Every area of research has two boundaries marking the point at which the process of reflection ceases to be exact and takes on a philosophical character. The pre-conditions for cognition in general, like the axioms of every specific domain, cannot be presented and tested within the latter domain, but rather they call for a science of a more fundamental nature. The goal of this science, which is located in infinity, is to think without pre-conditions - a goal which the individual sciences deny themselves since they do not take any step without proof, that is, without pre-conditions of a substantive and methodological nature. Philosophy, too, cannot completely transcend such pre-conditions with regard to its own activity when it presents and tests them. But in this case, it is always the last point of cognition at which an authoritative decision and the appeal to the unprovable arises within us, and yet in view of the advances made in terms of what can be proved this point is never definitively fixed. If the start of the philosophical domain marks, as it were, the lower boundary of the exact domain, then its upper boundary lies at the point where the ever-fragmentary contents of positive knowledge seek to be augmented by definitive concepts into a world picture and to be related to the totality of life. If the history of the sciences really does reveal that the philosophical mode of cognition is the primitive mode, is a mere estimate of the phenomena in general concepts, then this provisional procedure is nevertheless indispensable when confronted with certain questions, namely those questions - especially those related to valuations and the most general relations of intellectual life - that we have so far been unable either to answer or to dismiss. Moreover, even the empirical in its perfected state might no more replace philosophy as an interpretation, a colouring and an individually selective emphasis of what is real than would
每个研究领域都有两个边界，标志着反思过程不再精确并开始具有哲学特征的点。一般认知的前提条件，如每个特定领域的公理，不能在后者领域内呈现和测试，而是需要一种更基础性质的科学。这种位于无限中的科学的目标是无前提地思考——这是个体科学所否认的目标，因为它们在没有证明的情况下，即没有实质性和方法论性质的前提条件下，不会采取任何步骤。哲学也无法在其自身活动中完全超越这些前提条件，当它呈现和测试这些条件时。但在这种情况下，它总是认知的最后一点，在这一点上，我们内心产生了权威性的决定和对不可证明的诉求，然而，考虑到在可证明方面所取得的进展，这一点从未被最终确定。如果哲学领域的开始标志着精确领域的下边界，那么它的上边界则位于积极知识的片段内容试图通过确定性概念增强成世界图景并与生命的整体相关联的点。 如果科学史确实揭示出哲学的认知模式是原始模式，是对一般概念中现象的简单估计，那么，面对某些问题时，这种临时性的程序仍然是不可或缺的，即那些我们迄今为止既无法回答也无法驳斥的问题——特别是那些与价值判断和知识生活最普遍关系相关的问题。此外，即使经验主义在其完善状态下，也不可能像哲学那样取代对现实的诠释、着色和个体选择性的强调，正如现象的机械复制的完善不会使视觉艺术变得多余一样。
the perfection of the mechanical reproduction of phenomena make the visual arts superfluous.
现象的机械复制的完善不会使视觉艺术变得多余。

Out of this general appraisal of philosophy’s position there emerge the rights that it possesses with regard to individual objects. If there is to be a philosophy of money, then it can only lie on either side of the economic science of money. On the one hand, it can present the pre-conditions that, situated in mental states, in social relations and in the logical structure of reality and values, give money its meaning and its practical position. This is not the question of the origin of money, for such a question belongs to history and not to philosophy. Moreover, no matter how much we appreciate the gain in the understanding of a phenomenon that is derived from a study of its historical development, its substantive meaning and importance often rest upon connections of a conceptual, psychological or ethical nature that are not temporal but rather are purely material. Such connections have, of course, been realized by historical forces, but are not exhausted by the fortuitousness of the latter. The significance, the dignity and the substance of justice, religion or knowledge lie completely beyond the question concerning the manner in which they were historically realized. The first part of this book, therefore, relates money to the conditions that determine its essence and the meaning of its existence.
从对哲学地位的总体评估中，出现了它在个别对象方面所拥有的权利。如果要有一门货币哲学，那么它只能位于货币经济科学的两侧。一方面，它可以呈现出那些位于心理状态、社会关系以及现实和价值的逻辑结构中的前提条件，这些条件赋予了货币其意义和实际地位。这并不是货币起源的问题，因为这样的问提属于历史而非哲学。此外，无论我们多么欣赏通过研究现象的历史发展而获得的理解的提升，其实质意义和重要性往往依赖于一些概念、心理或伦理性质的联系，这些联系并非时间性的，而是纯粹的物质性的。当然，这些联系是由历史力量实现的，但并不被后者的偶然性所耗尽。正义、宗教或知识的意义、尊严和实质完全超越了它们在历史上是如何实现的问题。因此，本书的第一部分将货币与决定其本质和存在意义的条件联系起来。

The historical phenomenon of money, the idea and structure of which I shall attempt to develop out of feelings of value, out of praxis in relation to things and the reciprocal relationships between people as its presupposition, is studied in the second part of the book in its effects upon the inner world - upon the vitality of individuals, upon the linking of their fates, upon culture in general. Here, then, it is a question, on the one hand, of connections that are basically open to exact and detailed investigation but that, given the present state of knowledge, are not studied. They can only be dealt with in a philosophical manner, namely by a general estimation, by representing individual occurrences through connections between abstract concepts. On the other hand, it is a question of mental causes that will always be a matter of hypothetical interpretation and artistic reconstruction which can never be completely free from individual colouring. This combination of the money principle with the developments and valuations of inner life stands just as far behind the economic science of money as the problem area of the first part of the book stood before it. The one part seeks to make the essence of money intelligible from the conditions and connections of life in general; conversely, the other part seeks to make the essence and organization of the latter intelligible from the effectiveness of money.
货币的历史现象，我将试图从价值感、与事物的实践以及人与人之间的相互关系出发来发展其理念和结构，在书的第二部分中研究其对内心世界的影响——对个体活力、命运的联系以及文化整体的影响。因此，这里一方面是关于基本上可以进行精确和详细调查的联系，但鉴于目前的知识状态，这些联系并未被研究。它们只能以哲学的方式处理，即通过一般的评估，通过将个别事件通过抽象概念之间的联系来表现。另一方面，这是关于心理原因的问题，这将始终是一个假设性解释和艺术重构的问题，永远无法完全摆脱个体的色彩。这种货币原则与内心生活的发展和评估的结合，正如书的第一部分所探讨的问题领域在其之前一样，距离经济学的货币科学同样遥远。一部分试图从生活的一般条件和联系中使货币的本质变得可理解；相反，另一部分则试图从货币的有效性中使后者的本质和组织变得可理解。

Not a single line of these investigations is meant to be a statement about economics. That is to say, the phenomena of valuation and purchase, of
本书的研究丝毫不旨在论述经济学。也就是说，估价与购买、交换与交换手段、生产形式与占有价值等现象，经济学从一个角度看待它们，而本书则从另一个角度看待它们。仅仅是因为这些现象中最接近经济学的那一面在实践中最为有趣，研究得最为透彻，也能够以最精确的方式加以表达，这才使得人们似乎有理由将它们简单地视为“经济事实”。但是，正如一位宗教创始人的出现绝不仅仅是一种宗教现象，也可以运用心理学，甚至病理学、通史和社会学的范畴来研究一样；正如一首诗不仅仅是文学史上的一个事实，也是一个美学事实、一个语言学事实和一个传记事实一样；或者正如单一科学的立场（它也基于劳动分工）永远无法穷尽现实的全部一样——两个人交换产品这一事实绝不仅仅是一个经济事实。这样的事实——即其内容会穷尽于经济学对其呈现的图像的事实——是不存在的。此外，同样合情合理的是，这种交换可以被视为一个心理学事实，或者一个源于道德史的事实，甚至是一个美学事实。
exchange and the means of exchange, of the forms of production and the values of possession, which economics views from one standpoint, are here viewed from another. It is merely the fact that the aspect of these phenomena closest to economics is the most interesting in practical terms, is the most thoroughly investigated and can be represented in the most exact manner which has given rise to the apparent justification for regarding them simply as ‘economic facts’. But just as the appearance of a founder of a religion is by no means simply a religious phenomenon, and can also be studied by using the categories of psychology, perhaps even of pathology, general history and sociology; or just as a poem is not simply a fact of literary history, but also an aesthetic, a philological and a biographical fact; or just as the very standpoint of a single science, which is also based on the division of labour, never exhausts the totality of reality - so the fact that two people exchange their products is by no means simply an economic fact. Such a fact - that is, one whose content would be exhausted in the image that economics presents of it - does not exist. Moreover, and just as legitimately, such an exchange can be treated as a psychological fact, or as one that derives from the history of morals or even as an aesthetic fact. Even when it is considered to be an economic fact, it does not reach the end of a cul-de-sac; rather, in this guise it becomes the object of philosophical study, which examines its pre-conditions in non-economic concepts and facts and its consequences for non-economic values and relationships.
本段落延续了第一段的论述，强调了对经济现象的多元视角。作者认为，将交换仅仅视为经济事实是一种狭隘的理解，它忽略了心理学、道德史、美学等其他学科视角下可能存在的丰富内涵。任何单一学科的视角都无法穷尽事物的全部，经济现象也不例外。 即使在被视为经济事实时，它也并没有走入死胡同；相反，在这种 guise 下，它成为哲学研究的对象，这种研究考察其在非经济概念和事实中的前提条件及其对非经济价值和关系的影响。

In this problem-complex, money is simply a means, a material or an example for the presentation of relations that exist between the most superficial, ‘realistic’ and fortuitous phenomena and the most idealized powers of existence, the most profound currents of individual life and history. The significance and purpose of the whole undertaking is simply to derive from the surface level of economic affairs a guideline that leads to the ultimate values and things of importance in all that is human. The abstract philosophical construction of a system maintains such a distance from the individual phenomena, especially from practical existence, that actually, at first sight, it only postulates their salvation from isolation and lack of spirituality, even from repulsiveness. Here the achievement of such salvation will be exemplified in only a single instance, but in one which, like money, not merely reveals the indifference of purely economic techniques but rather is, as it were, indifference itself, in that its entire significance does not lie in itself but rather in its transformation into other values. But since the opposition between what is apparently most superficial and insubstantial and the inner substance of life reaches a peak here, there must be the most effective reconciliation if this particular fact not only permeates, actively and passively, the
在这个问题复杂性中，货币仅仅是一种手段，一种材料或一个例子，用于展示存在于最表面、‘现实’和偶然现象与最理想化的存在力量、个体生活和历史的最深刻潮流之间的关系。整个事业的意义和目的仅仅是从经济事务的表面层面推导出一条指导方针，指向所有人类中最终的价值和重要事物。抽象的哲学体系构建与个体现象，尤其是与实际存在之间保持着如此的距离，以至于实际上，乍一看，它仅仅假设了它们从孤立和缺乏精神性，甚至从令人厌恶中获得救赎。在这里，这种救赎的实现将仅在一个单一的实例中得到体现，但这个实例，如同货币，不仅揭示了纯经济技术的冷漠，反而在某种意义上就是冷漠本身，因为它的全部意义不在于自身，而在于它转化为其他价值。但由于表面上看似最肤浅和无实质的东西与生活的内在实质之间的对立在这里达到了顶峰，因此必须有最有效的和解，以便这一特定事实不仅在积极和消极的层面上渗透。
entire range of the intellectual world but also manifests itself as the symbol of the essential forms of movement within this world. The unity of these investigations does not lie, therefore, in an assertion about a particular content of knowledge and its gradually accumulating proofs but rather in the possibility - which must be demonstrated - of finding in each of life’s details the totality of its meaning. The great advantage of art over philosophy is that it sets itself a single, narrowly defined problem every time: a person, a landscape, a mood. Every extension of one of these to the general, every addition of bold touches of feeling for the world is made to appear as an enrichment, a gift, an undeserved benefit. On the other hand, philosophy, whose problem is nothing less than the totality of being, tends to reduce the magnitude of the latter when compared with itself and offers less than it seems obliged to offer. Here, conversely, the attempt is made to regard the problem as restricted and small in order to do justice to it by extending it to the totality and the highest level of generality.
整个知识世界的范围不仅表现为这一世界内基本运动形式的象征。因此，这些研究的统一性不在于对特定知识内容及其逐渐积累的证明的断言，而在于必须证明的可能性——在生活的每一个细节中找到其意义的整体。艺术相对于哲学的巨大优势在于它每次都设定一个单一、狭义的问题：一个人、一幅风景、一种情绪。将其中一个扩展到一般性，每增加一笔对世界的大胆情感，都被视为一种丰富、一种馈赠、一种不应得的利益。另一方面，哲学的问题无非是存在的整体，往往在与自身比较时会降低后者的规模，并提供的少于它似乎有义务提供的。在这里，相反，试图将问题视为有限和微小，以便通过将其扩展到整体和最高层次的普遍性来公正对待它。

Methodologically, this basic intention can be expressed in the following manner. The attempt is made to construct a new storey beneath historical materialism such that the explanatory value of the incorporation of economic life into the causes of intellectual culture is preserved, while these economic forms themselves are recognized as the result of more profound valuations and currents of psychological or even metaphysical pre-conditions. For the practice of cognition this must develop in infinite reciprocity. Every interpretation of an ideal structure by means of an economic structure must lead to the demand that the latter in turn be understood from more ideal depths, while for these depths themselves the general economic base has to be sought, and so on indefinitely. In such an alternation and entanglement of the conceptually opposed principles of cognition, the unity of things, which seems intangible to our cognition but none the less establishes its coherence, becomes practical and vital for us.
在方法论上，这一基本意图可以用以下方式表达。试图在历史唯物主义之下构建一个新的层面，以保持将经济生活纳入知识文化原因的解释价值，同时这些经济形式本身被视为更深层次的评估和心理或甚至形而上学的前提的结果。对于认知的实践，这必须在无限的互惠中发展。通过经济结构对理想结构的每一次解释都必须导致对后者的要求，即后者必须从更理想的深度来理解，而对于这些深度本身，必须寻找一般经济基础，等等，直到无穷。在这种概念上对立的认知原则的交替和纠缠中，事物的统一性在我们认知中似乎是无形的，但仍然建立了其连贯性，对我们来说变得实用和重要。

The intentions and methods referred to here could not lay claim to any justification in principle if they were not able to serve a substantive diversity of basic philosophical convictions. It is possible to relate the details and superficialities of life to its most profound and essential movements, and their interpretation in accordance with the total meaning of life can be performed on the basis of idealism just as much as of realism, of a rational as much as a volitional or an absolutist as much as a relativistic interpretation of being. The fact that the following investigations are founded on one of these world pictures, which I consider to be the most appropriate expression of the contemporary contents of science and emotional currents and decisively exclude the opposing world picture, might secure for them at
此处提到的意图和方法，如果不能为各种基本哲学信念提供实质性的多样性，则无法主张任何原则上的理由。可以将生活的细节和表面现象与最深刻和最基本的运动联系起来，并且可以基于唯心主义和唯物主义、理性主义和意志主义或绝对主义和相对主义对存在的解释来进行其与生命整体意义相符的诠释。以下研究基于其中一种世界图景，我认为这是当代科学内容和情感潮流最恰当的表达，并果断地排除了相反的世界图景，这可能会为它们在
worst the role of a mere typical example which, even if it is factually incorrect, reveals its methodological significance as the form of future truths.
最坏的情况下，只获得一个典型例子的角色，即使它在事实上是不正确的，也能揭示其作为未来真理形式的方法论意义。

At no point do the amendments to the second impression affect the essential motifs. However, through new examples and discussions and, above all, through an extension of the foundations, I have attempted to increase the likelihood of these motifs being intelligible and acceptable.
第二版修订之处并未影响其基本主题。然而，通过新的例子和讨论，尤其通过扩展基础，我试图提高这些主题的可理解性和可接受性。

Analytical Part  分析部分

The order in which things are placed as natural entities is based on the proposition that the whole variety of their qualities rests upon a uniform law of existence. Their equality before the law of nature, the constant sum of matter and energy, the convertibility of the most diverse phenomena into one another, transform the differences that are apparent at first sight into a general affinity, a universal equality. Yet on a closer view this means only that the products of the natural order are beyond any question of a law. Their absolute determinateness does not allow any emphasis that might provide confirmation or doubt of their particular quality of being. But we are not satisfied with this indifferent necessity that natural science assigns to objects. Instead, disregarding their place in that series we arrange them in another order - an order of value - in which equality is completely eliminated, in which the highest level of one point is adjacent to the lowest level of another; in this series the fundamental quality is not uniformity but difference. The value of objects, thoughts and events can never be inferred from their mere natural existence and content, and their ranking according to value diverges widely from their natural ordering. Nature, on many occasions, destroys objects that, in terms of their value, might claim to be preserved, and keeps in existence worthless objects which occupy the place of the more valuable ones. This is not to say that there is a fundamental opposition between the
事物作为自然实体的排列顺序是基于这样一个命题：它们各种特质的整体多样性依赖于一个统一的存在法则。它们在自然法则面前的平等、物质和能量的恒定总和、各种现象之间的可转换性，将初看上去显而易见的差异转变为一种普遍的亲和力和普遍的平等。然而，仔细观察这仅意味着自然秩序的产物超越了任何法律的问题。它们的绝对确定性不允许任何可能确认或怀疑其特定存在质量的强调。但我们并不满足于自然科学赋予对象的这种无动于衷的必然性。相反，忽视它们在那一系列中的位置，我们将它们排列成另一种秩序——一种价值的秩序——在这种秩序中，平等被完全消除，一个点的最高水平与另一个点的最低水平相邻；在这个系列中，基本特质不是统一性而是差异。对象、思想和事件的价值永远无法仅从它们的自然存在和内容推断出来，它们根据价值的排名与自然排序大相径庭。自然在许多情况下摧毁那些在价值上可能声称被保留的对象，而保留那些无价值的对象，这些无价值的对象占据了更有价值对象的位置。 这并不是说这两个序列之间存在根本的对立，或者它们是相互排斥的。这种观点意味着这两个序列之间存在某种关系；事实上，它会建立一个由价值观决定但符号相反的魔鬼世界。情况恰恰相反，这两个序列之间的关系完全是偶然的。自然界以同样的冷漠，有时提供给我们非常珍视的物品，有时又将它们拒之门外。这两个序列之间偶尔的和谐，即通过现实序列实现源于价值序列的需求，与相反的情况一样，都同样有力地表明了它们之间缺乏任何逻辑关系。我们可能会将同一种生活体验视为真实且有价值的，但在两种情况下，这种体验的意义却大相径庭。自然现象的序列可以完整地描述，而无需提及事物的价值；而我们的价值量表仍然是有意义的，无论其任何对象是否频繁出现或根本不出现在现实中。价值是对完全确定的客观存在的补充，就像光和影一样，它们并非内在于客观存在，而是来自不同的来源。然而，我们应该避免一种误解；即价值概念的形成，作为一个心理事实，与自然过程是截然不同的。
two series, or that they are mutually exclusive. Such a view would imply a relation between the two series; it would establish, indeed, a diabolical world, determined by values, but with the signs reversed. The case is, rather, that the relation between these series is completely accidental. With the same indifference, nature at one time offers us objects that we value highly, at another time withholds them. The occasional harmony between the series, the realization through the reality series of demands derived from the value series, shows the absence of any logical relationship between them just as strikingly as does the opposite case. We may be aware of the same life experience as both real and valuable, but the experience has quite a different meaning in the two cases. The series of natural phenomena could be described in their entirety without mentioning the value of things; and our scale of valuation remains meaningful, whether or not any of its objects appear frequently or at all in reality. Value is an addition to the completely determined objective being, like light and shade, which are not inherent in it but come from a different source. However, we should avoid one misinterpretation; namely, that the formation of value concepts, as a psychological fact, is quite distinct from the natural process. A superhuman mind, which could understand by means of natural laws everything that happens in the world, would also comprehend the fact that people have concepts of values. But these would have no meaning or validity for a being that conceived them purely theoretically, beyond their psychological existence. The meaning of value concepts is denied to nature as a mechanical causal system, while at the same time the psychic experiences that make values a part of our consciousness themselves belong to the natural world. Valuation as a real psychological occurrence is part of the natural world; but what we mean by valuation, its conceptual meaning, is something independent of this world; is not part of it, but is rather the whole world viewed from a particular vantage point. We are rarely aware of the fact that our whole life, from the point of view of consciousness, consists in experiencing and judging values, and that it acquires meaning and significance only from the fact that the mechanically unfolding elements of reality possess an infinite variety of values beyond their objective substance. At any moment when our mind is not simply a passive mirror or reality - which perhaps never happens, since even objective perception can arise only from valuation we live in a world of values which arranges the contents of reality in an autonomous order.
two series, or that they are mutually exclusive. Such a view would imply a relation between the two series; it would establish, indeed, a diabolical world, determined by values, but with the signs reversed. The case is, rather, that the relation between these series is completely accidental. With the same indifference, nature at one time offers us objects that we value highly, at another time withholds them. The occasional harmony between the series, the realization through the reality series of demands derived from the value series, shows the absence of any logical relationship between them just as strikingly as does the opposite case. We may be aware of the same life experience as both real and valuable, but the experience has quite a different meaning in the two cases. The series of natural phenomena could be described in their entirety without mentioning the value of things; and our scale of valuation remains meaningful, whether or not any of its objects appear frequently or at all in reality. Value is an addition to the completely determined objective being, like light and shade, which are not inherent in it but come from a different source. However, we should avoid one misinterpretation; namely, that the formation of value concepts, as a psychological fact, is quite distinct from the natural process. 一个超人类的思维，能够通过自然法则理解世界上发生的一切，也会理解人们对价值的概念。但这些对一个纯粹理论上构思它们的存在者来说没有意义或有效性，超出了它们的心理存在。价值概念的意义对作为机械因果系统的自然是被否定的，同时，使价值成为我们意识一部分的心理体验本身属于自然世界。作为一种真实的心理现象的评价是自然世界的一部分；但我们所指的评价，它的概念意义，是独立于这个世界的；不是这个世界的一部分，而是从特定的视角看待整个世界。我们很少意识到，从意识的角度来看，我们的整个生活由体验和判断价值构成，只有因为现实中机械展开的元素拥有超越其客观实质的无限多样的价值，它才获得意义和重要性。在任何时刻，当我们的思维不仅仅是现实的被动镜子时——这或许从未发生过，因为即使是客观感知也只能源于评价——我们生活在一个价值的世界中，这个世界以自主的秩序排列现实的内容。

Thus, value is in a sense the counterpart to being, and is comparable to being as a comprehensive form and category of the world view. As Kant pointed out, being is not a quality of objects; for if I state that an object,
因此，价值在某种意义上是存在的对立面，并且可以与存在作为一种全面的形式和世界观的范畴进行比较。正如康德所指出的，存在并不是物体的一个属性；因为如果我说一个物体，
which so far existed only in my thoughts, exists, it does not acquire a new quality, because otherwise it would not be the same object that I thought of, but another one. In the same way, an object does not gain a new quality if I call it valuable; it is valued because of the qualities that it has. It is precisely its whole already determined being that is raised to the sphere of value. This is supported by a thorough analysis of our thinking. We are able to conceive the contents of our world view without regard for their real existence or non-existence. We can conceive the aggregates of qualities that we call objects, including all the laws of their interrelation and development, in their objective and logical significance, and we can ask - quite independently of this - whether, where and how often all these concepts or inner notions are realized. The conceptual meaning and determinateness of the objects is not affected by the question as to whether they do exist, nor by the question whether and where they are placed in the scale of values. However, if we want to establish either a theory or a practical rule, we cannot escape the necessity to answer these two questions. We must be able to say of each object that it exists or does not exist, and each object must have a definite place for us in the scale of values, from the highest through indifference to negative values. Indifference is a rejection of positive value; the possibility of interest remains inactive but is always in the background. The significance of this requirement, which determines the constitution of our world view, is not altered by the fact that our powers of comprehension are often insufficient to decide upon the reality of concepts, or by the fact that the range and certainty of our feelings are often inadequate to rank things according to their value, especially in any permanently and universal fashion. Over against the world of mere concepts, of objective qualities and determinations, stand the great categories of being and value, inclusive forms that take their material from the world of pure contents. Both categories have the quality of being fundamental, that is irreducible to each other or to other simpler elements. Consequently, the being of objects can never be inferred logically; being is rather a primary form of our perception, which can be sensed, experienced and believed, but cannot be deduced for somebody who does not yet know it. When this form of perception has once grasped a specific content - by a non-logical act - it can then be interpreted in its logical context and developed as far as this logical context reaches. As a rule, we are able to state why we assume the reality of a particular phenomenon; namely, because we have already assumed another phenomenon with which this one is connected by its specific characteristics. The reality of the first one, however, can be shown only by tracing it in similar fashion to a more fundamental one. This regression requires a final member whose existence
到目前为止仅存在于我思想中的东西，存在时并不会获得新的特性，因为否则它就不是我所想到的那个对象，而是另一个对象。同样，如果我称一个对象为有价值的，它也不会获得新的特性；它之所以被赋予价值，是因为它所具有的特性。正是它的整体已确定的存在被提升到价值的领域。这一点通过对我们思维的深入分析得到了支持。我们能够在不考虑其真实存在或不存在的情况下构思我们世界观的内容。我们可以构思我们称之为对象的特性集合，包括它们相互关系和发展的所有法则，及其客观和逻辑意义，并且我们可以问——完全独立于此——这些概念或内在观念是否、在哪里以及多频繁地得以实现。对象的概念意义和确定性不受它们是否存在的问题的影响，也不受它们在价值尺度中是否以及在哪里被放置的问题的影响。然而，如果我们想建立一个理论或实践规则，我们就无法逃避回答这两个问题的必要性。我们必须能够对每个对象说它存在或不存在，并且每个对象在我们价值尺度中必须有一个明确的位置，从最高到无差别再到负值。 冷漠是一种对积极价值的拒绝；兴趣的可能性保持不活动，但始终处于背景之中。这一要求的重要性，决定了我们世界观的构成，并没有因为我们的理解能力常常不足以判定概念的现实性，或因为我们的感受的范围和确定性常常不足以根据价值对事物进行排名，尤其是以任何永久且普遍的方式，而改变。与仅仅是概念、客观性质和确定性的世界相对立的是存在和价值的伟大范畴，这些包容性的形式从纯内容的世界中获取其材料。这两个范畴具有基础性的特质，即不可简化为彼此或其他更简单的元素。因此，物体的存在永远无法通过逻辑推断；存在更是一种我们感知的主要形式，可以被感知、体验和相信，但无法为尚不理解它的人推导。当这种感知形式一旦通过非逻辑行为抓住了特定内容，它就可以在其逻辑背景中进行解读，并在这个逻辑背景所能达到的范围内进行发展。通常，我们能够说明我们为何假定某一现象的现实性；即，因为我们已经假定了与这个现象通过其特定特征相联系的另一个现象。 然而，第一个现实的存在只能通过类似的方式追溯到一个更基本的现实来证明。这种回归需要一个最终的成员，其存在
depends only upon a sense of conviction, affirmation and acceptance, a sense that is directly given. Valuation has exactly the same relation to objects. All proofs of the value of an object are nothing more than the necessity of recognizing for that object the same value as has been assumed, and for the time being accepted, as indubitable for another object. We will later analyse the motives of this action. Here it will suffice to say that what we consider a proof of value is only the transference of an existing value to a new object. It does not reveal the essence of value, or the reason why value was originally attached to the object from which it is transferred to others.
只依赖于一种信念、肯定和接受的感觉，一种直接给予的感觉。估值与客体的关系完全相同。所有关于客体价值的证明，都只不过是必须承认该客体具有与另一个客体已被假定并暂时接受为无可置疑的相同价值。我们稍后将分析这种行为的动机。在这里，只要说我们认为价值的证明只是将现有的价值转移到一个新的客体就足够了。它并没有揭示价值的本质，也没有揭示为什么最初将价值附加到从中转移到其他客体的客体上。

If we accept the existence of a value, then the process of its realization, its evolution, can be comprehended rationally, because in general it follows the structure of the contents of reality. That there is a value at all, however, is a primary phenomenon. Value inferences only make known the conditions under which values are realized, yet without being produced by these conditions, just as theoretical proofs only prepare the conditions that favour the sense of affirmation or of existence. The question as to what value really is, like the question as to what being is, is unanswerable. And precisely because they have the same formal relation to objects, they are as alien to each other as are thought and extension for Spinoza. Since both express the same absolute substance, each in its own way and perfect in itself, the one can never encroach upon the other. They never impinge upon each other because they question the concepts of objects from completely different points of view. But this disjunctive parallelism of reality and value does not divide the world into a sterile duality, which the mind with its need for unity could never accept - even though its destiny and the method of its quest may be to move incessantly from diversity to unity and from unity to diversity. What is common to value and reality stands above them: namely the contents, which Plato called ‘ideas’, the qualitative, that which can be signified and expressed in our concepts of reality and value, and which can enter into either one or the other series. Below these two categories lies what is common to both: the soul, which absorbs the one or produces the other in its mysterious unity. Reality and value are, as it were, two different languages by which the logically related contents of the world, valid in their ideal unity, are made comprehensible to the unitary soul, or the languages in which the soul can express the pure image of these contents which lies beyond their differentiation and opposition. These two compilations made by the soul, through perceiving and through valuing, may perhaps once more be brought together in a metaphysical unity, for which there is no linguistic term unless it be in religious symbols. There is perhaps a cosmic ground where the heterogeneity and divergencies that we experience between reality and value no longer
如果我们接受价值的存在，那么它的实现过程及其演变就可以理性地理解，因为它通常遵循现实内容的结构。然而，价值的存在本身就是一个基本现象。价值推理仅使已知价值实现的条件，却并非由这些条件产生，就像理论证明仅为有利于肯定感或存在感的条件做准备一样。关于价值究竟是什么的问题，就像关于存在是什么的问题，都是无法回答的。而正因为它们与对象具有相同的形式关系，它们之间是完全陌生的，就像斯宾诺莎的思想与扩展一样。既然两者以各自的方式表达同一绝对实体，各自都完美无缺，那么一个就决不会侵犯另一个。它们之间从未相互影响，因为它们从完全不同的角度质疑对象的概念。但现实与价值的这种选择性平行关系并没有将世界划分为一个无生气的二元性，而是心灵出于对统一的需要永远无法接受——尽管它的命运和寻求的方法可能是不断地从多样性走向统一，再从统一走向多样性。 价值与现实的共同之处高于它们自身：即内容，柏拉图称之为“理念”，即质的方面，它可以在我们对现实和价值的概念中被指明和表达，并且可以进入这两个系列中的任何一个。在这两个范畴之下，是两者共同的东西：灵魂，它以其神秘的统一性吸收其中一个或产生另一个。现实和价值，可以说是两种不同的语言，通过它们，在理想统一中有效的世界的逻辑相关内容，变得可以被统一的灵魂所理解，或者说是灵魂可以表达这些内容纯粹意象的语言，这些意象超越了它们的差异和对立。灵魂通过感知和评价所做的这两项汇编，也许可以再次在一个形而上学统一中结合起来，除非在宗教象征中，否则没有语言术语可以表达这种统一。也许存在一个宇宙基础，在那里我们体验到的现实和价值之间的异质性和差异不再
exist, where both series are revealed as one; this unity either being unaffected by the two categories, and standing beyond them in majestic indifference, or signifying a harmonious interweaving of both, which is shattered and distorted into fragments and contrasts only by our way of regarding it, as if we had an imperfect visual faculty.
存在，在那里这两个系列被揭示为一体；这种统一要么不受这两个范畴的影响，并超然于它们之外，漠然处之，要么表示两者和谐交织，只是由于我们的看待方式，才被粉碎和扭曲成碎片和对比，就好像我们具有不完善的视觉能力一样。

The characteristic feature of value, as it appears in contrast to reality, is usually called its subjectivity. Since one and the same object can have the highest degree of value for one soul and the lowest for another, and vice versa, and since on the other hand the most extensive and extreme differences between objects are compatible with equality of value, there appears to remain only the subject with his customary or exceptional, permanent or changing, moods and responses as the ground for valuation. This subjectivity, needless to say, has nothing to do with the subjectivity that refers to ‘my perception’ of the totality of the world. For the subjectivity of value contrasts value with the given objects, regardless of the way they are conceived. In other words, the subject who comprehends all objects is different from the subject who is confronted with the objects; the subjectivity that value shares with all other objects does not play any role here. Nor is his subjectivity merely caprice; independence from reality does not mean that value can be bestowed here and there with unrestrained and capricious freedom. Value exists in our consciousness as a fact that can no more be altered than can reality itself. The subjectivity of value, therefore, is first of all only negative, in the sense that value is not attached to objects in the same way as is colour or temperature. The latter, although determined by our senses, are accompanied by a feeling of their direct dependence upon the object; but in the case of value we soon learn to disregard this feeling because the two series constituted by reality and by value are quite independent of each other. The only cases more interesting than this general characterization are those in which psychological facts appear to lead to an opposite view.
价值的特征在于与现实的对比，通常被称为其主观性。由于同一对象对一个灵魂可能具有最高的价值，而对另一个灵魂则可能具有最低的价值，反之亦然；另一方面，对象之间最广泛和极端的差异也可以与价值的平等共存，因此似乎只剩下主观者及其习惯性或特殊的、持久的或变化的情绪和反应作为评估的基础。显然，这种主观性与指代“我对世界整体的感知”的主观性无关。因为价值的主观性是将价值与给定对象对比，而不管这些对象是如何被构思的。换句话说，理解所有对象的主体与面对对象的主体是不同的；价值与所有其他对象共享的主观性在这里并不起作用。也不是说他的主观性仅仅是任性；与现实的独立并不意味着价值可以在这里和那里以不受限制和任性的自由被赋予。价值在我们的意识中作为一个事实存在，这个事实与现实本身一样无法改变。因此，价值的主观性首先只是消极的，意味着价值并不像颜色或温度那样附着于对象。 后者虽然由我们的感官决定，但伴随着一种对其直接依赖于客体的感受；但在价值的情况下，我们很快就会学会忽略这种感受，因为由现实和价值构成的两个序列彼此完全独立。比这种一般性描述更有趣的案例是那些似乎导致相反观点的心理事实。

In whatever empirical or transcendental sense the difference between objects and subjects is conceived, value is never a ‘quality’ of the objects, but a judgment upon them which remains inherent in the subject. And yet, neither the deeper meaning and content of the concept of value, nor its significance for the mental life of the individual, nor the practical social events and arrangements based upon it, can be sufficiently understood by referring value to the ‘subject’. The way to a comprehension of value lies in a region in which that subjectivity is only provisional and actually not very essential.
无论以何种经验的或先验的意义来理解客体和主体之间的区别，价值从来都不是客体的“品质”，而是对客体的判断，这种判断仍然存在于主体之中。然而，价值概念的更深层次的意义和内容，它对个人精神生活的意义，以及基于它的实际社会事件和安排，都不能仅仅通过将价值归于“主体”来充分理解。理解价值的途径在于一个主体性只是暂时的，实际上并不十分重要的领域。

The distinction between subject and object is not as radical as the accepted separation of these categories in practical life and in the scientific world would have us believe. Mental life begins with an undifferentiated state in which the Ego and its objects are not yet distinguished; consciousness is filled with impressions and perceptions while the bearer of these contents has still not detached himself from them. It is as a result of a second-stage awareness, a later analysis, that a subject in particular real conditions comes to be distinguished from the content of his consciousness in those conditions. This development obviously leads to a situation where a man speaks of himself as ’ $I$$I$II ’ and recognizes the existence of other objects external to this ’ $I$$I$II '. Metaphysics sometimes claims that the transcendent essence of being is completely unified, beyond the opposition of subject-object, and this has a psychological counterpart in the simple, primitive condition of being possessed by the content of a perception, like a child who does not yet speak of himself as ’ $I$$I$II ', or as may perhaps be observed in a rudimentary form at all stages of life. This unity from which the categories of subject and object develop in relation to each other - in a process to be examined later - appears to us as a subjective unity because we approach it with the concept of objectivity developed later; and because we do not have a proper term for such unities, but name them usually after one of the partial elements that appear in the subsequent analysis. Thus, it has been asserted that all actions are essentially egoistic, whereas egoism has a meaning only within a system of action and by contrast with its correlate, altruism. Similarly, pantheism has described the universality of being as God, although a positive concept of God depends on its contrast with everything empirical. This evolutionary relation between subject and object is repeated finally on a large scale: the intellectual world of classical antiquity differs from that of modern times chiefly in the fact that only the latter has, on the one hand, developed a comprehensive and clear concept of the Ego, as shown by the significance of the problem of liberty which was unknown in ancient times; and on the other, expressed the independence and force of the concept of the object through the idea of unalterable laws of nature. Antiquity was much closer than were later periods to the stage of indifference in which the contents of the world were conceived as such, without being apportioned between subject and object.
主体与客体之间的区分并不像公认的在实践生活和科学世界中对这些类别的分离所让我们相信的那样根本。心理生活始于一种未分化的状态，在这种状态中，自我及其对象尚未被区分；意识充满了印象和感知，而这些内容的承载者仍然未能与这些内容分离。正是在第二阶段的自我意识和后来的分析中，特定现实条件下的主体才会与他在这些条件下意识中的内容区分开来。这一发展显然导致了一种情况，即一个人称自己为’ $I$$I$II ’并承认存在与这个’ $I$$I$II ’外部的其他对象。形而上学有时声称存在的超越本质是完全统一的，超越主体-客体的对立，这在心理上对应于被感知内容所占有的简单、原始状态，就像一个尚未称自己为’ $I$$I$II ’的孩子，或者在生活的各个阶段可能以某种原始形式观察到。 这种从中发展出主观和客观范畴的统一——在后续将要考察的过程中——对我们来说显得是一种主观统一，因为我们是以后来发展出的客观性概念来接近它的；而且因为我们没有一个合适的术语来描述这种统一，通常是根据后续分析中出现的部分元素来命名它们。因此，有人主张所有的行为本质上都是自私的，而自私的意义仅在于一个行动系统中，并与其对应的利他主义形成对比。同样，泛神论将存在的普遍性描述为上帝，尽管上帝的积极概念依赖于与一切经验的对比。这种主观与客观之间的进化关系最终在大规模上得以重复：古典古代的知识世界与现代的知识世界主要的不同在于，只有后者一方面发展出了一个全面而清晰的自我概念，这一点通过自由问题的重要性得以体现，而这一问题在古代是未知的；另一方面，通过不可改变的自然法则的观念表达了对象概念的独立性和力量。古代比后来的时期更接近于一种无差别的阶段，在这个阶段，世界的内容被视为如此，而没有在主观和客观之间进行划分。

This development which separates subject and object appears to be sustained on both sides by the same theme, but operating at different levels. Thus, the
这种将主体和客体分离的发展似乎在双方都由相同的主题支撑，但在不同的层面运作。因此，
awareness of being a subject is already an objectification. This is a basic feature of the mind in its form as personality. The fundamental activity of our mind, which determines its form as a whole, is that we can observe, know and judge ourselves just like any other ‘object’; that we dissect the Ego, experienced as a unity, into a perceiving subject and a perceived object, without its losing its unity, but on the contrary with its becoming aware of its unity through this inner antagonism. The mutual dependence of subject and object is here drawn together in a single point; it has affected the subject itself, which otherwise stands confronting the world as object. Thus man has realized the basic form of his relation to the world, of his acceptance of the world, as soon as he becomes aware of himself and calls himself ’ I '. But before that happens there exists - in respect of meaning as well as of mental growth - a simple perception of content which does not distinguish between subject and object and is not yet divided between them. Regarded from the other side, this content itself, as a logical and conceptual entity, likewise lies beyond the distinction between subjective and objective reality. We can think of any object simply in terms of its qualities and their interconnection without asking whether or not this ideal complex of qualities has an objective existence. To be sure, so far as such a pure objective content is thought, it becomes a conception and to that extent a subjective structure. But the subjective is here only the dynamic act of conception, the function that apprehends the content; in itself this content is thought of as being independent of the act of conceiving. Our mind has a remarkable ability to think of contents as being independent of the act of thinking; this is one of its primary qualities, which cannot be reduced any further. The contents have their conceptual or objective qualities and relationships which can be apprehended but which are not thereby completely absorbed; they exist whether or not they are part of my representation and whether or not they are part of objective reality. The content of a representation does not coincide with the representation of contents. The simple undifferentiated conception that consists only in becoming aware of a content cannot be characterized as subjective, because it does not yet know the contrast between subject and object. Similarly, the pure content of objects or conceptions is not objective, but escapes equally this differential form and its opposite, while being ready to present itself in one or the other. Subject and object are born in the same act: logically, by presenting the conceptual ideal content first as a content of representation, and then as a content of objective reality; psychologically, when the still ego-less representation, in which person and object are undifferentiated, becomes divided and gives rise to a distance between the self and its object, through which each of them becomes a separate entity.
作为主体的意识已经是一种物化。这是心智作为个性的基本特征。我们心智的基本活动，决定了其整体形式，是我们能够观察、认识和判断自己，就像任何其他“对象”一样；我们将作为统一体体验的自我分解为感知主体和被感知对象，而不失去其统一性，反而通过这种内在的对立意识到其统一性。主体和对象的相互依赖在这里汇聚成一个单一的点；它影响了主体本身，主体在此之前是作为对象面对世界的。因此，人类一旦意识到自己并称自己为“我”，就实现了他与世界关系的基本形式，以及他对世界的接受。但在此之前，无论在意义上还是在心理成长上，存在一种简单的内容感知，它并不区分主体和对象，且尚未在它们之间划分。从另一个角度看，这种内容本身，作为一个逻辑和概念实体，同样超越了主观现实和客观现实之间的区别。我们可以仅仅根据任何对象的特性及其相互联系来思考，而不去问这个理想的特性复合体是否具有客观存在。 可以肯定的是，就这种纯粹的客观内容而言，它被思考时变成了一个概念，在这个程度上成为一种主观结构。但这里的主观仅仅是概念的动态行为，即把握内容的功能；就其本身而言，这个内容被认为是独立于概念行为的。我们的思维具有一种显著的能力，可以将内容视为独立于思考行为的；这是它的主要特质之一，无法进一步简化。内容具有其概念或客观特性和关系，这些特性和关系可以被把握，但并不因此而被完全吸收；无论它们是否是我表象的一部分，或者是否是客观现实的一部分，它们都存在。表象的内容与内容的表象并不重合。仅仅意识到一个内容的简单未分化的概念不能被描述为主观，因为它尚未认识到主体与客体之间的对比。同样，对象或概念的纯内容也不是客观的，而是同样逃避这种差异形式及其对立，同时准备以某种方式呈现自己。 主体和客体在同一行为中产生：逻辑上，首先将概念的理想内容呈现为表象的内容，然后呈现为客观现实的内容；心理上，当仍然没有自我意识的表象（其中人和物没有区别）分裂并导致自我和客体之间产生距离时，两者都成为独立的实体。

This process, which finally produces our intellectual world view, also occurs in the sphere of our volitional practical activity. Here also the distinction between the desiring, consuming, valuing subject and the valued object does not comprehend all aspects of mental life, nor all the objective circumstances of practical activity. Human enjoyment of an object is a completely undivided act. At such moments we have an experience that does not include an awareness of an object confronting us or an awareness of the self as distinct from its present condition. Phenomena of the basest and the highest kind meet here. The crude impulse, particularly an impulse of an impersonal, general nature, wants to release itself towards an object and to be satisfied, no matter how; consciousness is exclusively concerned with satisfaction and pays no attention to its bearer on one side or its object on the other. On the other hand, intense aesthetic enjoyment displays the same form. Here too ‘we forget ourselves’, but at the same time we no longer experience the work of art as something with which we are confronted, because our mind is completely submerged in it, has absorbed it by surrendering to it. In this case, as in the other, our psychological condition is not yet, or is no longer, affected by the contrast between subject and object. Only a new process of awareness releases those categories from their undisturbed unity; and only then is the pure enjoyment of the content seen as being on the one hand a state of the subject confronting an object, and on the other the effect produced by an object that is independent of the subject. This tension, which disrupts the naive-practical unity of subject and object and makes us conscious of each in relation to the other, is brought about originally through the mere fact of desire. In desiring what we do not yet own or enjoy, we place the content of our desire outside ourselves. In empirical life, I admit, the finished object stands before us and is only then desired - if only because, in addition to our will, many other theoretical and emotional events contribute to the objectification of mental contents. Within the practical world, however, in relation to its inner order and intelligibility, the origin of the object itself, and its being desired by the subject, are correlative terms - the two aspects of this process of differentiation which splits the immediate unity of the process of enjoyment. It has been asserted that our conception of objective reality originates in the resistance that objects present to us, especially through our sense of touch. We can apply this at once to the practical problem. We desire objects only if they are not immediately given to us for our use and enjoyment; that is, to the extent that they resist our desire. The content of our desire becomes an object as soon as it is opposed to us, not only in the sense
这个过程，最终产生我们的知识世界观，也发生在我们意志的实践活动领域。在这里，渴望、消费、评价的主体与被评价的对象之间的区别并不能涵盖心理生活的所有方面，也不能涵盖实践活动的所有客观情况。人类对一个对象的享受是一个完全不分割的行为。在这样的时刻，我们的体验并不包括对一个与我们对立的对象的意识，也不包括对自我与其当前状态的区别的意识。最卑微和最高尚的现象在这里相遇。粗糙的冲动，特别是一种非个人的、一般的冲动，想要向一个对象释放自己并得到满足，无论如何；意识完全关注于满足，而不关注其承载者或其对象。另一方面，强烈的审美享受表现出相同的形式。在这里我们也“忘记了自己”，但与此同时，我们不再将艺术作品视为与我们对立的东西，因为我们的心智完全沉浸在其中，已经通过投降而吸收了它。在这种情况下，与另一种情况一样，我们的心理状态尚未或不再受到主体与对象之间对比的影响。 只有一种新的意识过程才能将这些类别从它们未受干扰的统一中释放出来；只有在那时，内容的纯粹享受才被视为一方面是主体面对对象的状态，另一方面是由独立于主体的对象产生的效果。这种紧张关系打破了主体和对象的天真实践统一，使我们意识到彼此之间的关系，最初是通过欲望的简单事实产生的。在渴望我们尚未拥有或享受的事物时，我们将欲望的内容置于自身之外。在经验生活中，我承认，完成的对象在我们面前存在，只有在那时才被渴望——即使是因为，除了我们的意志，许多其他理论和情感事件也促成了心理内容的客观化。然而，在实践世界中，就其内在秩序和可理解性而言，对象本身的起源及其被主体渴望是相关的术语——这是分裂享受过程的直接统一的差异化过程的两个方面。有人声称，我们对客观现实的概念源于对象对我们所呈现的抵抗，特别是通过我们的触觉。我们可以立即将其应用于实践问题。我们只在对象未立即提供给我们使用和享受时才渴望它们；也就是说，只有在它们抵抗我们的欲望的程度上。 我们欲望的内容，一旦与我们对立，就成为一个客体，这不仅指它对我们而言是不可渗透的，而且指它作为尚未享有的东西的距离，这种状态的主观方面就是欲望。正如康德所说：经验的可能性是经验对象的可能性——因为拥有经验意味着我们的意识从感官印象中创造出客体。同样，欲望的可能性是欲望对象的可能性。这样形成的客体，其特征是与主体分离，主体同时建立它并试图通过其欲望克服它，对我们来说就是一个价值。享乐的时刻本身，当主体与客体之间的对立被抹去时，消除了价值。价值只有作为对比，作为与主体分离的客体才能恢复。
of being impervious to us, but also in terms of its distance as something not-yet-enjoyed, the subjective aspect of this condition being desire. As Kant has said: the possibility of experience is the possibility of the objects of experience - because to have experiences means that our consciousness creates objects from sense impressions. In the same way, the possibility of desire is the possibility of the objects of desire. The object thus formed, which is characterized by its separation from the subject, who at the same time establishes it and seeks to overcome it by his desire, is for us a value. The moment of enjoyment itself, when the opposition between subject and object is effaced, consumes the value. Value is only reinstated as contrast, as an object separated from the subject. Such trivial experiences as that we appreciate the value of our possessions only after we have lost them, that the mere withholding of a desired object often endows it with a value quite disproportionate to any possible enjoyment that it could yield, that the remoteness, either literal or figurative, of the objects of our enjoyment shows them in a transfigured light and with heightened attractions - all these are derivatives, modifications and hybrids of the basic fact that value does not originate from the unbroken unity of the moment of enjoyment, but from the separation between the subject and the content of enjoyment as an object that stands opposed to the subject as something desired and only to be attained by the conquest of distance, obstacles and difficulties. To reiterate the earlier analogy: in the final analysis perhaps, reality does not press upon our consciousness through the resistance that phenomena exert, but we register those representations which have feelings of resistance and inhibition associated with them, as being objectively real, independent and external to us. Objects are not difficult to acquire because they are valuable, but we call those objects valuable that resist our desire to possess them. Since the desire encounters resistance and frustration, the objects gain a significance that would never have been attributed to them by an unchecked will.
我们欲望的内容，一旦与我们对立，就成为一个客体，这不仅指它对我们而言是不可渗透的，而且指它作为尚未享有的东西的距离，这种状态的主观方面就是欲望。正如康德所说：经验的可能性是经验对象的可能性——因为拥有经验意味着我们的意识从感官印象中创造出客体。同样，欲望的可能性是欲望对象的可能性。这样形成的客体，其特征是与主体分离，主体同时建立它并试图通过其欲望克服它，对我们来说就是一个价值。享乐的时刻本身，当主体与客体之间的对立被抹去时，消除了价值。价值只有作为对比，作为与主体分离的客体才能恢复。 这样的琐碎经历，比如我们只有在失去财物后才会意识到它们的价值，渴望的对象仅仅被拒绝时往往赋予它一种与可能的享受不成比例的价值，享受对象的远离，无论是字面上的还是比喻上的，都以一种变形的光辉和增强的吸引力展现出来——所有这些都是基本事实的衍生物、修饰和混合体：价值并不是源于享受时刻的无缝统一，而是源于主体与享受内容之间的分离，享受作为一个与主体对立的对象，作为一种渴望，只有通过征服距离、障碍和困难才能获得。重申之前的类比：从最终分析来看，现实并不是通过现象施加的抵抗来压迫我们的意识，而是我们记录那些与抵抗和抑制感相关的表象，认为它们是客观真实的、独立于我们之外的。物体并不是因为有价值而难以获得，而是我们称那些抵抗我们占有欲的物体为有价值。由于渴望遭遇抵抗和挫折，这些物体获得了一种本来不会被不受限制的意志所赋予的意义。

Value, which appears at the same time and in the same process of differentiation as the desiring Ego and as its correlate, is subordinate to yet another category. It is the same category as applies to the object that is conceived in theoretical representations. We concluded, in that case, that the contents that are realized in the objective world and also exist in us as subjective representations have, in addition, a peculiar ideal dignity. The concepts of the triangle or of the organism, causality or the law of gravitation have a logical sense, an inner structural validity which indeed determines their realization in space and in consciousness; but even if they were never realized, they would still belong to the ultimate unanalysable category of the valid and significant, and would differ entirely from fantastic and
价值，同时出现在欲望自我和其相关物的差异化过程中，服从于另一个类别。它与在理论表征中构思的对象适用的类别相同。在这种情况下，我们得出结论，客观世界中实现的内容以及作为主观表征存在于我们内部的内容，此外还有一种特殊的理想尊严。三角形或有机体、因果关系或引力法则的概念具有逻辑意义，内在结构的有效性确实决定了它们在空间和意识中的实现；但即使它们从未实现，它们仍然属于有效和重要的最终不可分析类别，并且与幻想和
contradictory conceptual notions to which they might be akin in their reference to physical and mental non-reality. The value that is attributed to the objects of subjective desire is analogous to this, with the qualifications required by its different sphere. Just as we represent certain statements as true while recognizing that their truth is independent of our representation, so we sense that objects, people and events are not only appreciated as valuable by us, but would still be valuable if no one appreciated them. The most striking example is the value that we assign to people’s dispositions or characters, as being moral, dignified, strong or beautiful. Whether or not such inner qualities ever show themselves in deeds that make possible or demand recognition, and whether their bearer himself reflects upon them with a sense of his own value, appears to us irrelevant to their real value; still more, this unconcern for recognition endows these values with their characteristic colouring. Furthermore, intellectual energy and the fact that it brings the most secret forces and arrangements of nature into the light of consciousness; the power and the rhythm of emotions that, in the limited sphere of the individual soul, are yet much more significant than the external world, even if the pessimistic view of the predominance of suffering in the world is true; the fact that, regardless of man, nature moves according to reliable fixed norms, that the manifold natural forms are not incompatible with a more profound unity of the whole, that nature’s mechanism can be interpreted through ideas and also produces beauty and grace - all this leads us to conceive that the world is valuable no matter whether these values are experienced consciously or not. This extends all the way down to the economic value that we assign to any object of exchange, even though nobody is willing to pay the price, and even though the object is not in demand at all and remains unsaleable. Here too a basic capacity of the mind becomes apparent: that of separating itself from the ideas that it conceives and representing these ideas as if they were independent of its own representation. It is true that every value that we experience is a sentiment; but what we mean by this sentiment is a significant content which is realized psychologically through the sentiment yet is neither identical with it nor exhausted by it. Obviously this category lies beyond the controversy about the subjectivity or objectivity of value, because it denies the relation to a subject that is indispensable for the existence of an ‘object’. It is rather a third term, an ideal concept which enters into the duality but is not exhausted by it. In conformity with the practical sphere to which it belongs, it has a particular form of relationship to the subject which does not exist for the merely abstract content of our theoretical concepts. This form may be described as a claim or demand. The value that attaches to any object, person,
与它们在指向物质和精神非现实方面可能相似的矛盾概念观念。主观欲望对象所赋予的价值与此类似，尽管它在不同领域中需要不同的限定。正如我们将某些陈述视为真实，同时承认它们的真实性独立于我们的表述，我们也感知到对象、人物和事件不仅被我们视为有价值，而且即使没有人欣赏它们，它们仍然会是有价值的。最显著的例子是我们赋予人们的性格或品德的价值，比如道德、尊严、力量或美丽。这些内在品质是否在能够或要求认可的行为中表现出来，以及其承载者是否以自身价值的意识反思这些品质，对它们的真实价值而言似乎无关紧要；更重要的是，这种对认可的漠不关心赋予了这些价值其特有的色彩。 此外，智力能量以及它将自然中最隐秘的力量和安排带入意识光芒中的事实；情感的力量和节奏，在个体灵魂的有限领域中，尽管世界的痛苦主导的悲观观点是正确的，但它们却远比外部世界更为重要；无论人类如何，自然都按照可靠的固定规范运作，众多自然形式与整体更深层次的统一并不矛盾，自然的机制可以通过观念进行解释，并且也产生美和优雅——所有这些都使我们意识到，世界是有价值的，无论这些价值是否被有意识地体验。这一直延伸到我们赋予任何交换对象的经济价值，即使没有人愿意支付这个价格，即使该对象根本没有需求并且无法出售。在这里，心智的基本能力也显现出来：将自己与所构思的观念分离，并将这些观念表现得好像它们独立于自身的表现。确实，我们所体验的每一个价值都是一种情感；但我们所指的这种情感是一个重要的内容，它通过情感在心理上实现，但既不与之相同，也不被其耗尽。 显然，这一类别超出了关于价值的主观性或客观性的争论，因为它否定了对一个“对象”存在不可或缺的主体关系。它更像是一个第三个术语，一个理想概念，它进入了二元性但并未被其所耗尽。根据它所属于的实践领域，它与主体之间存在一种特定的关系，这种关系在我们理论概念的纯粹抽象内容中并不存在。这种形式可以被描述为一种要求或需求。附着在任何对象、个人上的价值，
relationship or happening demands recognition. This demand exists, as an event, only within ourselves as subjects; but in accepting it we sense that we are not merely satisfying a claim imposed by ourselves upon ourselves, or merely acknowledging a quality of the object. The ability of a tangible symbol to awaken in us religious feelings; the moral challenge to revolutionize particular conditions of life or to leave them alone, to develop or retard them; the feeling of obligation not to remain indifferent to great events, but to respond to them; the right of what is perceived to be interpreted in an aesthetic context - all of these are claims that are experienced or realized exclusively within the Ego and have no counterpart or objective point of departure in the objects themselves, but which, as claims, cannot be traced either to the Ego or to the objects to which they refer. Regarded from a naturalistic point of view such a claim may appear subjective, while from the subject’s point of view it appears to be objective; in fact, it is a third category, which cannot be derived from either subject or object, but which stands, so to speak, between us and the objects. I have observed that the value of things belongs among those mental contents that, while we conceive them, we experience at the same time as something independent within our representation, and as detached from the function by which it exists in us. This representation, when its content is a value, appears upon closer scrutiny as a sense that a claim is being made. The ‘function’ is a demand which does not exist as such outside ourselves, but which originates in an ideal realm which does not lie within us. It is not a particular quality of the objects of valuation, but consists rather in the significance that the objects have for us as subjects through their position in the order of that ideal realm. This value, which we conceive as being independent of its recognition, is a metaphysical category, and as such it stands as far beyond the dualism of subject and object as immediate enjoyment stands below it. The latter is a concrete unity to which the differentiating categories have not yet been applied; the former is an abstract or ideal unity, in whose self-subsistent meaning the dualism has again disappeared, just as the contrast between the empirical Ego and the empirical Non-Ego disappears in the all-comprehending system of consciousness that Fichte calls the Ego. At the moment of complete fusion of the function and its content, enjoyment cannot be called subjective, because there is no counterposed object that would justify the concept of a subject. Likewise, this independent, self-justifying value is not objective simply because it is conceived as independent by the subject who conceives it; although it becomes manifest within the subject as a claim for recognition, it will not forfeit anything of its reality if this claim is not fulfilled.
关系或事件要求被认可。这种要求作为一种事件，仅存在于我们作为主体的内心；但在接受它时，我们感受到的并不仅仅是满足自己对自己的要求，或仅仅是承认对象的某种特性。一个有形符号唤起我们宗教情感的能力；道德上挑战革命特定生活条件或置之不理的责任；不对重大事件保持冷漠而作出回应的义务感；在美学背景下被解读的权利——所有这些要求都是在自我内部独特体验或实现的，并且在对象本身中没有对应或客观的出发点，但作为要求，它们既无法追溯到自我，也无法追溯到它们所指的对象。从自然主义的角度来看，这种要求可能显得主观，而从主体的角度来看，它又显得客观；实际上，它是一个第三类，既不能从主体或对象中推导出来，但可以说，它站在我们与对象之间。我观察到，事物的价值属于那些心理内容，在我们构思它们的同时，我们也体验到它们在我们的表象中作为某种独立的东西，并且与其在我们内部存在的功能相脱离。 这种表现，当其内容是一个价值时，经过仔细审视，似乎是一种主张的感觉。“功能”是一种需求，这种需求在我们之外并不存在，而是源于一个不在我们内部的理想领域。它不是评价对象的特定属性，而是体现在这些对象作为主体在那个理想领域秩序中的位置对我们所具有的意义。我们认为独立于其认可的这种价值，是一个形而上学的范畴，因此它远远超越了主体与客体的二元对立，就像直接享受低于它一样。后者是一个具体的统一体，尚未应用区分的范畴；前者是一个抽象或理想的统一体，在其自足的意义中，二元对立再次消失，就像经验自我与经验非自我之间的对比在费希特所称的自我所包含的全知意识系统中消失一样。在功能与其内容完全融合的瞬间，享受不能被称为主观，因为没有对立的对象可以证明主体的概念。 同样，这种独立、自我证明的价值并不是客观的，仅仅因为它被构想为独立的主体；尽管它在主体内表现为一种对认可的要求，但如果这个要求没有得到满足，它的现实性并不会因此而失去任何东西。

This metaphysical sublimation of value does not play any role in the valuations of daily life, which are concerned only with values in the consciousness of the subject and with the objectivity that emerges as a counterposed object in this psychological process of valuation. I showed earlier that this process of the formation of values develops with the increase in distance between the consumer and the cause of his enjoyment. The differences in valuation which have to be distinguished as subjective and objective, originate from such variations in distance, measured not in terms of enjoyment, in which the distance disappears, but in terms of desire, which is engendered by the distance and seeks to overcome it. At least in the case of those objects whose valuation forms the basis of the economy, value is the correlate of demand. Just as the world of being is my representation, so the world of value is my demand. However, in spite of the logical-physical necessity that every demand expects to be satisfied by an object, the psychological structure of demand is such that in most cases it is focused upon the satisfaction itself, and the object becomes a matter of indifference so long as it satisfies the need. When a man is satisfied with any woman whatsoever, without exercising an individual choice, when he eats anything at all that he can chew and digest, when he sleeps at any resting place, when his cultural needs can be satisfied by the simplest materials offered by nature, then his practical consciousness is completely subjective, he is inspired exclusively by the agitations and satisfactions of his own subjective condition and his interest in objects is limited to their being the causes of these effects. This fact is observed in the naive need for projection by primitive man, who directs his life towards the outside world and takes his inner life for granted. But the conscious wish cannot always be taken as a sufficient index of the really effective valuation. Often enough it is some expediency in the direction of our practical activities that leads us to regard an object as valuable, and it is not in fact the significance of the object but the possible subjective satisfaction that excites us. From this condition - which is not always temporally prior but is, so to speak, the simplest and most fundamental and thus in a systematic sense prior - consciousness is led to the object along two roads which finally merge. When an identical need rejects a number of possible satisfactions, perhaps all but one, and when, therefore, it is not satisfaction as such but satisfaction by a specific object that is desired, there begins a fundamental reorientation from the subject to the object. It may be said that this is still only a question of the subjective satisfaction of need, but that in this second case the need is differentiated to such an extent that only a specific object can satisfy it. In this case also the object is only the cause of sensation and is not valued in itself. Such an objection would indeed nullify
这种价值的形而上升华在日常生活的评估中并没有任何作用，这些评估仅关心主体意识中的价值以及在这种心理评估过程中作为对立对象出现的客观性。我之前已经表明，这种价值形成的过程随着消费者与其享受原因之间距离的增加而发展。需要区分的主观和客观的评估差异，源于这种距离的变化，这种距离不是以享受为标准（在享受中距离消失），而是以欲望为标准，欲望是由距离产生并试图克服它的。至少在那些其评估构成经济基础的对象中，价值是需求的对应物。正如存在的世界是我的表象，价值的世界是我的需求。然而，尽管每个需求都逻辑上和物理上期待通过一个对象得到满足，但需求的心理结构在大多数情况下是集中于满足本身的，只要对象满足需求，它就变得无关紧要。 当一个男人对任何女人都感到满意，而不进行个体选择；当他吃任何他能咀嚼和消化的东西；当他在任何休息的地方睡觉；当他的文化需求可以通过自然提供的最简单材料得到满足时，他的实践意识就完全是主观的，他的灵感完全来自于他自己主观状态的激动和满足，他对物体的兴趣仅限于它们作为这些效果的原因。这个事实在原始人对投射的天真需求中得到了体现，他将生活导向外部世界，并将内心生活视为理所当然。但意识的愿望并不总能作为真正有效评估的充分指标。往往是我们实践活动方向上的某种权宜之计使我们将一个物体视为有价值的，实际上激励我们的并不是物体的意义，而是可能的主观满足。从这种状态出发——这种状态并不总是时间上优先，但可以说是最简单和最基本的，因此在系统意义上是优先的——意识沿着两条最终汇合的道路走向对象。 当一个相同的需求拒绝了多个可能的满足，或许除了一个以外的所有满足时，因此，所渴望的不是作为满足本身的满足，而是通过特定对象的满足，这就开始了从主体到客体的根本重新定位。可以说，这仍然只是一个关于主观需求满足的问题，但在这种第二种情况下，需求被区分到如此程度，以至于只有特定对象才能满足它。在这种情况下，对象也只是感知的原因，并不被本身所重视。这样的反对意见确实会使得
the difference, if it were the case that the differentiation of the impulse directed it exclusively upon a single satisfying object and ruled out the possibility of satisfaction through any other object. However, this is a very rare and exceptional case. The broader basis from which even the most highly differentiated impulses evolve, and the original diffuseness of need which includes only a drive but not yet a definite single goal, remain as a substratum upon which a consciousness of the individual character of more specific desires for satisfaction develops. The circle of objects that can satisfy the subject’s needs is diminished as he becomes more refined, and the objects desired are set in a sharper contrast with all the others that might satisfy the need but are no longer acceptable. It is well known from psychological investigations that this difference between objects is largely responsible for directing consciousness towards them and endowing them with particular significance. At this stage the need seems to be determined by the object; feeling is guided increasingly by its terminus ad quem instead of its terminus a quo, in the measure that impulse no longer rushes upon every possible satisfaction. Consequently, the place that the object occupies in our consciousness becomes larger. There is also another reason for this. So long as man is dominated by his impulses the world appears to him as an undifferentiated substance. Since it represents for him only an irrelevant means for the satisfaction of his drives - and this effect may arise from all kinds of causes - he has no interest in the nature of the objects themselves. It is the fact that we need a particular single object that makes us acutely aware that we need an object at all. But such awareness is, so to speak, more theoretical - and it diminishes the blind energy of the impulse which is directed only to its own extinction.
如果冲动的差异使其仅仅指向一个满足的对象，并排除了通过其他对象获得满足的可能性，那么这种情况的差异就会出现。然而，这是一种非常罕见和特殊的情况。即使是最高度分化的冲动所发展的更广泛基础，以及仅包含一种驱动但尚未有明确单一目标的需求的最初扩散性，仍然作为一个基础，在此基础上更具体的满足欲望的个体特征意识得以发展。随着个体的精细化，能够满足主体需求的对象范围缩小，所渴望的对象与所有其他可能满足需求但不再可接受的对象形成了更为鲜明的对比。心理学研究表明，这种对象之间的差异在很大程度上负责引导意识朝向它们，并赋予它们特定的意义。在这个阶段，需求似乎是由对象决定的；感觉越来越多地受到其终点的引导，而不是其起点，随着冲动不再冲向每一个可能的满足。因此，对象在我们意识中所占据的位置变得更大。还有另一个原因。只要人被他的冲动支配，世界在他眼中就显得是一种未分化的物质。 由于它对他来说仅仅是满足他驱动的无关手段——这种效果可能源于各种原因——他对对象本身的性质没有兴趣。正是我们需要一个特定的单一对象的事实，使我们敏锐地意识到我们确实需要一个对象。但这种意识可以说是更理论性的——它减弱了仅仅指向自身消亡的冲动的盲目能量。

Since the differentiation of need goes hand in hand with the reduction of its elemental power, consciousness becomes more able to accommodate the object. Or regarded from the other aspect: because consciousness is constrained by the refinement and specialization of need to take a greater interest in the object, a certain amount of force is removed from the solipsistic need. Everywhere the weakening of the emotions, that is to say of the absolute surrender of the Ego to his momentary feelings, is correlated with the objectification of representations, with their appearance in a form of existence that stands over against us. Thus, for instance, talking things over is one of the most powerful means for subduing emotions. The inner process is, as it were, projected by the word into the external world; it now stands over against the individual like a tangible structure, and the intensity of the emotions is diverted. The tranquillization of the passions, and the representation of the objective world as existing and significant, are two sides of one
需求的差异化与其基本力量的减弱是相辅相成的，因此意识变得更能够适应对象。或者从另一个方面来看：因为意识受到需求的精细化和专业化的限制，更加关注对象，从而从自我中心的需求中移除了一定的力量。情感的减弱，也就是说自我对瞬时感受的绝对投降，与表象的客观化相关联，这些表象以一种与我们对立的存在形式出现。因此，例如，讨论事情是平息情感的最有效手段之一。内在过程可以说通过语言投射到外部世界；它现在像一个有形的结构一样与个体对立，情感的强度被转移。激情的平静以及将客观世界表现为存在和重要性的过程是一个整体的两个方面。
and the same basic process. The diversion of inner interest from mere need and its satisfaction to the object itself, as a result of diminishing the possibility of satisfying the need, can obviously be brought about and strengthened just as well from the side of the object, if the latter makes satisfaction difficult, rare, and to be attained only indirectly or by exceptional effort. Even if we assume a highly differentiated desire concentrated upon selected objects, satisfaction might still be regarded as more or less a matter of course so long as there is no difficulty or resistance. What really matters, in order to conceive the independent significance of objects, is the distance between them and our impression of them. It is one of the numerous cases in which one has to stand back from the objects, to establish a distance between them and oneself, in order to get an objective picture of them. This is certainly no less subjective a view than the unclear or distorted picture that is obtained when the distance is too great or too small; but inner expediential reasons of our cognition lay a special emphasis upon subjectivity in the case of these extremes. At first, the object exists only in our relationship to it and is completely absorbed in this relationship; it becomes something external and opposed to us only in the degree that it escapes from this connection. Even the desire for objects, which recognizes their autonomy while seeking to overcome it, develops only when want and satisfaction do not coincide. The possibility of enjoyment must be separated, as an image of the future, from our present condition in order for us to desire things that now stand at a distance from us. Just as in the intellectual sphere the original oneness of perception, which we can observe in children, is only gradually divided into awareness of the self and of the object, so the naive enjoyment of objects only gives way to an awareness of the significance of things, and respect for them, when the objects are somewhat withdrawn. Here, too, the relationship between the weakening of desire and the beginning of an objectification of values is apparent, since the decline of the elemental strength of volition and feeling favours the growing awareness of the self. So long as a person surrenders unreservedly to a momentary feeling and is completely possessed by it, the Ego cannot develop. The awareness of a self that exists beyond its various emotions can emerge only when it appears as an enduring entity amid all these changes, and when the emotions do not absorb the whole self. The emotions must leave a part of the self untouched, as a neutral point for their contrasts, so that a certain reduction and limitation of the emotions allows the self to develop as the unchanging bearer of diverse contents. In all areas of our life Ego and object are related concepts, which are not yet separated in the initial forms of representation and only become differentiated through each other; and in just the same way, the
同样的基本过程。内在兴趣从单纯的需求及其满足转移到对象本身，这一过程的结果是减少满足需求的可能性，显然可以通过对象本身来实现和加强，如果后者使得满足变得困难、稀少，并且只能通过间接或特殊的努力来获得。即使我们假设有高度差异化的欲望集中于特定对象，只要没有困难或阻力，满足仍然可以被视为或多或少是理所当然的。为了理解对象的独立意义，真正重要的是它们与我们对它们的印象之间的距离。这是许多情况下的一个例子，在这些情况下，人们必须从对象中退后，建立它们与自己之间的距离，以便获得它们的客观图像。这种观点无疑与当距离过大或过小时所获得的不清晰或扭曲的图像一样主观；但在这些极端情况下，我们认知的内在经验理由特别强调了主观性。起初，对象仅存在于我们与它的关系中，并完全被这种关系所吸收；只有在它逃离这种联系的程度上，它才成为外在的、与我们对立的事物。 即使是对物体的渴望，虽然承认它们的自主性但又试图克服这种自主性，只有在需求和满足不重合时才会发展。享受的可能性必须与我们当前的状态分开，作为未来的一个图像，才能让我们渴望那些现在与我们保持距离的事物。正如在智力领域中，我们可以在儿童身上观察到的感知的原始统一性，只有逐渐分化为自我意识和对象意识，天真的物体享受也只有在物体稍微撤回时，才会让位于对事物意义的意识和对它们的尊重。在这里，欲望的减弱与价值的物化开始之间的关系也显而易见，因为意志和情感的基本力量的衰退有利于自我意识的增强。只要一个人毫无保留地屈服于瞬间的感觉并完全被其占据，自我就无法发展。超越各种情感而存在的自我意识只有在它作为一个持久的实体出现在所有这些变化中，并且情感没有吸收整个自我的时候才能出现。情感必须留下一部分自我不受影响，作为它们对比的中立点，以便某种程度的情感减少和限制使自我能够作为多样内容的不变承载者发展。 在我们生活的各个领域，自我和客体都是相关的概念，在表象的初始形式中尚未分离，只是通过彼此才变得有所区别；同样，客体的独立价值也只有与已经独立的自我形成对比才能发展起来。只有我们经历的排斥、获得客体的困难、愿望与实现之间等待和劳作，才能将自我与客体分开；否则，它们就会在需求与满足的接近中保持未发展和未分化的状态。客体的有效定义是源于其相对于需求的稀缺性，还是源于积极获取它的努力，毫无疑问，只有这样才能在客体与我们之间建立距离，使我们能够赋予它超越仅仅被享用的价值。
independent value of objects develops only by contrast with an Ego that has become independent. Only the repulsions that we experience, the difficulties of attaining an object, the waiting and the labour that stand between a wish and its fulfilment, drive the Ego and the object apart; otherwise they remain undeveloped and undifferentiated in the propinquity of need and satisfaction. Whether the effective definition of the object arises from its scarcity, in relation to demand, or from the positive effort to acquire it, there is no doubt that only in this way is distance established between the object and ourselves which enables us to accord it a value beyond that of being merely enjoyed.
独立的客体价值只有与独立的自我形成对比才能发展。只有我们经历的排斥、获得客体的困难、愿望与实现之间的等待和劳作，才能将自我与客体分开；否则，它们就会在需求与满足的接近中保持未发展和未分化的状态。客体的有效定义是源于其相对于需求的稀缺性，还是源于积极获取它的努力，毫无疑问，只有这样才能在客体与我们之间建立距离，使我们能够赋予它超越仅仅被享用的价值。

It may be said, therefore, that the value of an object does indeed depend upon the demand for it, but upon a demand that is no longer purely instinctive. On the other hand, if the object is to remain an economic value, its value must not be raised so greatly that it becomes an absolute. The distance between the self and the object of demand could become so large - through the difficulties of procuring it, through its exorbitant price, through moral or other misgivings that counter the striving after it - that the act of volition does not develop, and the desire is extinguished or becomes only a vague wish. The distance between subject and object that establishes value, at least in the economic sense, has a lower and an upper limit; the formula that the amount of value equals the degree of resistance to the acquisition of objects, in relation to natural, productive and social opportunities, is not correct. Certainly, iron would not be an economic value if its acquisition encountered no greater difficulty than the acquisition of air for breathing; but these difficulties had to remain within certain limits if the tools were to be manufactured which made iron valuable. To take another example: it has been suggested that the pictures of a very productive painter would be less valuable than those of one who was less productive, assuming equal artistic talent. But this is true only above a certain quantitative level. A painter, in order to acquire the fame that raises the price of his pictures, is obliged to produce a certain number of works. Again, the scarcity of gold in some countries with a paper currency has created a situation in which ordinary people will not accept gold even when it is offered to them. In the particular case of precious metals, whose suitability as the material of money is usually attributed to their scarcity, it should be noted that scarcity can only become significant above a considerable volume, without which these metals could not serve the practical demand for money and consequently could not acquire the value they possess as money. It is, perhaps, only the avaricious desire for an unlimited quantity of goods, in terms of which all values are scarce, that leads us to overlook that a certain proportion between scarcity
因此，可以说，一个物体的价值确实依赖于对它的需求，但这种需求不再是纯粹的本能需求。另一方面，如果这个物体要保持经济价值，它的价值就不能被抬高到绝对的程度。自我与需求对象之间的距离可能会变得如此之大——通过获取它的困难，通过其过高的价格，通过道德或其他反对追求它的顾虑——以至于意志行为无法发展，欲望被熄灭或仅仅变成模糊的愿望。确立价值的主体与客体之间的距离，在经济意义上，具有下限和上限；价值的量等于获取物体的抵抗程度的公式，关于自然、生产和社会机会的关系，并不正确。当然，如果获取铁的难度与获取呼吸空气的难度没有更大差别，铁就不会成为经济价值；但这些困难必须保持在某些限度内，才能制造出使铁有价值的工具。再举一个例子：有人提出，一个非常高产的画家的画作可能比一个低产画家的画作价值低，假设两者的艺术才能相等。但这只有在某个数量水平以上才是正确的。 一位画家为了获得提升其作品价格的名声，不得不创作一定数量的作品。此外，在一些使用纸币的国家，黄金的稀缺性导致普通人即使在提供黄金时也不愿接受。在贵金属的特定情况下，其作为货币材料的适用性通常归因于其稀缺性，但需要注意的是，稀缺性只有在达到相当的数量时才会变得重要，否则这些金属无法满足货币的实际需求，因此也无法获得作为货币所具备的价值。或许，正是对无限数量商品的贪婪欲望，使我们忽视了稀缺性之间的某种比例。
and non-scarcity, and not scarcity itself, is the condition of value. The factor of scarcity has to be related to the significance of the sense for differences; the factor of abundance to the significance of habituation. Life in general is determined by the proportion of these two facts: that we need variety and change of content just as we need familiarity; and this general need appears here in the specific form that the value of objects requires, on the one hand, scarcity - that is to say, differentiation and particularity - while on the other hand it needs a certain comprehensiveness, frequency and permanence in order that objects may enter the realm of values.
并非稀缺性本身，而是非稀缺性和稀缺性，才是价值的条件。稀缺性因素必须与差异感的重要性相关；丰裕性因素必须与习惯的重要性相关。生活普遍由这两个事实的比例决定：我们需要多样性和内容变化，就像我们需要熟悉感一样；这种普遍需求在这里以一种特殊形式出现，即物体的价值一方面需要稀缺性——也就是说，差异性和特殊性——另一方面，它需要一定的全面性、频率和持久性，以便物体能够进入价值领域。

I would like to show the universal significance of distance for supposedly objective valuation by an example that has nothing to do with economic values and which therefore illustrates the general principle, namely aesthetic valuation. What we call the enjoyment of the beauty of things developed relatively late. For no matter how much immediate sensual enjoyment may exist even today in the individual case, the specific quality of aesthetic enjoyment is the ability to appreciate and enjoy the object, not simply an experience of sensual or supra-sensual stimulation. Every cultivated person is able to make a clear distinction in principle between the aesthetic and the sensual enjoyment of female beauty, even though he may not be able to draw the line between these components of his impression on a particular occasion. In the one case we surrender to the object, while in the other case the object surrenders to us. Even though aesthetic value, like any other value, is not an integral part of the object but is rather a projection of our feelings, it has the peculiarity that the projection is complete. In other words, the content of the feeling is, as it were, absorbed by the object and confronts the subject as something which has autonomous significance, which is inherent in the object. What was the historical psychological process in which this objective aesthetic pleasure in things emerged, given that primitive enjoyment which was the basis for any more refined appreciation must have been tied to direct subjective satisfaction and utility? Perhaps we can find a clue in a very simple observation. If an object of any kind provides us with great pleasure or advantage we experience a feeling of joy at every later viewing of this object, even if any use or enjoyment is now out of the question. This joy, which resembles an echo, has a unique psychological character determined by the fact that we no longer want anything from the object. In place of the former concrete relationship with the object, it is now mere contemplation that is the source of enjoyable sensation; we leave the being of the
我想通过一个与经济价值无关的例子来展示距离对所谓客观评价的普遍意义，这个例子因此说明了一个普遍原则，即审美评价。我们所称的对事物美的享受相对较晚发展。因为无论今天在个别情况下存在多少直接的感官享受，审美享受的特定质量在于欣赏和享受对象的能力，而不仅仅是感官或超感官刺激的体验。每个有修养的人原则上都能够清楚地区分女性美的审美享受和感官享受，尽管他可能无法在特定场合划分这些印象的组成部分。在一种情况下，我们向对象投降，而在另一种情况下，对象向我们投降。尽管审美价值与任何其他价值一样，并不是对象的一个整体部分，而是我们情感的投射，但它有一个特殊性，即投射是完整的。换句话说，情感的内容在某种程度上被对象吸收，并以一种具有自主意义的东西面对主体，这种意义是固有于对象的。 在这种客观审美愉悦的历史心理过程中，原始的享受作为任何更精致欣赏的基础，必然与直接的主观满足和效用相联系，这种过程是如何出现的？也许我们可以在一个非常简单的观察中找到线索。如果任何类型的物体给我们带来了巨大的愉悦或好处，我们在每次再次看到这个物体时都会感到快乐，即使现在已经无法使用或享受。这种类似回声的快乐具有独特的心理特征，源于我们不再想从这个物体中获得任何东西。取而代之的是，曾经与物体的具体关系，现在仅仅是沉思成为愉悦感的源泉；我们离开了物体的存在。
object untouched, and our sentiment is attached only to its appearance, not to that which in any sense may be consumed. In short, whereas formerly the object was valuable as a means for our practical and eudaemonistic ends, it has now become an object of contemplation from which we derive pleasure by confronting it with reserve and remoteness, without touching it. It seems to me that the essential features of aesthetic enjoyment are foreshadowed here, but they can be shown more plainly if we follow the changes in sensation from the sphere of individual psychology to that of the species as a whole. The attempt has often been made to derive beauty from utility, but as a rule this has led only to a philistine coarsening of beauty. This might be avoided if the practical expediency and sensual eudaemonistic immediacy were placed far enough back in the history of the species, as a result of which an instinctive, reflex-like sense of enjoyment in our organism were attached to the appearance of objects; the physico-psychic connection would then be genetic and would become effective in the individual without any consciousness on his part of the utility of the object. There is no need to enter into the controversy about the inheritance of such acquired associations; it suffices here that the events occur as if such qualities were inheritable. Consequently, the beautiful would be for us what once proved useful for the species, and its contemplation would give us pleasure without our having any practical interest in the object as individuals. This would not of course imply uniformity or the reduction of individual taste to an average or collective level. These echoes of an earlier general utility are absorbed into the diversity of individual minds and transformed into new unique qualities, so that one might say that the detachment of the pleasurable sensation from the reality of its original cause has finally become a form of our consciousness, quite independent of the contents that first gave rise to it, and ready to absorb any other content that the psychic constellation permits. In those cases that offer realistic pleasure, our appreciation of the object is not specifically aesthetic, but practical; it becomes aesthetic only as a result of increasing distance, abstraction and sublimation. What happens here is the common phenomenon that, once a certain connection has been established, the connecting link itself disappears because it is no longer required. The connection between certain useful objects and the sense of pleasure has become so well established for the species through inheritance or some other mechanism, that the mere sight of these objects becomes pleasurable even in the absence of any utility. This explains what Kant calls ‘aesthetic indifference’, the lack of concern about the real existence of an object so long as its ‘form’, i.e. its visibility, is given. Hence also the radiance and transcendence of the beautiful, which arises from the temporal remoteness
物体未被触碰，我们的情感仅与其外观相连，而不是与任何意义上可能被消费的东西相连。简而言之，过去物体作为我们实践和幸福目的的手段而有价值，而现在它已成为一种沉思的对象，我们通过与之保持距离和保留来获得愉悦，而不去触碰它。在我看来，这里预示着美学享受的基本特征，但如果我们从个体心理学的领域转向整个物种的领域，便可以更清楚地展示这些特征。人们常常试图从实用性中推导出美，但通常这只会导致美的庸俗化。如果将实践的便利性和感性的幸福直接性放在物种历史的较早阶段，结果是我们有机体对物体外观产生一种本能的、反射式的享受感；物理-心理的联系将是遗传的，并将在个体中有效，而个体对此物体的实用性并没有任何意识。关于这种获得的联想是否可遗传的争论无需深入探讨；在这里，只需注意这些事件的发生就好，仿佛这些特质是可以遗传的。 因此，美丽对我们来说就像曾经对物种有用的东西，而其观赏会给我们带来愉悦，尽管作为个体我们对这一对象没有任何实际利益。当然，这并不意味着统一性或对个人品味的平均或集体化。这些早期普遍实用性的回响被吸收到个体思想的多样性中，并转化为新的独特特质，可以说，愉悦感与其原始原因的现实脱离，最终成为我们意识的一种形式，完全独立于最初引发它的内容，并准备吸收任何其他心理构成所允许的内容。在那些提供现实愉悦的情况下，我们对对象的欣赏并非特定的美学，而是实用的；它仅在距离、抽象和升华增加的结果下才会变得美学。在这里发生的是一个普遍现象，一旦某种联系建立，连接的纽带本身就消失了，因为它不再需要。某些有用对象与愉悦感之间的联系，通过遗传或其他机制，已经为物种建立得如此牢固，以至于即使在没有任何实用性的情况下，仅仅看到这些对象也会变得令人愉悦。 这解释了康德所称的“审美无关”，即对一个对象的真实存在缺乏关心，只要其“形式”，即其可见性，得以呈现。因此，美的光辉和超越性也源于时间的遥远。
of the real motives in which we now discover the aesthetic. Hence the idea that the beautiful is something typical, supra-individual, and universally valid; for the evolution of the species has long ago eliminated from these inner states of mind anything specific and individual in the motives and experiences. In consequence it is often impossible to justify on rational grounds aesthetic judgments or the opposition that they sometimes present to what is useful and agreeable to the individual. The whole development of objects from utility value to aesthetic value is a process of objectification. When I call an object beautiful, its quality and significance become much more independent of the arrangements and the needs of the subject than if it is merely useful. So long as objects are merely useful they are interchangeable and everything can be replaced by anything else that performs the same service. But when they are beautiful they have a unique individual existence and the value of one cannot be replaced by another even though it may be just as beautiful in its own way. We need not pursue these brief remarks on the origin of aesthetic value into a discussion of all the ramifications of the subject in order to recognize that the objectification of value originates in the relative distance that emerges between the direct subjective origin of the valuation of the object and our momentary feeling concerning the object. The more remote for the species is the utility of the object that first created an interest and a value and is now forgotten, the purer is the aesthetic satisfaction derived from the mere form and appearance of the object. The more it stands before us in its own dignity, the more we attribute to it a significance that is not exhausted by haphazard subjective enjoyment, and the more the relationship of valuing the objects merely as means is replaced by a feeling of their independent value.
我们现在发现美学的真实动机。因此，美是某种典型的、超个体的和普遍有效的观念；因为物种的进化早已从这些内心状态中消除了任何特定和个体的动机和经验。因此，往往无法在理性基础上为美学判断或它们有时与对个体有用和愉悦的事物之间的对立辩护。从效用价值到美学价值的整个发展是一个物化的过程。当我称一个物体为美丽时，它的质量和意义变得比仅仅有用时更独立于主体的安排和需求。只要物体仅仅是有用的，它们就是可互换的，任何东西都可以被执行相同服务的其他东西所替代。但当它们是美丽的时，它们具有独特的个体存在，一个的价值不能被另一个所替代，即使它在自己的方式上同样美丽。我们无需将这些关于美学价值起源的简要评论追溯到对该主题所有分支的讨论，以认识到价值的物化源于对物体的评价的直接主观起源与我们对物体的瞬时感受之间出现的相对距离。 物体的效用越是远离物种最初产生兴趣和价值并如今被遗忘的阶段，从物体的纯粹形式和外观中获得的审美满足就越纯粹。它越是独立地呈现在我们面前，我们就越赋予它一种意义，这种意义并非仅仅是偶然的主观享乐所能穷尽的，而将物体仅仅作为手段进行估价的关系，则被对其独立价值的感受所取代。

I have chosen the above example because the objectifying effect of what I have called ‘distance’ is particularly clear when it is a question of distance in time. The process is, of course, intensive and qualitative, so that any quantitative designation in terms of distance is more or less symbolic. The same effect can be brought about by a number of other factors, as I have already mentioned: for example, by the scarcity of an object, by the difficulties of acquisition, by the necessity of renunciation. Even though in these economically important instances the significance of the objects remains a significance for us and so dependent upon our appreciation, the decisive change is that the objects confront us after these developments as independent powers, as a world of substances and forces that determine by their own qualities
我之所以选择上述例子，是因为当我谈到时间上的距离时，“距离”的客观化效应尤为明显。当然，这个过程是密集的、质的，因此任何用距离来进行的数量化描述或多或少都是象征性的。正如我前面提到的，许多其他因素也能产生同样的效果：例如，物体的稀缺性、获取的困难、放弃的必要性。即使在这些经济上重要的例子中，物体的意义仍然对我们有意义，因此依赖于我们的评价，但决定性的变化是，在这些发展之后，物体以独立的力量呈现在我们面前，作为一个由其自身品质决定的物质和力量的世界。
whether and to what extent they will satisfy our needs, and which demand effort and hardship before they will surrender to us. Only if the question of renunciation arises - renunciation of a feeling that really matters - is it necessary to direct attention upon the object itself. The situation, which is represented in stylized form by the concept of Paradise, in which subject and object, desire and satisfaction are not yet divided from each other - a situation that is not restricted to a specific historical epoch, but which appears everywhere in varying degrees - is destined to disintegrate, but also to attain a new reconciliation. The purpose of establishing a distance is that it should be overcome. The longing, effort and sacrifice that separate us from objects are also supposed to lead us towards them. Withdrawal and approach are in practice complementary notions, each of which presupposes the other; they are two sides of our relationship to objects, which we call subjectively our desire and objectively their value. We have to make the object enjoyed more remote from us in order to desire it again, and in relation to the distant object this desire is the first stage of approaching it, the first ideal relation to it. This dual significance of desire - that it can arise only at a distance from objects, a distance that it attempts to overcome, and yet that it presupposes a closeness between the objects and ourselves in order that the distance should be experienced at all - has been beautifully expressed by Plato in the statement that love is an intermediate state between possession and deprivation. The necessity of sacrifice, the experience that the satisfaction of desire has a price, is only the accentuation or intensification of this relationship. It makes us more distinctly aware of the distance between our present self and the enjoyment of things, but only by leading along the road towards overcoming it. This inner development towards the simultaneous growth of distance and approach also appears as a historical process of differentiation. Culture produces a widening circle of interests; that is, the periphery within which the objects of interest are located becomes farther and farther removed from the centre, the Ego. This increase in distance, however, depends upon a simultaneous drawing closer. If objects, persons and events hundreds or thousands of miles away acquire a vital importance for modern man, they must have been brought much closer to him than to primitive man, for whom they simply do not exist because the positive distinction between close and far has not yet been made. These two notions develop in a reciprocal relation from the original undifferentiated state. Modern man has to work in a different way, to apply a much greater effort than primitive man; the distance between him and the objects of his endeavours is much greater and much more difficult obstacles stand in his way, but on the other hand he acquires a greater quantity of
它们是否以及在多大程度上能够满足我们的需求，以及在它们向我们屈服之前需要付出努力和艰辛。只有当放弃的问题出现时——放弃一个真正重要的感觉——才有必要将注意力集中在对象本身。这个由“天堂”概念以风格化形式表现的情境，其中主体与对象、欲望与满足尚未彼此分离——这种情境并不局限于特定的历史时期，而是在不同程度上无处不在——注定要解体，但也注定要实现新的和解。建立距离的目的在于克服这种距离。将我们与对象分开的渴望、努力和牺牲也应该引导我们走向它们。撤退与接近在实践中是互补的概念，每个概念都假设着另一个；它们是我们与对象关系的两个方面，我们主观上称之为欲望，客观上称之为它们的价值。我们必须使享受的对象与我们保持更远的距离，以便再次渴望它，而对于遥远的对象，这种渴望是接近它的第一阶段，是与它的第一种理想关系。 欲望的这种双重意义——它只能在与对象的距离中产生，这种距离它试图克服，而它又假设对象与我们之间存在亲近，以便这种距离能够被体验——在柏拉图的表述中得到了美妙的表达，即爱是一种介于占有与剥夺之间的中间状态。牺牲的必要性，欲望满足的体验有其代价，仅仅是这种关系的强调或强化。它使我们更加清晰地意识到我们当前自我与享受事物之间的距离，但仅仅是通过引导我们走向克服这种距离的道路。这种朝向距离与接近同时增长的内在发展也表现为一种历史的差异化过程。文化产生了一个不断扩大的兴趣圈；也就是说，兴趣对象所在的边缘变得越来越远离中心，即自我。然而，这种距离的增加依赖于同时的拉近。如果几百或几千英里外的对象、人物和事件对现代人具有重要意义，那么它们必须比对原始人更接近于他，因为对原始人来说，它们根本不存在，因为近与远的积极区分尚未形成。这两个概念从最初的未分化状态中以相互关系发展。 现代人必须以不同的方式工作，付出比原始人多得多的努力；他和其努力目标之间的距离要远得多，阻碍也多得多，但另一方面，他获得的物品数量也多得多，理想上是通过他的欲望，实际上是通过他的工作。
objects, ideally through his desire and in practice through his work. The cultural process - which transposes the subjective condition of impulse and enjoyment into the valuation of objects - separates more distinctly the elements of our dual relationship of closeness and distance.
文化过程——它将冲动和享乐的主观状态转化为对客体的评价——更清晰地将我们这种既亲近又疏远的双重关系的各个要素区分开来。

The subjective events of impulse and enjoyment become objectified in value; that is to say, there develop from the objective conditions obstacles, deprivations, demands for some kind of ‘price’ through which the cause or content of impulse and enjoyment is first separated from us and becomes, by this very act, an object and a value. The fundamental conceptual question as to the subjectivity or objectivity of value is misconceived. The subjectivity of value is quite erroneously based upon the fact that no object can ever acquire universal value, but that value changes from place to place, from person to person, and even from one hour to the next. This is a case of confusing subjectivity with the individuality of value. The fact that I want to enjoy, or do enjoy, something is indeed subjective in so far as there is no awareness of or interest in the object as such. But then an altogether new process begins: the process of valuation. The content of volition and feeling assumes the form of the object. This object now confronts the subject with a certain degree of independence, surrendering or refusing itself, presenting conditions for its acquisition, placed by his original capricious choice in a law-governed realm of necessary occurrences and restrictions. It is completely irrelevant here that the contents of these forms of objectivity are not the same for all subjects. If we assumed that all human beings evaluated objects in exactly the same way, this would not increase the degree of objectivity beyond that which exists in an individual case; for if any object is valued rather than simply satisfying desire it stands at an objective distance from us that is established by real obstacles and necessary struggles, by gain and loss, by considerations of advantage and by prices. The reason why the misleading question about the objectivity or subjectivity of value is raised again and again is that we find empirically an infinite number of objects that are entirely the products of representations. But if an object in its finished form arises first in our consciousness, its value seems to reside entirely in the subject; the aspect from which I began - the classification of objects in the two series of being and value - seems to be identical with the division between objectivity and subjectivity. But this fails to take into account that the object of volition is different from the object of representation. Even though both may occupy the same place in the series of space, time and quality, the desired object confronts us in a different way and has quite a different significance from the represented object. Consider the analogy of love. The person we love is not the same being as our reason represents. I am
冲动和享受的主观事件在价值中被物化；也就是说，从客观条件中发展出障碍、剥夺、对某种“价格”的需求，通过这些，冲动和享受的原因或内容首先与我们分离，并通过这一行为成为一个对象和一个价值。关于价值的主观性或客观性的基本概念问题是被误解的。价值的主观性完全错误地基于这样一个事实：没有任何对象能够获得普遍价值，而价值在不同的地方、不同的人之间，甚至在每一个小时之间都在变化。这是将主观性与价值的个体性混淆的一个例子。我想要享受或确实享受某样东西的事实确实是主观的，因为没有对对象本身的意识或兴趣。但随后一个全新的过程开始了：价值评估的过程。意志和感觉的内容以对象的形式出现。这个对象现在以一定程度的独立性面对主体，屈服或拒绝自己，提出获取的条件，这些条件由他最初任性的选择置于一个受法律支配的必要事件和限制的领域。在这里，这些客观形式的内容对所有主体并不相同是完全无关紧要的。 如果我们假设所有人类以完全相同的方式评估对象，这并不会增加超出个别案例的客观性程度；因为如果任何对象被赋予价值而不仅仅是满足欲望，它就以真实的障碍和必要的斗争、得失、利益考量和价格所建立的客观距离与我们相对。关于价值的客观性或主观性这一误导性问题之所以一次又一次被提出，是因为我们在经验上发现了无数完全是表象产物的对象。但如果一个对象在其完成形式中首先出现在我们的意识中，它的价值似乎完全存在于主体中；我开始的那个方面——在存在和价值的两个系列中对对象的分类——似乎与客观性和主观性之间的划分是相同的。但这没有考虑到意志的对象与表象的对象是不同的。即使两者可能在空间、时间和质量的系列中占据相同的位置，所渴望的对象以不同的方式与我们对峙，并且与被表象的对象具有完全不同的意义。考虑爱的类比。我们所爱的那个人并不是我们的理性所表征的同一个存在。
not referring here to the distortions or falsifications that emotions may produce in the object of cognition; for these remain within the sphere of representation and of intellectual categories, even though the content is modified. It is in a completely different way from that of intellectual representations that the beloved person is an object to us. Despite the logical identity it has a different meaning for us, just as the marble of the Venus de Milo means different things for a crystallographer and an art critic. A single element of being, although recognized as one and the same, can become an object for us in quite different ways: as an object of representation, and as an object of desire. Within each of these categories the confrontation between subject and object has other causes and other effects, so that it leads only to confusion if the practical relation between man and his object is equated with the alternative between subjectivity and objectivity which is valid only in the realm of intellectual representation. For even though the value of an object is not objective in the same manner as colour or weight, it is also not at all subjective in the sense of corresponding with this kind of objectivity; such subjectivity would apply rather to a perception of colour resulting from a deception of the senses, or of any other quality of the object based on a mistaken conclusion, or of a quality suggested by superstition. The practical relation to objects, however, produces a completely different kind of objectivity, because the conditions of reality withdraw the object of desire and enjoyment from the subjective realm and thus produce the specific category that we call value.
这里并不是指情感在认知对象上可能产生的扭曲或伪造；因为这些仍然在表象和智力范畴的范围内，即使内容被修改。被爱之人对我们而言，是一种与智力表征完全不同的对象。尽管它在逻辑上是相同的，但对我们而言，它有着不同的意义，就像米洛的维纳斯的雕刻对一个结晶学家和一个艺术评论家意味着不同的东西。一个被认同为统一的存在元素，可以以完全不同的方式成为我们的对象：作为表征的对象，以及作为欲望的对象。在这两种类别中，主体与对象之间的对抗有着其他原因和效果，因此，如果人与其对象之间的实际关系被等同于有效于智力表征领域的主观性与客观性之间的替代关系，将只会导致混淆。因为即使一个对象的价值并不像颜色或重量那样客观，它也根本不是在这种客观性下的主观；这种主观性更适用于由于感官的欺骗而产生的对颜色的感知，或者基于错误结论的对象的任何其他属性，或被迷信所暗示的属性。 然而，对对象的实际关系产生了一种完全不同的客观性，因为现实的条件将欲望和享受的对象从主观领域中抽离，从而产生了我们称之为价值的特定类别。

Within the economic sphere, this process develops in such a way that the content of the sacrifice or renunciation that is interposed between man and the object of his demand is, at the same time, the object of someone else’s demand. The one has to give up the possession or enjoyment that the other wants in order to persuade the latter to give up what he owns and what the former wants. I shall show that the subsistence economy of an isolated producer can be reduced to the same formula. Two value formations are interwoven; a value has to be offered in order to acquire a value. Thus it appears that there is a reciprocal determination of value by the objects. By being exchanged, each object acquires a practical realization and measure of its value through the other object. This is the most important consequence and expression of the distance established between the objects and the subject. So long as objects are close to the subjects, so long as the differentiation of demand, scarcity, difficulties and resistance to acquisition have not yet removed the objects to a distance from the subject, they are, so to speak, desire and enjoyment, but not yet objects of desire and enjoyment. The process that I have outlined through which they become objects is brought
在经济领域，这一过程的发展方式是，人与其需求对象之间所介入的牺牲或放弃的内容，同时也是他人需求的对象。一个人必须放弃另一个人想要的占有或享受，以说服后者放弃他所拥有的、而前者想要的东西。我将展示，孤立生产者的生存经济可以简化为同样的公式。两种价值形成交织在一起；必须提供一种价值以获得另一种价值。因此，似乎存在着对象之间的相互价值决定。通过交换，每个对象通过另一个对象获得了其价值的实际实现和衡量。这是对象与主体之间建立的距离的最重要的结果和表现。只要对象靠近主体，只要需求的差异、稀缺性、获取的困难和阻力尚未将对象与主体隔离，它们就可以说是欲望和享受，但还不是欲望和享受的对象。我所概述的使它们成为对象的过程被带入。
to completion when the object, which is at the same time remote and yet overcomes the distance, is produced specifically for this purpose. Thus, pure economic objectivity, the detachment of the object from any subjective relationship to the subject, is established; and since production is carried out for the purpose of exchange with another object, which has a corresponding role, the two objects enter into a reciprocal objective relationship. The form taken by value in exchange places value in a category beyond the strict meaning of subjectivity and objectivity. In exchange, value becomes suprasubjective, supra-individual, yet without becoming an objective quality and reality of the things themselves. Value appears as the demand of the object, transcending its immanent reality, to be exchanged and acquired only for another corresponding value. The Ego, even though it is the universal source of values, becomes so far removed from the objects that they can measure their significance by each other without referring in each case to the Ego. But this real relationship between values, which is executed and supported by exchange, evidently has its purpose in eventual subjective enjoyment, that is, in the fact that we receive a greater quantity and intensity of values than would be possible without exchange transactions. It has been said that the divine principle, after having created the elements of the world, withdrew and left them to the free play of their own powers, so that we can now speak of an objective cosmos, subject to its own relations and laws; and further, that the divine power chose this independence of the cosmic process as the most expedient means of accomplishing its own purposes for the world. In the same way, we invest economic objects with a quantity of value as if it were an inherent quality, and then hand them over to the process of exchange, to a mechanism determined by those quantities, to an impersonal confrontation between values, from which they return multiplied and more enjoyable to the final purpose, which was also their point of origin: subjective experience. This is the basis and source of that valuation which finds its expression in economic life and whose consequences represent the meaning of money. We turn now to their investigation.
当对象既遥远又克服距离时，专门为此目的而生产的对象完成了这一过程。因此，纯粹的经济客观性，即对象与主体之间任何主观关系的脱离得以确立；由于生产是为了与另一个具有相应角色的对象进行交换而进行的，这两个对象进入了相互的客观关系。价值在交换中所呈现的形式将价值置于超越主观性和客观性的严格意义的范畴。在交换中，价值变得超主观、超个体，但并未成为事物本身的客观属性和现实。价值表现为对象的需求，超越其内在现实，仅为交换和获取另一个相应的价值。自我，尽管是价值的普遍源泉，却与对象相距甚远，以至于它们可以通过彼此来衡量其重要性，而不必在每种情况下都参考自我。然而，这种通过交换执行和支持的价值之间的真实关系，显然其目的在于最终的主观享受，即我们获得的价值的数量和强度超过了没有交换交易时所能获得的。 人们常说，神圣的原则在创造了世界的元素之后，便退却了，将它们留给它们自身力量的自由发挥，因此我们现在可以说存在一个客观的宇宙，它受制于自身的关系和规律；此外，神圣的力量选择宇宙过程的这种独立性作为实现其自身世界目的的最有效手段。同样，我们将一定数量的价值赋予经济对象，就好像它是一种内在的品质一样，然后将其交给交换过程，交给由这些数量决定的机制，交给价值之间非个人的对抗，从这种对抗中，它们以倍增的形式回归，并更令人愉悦地实现最终目的，而这最终目的也是它们的起源点：主观体验。这就是经济生活中表达的估价的基础和来源，其结果代表了货币的意义。我们现在转向对它们的调查。

The technical form of economic transactions produces a realm of values that is more or less completely detached from the subjective-personal substructure. Although the individual buys because he values and wants to consume
经济交易的技术形式产生了一个或多或少完全脱离主观个人基础结构的价值领域。尽管个人购买是因为他重视并想要消费