業，這些產業支持較高的估值。
Nevertheless, the likelihood that we are in the midst of a valuation-supporting productivity boom, akin to the mid-1990s, must be balanced with the possibility that the current environment may be more analogous to 1999. In the latter scenario, a negative economic development could expose the vulnerability of current stock market valuations. 儘管如此，我們有可能正處於類似 1990 年代中期的估值支持生產力繁榮時期，但也必須平衡目前環境可能更類似 1999 年的可能性。在後一種情況下，負面的經濟發展可能會暴露目前股市估值的脆弱性。
While the median of our U.S. return outlook over the next decade appears cautious, the range of possible outcomes is wide, and valuations are rarely a good timing tool. Ultimately, high starting valuations will drag long-term returns down. But history shows that, absent an economic or earnings growth shock, U.S. equity market returns can continue to defy their valuation gravity in the near term. 儘管我們對美國未來十年回報展望的中位數顯得較為審慎，但可能出現的結果範圍很廣，而估值很少是良好的時機工具。最終，高起始估值會拖累長期回報。但歷史顯示，在沒有經濟或盈利成長衝擊的情況下，美國股票市場的回報在短期內仍能繼續違背其估值引力。
International valuations are more attractive. We suspect this could continue as these economies are likely to be most exposed to rising global economic and policy risks. Differences in longterm price/earnings ratios are the biggest driver of relative returns over five-plus years, but economic growth and profits matter more over shorter horizons. Over the past few years, persistently lackluster growth in the economies 國際估值更具吸引力。我們認為這種情況可能會持續，因為這些經濟體可能最容易受到全球經濟和政策風險上升的影響。長期市盈率的差異是五年以上相對回報的最大驅動因素，但經濟成長與獲利在較短期間則更為重要。過去幾年來，各經濟體的成長持續低迷。
and earnings outside of the U.S. kept international returns lukewarm relative to the remarkable return in the U.S. market. Within emerging markets, China is the sole reason valuations are below fair value, but the risks of rising trade tensions and insufficient fiscal stimulus in China pose additional headwinds. 在新興市場中，中國是估值低於公允價值的唯一原因。在新興市場中，中國是估值低於公允價值的唯一原因，但貿易緊張局勢升溫及中國財政刺激不足的風險亦構成額外阻力。
IMPORTANT: The projections and other information generated by the VCMM regarding the likelihood of various investment outcomes are hypothetical in nature, do not reflect actual investment results, and are not guarantees of future results. Distribution of return outcomes from VCMM are derived from 10,000 simulations for each modeled asset class. Simulations are as of November 8, 2024. Results from the model may vary with each use and over time. For more information, please see page 23. 重要事項： VCMM 就各種投資結果的可能性所產生的預測及其他資訊屬於假設性質，不反映實際投資結果，且並非未來結果的保證。來自 VCMM 的回報結果分佈是來自每個模擬資產類別的 10,000 次模擬。模擬截至 2024 年 11 月 8 日。模擬結果可能因每次使用及時間而異。如需詳細資訊，請參閱第 23 頁。
OUR ECONOMIC OUTLOOK 我們的經濟展望
Cutting to the chase: The global easing cycle in full swing 切入正題：全球寬鬆週期如火如荼
After two years of sharp inflation declines across developed markets, central banks are finally nearing their inflation targets of 2%2 \%. Confident that inflation was under control, and with a steady outlook for global economic growth, policymakers began lowering interest rates. The global easing cycle will be in full swing in 2025 as central banks gradually unwind restrictive monetary policies. 經過兩年來各個發達市場通貨膨脹的大幅下降，各國央行終於接近 2%2 \% 的通貨膨脹目標。由於對通脹受到控制充滿信心，加上全球經濟成長前景穩定，決策者開始降低利率。隨著各國央行逐步放寬限制性貨幣政策，全球寬鬆週期將於 2025 年全面展開。
Despite significant progress against inflation in the U.S., we expect core inflation to remain above 2% throughout 2025 due to “sticky” shelter and services inflation. The Federal Reserve will most likely adopt a cautious stance toward further monetary easing. Our baseline is that policy rates will decrease to 4%4 \% by the end of the year, but risks are skewed toward inflationary pressures reigniting. If inflation were to rebound, the Fed would have to slow its pace of easing or potentially reverse course. 儘管美國在抑制通貨膨脹方面已取得重大進展，但由於住房和服務業通貨膨脹的 「粘性」，我們預計核心通貨膨脹率在整個 2025 年仍將保持在 2% 以上。聯儲局很可能會對進一步放寬貨幣政策採取謹慎的立場。我們的基準是政策利率將在年底前降至 4%4 \% ，但風險偏向於通脹壓力重燃。如果通貨膨脹反彈，聯儲局將必須放緩其寬鬆步伐，或可能扭轉方向。
In the euro area, strong progress on inflation was achieved in 2023 and 2024 but at the expense of economic growth. With growth likely to remain 在歐元區，2023 年和 2024 年在通貨膨脹方面取得了強大進展，但卻犧牲了經濟增長。隨著經濟增長可能保持
below trend next year, we expect the European Central Bank to cut rates below 2% by the end of 2025. Australia’s struggle with stubborn inflation will probably keep rates elevated into 2025, while Canada is expected to quickly unwind higher rates to stimulate slumping growth. In China, stimulus measures may provide a short-term boost to the economy, but stringent fiscal and monetary measures will be needed to overcome structural headwinds to growth. Japan will likely be an exception, with a strengthening economy that has the potential to lift rates to 1%1 \% by year-end. 我們預期歐洲央行會在 2025 年底前將利率降至 2% 以下。澳洲與頑固的通貨膨脹抗爭，可能會使利率在 2025 年內持續偏高，而加拿大則預計會迅速解除較高的利率，以刺激不景氣的成長。在中國，刺激經濟的措施可能會在短期內提振經濟，但仍需要嚴格的財政與貨幣措施來克服經濟成長的結構性阻力。日本很可能是一個例外，其經濟持續強勁，有可能在年底前將利率提升至 1%1 \% 。
Although central banks are easing monetary policies, we believe that policy rates will settle at higher levels than in the 2010s. This structural theme holds even if central banks cut rates below neutral in the short term to alleviate temporary growth concerns. The era of sound moneycharacterized by positive real interest rates-will endure, setting the foundation for solid cash and fixed income returns over the next decade. 儘管央行正在放寬貨幣政策，但我們認為政策利率將落在高於 2010 年代的水平。即使央行在短期內將利率降至中性水平以下，以紓緩暫時的經濟成長憂慮，這個結構性主題仍然成立。以正實際利率為特色的穩健貨幣時代將會持續，為未來十年穩健的現金及固定收益回報奠定基礎。
Most policy rates will likely settle lower but above inflation 大多數政策利率可能會降至較低但高於通貨膨脹的水平
U.S. economic resilience: Good luck on the supply side 美國經濟復甦能力：祝供應方好運
Disinflation in the United States has, so far, been relatively painless. Over the last two years, annual inflation has fallen from 6.7%6.7 \% to 2.1%.^(1)2.1 \% .^{1} Meanwhile, the economy grew about 3% in 2023 and we expect it to grow slightly above 2%2 \% in both 2024 and 2025. The labor market has softened only a little. 到目前為止，美國的通貨緊縮相對沒有痛苦。在過去兩年，年通脹率從 6.7%6.7 \% 下降到 2.1%.^(1)2.1 \% .^{1} 與此同時，2023 年的經濟成長率約為 3%，我們預期 2024 年和 2025 年的經濟成長率都將略高於 2%2 \% 。勞動力市場僅輕微疲軟。
This resilience has stemmed primarily from positive supply-side developments, including strong productivity growth and a surge in available labor. Between the second quarter of 2022 and the second quarter of 2024, productivity increased by 4%4 \% and the labor supply grew by 1.8%.^(2)1.8 \% .^{2} Such good luck on the supply side explains both the strong inflation progress and the muted effect of restrictive monetary policy on growth. 這種韌性主要來自供應端的積極發展，包括生產力的強勁增長和可用勞動力的激增。在 2022 年第二季到 2024 年第二季之間，生產力成長了 4%4 \% ，勞動力供給成長了 1.8%.^(2)1.8 \% .^{2} ，如此好運的供給面，解釋了強勁的通貨膨脹進展，以及限制性貨幣政策對經濟成長的弱化影響。
As the chart illustrates, other advanced economies have been less lucky. Although most countries have had strong labor supply growth over the last two years, productivity growth has been very weak, notably in Australia, Canada, Italy, and Germany. An exception is Spain, which has seen strong productivity growth. 如圖所示，其他先進經濟體就沒那麼幸運了。雖然大多數國家在過去兩年的勞動力供應成長強勁，但生產力成長卻非常疲弱，尤其是澳洲、加拿大、義大利和德國。西班牙是個例外，其生產力成長強勁。
Three reasons could explain this divergence in productivity between the United States and other advanced economies. First, the U.S. had a surge in new business formations during the pandemic, especially in high-tech sectors, boosting innovation. Second, although the U.S. experienced a pandemic-related spike in unemployment, it also saw a quick return to trend as workers reallocated to more productive jobs. In other economies, furloughs prevented reallocations that would have improved productivity. Finally, expansionary U.S. fiscal policy helped to boost productivity in targeted sectors such as semiconductors and information technology, whereas fiscal policy was less expansive elsewhere. 有三個原因可以解釋美國與其他先進經濟體在生產力上的差異。首先，在大流行病期間，美國新成立的企業激增，尤其是高科技產業，促進了創新。其次，儘管美國經歷了與大流行病相關的失業率飆升，但隨著工人重新分配到更具生產力的工作，失業率也迅速回復趨勢。在其他經濟體中，休假阻止了原本可以提高生產力的重新分配。最後，美國的擴張性財政政策有助於提升半導體與資訊科技等目標產業的生產力，而其他地區的財政政策則沒有那麼擴張。
Although these positive supply-side drivers of U.S. growth may continue in 2025, emerging policy risks such as the implementation of trade tariffs and stricter immigration policies may act as offsetting negative supply impacts, while also increasing inflationary pressures. 儘管這些美國經濟成長的正面供應面驅動因素在 2025 年可能會持續，但新興的政策風險，例如貿易關稅的實施和更嚴格的移民政策，可能會起到抵銷負面供應影響的作用，同時也會增加通貨膨脹壓力。
Cumulative change in GDP since Q2 2022 GDP 自 2022 年第二季以來的累計變化
Notes: The bars show the cumulative change in labor supply (as measured by hours worked) and labor productivity (as measured by output per hour worked) between Q2 2022 and Q2 2024. The white dots show the cumulative change in GDP for each economy between Q2 2022 and Q2 2024. The tan dots show the forecasted cumulative change in GDP for each economy between Q2 2022 and Q4 2025. 註：柱形顯示 2022 年第二季至 2024 年第二季勞工供應量（以工作時數衡量）與勞動生產力（以每工作時數產出衡量）的累積變化。白點顯示每個經濟體在 2022 年第二季至 2024 年第二季之間的 GDP 累積變化。棕點顯示每個經濟體在 2022 年第二季至 2025 年第四季之間的 GDP 預測累計變化。
Sources: Vanguard calculations, based on data from Bloomberg, the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, Eurostat, the Australian Bureau of Statistics, Statistics Canada, the Economic and Social Research Institute (Japan), the Office for National Statistics, the European Central Bank, the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, and CEIC, as of October 30, 2024. 資料來源：Vanguard 根據彭博社、美國經濟分析局、歐洲統計局、澳洲統計局、加拿大統計局、經濟社會研究所（日本）、國家統計局、歐洲央行、美國勞工統計局和 CEIC 截至 2024 年 10 月 30 日的數據計算。
Lessons from history: Mind supply-side surprises 歷史的教訓：警惕供給方的驚喜
Historically, economies have faced turbulent periods following monetary tightening cycles, with many ending in economic downturns. ^(3){ }^{3} While monetary policy actions and external shockswhether geopolitical events or wars-significantly influenced those conditions, unexpected shifts in the supply side of an economy cannot be overlooked. These “supply-side surprises” have often caught policymakers off guard due to the challenge of measuring such changes in real time. 從歷史上看，各經濟體在貨幣緊縮週期後都會面臨動盪時期，許多經濟體以經濟衰退告終。 ^(3){ }^{3} 雖然貨幣政策行動和外部衝擊（無論是地緣政治事件或戰爭）對這些情況有重大影響，但經濟供應面的意外變化也不容忽視。這些「供應端意外」經常讓決策者措手不及，因為要即時測量這些變化是一項挑戰。
In the late 1960s, for example, the Federal Reserve encountered challenges as it began an easing cycle. When favorable productivity conditions disappeared, a growing economy experienced a surge in inflation. This prompted the Fed to aggressively raise rates again, contributing to a painful recession. The surprise element of a shifting supply side complicated the Fed’s ability to achieve continued growth without accelerated inflation. 例如，在 1960 年代末期，聯儲局在開始寬鬆週期時遇到了挑戰。當有利的生產力條件消失時，成長中的經濟經歷了通貨膨脹的激增。這促使聯儲局再次積極提高利率，造成了痛苦的經濟衰退。供應方轉變的意外因素使聯儲局在不加速通貨膨脹的情況下實現持續增長的能力變得複雜。
The late 1990 s , however, represented the classic example of a successful "soft landing."4 Despite some initial weakness as the Fed began to hike interest rates in late 1993, productivity gains-particularly driven by technological advancements-began to accelerate and helped cushion the economy. This surge in productivity allowed the Fed to maintain higher interest rates without stalling economic growth or fueling inflation. Ultimately, the Fed recognized favorable supply-side conditions and guided the economy through continued growth with low inflation. 4 儘管美國聯邦儲備局在 1993 年末開始加息時出現了一些疲弱現象，但生 產力的提高（尤其是在技術進步的驅動下）開始加速，並幫助緩和了經濟。生產力的激增使聯儲局得以維持較高的利率，而不會阻礙經濟成長或助長通貨膨脹。最後，聯儲局確認了有利的供應方條件，並引導經濟在低通膨下持續成長。
Over the past two years, the U.S. economy has achieved a favorable balance of strong growth, low unemployment, and cooling inflation. We attribute these conditions to recent supportive supply dynamics, including a surge in both productivity and available labor. As in past episodes, how these conditions evolve from here-and the ability of policymakers to recognize them-will play a decisive role in the trajectory of the economy in 2025. 過去兩年來，美國經濟在強勁成長、低失業率和通貨膨脹降溫之間取得了有利的平衡。我們將這些狀況歸功於近期有利的供應動力，包括生產力和可用勞動力的激增。一如過往，這些條件將如何演變，以及決策者是否有能力認清這些條件，將對 2025 年的經濟發展軌跡起決定性的作用。
Supply-side forces have driven much of the U.S. economy through economic cycles 供應方力量推動美國經濟經歷了許多經濟週期
Notes: All variables are percent changes at an annual rate. Labor input is the time people spend working to produce goods and services. Capital deepening is the ratio of capital to labor. Total factor productivity is the ratio of aggregate outputs to aggregate inputs. 註釋：所有變數均為年率變化百分比。勞工投入是指人們為了生產商品與服務所花費的工作時間。資本深化是指資本與勞動力的比率。全要素生產力是總產出與總投入的比率。
Sources: Vanguard calculations, using data from the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, as of June 30, 2024. 資料來源：Vanguard 根據舊金山聯邦儲備銀行截至 2024 年 6 月 30 日的資料計算。
3 Alan S. Blinder. Landings, Soft and Hard: The Federal Reserve, 1965-2022. Journal of Economic Perspectives, Winter 2023. pubs.aeaweb.org/doi/pdfplus/10.1257/jep.37.1.101. 3 Alan S. Blinder.Landings, Soft and Hard: The Federal Reserve, 1965-2022.Pubs.aeaweb.org/doi/pdfplus/10.1257/jep.37.1.101.
4 Philip N. Jefferson. Philip N. Jefferson: Is This Time Different? Recent Monetary Policy Cycles in Retrospect. Bank for International Settlements, February 22, 2023. bis.org/review/r240223a.htm. 4 Philip N. Jefferson。Philip N. Jefferson：Is This Time Different?近期貨幣政策週期回顧。國際結算銀行，2023 年 2 月 22 日。Bis.org/review/r240223a.htm。
Artificial intelligence: Transformative potential, but 2025 is too soon for significant productivity growth 人工智慧：具有變革潛力，但 2025 年生產力大幅成長仍為時尚早
Excitement surrounding artificial intelligence (AI) and its potential to transform the global economy is warranted, but widespread adoption won’t happen overnight. When new technologies emerge, firms can take years, sometimes decades, to find profitable commercial applications for them and see improved productivity. While we expect Al adoption to be relatively quicker than previous innovations (a common trait of digital technologies), significant productivity growth from AI utilization likely wouldn’t occur until the late 2020s even in our most optimistic scenario. 圍繞著人工智慧 (AI) 及其改變全球經濟的潛力的興奮是有道理的，但廣泛的採用不會在一夜之間發生。當新技術出現時，企業可能需要數年，有時甚至數十年，才能找到有利可圖的商業應用，並看到生產力的提升。儘管我們預期 Al 的採用速度會比以往的創新更快（這是數位技術的共通特徵），但即使在我們最樂觀的情況下，人工智慧的運用也可能要到 2020 年代末才會出現顯著的生產力成長。
Although considerable uncertainty exists in predicting how technology and social attitudes toward Al will evolve in coming years, we estimate that in developed economies, roughly 30%30 \% of current working hours are spent on tasks that will be performed by AI in 20 years. Contrary to dystopian fears, this will not cause 30%30 \% unemployment because many of these working hours will be reallocated to other, less Al-sensitive tasks. 儘管在預測未來幾年科技與社會對 Al 的態度會如何演進方面存在相當大的不確定性，但我們估計在已開發經濟體系中，目前大約有 30%30 \% 的工作時間是花在 20 年後人工智慧將會執行的任務上。與烏托邦式的恐懼相反，這不會造成 30%30 \% 失業，因為這些工時中有許多會被重新分配給其他對 Al 較不敏感的工作。
Al adoption curves and economic significance will vary by country, but early indicators suggest a substantial first-mover advantage for the U.S., which financial markets have noticed. Based on our estimate of Al task displacement, we expect the U.S. economy to grow at a real rate of 3.1%3.1 \% between 2028 and 2040, with nearly half of that growth attributable to AI. In a less rosy scenario, where Al technologies only marginally improve from current capabilities, the benefits would be insufficient to overcome growing government deficits, and economic growth would be about 1%1 \% per year. Al 的採用曲線和經濟意義會因國家而異，但早期指標顯示美國具有相當大的先發優 勢，金融市場已注意到這一點。根據我們對 Al 任務位移的估計，我們預期美國經濟在 2028 年至 2040 年間的實際成長率為 3.1%3.1 \% ，其中近一半的成長歸功於 AI。在較不樂觀的情況下，人工智慧技術僅在現有能力的基礎上略有改進，其效益將不足以克服不斷增長的政府赤字，每年的經濟增長率約為 1%1 \% 。
U.S. leads the pack in AI 美國在人工智能領域處於領先地位
Notes: The chart shows private investment in Al for 2023 and includes only companies that received more than $1.5\$ 1.5 million in investment. The data likely understate global AI investment as they reflect only private equity transactions. 註釋：圖表顯示 2023 年 Al 的私人投資，僅包括獲得超過 $1.5\$ 1.5 百萬投資的公司。由於數據僅反映私募股權交易，因此可能低估了全球人工智能投資。
Sources: Vanguard calculations, using data from Our World in Data, Stanford University’s Al Index Report 2024, and the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, as of December 31, 2023. 資料來源：Vanguard 運用資料來源 Our World in Data、史丹福大學 Al Index Report 2024 及美國勞工統計局截至 2023 年 12 月 31 日的資料進行計算。
An Al boom in 2025 would require rapid commercial adoption 2025 年的 Al 熱潮需要快速的商業採用
United States: Resilience and recalibration 美國：復原與重新調整
The Federal Reserve began easing interest rates for the first time this cycle at its September 2024 meeting, acknowledging the progress toward restoring price stability. Indeed, the U.S. economy has achieved a favorable balance of strong GDP growth, low unemployment, and cooling inflation. We attribute this confluence to recent supply dynamics-labor force and productivity growththat have shaped the economic landscape over the past two years. Going forward, these conditions along with a shifting policy environment will require the Fed to recalibrate its current expectations about how far it needs to, or can, ease policy rates. 美聯儲在 2024 年 9 月的會議上開始本週期首次放寬利率，確認在恢復價格穩定方面取得的進展。事實上，美國經濟已在強勁的 GDP 成長、低失業率以及通貨膨脹降溫之間取得有利的平衡。我們將此歸功於近期的供給動力 - 勞動力和生產力的成長，這些動力在過去兩年塑造了經濟格局。展望未來，這些條件加上不斷轉變的政策環境，將要求聯儲局重新調整其目前對於需要或能夠放寬政策利率程度的預期。
We anticipate that growth momentum will remain solid in 2025, supported by less restrictive monetary policy as well as ongoing productivity tailwinds that have increased our estimate of potential growth. We forecast GDP growth of 2.1%2.1 \%, reflecting a modest drag from potential changes to trade and immigration policies. 我們預期，在較寬鬆的貨幣政策以及生產力持續上揚的支持下，2025 年的成長動能仍將維持穩健，這也提高了我們對潛在成長的預估。我們預測 2025 年的 GDP 成長率為 2.1%2.1 \% ，反映出貿易和移民政策的潛在變化所帶來的輕微拖累。
Labor supply dynamics, especially immigration policy, will be a key factor influencing the U.S. labor market trajectory in 2025. Strong macroeconomic fundamentals, an aging domestic labor force, and stricter immigration policies could all contribute to a potentially tighter labor market. While hiring has slowed in recent months, we expect the unemployment rate will remain in the low 4% range. An outright contraction in available labor is a risk that could reignite wage inflation in the service and construction sectors. 勞工供應動態，尤其是移民政策，將是影響 2025 年美國勞動市場軌跡的關鍵因素。強勁的宏觀經濟基本面、老齡化的國內勞動力，以及更嚴格的移民政策，都可能導致勞動力市場潛在的緊縮。儘管近幾個月來招聘速度有所放緩，但我們預計失業率仍將保持在 4% 的低位。可用勞動力徹底萎縮的風險，可能會重燃服務業與建築業的薪資通膨風險。
We expect core inflation to remain near 2.5%2.5 \% in 2025, above the Fed’s 2% target, due to strong economic momentum coupled with potentially inflationary effects from new immigration and trade policies. 由於經濟動力強勁，加上新移民和貿易政策可能造成通貨膨脹效應，我們預期 2025 年核心通貨膨脹率將保持在 2.5%2.5 \% 附近，高於聯儲局 2% 的目標。
In response, the Fed will have to adjust to those policies and recalibrate to the likelihood that a neutral policy rate is above its currently assumed 2.9%2.9 \%. We expect a more cautious reaction in 2025, with the policy rate remaining at or above 4%4 \% by year-end. 作為回應，聯儲局將必須調整這些政策，並重新校準中性政策利率高於其目前假設的 2.9%2.9 \% 的可能性。我們預期 2025 年的反應會比較謹慎，到年底時政策利率會維持在 4%4 \% 或以上。
Productivity growth will likely keep the U.S. going strong 生產力增長可能會使美國保持強勁增長
Euro area: Policy rate to dip below neutral to support the economy 歐元區：政策利率將降至中性以下以支持經濟
The euro area experienced a modest recovery in 2024, following a year of stagnation in 2023. However, concerns about growth remain heightened. Manufacturing continues to face headwinds due to the lingering effects of the energy crisis and weakening external demand. The services sector is also slowing due to restrictive fiscal and monetary policies. We expect the euro area to continue experiencing below-trend growth, with a slowdown in global trade representing a key risk. 歐元區在 2023 年停滯一年後，於 2024 年出現溫和復甦。然而，對於經濟成長的憂慮仍然高漲。由於能源危機的影響揮之不去，加上外部需求減弱，製造業繼續面臨阻力。服務業也因限制性的財政及貨幣政策而放緩。我們預期歐元區將繼續經歷低於趨勢的成長，而全球貿易放緩將成為主要風險。
Disinflation has been strong and fast. Since reaching a peak of 10.6%10.6 \% in October 2022, annual inflation has dropped over 8 percentage points, standing at 2.0%2.0 \% in October 2024. Core inflation remains slightly elevated because of the slowermoving services component. But with anemic growth set to continue next year, we expect both headline and core inflation to end 2025 below 2%2 \%. 通貨膨脹強勁且快速。自 2022 年 10 月達到 10.6%10.6 \% 的峰值以來，年度通貨膨脹率已下降超過 8 個百分點，2024 年 10 月為 2.0%2.0 \% 。由於服務業成份增長緩慢，核心通脹率仍略高。不過，由於明年經濟成長將持續疲弱，我們預期 2025 年底整體與核心通貨膨脹率都將低於 2%2 \% 。
The European Central Bank (ECB) will continue easing policy. We expect the policy rate to dip below neutral in 2025 and end the year at 1.75%. The risks to this outlook are skewed to the downside. A sharp intensification of trade tensions and a significant slowdown in global growth would each likely result in a more dovish monetary policy stance. 歐洲央行 (ECB) 將持續放寬政策。我們預期 2025 年的政策利率將降至中性水平以下，年底為 1.75%。此展望的風險偏向下行。貿易緊張局勢急劇加劇及全球增長顯著放緩，均可能導致貨幣政策立場更為鴿派。
Taking a step back, euro area growth in 2023 and 2024 has struggled mainly because of very weak productivity growth. Finding a way to rejuvenate productivity is vital to the long-term outlook. Advances in artificial intelligence and a stated desire by governments to reduce red tape are encouraging. In 2025 and 2026, we anticipate a modest recovery in productivity growth and a moderation in the growth of hours worked. 退一步來看，歐元區在 2023 年和 2024 年的經濟成長之所以舉步維艱，主要是因為生產力成長非常疲弱。找到重振生產力的方法對於長期前景至關重要。人工智慧的進展，以及政府明確表示希望減少繁文縟節，都令人鼓舞。在 2025 年和 2026 年，我們預期生產力的成長將溫和復甦，工作時數的成長也將放緩。
ECB policy rate will fall, but by how much? 歐洲央行政策利率將會下降，但幅度有多大？
Notes: The chart shows the ECB policy rate at the end of each quarter through September 2024, then its forecasted path through year-end 2025 under three scenarios: our baseline, a downside surprise, and an upside surprise. GDP refers to annual GDP growth for 2025, and inflation refers to core inflation at year-end 2025. 註：圖表顯示歐洲央行在 2024 年 9 月前每個季度末的政策利率，以及在我們的基準、下行意外和上行意外等三種情況下到 2025 年底的預測路徑。GDP 指 2025 年的年度 GDP 增長，通貨膨脹指 2025 年底的核心通貨膨脹。
Sources: Vanguard calculations, using data from the ECB, as of September 30, 2024. 資料來源：資料來源：Vanguard 計算，使用歐洲央行的資料，截至 2024 年 9 月 30 日。
Decline in labor productivity was a drag on 勞動生產力下降拖累
growth in recent years 近年增長
United Kingdom: Fiscal loosening to revive growth in 2025 英國：財政寬鬆將於 2025 年重振經濟成長
After a lackluster end to 2023, the U.K. economy recovered in 2024. However, growth has been uninspiring. Unlike in the U.S., supply-side forces in the U.K., particularly productivity, have been weak. 經過 2023 年年底的低迷後，英國經濟於 2024 年復甦。然而，經濟增長一直不振。與美國不同，英國的供應方力量（尤其是生產力）一直疲弱。
In 2025, U.K. growth is expected to accelerate above potential, driven by fiscal stimulus. The autumn budget announced in October 2024 represented the largest fiscal-loosening event in decades, bar the COVID-19 pandemic, with much of the spending expected to be realized in 2025 and 2026. This loosening comes despite taxes also rising significantly. The size of the government’s role in the economy is increasing. 2025 年，在財政刺激的帶動下，英國的經濟增長有望加速並超過潛力值。2024 年 10 月公佈的秋季預算案是數十 年來最大規模的財政寬鬆事件，除了 COVID-19 大流行之外，大部分支出預計將在 2025 年和 2026 年實現。儘管稅收也大幅增加，但仍出現這種寬鬆的情況。政府在經濟中扮演的角色越來越重要。
Meanwhile, strong progress has been made on inflation. Core inflation, which excludes food and energy prices, fell from an annual rate of 7.1%7.1 \% in May 2023 to 3.3%3.3 \% in October 2024. We expect progress to be slower in 2025. Services inflation remains elevated and is more stubborn, and fiscal easing will support demand. An intensification of global trade tensions also poses an inflation risk. Expect core inflation to be around 2.4%2.4 \% by year-end. 與此同時，通貨膨脹也取得了強大進展。核心通脹（不包括食品和能源價格）從 2023 年 5 月的年率 7.1%7.1 \% 下降到 2024 年 10 月的 3.3%3.3 \% 。我們預期 2025 年的進展會較為緩慢。服務業通脹仍然高企，而且較為頑固，財政寬鬆將支持需求。全球貿易緊張局勢加劇也構成通脹風險。預期年底核心通脹率約為 2.4%2.4 \% 。
The Bank of England will continue lowering interest rates in 2025, but at a gradual pace. Expect the policy rate to end 2025 at 3.75%3.75 \%, still above our estimate of neutral. 英國央行將在 2025 年繼續降息，但降息速度將逐步放緩。預期 2025 年底的政策利率為 3.75%3.75 \% ，仍高於我們預估的中性水平。
Over the next two years, we expect productivity growth to recover to a rate similar to the average since 2010, helped by the extra public investment announced in the autumn budget. However, this would still be lower than the productivity growth seen in the 2000s. Labor supply growth in 2025 and 2026 is expected to remain broadly similar to the figures from 2023 and 2024. 在未來兩年，我們預期生產力增長率將在秋季預算案宣佈的額外公共投資的幫助下，恢復至類似 2010 年以來的平均水平。然而，這仍低於 2000 年代的生產力成長率。2025 年和 2026 年的勞動力供給成長率預計將與 2023 年和 2024 年的數字大致相同。
Stagnant labor productivity inhibited growth in recent years 停滯不前的勞動生產力抑制了近年來的經濟成長
Notes: The chart shows the average annualized growth of real GDP, labor productivity (measured as output per hour worked), and labor supply (measured as hours worked) for different periods. Projections were used for periods after Q3 2024. 註釋：圖表顯示不同時期的實際 GDP、勞動生產力 (以每小時工作產出衡量) 及勞工供應 (以工作時數衡量) 的平均年化成長率。預測使用的是 2024 年第三季之後的期間。
Sources: Vanguard calculations, using data from Bloomberg and the Office for National Statistics, as of September 30, 2024. 資料來源：資料來源：Vanguard 運用 Bloomberg 和國家統計局的資料計算，截至 2024 年 9 月 30 日。
China: More work to do after a policy pivot 中國：政策轉向後還有更多工作要做
Despite resilient Chinese manufacturing and export activities, subdued domestic demand prompted a coordinated policy pivot in late 2024, encompassing monetary easing and an aggressive local government debt-resolution program. While these moves boost sentiment and mitigate risks to growth and financial stability, a more decisive fiscal push will be needed to engineer a meaningful recovery in private confidence and spending. 儘管中國製造業和出口活動表現強勁，但內需疲弱促使政府在 2024 年底採取協調政策，包括放寬貨幣政策和積極的地方政府債務解決方案。儘管這些措施提振了民眾情緒，並緩和了經濟成長與金融穩定的風險，但仍需要更果斷的財政推動，才能使民眾信心與支出顯著復甦。
While near-term growth momentum may improve, we expect full-year GDP growth to decelerate to 4.5%4.5 \% in 2025 amid persistent structural and external headwinds, including the prolonged housing downturn, deepening supply-demand imbalances, and global trade developments. We expect staged U.S. tariff hikes to have a mild negative impact on growth compared with the impact of tariffs in 2018 and 2019. We anticipate that policymakers could respond with more comprehensive stimulus to cushion the downside risk. 雖然近期的增長動力可能會有所改善，但在持續的結構性和外部不利因素（包括房地產市場長期低迷、供需失衡加深以及全球貿易發展）影響下，我們預計 2025 年全年 GDP 增長將放緩至 4.5%4.5 \% 。與 2018 年和 2019 年的關稅影響相比，我們預期美國分階段提高關稅會對經濟增長造成溫和的負面影響。我們預期決策者可採取更全面的刺激措施以緩衝下行風險。
Further monetary easing, including interest rate and reserve requirement ratio (RRR) cuts, is expected to counter persistent deflationary pressure. Although we see a modest inflationary thrust from currency depreciation in the face of higher tariffs, the magnitude is limited. Instead, the supply-centric policy support so far has reinforced the negative feedback loop between weak demand and low prices, widening the gap between real and nominal growth. Hence, both the magnitude and composition (that is, more support to consumers) of policy stimulus are critical to break the cycle. 進一步的貨幣寬鬆政策，包括降低利率與存款準備金率，可望對抗持續的通縮壓力。儘管我們認為貨幣貶值在面對關稅上漲的情況下會帶來輕微的通貨膨脹推力，但幅度有限。相反，迄今為止以供應為中心的政策支持，卻強化了需求疲弱與低價格之間的負反饋循環，擴大了實際與名義增長之間的差距。因此，政策刺激的幅度和組成（即對消費者提供更多支 持）對於打破循環都至關重要。
Still, cyclical stimulus isn’t sufficient without structural reforms, given declining trend growth. Contrary to most developed markets central banks’ “higher for longer” interest rate trajectory, China is likely to stay “lower for longer” in the coming years. 儘管如此，鑒於趨勢性增長的下降，如果沒有結構性改革，週期性的刺激是不夠的。與大多數發達市場央行 「越高越好 」的利率軌跡相反，中國在未來幾年可能會保持 「越低越好 」的利率軌跡。
China's policy stimulus will be partly offset by tariff hikes 中國的政策刺激將被提高關稅部分抵消
Notes: The chart shows the projected impact of each policy stimulus on GDP growth in 2025. The monetary quantitative tools include RRR and other targeted liquidity facility instruments. Fiscal stimulus to consumption and investment includes fiscal tools such as targeted local government bond issuance. 註釋：圖表顯示各項政策刺激對 2025 年 GDP 成長的預測影響。貨幣量化工具包括存款準備金率和其他定向流動性工具。對消費和投資的財政刺激措施包括財政工具，如定向發行地方政府債券。
Sources: Vanguard calculations, using data from the Ministry of Finance, the People’s Bank of China, and CEIC, as of November 12, 2024. 資料來源：Vanguard 根據財政部、中國人民銀行和 CEIC 截至 2024 年 11 月 12 日的數據進行計算。
Japan: Bank of Japan to continue its gradual hiking cycle 日本：日本央行將繼續其逐步加息週期
In 2024, amid persistent inflationary pressure, the Bank of Japan (BoJ) increased interest rates for the first time in 18 years. In 2025, we expect the BoJ to continue to gradually normalize monetary policy, as economic activity recovers and inflation momentum holds steady. 2024 年，在持續的通貨膨脹壓力下，日本央行 (BoJ) 18 年來首次提高利率。2025 年，隨著經濟活動復甦，通貨膨脹勢頭穩定，我們預期日本央行將繼續逐步將貨幣政策正常化。
We also expect Japan’s economy to recover to a growth rate above 1% in 2025, with the driver shifting from exports to a pickup in domestic demand. Risks from the global economy may increase uncertainty, with potential tariffs by the U.S. offsetting China’s policy stimulus, though the overall impact for Japan is likely to be limited. 我們也預期日本經濟將於 2025 年復甦至 1%以上的成長率，驅動力將由出口轉為內需回升。來自全球經濟的風險可能會增加不確定性，美國可能加徵的關稅會抵銷中國的政策刺激，但對日本的整體影響可能有限。
As for inflation, steady wage growth on the back of strong corporate profits and structural labor shortages will likely support a recovery in domestic consumption and keep core inflation robust at around 2%2 \% in 2025 . More importantly, a virtuous cycle of wages and inflation will continue to strengthen-a positive development after decades of economic and market stagnationpotentially justifying further BoJ rate hikes. 至於通貨膨脹，由於企業利潤強勁和結構性勞工短缺，工資將穩定增長，這可能會支持國內消費復甦，並使 2025 年的核心通貨膨脹率保持在 2%2 \% 左右。更重要的是，工資和通貨膨脹的良性循環將繼續加強--在經歷了數十年的經濟和市場停滯之後，這是一個積極的發展，有可能為日本央行進一步加息提供理據。
Therefore, we expect the BoJ to embark on a rate-hiking cycle, with the policy rate rising to 1%1 \% by the end of 2025 . However, we expect the pace of rate hikes to be gradual given concerns about the yen and capital market stability. Global trade developments may also prompt the BoJ to proceed with caution. On the other hand, a pace of Federal Reserve easing that is only mild would weaken the yen, giving the BoJ more conviction to hike. On balance, the risk is tilted toward the downside, and the BoJ will likely exercise a prudent policy stance with accommodative financial conditions over an extended period 因此，我們預期日本央行將展開加息週期，政策利率將於 2025 年底升至 1%1 \% 。然而，鑒於對日圓和資本市場穩定性的擔憂，我們預計加息步伐將是漸進的。全球貿易發展也可能促使日本央行謹慎行事。另一方面，如果聯儲局的寬鬆步伐只是溫和的，日圓將走弱，令日本央行有更大的信心加息。總的來說，風險偏向下行，日本央行可能會在一段較長的時間內採取審慎的政策立場，提供寬鬆的金融環境。
The BoJ has become more responsive to inflation post-Abenomics 日本央行在安倍經濟學後對通貨膨脹的反應更加靈敏
Notes: The chart shows Vanguard’s estimate of the augmented Taylor rule which incorporates exchange rates and capital market volatility as well as traditional Taylor rule measures of economic growth and inflation. The yy-axis represents the degrees to which we estimate that specific variables, represented on the xx-axis, have been important to the BoJ in rate-setting as measured by the Taylor rule, an equation introduced by the economist John Taylor in 1993. Y-axis values are Taylor rule coefficients. The Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index (VIX) is used as a proxy for capital market volatility. Output gap is the difference between actual and potential growth. The Abenomics period (when the policies of Shinzo Abe, whose second term as prime minister ran from 2012 to 2020, were in force) is from Q1 2012 through Q1 2022; the post-Abenomics period is from Q2 2022 through Q2 2024. For sources, see the source line under the chart below. 註：圖表顯示 Vanguard 對擴展泰勒規則的估計，該規則包含了匯率和資本市場波動性，以及經濟增長和通貨膨脹的傳統泰勒規則措施。軸 yy 代表我們估計特定變量（軸 xx 代表）在日本央行利率制定中的重要程度，該變量由經濟學家 John Taylor 於 1993 年提出。Y 軸的值為泰勒規則係數。芝加哥期權交易所波動性指數 (VIX) 用來代表資本市場的波動性。產出缺口指實際增長與潛在增長之間的差異。安倍經濟學時期（即安倍晉三的政策實施時期，其第二任首相任期為 2012 年至 2020 年）為 2012 年第一季至 2022 年第一季；後安倍經濟學時期為 2022 年第二季至 2024 年第二季。有關資料來源，請參閱下圖下方的資料來源線。
The yen and capital markets will also determine the policy rate 日圓和資金市場也將決定政策利率
Notes: The chart shows the BoJ’s policy rates through October 2024, and then our projections for year-end 2024 and year-end 2025 under three scenarios: our baseline view, an environment with a weak yen and stable capital markets, and an environment with a strong yen and volatile markets. The consensus projections of the financial markets are also shown. 註：圖表顯示日本央行至 2024 年 10 月的政策利率，然後是我們在三種情況下對 2024 年底和 2025 年底的預測：我們的基準觀點、日圓疲弱且資金市場穩定的環境，以及日圓強勢且市場波動的環境。同時也顯示了金融市場的一致預測。
Sources: Vanguard calculations, using data from the Statistics Bureau of Japan, the Bank of Japan, and CEIC, as of October 31, 2024. Consensus views are from Bloomberg, as of November 11, 2024. 資料來源：資料來源：Vanguard 根據日本統計局、日本央行和 CEIC 截至 2024 年 10 月 31 日的數據計算。一致意見來自彭博社，截至 2024 年 11 月 11 日。
Emerging markets: High real rates will continue to restrict growth 新興市場：高實質利率將繼續限制成長
Across many emerging markets, proactive policymaking has led to significant progress in reducing inflation. Indeed, most central banks in these markets felt comfortable enough to start easing policy from restrictive levels before their developed markets counterparts did. This was partly due to high real rates restricting economic activity in 2024. 在許多新興市場中，積極的政策制定已在降低通貨膨脹方面取得重大進展。事實上，這些市場的大多數中央銀行都覺得足夠放心，可以在發達市場的同業之前開始從限制性水平放寬政策。部分原因是高實際利率限制了 2024 年的經濟活動。
In 2025, we expect the easing cycle across emerging markets to both continue and broaden. But rates will remain in restrictive territory and thus continue to pin back growth. We expect emerging markets growth in aggregate to be around 4%4 \% in 2025 , consistent with the growth seen in 2024, but potential escalation in global trade tensions presents downside risk. With the Federal Reserve and other central banks in developed markets now easing monetary policy too, the rate differential to developed markets should narrow. This development would decrease many emerging markets central banks’ concerns about foreign exchange depreciation and capital flows 2025 年，我們預期新興市場的寬鬆週期將持續並擴大。但利率仍將處於限制性區域，從而繼續抑制增長。我們預期 2025 年新興市場的總體成長率約為 4%4 \% ，與 2024 年的成長率一致，但全球貿易緊張局勢可能升級，帶來下行風險。隨著美聯儲和其他發達市場央行也開始放寬貨幣政策，與發達市場的利率差異應會收窄。這將減少許多新興市場中央銀行對外匯貶值和資金流動的疑慮。
Within emerging Asia, inflation has generally remained near or below target. Deflationary risks are mounting in China. Most emerging Asia central banks are easing monetary policy, and we expect slightly higher inflation in this region. We are most constructive on the outlooks for India, the Philippines, and Indonesia, where we expect growth averaging around 5% in 2025. 在亞洲新興市場，通貨膨脹普遍維持在接近或低於目標水平。中國的通縮風險正在增加。大多數亞洲新興市場的央行都在放寬貨幣政策，我們預期該地區的通脹率將略有上升。我們對印度、菲律賓和印尼的前景最有建設性，我們預期這些國家在 2025 年的平均增長率約為 5%。
In Latin America, inflationary pressures persist, with services inflation expected to remain above central banks’ targets in 2025. This is primarily due to still-elevated wage growth. Easier monetary policy should keep growth steady at 2%-2.5% in 2025. Pro-cyclical fiscal policy in Brazil is expected to continue to boost the economy, while restrictive interest rates and U.S.-related policy uncertainty make us more bearish on Mexico. Finally, in emerging Europe, lower commodity prices should help inflation reach target in 2025. Expect below-trend growth of around 2.5%2.5 \%. 在拉丁美洲，通貨膨脹壓力持續，服務業通貨膨脹預計在 2025 年仍高於中央銀行的目標。這主要是由於薪資成長仍然偏高所致。2025 年，較寬鬆的貨幣政策應可維持 2%-2.5% 的穩定成長。巴西的順周期財政政策預期將繼續提振經濟，而限制性利率及與美國相關的政策不確定性則使我們更看淡墨西哥。最後，在新興歐洲，商品價格下跌應有助通脹於 2025 年達到目標。預期低於趨勢的成長率約為 2.5%2.5 \% 。
Real interest rates will likely fall across emerging markets 新興市場的實際利率可能會下降
Note: Real rate is calculated as a GDP-weighted policy rate minus the GDP-weighted year-over-year CPI rate 註：實際利率的計算方式為 GDP 加權政策利率減 GDP 加權年度 CPI 利率
Sources: Vanguard calculations, using data from Refinitiv, as of September 30, 2024. 資料來源：Vanguard 使用 Refinitiv 的資料計算，截至 2024 年 9 月 30 日。
OUR MARKET OUTLOOK 我們的市場展望
U.S. outperformance rides on earnings growth 盈利增長帶動美國表現優異
Over the past decade, U.S. equities have delivered an astounding 12.8%12.8 \% annualized return, far outpacing international equities (5.7% USD; 7.6% local currency). While valuation expansion and the technology sector have attracted attention in the U.S., broad earnings growth (primarily driven by revenue) has largely been responsible for U.S. outperformance. Conversely, ex-U.S. developed markets have had stagnant earnings growth, partly due to negative output gaps since 2010. Non-U.S. tech has been a bright spot, but its lower index weight ( 13%13 \% versus 32%32 \% in the U.S.) has dampened returns. 過去十年來，美國股票創造了驚人的 12.8%12.8 \% 年化報酬率，遠遠超越國際股票（美元為 5.7%；當地貨幣為 7.6%）。儘管美國股票的估值擴張和科技板塊吸引了投資人的目光，但廣泛的盈利增長（主要由收入驅動）在很大程度上是美國股票跑贏大市的原因。相反，美國以外的已發展市場盈利增長停滯不前，部分原因是自 2010 年以來出現負產出缺口。非美國的科技股是一個亮點，但其較低的指數比重（ 13%13 \% 相對於美國的 32%32 \% ）減低了回報。
Historically, rotations from U.S. to international outperformance have coincided with U.S. earnings contractions. International markets outperformed in six of the eight periods since 1980 where U.S. year-over-year earnings declined substantially. 從歷史經驗來看，從美國市場轉向國際市場的優異表現，都是與美國盈利收縮同時發生的。自 1980 年以來，在美國年度收益大幅下降的八個期間中，有六個期間的國際市場表現優於美國。
Stretched valuations: A long-term hurdle 估值捉襟見肘：長期的障礙
Here is the catch: Replicating the past decade’s stellar returns is not an easy feat-it would require unprecedented earnings growth or historically high valuations. But the time horizon 問題就在這裡：要複製過去十年的輝煌回報並非易事，需要史無前例的盈利成長或歷史性的高估值。但時間範圍
matters. Over the short term, our analysis suggests that if economic growth and earnings hold up, U.S. equities could sustain elevated valuations. However, as the horizon extends, growth and earnings impacts diminish, with valuations eventually dominating returns as a “fundamental gravity.” 事項。短期而言，我們的分析顯示，若經濟成長與獲利維持不變，美國股票可能會維持較高的估值。然而，隨著時間的推移，經濟成長與獲利的影響會逐漸減弱，而估值最終會以「基本面引力」的方式主宰回報。
For these reasons, our 10-year outlook leans toward the U.S. underperforming international markets. However, there remains a 30% probability that the U.S. could still outperform over the long term, but by a narrower margin than in recent years. 基於這些原因，我們的十年展望傾向於美國表現不如國際市場。然而，長期而言，美國仍有 30% 的機會跑贏國際市場，但幅度會比近年縮小。
The push and pull of policy shifts 政策轉變的推力與拉力
Looking ahead, the challenge is that regions with the most attractive valuations are also most exposed to economic policy risks. Emerging markets and Europe have low valuations but are particularly vulnerable to U.S. trade policy. A tug-of-war between tax cuts and tariffs will be key to reconciling near-term U.S. equity earnings. This policy tension raises the prospect of an adverse economic development that may expose the current overvaluation of U.S. equities. 展望未來，我們面臨的挑戰是，估值最吸引的地區也最容易受到經濟政策風險的影響。新興市場和歐洲的估值偏低，但卻特別容易受到美國貿易政策的影響。減稅與關稅之間的角力，將是調和近期美國股票收益的關鍵。這種政策上的緊張關係會帶來不利經濟發展的前景，可能會暴露目前美國股票估值過高的問題。
Valuations, revenue, and the technology sector drove U.S. outperformance 估值、營收及科技業驅動美國股跑贏大市
Digging deeper into U.S. equity overvaluation 深入挖掘美國股票估值過高問題
Valuations have been a central theme driving equity returns over the past few years. The cyclically adjusted price/earnings (CAPE) ratio for the U.S. equity market has been above our estimate of fair value since late 2020, aside from a brief sell-off in 2022. Market concentration and corporate interest rate-lock support this trend. Both may support equity valuations in the near term. But there is growing tension between momentum and overvaluation. 估值一直是過去幾年驅動股票回報的核心主題。除了 2022 年的短暫拋售外，美國股票市場的週期調整市盈率 (CAPE) 自 2020 年底以來一直高於我們估計的公平價值。市場集中度和企業利率鎖定支持了這一趨勢。兩者都可能在短期內支持股票估值。但動力與估值過高之間的緊張關係日益緊張。
Deconstructing U.S. valuations 解構美國估值
High market concentration means that several large growth companies are dominating the Standard & Poor’s 500 Index (in fact, the six largest companies in the index currently account for about 30% of its overall market cap). These companies benefit from competitive moats and winner-take-all business models that have translated into earnings resilience despite rising interest rates. 高市場集中度意味著幾家大型成長型公司主宰了標準普爾 500 指數（事實上，該指數中最大的六家公司目前約佔整體市值的 30%）。這些公司受惠於具有競爭力的護城河以及贏家通吃的商業模式，儘管利率不斷上漲，這些模式仍能轉化為盈利彈性。
Large companies also took advantage of the low borrowing costs that prevailed before 2022 to protect their balance sheets from rising interest rates-a luxury that was not as easily available to non-U.S. and smaller U.S. companies. 大型公司也利用 2022 年前的低借貸成本，保護其資產負債表免受利率上升的影響 - 這對非美國和較小型的美國公司來說，是不容易獲得的奢侈品。
Adjusting for these factors paints a less-severe picture of U.S. overvaluation. The chart shows our “standard” fair-value CAPE estimate compared with an estimate factoring in the market concentration and lower cost of debt for large technology companies. This analysis suggests that valuations could be about 25%25 \% above fair value instead of 72%72 \%, and that getting back to the new fair value would not require as much of a market correction. 調整這些因素後，美國估值過高的情況就沒那麼嚴重了。圖表顯示我們的「標準」公平價值 CAPE 估計值與考慮到市場集中度和大型科技公司較低債務成本的估計值的比較。這項分析顯示，估值可能高於公允價值約 25%25 \% ，而非 72%72 \% ，而回到新的公允價值將不需要那麼大的市場修正。
Three paths forward for U.S. returns 美國回流的三條路徑
Moving forward, we see three possible scenarios for U.S. equities. First, a boom in productivity, akin to the mid-1990s, could continue to support large-cap and growth stock valuations and drive the market higher. Second, a shift toward lower rates and broadening growth could catalyze a rotation into undervalued factors such as value and small-cap. Finally, the current environment may be more analogous to 1999: An adverse economic development could expose the vulnerability of current stock market valuations and increase the odds of a market drawdown. While these risks will be important in the near term, we expect high valuations and stretched margins to be meaningful headwinds to U.S. equity returns over the long term. 展望未來，我們認為美國股票有三種可能的情況。第一，類似 1990 年代中期的生產力蓬勃發展，可能會繼續支持大型股票和成長型股票的估值，並推動市場走高。其次，利率降低和成長擴張的轉變，可能會催化低估值因素的輪動，例如價值型和小型股。最後，目前的環境可能更類似 1999 年：不利的經濟發展可能會暴露目前股市估值的脆弱性，並增加市場縮水的機率。儘管這些風險在短期內會很重要，但我們預期高估值和利潤率緊縮，長期而言將成為美國股票回報的重要阻力。
Fair value may not be that far away 公允價值可能並不遙遠
Notes: The chart shows the CAPE ratio for U.S. equities, measured by the MSCI USA Index until April 30, 2003, and the MSCI US Broad Market Index thereafter. It also depicts our “standard” fair-value estimate based on a statistical model considering interest rate and inflation, and an adjusted fair-value estimate taking into account the recent divergence between companies’ after-tax cost of debt and market yields, and the rising share of the technology sector in the overall equity index. 註：圖表顯示美國股票的 CAPE 比率，2003 年 4 月 30 日前以 MSCI 美國指數衡量，2003 年 4 月 30 日後 則以 MSCI 美國廣泛市場指數衡量。圖中也描繪了我們根據考慮利率與通貨膨脹的統計模型所做的「標準」公平價值估算，以及考慮到近期公司稅後債務成本與市場收益率之間的差異，以及科技產業在整體股票指數中所佔比重上升而調整的公平價值估算。
Sources: Vanguard calculations, based on data from Refinitiv, Bloomberg, and Global Financial Data. Fair-value estimates as of September 30, 2024, and actual data as of November 8, 2024. 資料來源：Vanguard 根據 Refinitiv、Bloomberg 和 Global Financial Data 的資料計算。公允價值估計截至 2024 年 9 月 30 日，實際數據截至 2024 年 11 月 8 日。
"Coupon wall" strengthens the case for bonds 「優惠券牆 」強化了債券的地位
Higher starting yields cushion bond returns while still allowing investors to take advantage of falling rates. This development, which we refer to as the “coupon wall,” creates an asymmetric and favorable risk/return environment. The long-term case for bonds remains solid. 較高的起始孳息率可緩衝債券回報，同時仍可讓投資人利用利率下降的優勢。我們稱這種發展為「息票牆」，創造了不對稱且有利的風險／回報環境。債券的長期表現仍然穩健。
The U.S. Treasury yield curve is near our estimate of fair value that considers our baseline U.S. economic view of strong productivity growth and a cautious Federal Reserve. Expect the yield curve to stay near current levels and for relatively high coupons to drive returns. 美國國庫債券收益率曲線接近我們對公允價值的估計，該估計考慮了我們對美國經濟的基準看法，即強勁的生產力增長和審慎的美聯儲。預期孳息曲線將維持在目前水平附近，而相對較高的息票將帶動回報。
Risks to our outlook hinge on a tug-of-war between productivity gains and potentially inflationary policy. If the latter were to materialize, we believe yields across the curve would likely rise and the stock/bond correlation would turn positive as investors demand more compensation for uncertainty. 我們展望的風險取決於生產力提升與潛在通貨膨脹政策之間的角力。如果後者成為現實，我們相信整個曲線的殖利率可能會上升，而股票/債券的相關性也會轉為正值，因為投資人要求對不確定性給予更多補償。
If productivity gains were to win out, any downward pressure on inflation would increase the chances that the Fed would cut below 4% and that short-term yields would fall more than long-term yields. We expect long-term yields to remain above 4% due to our strong growth outlook. Further, if yields fall because of a negative shock to demand, bonds should provide a hedge in multiasset portfolios. 如果生產力成長勝出，通貨膨脹的任何下調壓力都會增加聯儲局降息至 4% 以下的機會，短期孳息率的跌幅也會超過長期孳息率。由於強勁的成長前景，我們預期長期收益率將維持在 4% 以上。此外，倘若孳息率因需求受到負面衝擊而下跌，債券應可為多元資產組合提供對沖。
We estimate an 81%81 \% probability that the Bloomberg U.S. Aggregate Index will provide a positive total return over the next year. Negative returns would result only if yields were to rise enough to breach the coupon wall and induce a capital loss that is larger than the income generated from coupons. We calculate this threshold as around 0.8 to 0.9 percentage points higher than current yields. 我們估計， 81%81 \% 彭博美國綜合指數在未來一年提供正總回報的概率為 81%81 \% 。只有當收益率上升到足以突破票息牆，並導致資本虧損大於票息所產生的收入時，才會出現負回報。根據我們的計算，此門檻約為較目前收益率高 0.8 至 0.9 個百分點。
Starting yields are much higher than they were three years ago 起始收益率遠高於三年前
Notes: The two charts show the one-year-ahead price (y-axis) and income ( xx-axis) Vanguard Capital Markets Model (VCMM) return projections for the Bloomberg U.S. Aggregate Index as of May 31, 2021, and November 8, 2024. The forecasts are sorted by positive price returns (interest rates fall) and two scenarios under negative price returns (interest rates rise): income returns from coupons offset price losses and income returns do not offset price losses, leading to negative total returns. 註釋：這兩個圖表顯示 Vanguard 資本市場模型（VCMM）對彭博美國綜合指數截至 2021 年 5 月 31 日和 2024 年 11 月 8 日的一年前價格（y 軸）和收入（ xx -軸）回報預測。預測依正價格回報（利率下降）和負價格回報（利率上升）下的兩種情況排序：來自息票的收入回報抵銷價格損失，以及收入回報無法抵銷價格損失，導致總回報為負。
Sources: Vanguard calculations, based on data from Bloomberg, as of May 31, 2021, and November 8, 2024 資料來源：Vanguard 根據彭博社的資料計算，截至 2021 年 5 月 31 日和 2024 年 11 月 8 日
IMPORTANT: The projections and other information generated by the VCMM regarding the likelihood of various investment outcomes are hypothetical in nature, do not reflect actual investment results, and are not guarantees of future results. Distribution of return outcomes from the VCMM are derived from 10,000 simulations for each modeled asset class. Simulations are as of May 31, 2021, and November 8, 2024. Results from the model may vary with each use and over time. For more information, please see page 23. 重要事項： VCMM 就各種投資結果的可能性所產生的預測及其他資訊屬於假設性質，不反映實際投資結果，且並非未來結果的保證。來自 VCMM 的回報結果分佈是來自每個模擬資產類別的 10,000 次模擬。模擬截至 2021 年 5 月 31 日及 2024 年 11 月 8 日。模擬結果可能因每次使用及時間而異。如需詳細資訊，請參閱第 23 頁。
Emerging markets equities: Soft earnings growth dampens outlook 新興市場股票：盈利成長疲軟，前景黯淡
Investors looking to emerging markets equities to bolster international returns are likely to be disappointed in the near term. A soft earnings profile, driven by our underwhelming outlook for Chinese growth and coupled with our expectations for limited upside valuation potential, suggests muted return prospects. 希望透過新興市場股票提高國際回報的投資者，短期內可能會感到失望。由於我們對中國的增長前景並不樂觀，加上我們預期估值上升潛力有限，因此盈利狀況疲弱，回報前景暗淡。
We expect corporate earnings growth within emerging markets equities to be just 2.2%2.2 \% per year over the next decade. This is less than one-third of their 20-year historical average (7.2%) and about half of the earnings growth expected from the U.S. stock market. Our subdued outlook is driven by the weaker-thanconsensus view we have on economic growth in China, which accounts for 27%27 \% of the MSCI Emerging Markets Index. 我們預期未來十年新興市場股票的企業盈利增長僅為每年 2.2%2.2 \% 。這還不到 20 年歷史平均值（7.2%）的三分之一，約為美國股市預期盈利增長的一半。我們對中國經濟增長的一致看法較弱，導致我們對中國的前景看淡，而中國經濟增長佔 MSCI 新興市場指數的 27%27 \% 。
Meanwhile, emerging markets equity valuations have increased over the past year, driven in large part by expectations for stimulus in China in the second half of 2024. In our assessment, emerging markets equity valuations are now “fair” rather than “undervalued,” and even approaching 與此同時，新興市場股票的估值在過去一年有所上升，主要是受到 2024 年下半年中國刺激經濟的預期所帶動。根據我們的評估，新興市場股票的估值目前是「合理」而非「低估」，甚至接近「公平」。
“overvalued” when China is excluded. Continued U.S. dollar strength and additional trade policy uncertainty could further limit the upside in emerging markets returns in the near term. 若撇除中國，則為「估值過高」。美元持續走強，加上貿易政策的不確定性增加，可能在短期內進一步限制新興市場回報的上升空間。
What could cause us to change our mind? The main possibility is a China policy “bazooka” that significantly and sustainably raises earnings growth prospects for both the local market and broader emerging markets. Another influence that could benefit emerging markets over a longer time horizon is the ongoing reshaping of manufacturing supply chains. Some emerging markets could benefit more than we expect if they are able to successfully position themselves as integral pieces of an evolving global trade network. 什麼原因會讓我們改變想法？主要的可能性是中國的政策「火箭筒」能夠顯著且持續地提升當地市場和更廣泛新興市場的盈利成長前景。另一個可能讓新興市場在較長時間內受惠的影響因素是製造業供應鏈的持續重塑。一些新興市場若能成功定位，成為不斷演進的全球貿易網絡中不可或缺的一環，其受惠程度將超出我們的預期。
Despite the near-term risks, the long-term outlook for emerging markets is reasonable relative to developed markets where valuations are more stretched. Furthermore, emerging markets continue to bring diversification benefits to a global portfolio given their low correlation with the rest of the world. 儘管存在短期風險，但相對於估值較為緊張的已發展市場，新興市場的長期前景仍屬合理。此外，由於新興市場與全球其他市場的相關性較低，因此仍可為全球投資組合帶來分散投資的效益。
Emerging markets equity valuations are within our fair-value range 新興市場股票估值在我們的公允價值範圍內
Notes: The price-to-earnings ratio reflects the price divided by the trailing 3-year average earnings for the MSCl Emerging Markets Index. Our fair-value estimate (the “predicted” value midway between the top and bottom of our fair-value range) is based on a statistical model where the inputs include emerging markets inflation, emerging markets policy rates minus the federal funds rate, Vanguard’s Leading Economic Indicators for emerging markets, and the inflation-adjusted 2-year U.S. Treasury yield. 註：市盈率反映價格除以 MSCl 新興市場指數的往績三年平均盈利。我們的公允價值估計值（介於公允價值範圍頂端和底部中間的「預測」值）是基於一個統計模型，其中的輸入包括新興市場通貨膨脹、新興市場政策利率減聯邦基金利率、Vanguard 的新興市場領先經濟指標，以及經通脹調整的 2 年期美國國庫債券收益率。
Sources: Vanguard calculations, based on data from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis FRED database and Bloomberg, as of November 8, 2024. 資料來源：資料來源：Vanguard 根據聖路易聯邦儲備銀行 FRED 資料庫和彭博社截至 2024 年 11 月 8 日的資料計算。
How stock and bond valuations have changed in the last year 股票和債券的估值在過去一年有何變化
Risk asset valuations are more stretched, but opportunities exist 風險資產估值更加緊張，但機會仍然存在
Notes: The U.S. equity valuation measure is the current cyclically adjusted price/earnings (CAPE) ratio percentile relative to our fair-value CAPE estimate for the MSCI US Broad Market Index. Factor valuations are relative to U.S. equities as the base at the 50th percentile. Growth, value, and small-cap valuation measures are all based on the percentile rank based on our fair-value model relative to the market. The large-cap valuation measure is a composite valuation measure of the style factor to U.S. relative valuations and the current U.S. CAPE percentile relative to its fair-value CAPE. The emerging markets valuation measure is based on the percentile rank based on our fair-value model relative to the market. The ex-U.S. developed markets and global ex-U.S. equity valuation measures are the market-capitalization-weighted CAPE percentiles relative to our fair-value CAPE estimate for the MSCI EMU Index, MSCI UK Index, MSCI Japan Index, MSCI Canada Index, MSCI Australia Index, and MSCI Emerging Markets Index; the MSCI Emerging Markets Index is used only for global ex-U.S. equities. 註：美國股票估值指標為目前經週期調整市盈率 (CAPE) 相對於 MSCI 美國廣泛市場指數公允價值 CAPE 估計值的百分位數。因子估值是相對於以美國股票為基準的第 50 個百分位數。成長型、價值型及小型股估值指標均以我們的公平價值模型相對於市場的百分位數排名為基礎。大型股估值指標為風格因子相對於美國相對估值的複合估值指標，以及目前美國 CAPE 相對於其公平價值 CAPE 的百分位數。新興市場估值計量基於我們的公允價值模型相對於市場的百分位數排名。美國以外已開發市場和全球（美國以外）股票的估值指標為 MSCI 歐盟指數、MSCI 英國指數、MSCI 日本指數、MSCI 加拿大指數、MSCI 澳洲指數和 MSCI 新興市場指數的市值加權 CAPE 百分位數相對於我們公允價值 CAPE 估值的百分位數；MSCI 新興市場指數僅用於全球（美國以外）股票。
Aggregate bond valuation measures are market-capitalization-weighted averages of intermediate-term credit and Treasury valuation percentiles for the U.S. and global ex-U.S. (market-capitalization-weighted averages of the euro area, the U.K., Japan, Canada, and Australia). Treasury valuation measures are the key rate duration-weighted average of our fair-value model. Intermediate credit spread, high-yield credit spread, mortgage-backed securities (MBS) spread, and emerging markets sovereign debt spread valuation measures are based on current spreads relative to the VCMM simulation of spreads in year 30 of our forecast. The Treasury Inflation-Protected Securities (TIPS) valuation measure is based on the 10-year annualized inflation forecast relative to our equilibrium forecast for inflation. The valuation percentiles are as of November 8, 2024, and September 30, 2023 (in parentheses). 總體債券估值指標為美國及全球（美國除外）中長期信貸及國庫債券估值百分位數的市值加權平均值（歐元區、英國、日本、加拿大及澳洲的市值加權平均值）。國庫券估值指標為我們公允價值模型的關鍵利率期限加權平均值。中級信貸息差、高收益信貸息差、按揭抵押證券 (MBS) 息差及新興市場主權債務息差的估值計量基於相對於我們預測第 30 年息差的 VCMM 模擬息差的當前息差。國庫通貨膨脹保值證券 (TIPS) 的估值計量基於相對於我們對通脹的均衡預測的 10 年年化通脹預測。估值百分位數截至 2024 年 11 月 8 日和 2023 年 9 月 30 日（括號內）。
Sources: Vanguard calculations, based on data from Robert Shiller’s website at shillerdata.com/, the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, the Federal Reserve Board, and Refinitiv, as of November 8, 2024 資料來源：Vanguard 根據 Robert Shiller 網站 shillerdata.com/、美國勞工統計局、美國聯邦儲備局和 Refinitiv 的數據計算，截至 2024 年 11 月 8 日
IMPORTANT: The projections and other information generated by the VCMM regarding the likelihood of various investment outcomes are hypothetical in nature, do not reflect actual investment results, and are not guarantees of future results. Distribution of return outcomes from the VCMM are derived from 10,000\mathbf{1 0 , 0 0 0} simulations for each modeled asset class. Simulations are as of November 8, 2024, and September 30, 2023. Results from the model may vary with each use and over time. For more information, please see page 23. 重要事項：VCMM 就各種投資結果的可能性所產生的預測及其他資訊屬於假設性質，不反映實際投資結果，且並非未來結果的保證。來自 VCMM 的回報結果分佈是來自每個模擬資產類別的 10,000\mathbf{1 0 , 0 0 0} 模擬。模擬截至 2024 年 11 月 8 日及 2023 年 9 月 30 日。模擬結果可能因每次使用及時間而異。如需詳細資訊，請參閱第 23 頁。
A continued tilt toward fixed income 持續傾斜於固定收益
Elevated interest rates and high starting equity valuations continue to imply a narrow equity risk premium. Accordingly, our valuation-aware timevarying asset allocation (TVAA) is underweight equity and overweight fixed income relative to a 60/40 benchmark. Our TVAA is geared toward investors who are comfortable with model forecast risk, which is a type of active risk. 高利率及高股票起始估值繼續意味著股票風險溢價收窄。因此，相對於 60/40 基準，我們的估值感知時變資產配置 (TVAA) 是低配股票而高配固定收益。我們的 TVAA 針對能夠承受模型預測風險（一種主動風險）的投資者。
Within equity sub-asset classes, the portfolio remains overweight U.S. value, U.S. small-cap, and developed markets ex-U.S. equities due to their more appealing valuations and higher anticipated returns. The most notable change 在股票子資產類別中，由於美國價值型股票、美國小盤股票及美國以外已發展市場股票的估值較具吸引力且預期回報較高，因此投資組合的比重仍然偏高。最顯著的變動
is a reduction in emerging markets equities, as lower earnings growth and investor sentiment have weighed on the outlook. Within fixed income, the portfolio remains overweight U.S. credit, given its more favorable expected returns despite stretched valuations, and U.S. long-term bonds. 在固定收益方面，投資組合仍然偏重美國信貸，因為儘管美國長期債券的估值較高，但預期回報較佳。在固定收益方面，儘管美國信貸的估值偏高，但由於其預期回報較佳，因此投資組合仍偏重美國信貸及美國長期債券。
Our TVAA results in expected returns slightly higher than would be expected of the 60/40 benchmark, with lower volatility. This comes at the expense of active risk (tracking error relative to the benchmark) of 4.27%4.27 \%. 我們的 TVAA 預期回報略高於 60/40 基準，且波幅較低。這是以 4.27%4.27 \% 的主動風險（相對於基準的追蹤誤差）為代價的。
For valuation-aware investors, our model still favors fixed income 對於有估值意識的投資者而言，我們的模型仍偏好固定收益
Notes: Time-varying portfolio allocations were determined by the Vanguard Asset Allocation Model (VAAM). Equity assets under consideration were U.S. value, U.S. growth, U.S. small-cap, developed markets ex-U.S., and emerging markets. Fixed income assets under consideration were U.S. aggregate bonds, U.S. intermediate-term credit, U.S. short-term Treasuries, U.S. long-term Treasuries, and hedged international bonds. See “Indexes for VCMM simulations” on page 24 for additional details on asset class indexes. Constraints applied: The U.S. equity home bias range is 60%-70%60 \%-70 \% of equities and hedged international bonds are limited to a minimum of 30%30 \% of fixed income. U.S. value and growth equities are each bound to a range of 30%-70%30 \%-70 \% of U.S. equities, U.S. small-cap is limited to 20%20 \% of U.S. equities, and emerging markets equities are limited to 20%20 \% of total equities. U.S. credit and short-term and long-term Treasuries are limited to a maximum of 50%50 \% of all bonds, and long-term Treasuries are limited to a maximum of 15%15 \% of U.S. bonds. 註：時變投資組合配置由 Vanguard 資產配置模型 (VAAM) 決定。考慮的股票資產為美國價值型、美國成長型、美國小型股、美國以外已開發市場及新興市場。考慮的固定收益資產包括美國綜合債券、美國中期信貸、美國短期國債、美國長期國債及對沖國際債券。有關資產類別指數的其他詳情，請參閱第 24 頁「VCMM 模擬的指數」。應用的限制條件：美國股票主損益範圍為股票的 60%-70%60 \%-70 \% ，對沖國際債券則限制為固定收益的最低 30%30 \% 。美國價值型股票與成長型股票各以 30%-70%30 \%-70 \% 的美國股票範圍為限，美國小型股票以 20%20 \% 的美國股票範圍為限，新興市場股票以 20%20 \% 的總股票範圍為限。美國信貸及短期和長期國債最多限於所有債券中的 50%50 \% ，長期國債最多限於美國債券中的 15%15 \% 。
Source: Vanguard calculations, using data as of November 8, 2024. 資料來源：Vanguard 使用截至 2024 年 11 月 8 日的資料計算。
Tracking error compared with the benchmark 與基準相比的追蹤誤差
Probability of underperforming the benchmark 表現低於基準的可能性
TVAA
38%
5.9%
7.0%
0.22
-4.6%
4.27%
48.2%
Benchmark 基準
60%
5.7%
9.8%
0.13
-9.6%
-
-
Equity allocation 10-year expected annualized return 10-year expected annualized volatility Expected Sharpe ratio Expected maximum drawdown Tracking error compared with the benchmark Probability of underperforming the benchmark
TVAA 38% 5.9% 7.0% 0.22 -4.6% 4.27% 48.2%
Benchmark 60% 5.7% 9.8% 0.13 -9.6% - -| | Equity allocation | 10-year expected annualized return | 10-year expected annualized volatility | Expected Sharpe ratio | Expected maximum drawdown | Tracking error compared with the benchmark | Probability of underperforming the benchmark |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| TVAA | 38% | 5.9% | 7.0% | 0.22 | -4.6% | 4.27% | 48.2% |
| Benchmark | 60% | 5.7% | 9.8% | 0.13 | -9.6% | - | - |
Notes: Vanguard calculations are based on portfolios optimized by the VAAM, using return projections from the VCMM. Sharpe ratio is a measure of return above the risk-free rate that adjusts for volatility. A higher Sharpe ratio indicates a higher expected risk-adjusted return. Expected maximum drawdown is the median peak-to-trough drop in the portfolio’s value in 10,000VCMM10,000 \mathrm{VCMM} simulations. The probability of underperforming the benchmark is in any given year. 註：Vanguard 的計算以 VAAM 優化的投資組合為基礎，使用 VCMM 的回報預測。夏普比率（Sharpe ratio）是衡量高於無風險利率的回報率，並對波動性進行調整。夏普比率越高，表示風險調整後的預期回報越高。預期最大縮減是指在 10,000VCMM10,000 \mathrm{VCMM} 模擬中，投資組合價值從高峰到谷底的跌幅中位數。在任何給定年份中，表現遜於基準的概率為。
Source: Vanguard calculations, using data as of November 8, 2024. 資料來源：Vanguard 使用截至 2024 年 11 月 8 日的資料計算。
IMPORTANT: The projections and other information generated by the VCMM regarding the likelihood of various investment outcomes are hypothetical in nature, do not reflect actual investment results, and are not guarantees of future results. Distribution of return outcomes from the VCMM are derived from 10,000\mathbf{1 0 , 0 0 0} simulations for each modeled asset class. Simulations as of November 8,2024. Results from the model may vary with each use and over time. For more information, please see page 23. 重要事項：VCMM 就各種投資結果的可能性所產生的預測及其他資訊屬於假設性質，不反映實際投資結果，且並非未來結果的保證。來自 VCMM 的回報結果分佈是來自每個模擬資產類別的 10,000\mathbf{1 0 , 0 0 0} 模擬。模擬截至 2024 年 11 月 8 日。模型的結果可能因每次使用及時間而異。詳情請參閱第 23 頁。
References 參考資料
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Davis, Joseph H., Ryan Zalla, Joana Rocha, and Josh Hirt. R-Star Is Higher. Here’s Why. Social Science Research Network, June 14, 2023. ssrn.com/ abstract=4478413. Davis, Joseph H., Ryan Zalla, Joana Rocha, and Josh Hirt.R-Star 更高。原因在此。社會科學研究網路，2023 年 6 月 14 日。ssrn.com/ abstract=4478413。
Hirt, Josh, and Ian Kresnak. For Bond Investors, Near-Term Pain but Long-Term Gain. The Vanguard Group, July 28, 2023. corporate.vanguard.com/ content/corporatesite/us/en/corp/articles/near-term-pain-but-long-term-gain.html?sf268121686=1. Hirt, Josh, and Ian Kresnak.對於債券投資者而言，近期痛苦但長期收益。Vanguard Group，2023 年 7 月 28 日。corporate.vanguard.com/ content/corporatesite/us/en/corp/articles/near-term-pain-but-long-term-gain.html?sf268121686=1。
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Abstract 摘要
About the Vanguard Capital Markets Model IMPORTANT: The projections and other information generated by the Vanguard Capital Markets Model regarding the likelihood of various investment outcomes are hypothetical in nature, do not reflect actual investment results, and are not guarantees of future results. VCMM results will vary with each use and over time. 關於 Vanguard 資本市場模型 重要提示：Vanguard 資本市場模型產生的關於各種投資結果可能性的預測和其他資訊屬於假設性質，不反映實際投資結果，也不保證未來結果。VCMM 的結果會隨著每次使用和時間的推移而有所不同。
The VCMM projections are based on a statistical analysis of historical data. Future returns may behave differently from the historical patterns captured in the VCMM. More important, the VCMM may be underestimating extreme negative scenarios unobserved in the historical period on which the model estimation is based. VCMM 預測以歷史數據的統計分析為基礎。未來回報的表現可能與 VCMM 所捕捉的歷史模式不同。更重要的是，VCMM 可能低估了模型估計所依據的歷史時期中未發現的極端負面情況。
The VCMM is a proprietary financial simulation tool developed and maintained by Vanguard’s primary investment research and advice teams. The model forecasts distributions of future returns for a wide array of broad asset classes. Those asset classes include U.S. and international equity markets, several maturities of the U.S. Treasury and corporate fixed income markets, international fixed income markets, U.S. money markets, commodities, and certain alternative investment strategies. The theoretical and empirical foundation for the VCMM is that the returns of various asset classes reflect the compensation investors require for bearing different types of systematic risk (beta). At the core of the model are estimates of the dynamic statistical relationship between risk factors and asset returns, obtained from statistical analysis based on available monthly financial and economic data from as early as 1960. Using a system of estimated equations, the model then applies a Monte Carlo simulation method to VCMM 是由 Vanguard 的主要投資研究和諮詢團隊開發和維護的專有金融模擬工具。該模型預測各種廣泛資產類別的未來回報分佈。這些資產類別包括美國和國際股票市場、多種年期的美國國庫債券和公司固定收益市場、國際固定收益市場、美國貨幣市場、商品以及某些另類投資策略。VCMM 的理論與實證基礎是，各種資產類別的回報反映投資人因承擔不同類型的系統風險 (beta) 而需要的報酬。該模型的核心是對風險因素與資產報酬率之間的動態統計關係的估算，這些估算是根據早在 1960 年就已存在的每月金融和經濟數據進行統計分析而獲得的。該模型使用一個估計方程系統，然後運用 Monte Carlo 模擬方法來計算風險因素與資產回報之間的動態統計關係。
project the estimated interrelationships among risk factors and asset classes as well as uncertainty and randomness over time. The model generates a large set of simulated outcomes for each asset class over several time horizons. Forecasts are obtained by computing measures of central tendency in these simulations. Results produced by the tool will vary with each use and over time. 預測風險因素和資產類別之間的估計相互關係，以及隨時間變化的不確定性和隨機性。該模型為每種資產類別在多個時間範圍內產生大量模擬結果。預測是透過計算這些模擬結果的中心趨勢來獲得的。該工具產生的結果會隨著每次使用和時間的推移而有所不同。
The primary value of the VCMM is in its application to analyzing potential client portfolios. VCMM asset-class forecastscomprising distributions of expected returns, volatilities, and correlations-are key to the evaluation of potential downside risks, various risk-return trade-offs, and the diversification benefits of various asset classes. Although central tendencies are generated in any return distribution, Vanguard stresses that focusing on the full range of potential outcomes for the assets considered, such as the data presented in this paper, is the most effective way to use VCMM output. VCMM 的主要價值在於其應用於分析潛在客戶的投資組合。VCMM 資產類別預測包括預期回報、波動率及相關性的分佈，是評估潛在下行風險、各種風險回報權衡及各種資產類別分散化效益的關鍵。雖然任何回報分佈都會產生中心趨勢，但 Vanguard 強調，專注於所考量資產的全部潛在結果，例如本文件所提出的資料，是使用 VCMM 輸出的最有效方法。
The VCMM seeks to represent the uncertainty in the forecast by generating a wide range of potential outcomes. It is important to recognize that the VCMM does not impose “normality” on the return distributions, but rather is influenced by the so-called fat tails and skewness in the empirical distribution of modeled asset-class returns. Within the range of outcomes, individual experiences can be quite different, underscoring the varied nature of potential future paths. Indeed, this is a key reason why we approach asset-return outlooks in a distributional framework. VCMM 試圖透過產生廣泛的潛在結果來表示預測的不確定性。重要的是要認識到，VCMM 並未將「正態」強加於回報分佈上，而是受到建模資產類別回報實證分佈中所謂肥尾和偏斜的影響。在結果範圍內，個人經驗可能會有很大差異，突顯出潛在未來路徑的多樣性。事實上，這也是我們在分佈框架下探討資產報酬率展望的主要原因。
Indexes for VCMM simulations VCMM 模擬的索引
The long-term returns of our hypothetical portfolios are based on data for the appropriate market indexes through November 8, 2024. We chose these benchmarks to provide the most complete history possible, and we apportioned the global allocations to align with Vanguard’s guidance in constructing diversified portfolios. Asset classes and their representative forecast indexes are as follows: 我們假設投資組合的長期報酬率，是根據適當市場指數截至 2024 年 11 月 8 日的資料計算。我們選擇這些基準是為了盡可能提供最完整的歷史資料，我們對全球配置進行了分配，以符合 Vanguard 建構多元化投資組合的指引。資產類別及其代表性預測指數如下：
U.S. equities: MSCI US Broad Market Index. 美國股票：MSCI 美國廣泛市場指數。
Global ex-U.S. equities: MSCI All Country World ex USA Index. 全球（美國除外）股票：MSCI 全球（美國除外）指數。
Global ex-U.S. developed market equities: MSCI World ex USA Index. 全球（美國除外）已發展市場股票：MSCI 全球（美國除外）指數。
U.S. REITs: FTSE Nareit U.S. Real Estate Index. 美國房地產投資信託基金：FTSE Nareit 美國房地產指數。
U.S. Treasury bonds: Bloomberg U.S. Treasury Index. 美國國庫債券：彭博美國國庫債券指數。
U.S. short-term Treasury bonds: Bloomberg U.S. 1-5 Year Treasury Bond Index. 美國短期國庫債券：彭博美國 1-5 年期國庫債券指數。
U.S. intermediate-term Treasury bonds: Bloomberg U.S. 5-10 Year Treasury Bond Index. 美國中期國庫債券：彭博美國 5-10 年期國庫債券指數。
U.S. long-term Treasury bonds: Bloomberg U.S. Long Treasury Bond Index. 美國長期國庫債券：彭博美國長期國庫債券指數。
U.S. intermediate credit bonds: Bloomberg U.S. Credit Bond Index. 美國中級信用債券：彭博美國信用債券指數。
U.S. high-yield corporate bonds: Bloomberg U.S. Corporate High Yield Bond Index. 美國高收益企業債券：彭博美國公司高收益債券指數。
U.S. bonds: Bloomberg U.S. Aggregate Bond Index. 美國債券：彭博美國綜合債券指數。
Global ex-U.S. bonds: Bloomberg Global Aggregate ex-USD Index USD Hedged. 全球（美國除外）債券：Bloomberg Global Aggregate ex-USD Index 美元對沖。
U.S. TIPS: Bloomberg U.S. Treasury Inflation Protected Securities Index. 美國 TIPS：彭博美國國庫通貨膨脹保護證券指數。
Emerging markets sovereign bonds: Bloomberg Emerging Markets USD Sovereign Bond Index10% Country Capped. 新興市場主權債券：Bloomberg Emerging Markets USD Sovereign Bond Index10% Country Capped。
All equity indexes below are weighted by market capitalization: 以下所有股票指數均以市值加權計算：
Small-cap equities: Stocks with a market cap in the lowest two-thirds of the Russell 3000 Index. 小型股股票：市值在羅素 3000 指數最低三分之二的股票。
Large-cap equities: Stocks with a market cap in the highest one-third of the Russell 1000 Index. 大型股票：市值位於羅素 1000 指數最高三分之一的股票。
Growth equities: Stocks with a price/book ratio in the highest one-third of the Russell 1000 Index. 成長型股票：市盈率在 Russell 1000 指數最高三分之一的股票。
Value equities: Stocks with a price/book ratio in the lowest one-third of the Russell 1000 Index. 價值型股票：市盈率在羅素 1000 指數最低三分之一的股票。
Indexes used in our historical calculations 我們在歷史計算中使用的指數
The long-term returns for our hypothetical portfolios are based on data for the appropriate market indexes through November 8, 2024. We chose these benchmarks to provide the best history possible, and we split the global allocations to align with Vanguard’s guidance in constructing diversified portfolios. 我們假設投資組合的長期報酬率，是根據適當市場指數截至 2024 年 11 月 8 日的資料計算。我們選擇這些基準是為了盡可能提供最好的歷史資料，並且我們將全球配置分開，以符合 Vanguard 建構多元化投資組合的指引。
U.S. bonds: Standard & Poor’s High Grade Corporate Index from 1926 through 1968; Citigroup High Grade Index from 1969 through 1972; Lehman Brothers U.S. Long Credit AA Index from 1973 through 1975; and Bloomberg U.S. Aggregate Bond Index thereafter. 美國債券：1926 年至 1968 年的標準普爾高等級公司指數；1969 年至 1972 年的花旗集團高等級指數；1973 年至 1975 年的雷曼兄弟美國長期信貸 AA 指數；以及之後的彭博美國綜合債券指數。
Ex-U.S. bonds: Citigroup World Government Bond Ex-U.S. Index from 1985 through January 1989 and Bloomberg Global Aggregate ex-USD Index thereafter. 除美國以外的債券：1985 年至 1989 年 1 月的 Citigroup World Government Bond Ex-U.S. Index 及其後的 Bloomberg Global Aggregate ex-USD Index。
Global bonds: Before January 1990, 100% U.S. bonds, as defined above. From January 1990 onward, 70%70 \% U.S. bonds and 30%30 \% ex-U.S. bonds, rebalanced monthly. 全球債券：1990 年 1 月之前，100% 美國債券，如上述定義。自 1990 年 1 月起， 70%70 \% 美國債券和 30%30 \% 美國以外債券，每月重新平衡。
U.S. equities: S&P 90 Index from January 1926 through March 1957; S&P 500 Index from March 1957 through 1974; Dow Jones Wilshire 5000 Index from the beginning of 1975 through April 2005; and MSCI US Broad Market Index thereafter. 美國股票：1926 年 1 月至 1957 年 3 月的標準普爾 90 指數；1957 年 3 月至 1974 年的標準普爾 500 指數；1975 年初至 2005 年 4 月的道瓊斯 Wilshire 5000 指數；以及之後的 MSCI US Broad Market Index。
Ex-U.S. equities: MSCI World ex USA Index from January 1970 through 1987 and MSCI All Country World ex USA Index thereafter. 美國以外股票：1970 年 1 月至 1987 年的 MSCI World ex USA 指數，以及其後的 MSCI All Country World ex USA 指數。
Global equities: Before January 1970, 100% U.S. equities, as defined above. From January 1970 onward, 60%60 \% U.S. equities and 40%40 \% ex-U.S. equities, rebalanced monthly. 全球股票：1970 年 1 月之前，100% 美國股票，如上述定義。自 1970 年 1 月起， 60%60 \% 美國股票及 40%40 \% 美國以外股票，每月重新平衡。
Notes on risk 風險注意事項
All investing is subject to risk, including the possible loss of the money you invest. Past performance is no guarantee of future returns. Diversification does not ensure a profit or protect against a loss. Be aware that fluctuations in the financial markets and other factors may cause declines in the value of your account. There is no guarantee that any particular asset allocation or mix of funds will meet your investment objectives or provide you with a given level of income. The performance of an index is not an exact representation of any particular investment, as you cannot invest directly in an index. 所有投資均有風險，包括可能損失您的投資金錢。過去的表現並不保證未來的回報。分散投資並不能確保獲利或避免虧損。請注意，金融市場波動及其他因素可能導致您帳戶價值下降。不保證任何特定的資產配置或基金組合能滿足您的投資目標或為您提供特定的收益水平。由於您無法直接投資於指數，因此指數的表現並不完全代表任何特定投資。
U.S. government backing of Treasury or agency securities applies only to the underlying securities and does not prevent share-price fluctuations. Unlike stocks and bonds, U.S. Treasury bills are guaranteed as to the timely payment of principal and interest. Funds that concentrate on a relatively narrow market sector face the risk of higher share-price volatility. Investments in stocks and bonds issued by non-U.S. companies are subject to risks including country/regional risk and currency risk. These risks are especially high in emerging markets. 美國政府對國庫或機構證券的支持僅適用於相關證券，無法防止股價波動。與股票及債券不同，美國國庫券獲保證準時支付本金及利息。專注於相對狹窄市場領域的基金面臨股價波動較大的風險。投資於由非美國公司發行的股票及債券須承受風險，包括國家／地區風險及貨幣風險。這些風險在新興市場尤其高。
Bond funds are subject to the risk that an issuer will fail to make payments on time, and that bond prices will decline because of rising interest rates or negative perceptions of an issuer’s ability to make payments. High-yield bonds generally have medium-and lower-range credit-quality ratings and are therefore subject to a higher level of credit risk than bonds with higher credit-quality ratings. Although the income from U.S. Treasury obligations held in the fund is subject to federal income tax, some or all of that income may be exempt from state and local taxes. 債券基金須承受發行人未能準時付款的風險，以及債券價格因利率上升或對發行人付款能力的負面看法而下跌的風險。高收益債券通常具有中等及較低的信貸品質評等，因此承受的信貸風險高於具有較高信貸品質評等的債券。雖然基金持有的美國國庫債券收入須繳納聯邦所得稅，但部分或全部收入可能免繳州及地方稅。
Our teams behind this report 本報告背後的團隊
Roger A. Aliaga-Díaz, Ph.D. Roger A. Aliaga-Díaz 博士
Americas Chief Economist and Global Head of Portfolio Construction 美洲首席經濟學家暨投資組合建構全球主管
Jumana Saleheen, Ph.D Jumana Saleheen 博士
European Chief Economist 歐洲首席經濟師
Qian Wang, Ph.D. 王倩，博士
Asia-Pacific Chief Economist and Global Head of VCMM 亞太區首席經濟學家兼 VCMM 全球主管
Vanguard's global economics, markets, and portfolio construction teams Vanguard 的全球經濟、市場和投資組合建構團隊
Joseph Davis, Ph.D., Global Chief Economist Joseph Davis 博士，全球首席經濟師
Americas 美洲地區
Roger A. Aliaga-Díaz, Ph.D., Chief Economist, Americas Kevin Khang, Ph.D., Senior International Economist Joshua Hirt, CFA Roger A. Aliaga-Díaz，博士，美洲首席經濟師 Kevin Khang，博士，資深國際經濟師 Joshua Hirt，CFA
Adam Schickling, CFA Adam Schickling，CFA
Vytautas Maciulis, CFA
Rhea Thomas
Ryan Zalla, Ph.D. Ryan Zalla 博士
Asia-Pacific 亞太地區
Qian Wang, Ph.D., Chief Economist, Asia-Pacific Grant Feng, Ph.D. 王倩，博士，亞太區首席經濟學家 Grant Feng，博士，亞太區首席經濟學家
Victoria Zhang, M.Sc.
Europe 歐洲
Jumana Saleheen, Ph.D., Chief Economist, Europe Shaan Raithatha, CFA Jumana Saleheen 博士，歐洲首席經濟學家 Shaan Raithatha，CFA
Josefina Rodriguez, M.Sc. Josefina Rodriguez，理學碩士。
Aly Maghraby, M.Sc. Aly Maghraby，理學碩士。
Capital Markets Model Research Team 資本市場模型研究團隊
Qian Wang, Ph.D., Global Head of VCMM 王倩博士，VCMM 全球主管
Kevin DiCiurcio, CFA, Head of VCMM Development Kevin DiCiurcio，CFA，VCMM 開發主管
Daniel Wu, Ph.D. Daniel Wu 博士
Olga Lepigina, MBA Olga Lepigina，MBA
Ian Kresnak, CFA
Lukas Brandl-Cheng, M.Sc. Lukas Brandl-Cheng, 理學碩士
Junhao Liu, Ph.D. 劉俊豪博士
Alex Qu
Ben Vavreck, CFA Ben Vavreck，CFA
Sarina Fard
Ziqi Tan, CFA 陳子琪，CFA
Asset Allocation Research Team 資產配置研究團隊
Roger Aliaga-Diaz, Ph.D., Global Head of Portfolio Construction Harshdeep Singh Ahluwalia, M.Sc., Head of Asset Allocation, Americas Roger Aliaga-Diaz，博士，投資組合建構全球主管 Harshdeep Singh Ahluwalia，碩士，美洲資產配置主管
Giulio Renzi-Ricci, M.Sc., Head of Asset Allocation, Europe Giulio Renzi-Ricci，理學碩士，歐洲資產配置主管
Victor Zhu, CFA, CAIA
Asawari Sathe, M.Sc. Asawari Sathe，理學碩士。
Todd Schlanger, CFA Todd Schlanger，CFA
Yu Zhang, Ph.D. Yu Zhang 博士
Cheng Li, CFA, MBA 李成，CFA，MBA
Yiran Zi, M.Sc. Yiran Zi，理學碩士。
Yan Zilbering
Hirumi Samarakoon
Lucas Baynes 盧卡斯貝恩斯
Ollie Harvey, M.Sc. Ollie Harvey，理學碩士。
Joana Rocha, M.Sc. Joana Rocha，理學碩士
Maziar Nikpour, Ph.D. Maziar Nikpour 博士
Dimitris Korovilas, Ph.D. Dimitris Korovilas 博士
Notes: The chart shows central banks’ nominal monetary policy rates for each quarter through November 4, 2024, and forecasts thereafter. Most major central banks have target inflation rates around 2%2 \%
