Re: Dispute between Lei Shing Hong Credit Ltd (利星行信貸有限公司)
主旨：利星行信貸有限公司（Lei Shing Hong Credit Ltd）之爭議事件

& Turbo Finance Group Ltd

ADVICE ON PRIORITY AND NEXT STEPS
優先順序與下一步建議

Introduction & Summary of Conclusions
引言與結論摘要

Instructing solicitors act for Lei Shing Hong Credit Ltd (“LSHC”). By instruction letters dated 16^th April 2025 and 23^rd May 2025 together with enclosed documents (collectively, “Written Instructions”), we are instructed to advise on disputed issues of priority arising from security interests in the property known as House No. 36 and Motor Cycle Parking Space No. M2, Car Park of The Carmel, No. 168 Castle Peak Road, Tai Lam, Tuen Mun (collectively, the “Property”, and individually, “House”¹ and “Parking Space”²).
指示律師代表麗晶香港信託有限公司（「LSHC」）。依據日期為 2025 年 4 月 16 日及 2025 年 5 月 23 日的指示信函，並附帶文件（合稱，「書面指示」），我們受指示就來自所謂 36 號住宅及卡梅爾停車場 168 號羅湖道天水圍泰欖第 M2 號機車停車位的擔保權優先爭議問題提供意見（合稱為「該房地產」，及單稱為「住宅」 ¹ 及「停車位」 ² ）。

The background and list of documents to be considered are clearly set out in the Written Instructions, and we do not propose to repeat the same in full. References to the enclosed documents are in the format of [document/page] number. We summarize the material background as follows:-
背景及應考慮的文件清單已在書面指示中明確列明，我們不打算全文重述。對附帶文件的參照格式為[文件/頁面]編號。我們將主要背景總結如下：-

The relevant events can be set out in form of a chronology, as follows:-
相關事件可按時間順序列明如下：-

Extracting from the above chronology, the relevant security interests in the Property can be set out in table form, as follows:-
根據上述時間線，不動產相關的相保權利可整理如下表：

On the dispute as to the priority of LSHC’s First Legal Charge and Turbo’s Second Mortgage, a summary of our conclusions is as follows:-
關於 LSHC 第一法律抵押權與 Turbo 第二抵押權的優先順位爭議，我們的結論摘要如下：-

As will be explained at Section B below, as a matter of priority under the Land Registration Ordinance (Cap. 128) (“LRO”), pursuant to s.5, LSHC’s First Legal Charge has priority over Turbo’s Second Mortgage on the basis of an earlier “time of execution”. In particular, the contemporaneous documentary evidence suggests:-
如下方 B 節所述，依據《土地登記條例》（第 128 章）（下稱「LRO」）的優先順位原則，根據第 5 條，LSHC 第一法律抵押權基於較早的「執行時間」優先於 Turbo 第二抵押權。具體來說，同時的文書證據顯示：-

LSHC’s First Legal Charge was executed on or before 20^th May 2022; and
LSHC 第一法律抵押權是在 2022 年 5 月 20 日或之前執行的；以及

Turbo’s Second Mortgage was executed no earlier than 23^rd May 2022, and most likely on 25^th May 2022 at a meeting at Turbo’s registered office situated at Room 1102, 11/F, Railway Plaza, 39 Chatham Road South, Tsim Sha Tsui, Kowloon (“Turbo’s TST Office”).⁹
Turbo 的第二次抵押貸款最遲於 2022 年 5 月 23 日執行，最可能在 2022 年 5 月 25 日在 Turbo 的註冊辦公室舉行會議，該辦公室位於九龍尖沙咀遮打道 39 號鐵路廣場 11 樓 1102 室（「Turbo 的 TST 辦公室」）。 ⁹

As will be explained at Section C below, as a matter of priority under principles of equitable subrogation, there is a strongly arguable case on the available evidence before us that LSHC’s First Legal Charge has priority over Turbo’s Second Mortgage, on the basis that what Turbo bargained for was not an unencumbered security right in the Property (“Turbo’s Encumbered Bargain”). However, this conclusion may be subject to evidence which may emerge as the dispute progresses.
如下方 C 節所述，根據公平代位原則的優先順序原則，根據我們目前掌握的證據，有力地可以主張 LSHC 的第一個法律擔保具有優先權，優先於 Turbo 的第二次抵押貸款，基於 Turbo 討價還價的不是該房地產的無擔保權利（「Turbo 的擔保討價還價」）。然而，這個結論可能會受到隨著爭議進展可能出現的證據的影響。

As will be explained at Section D below, the next steps to take are as follows:-
如下方 D 節所述，接下來要採取的步驟如下：-

Issue a pre-action letter to Turbo setting out LSHC’s strong position (also replying to the previous letters sent by Turbo’s solicitors), ¹⁰ incorporating the legal and evidential analysis hereinbelow on (1) application of LRO s.5; and (2) equitable subrogation and Turbo’s Encumbered Bargain.
向 Turbo 發出事先行動信，列明 LSHC 的堅定立場（同時回覆 Turbo 律師之前發送的信函）， ¹⁰ 包含 hereinbelow 下（1）LRO 第 5 條的應用；以及（2）公平代位和 Turbo 的擔保討價還價的法律和證據分析。

Apply in the existing O.88 Proceedings to join Turbo as the 3^rd Defendant, on the basis of an amended originating summons seeking a declaration that LSHC’s First Legal Charge has priority over Turbo’s Second Mortgage.
向現有 O.88 案件申請加入 Turbo 為第 3 名被告，基於修改後的起訴狀尋求宣告 LSHC 的第一法律控訴優先於 Turbo 的第二抵押權。

Upon joinder of Turbo, to consider whether directions for that component of the O.88 Proceedings to continue as if begun by Writ need to be sought (at LSHC’s instigation) or opposed (if instigated by Turbo). This will largely depend on what evidence (if any) Turbo raises to oppose LSHC’s position.
在加入 Turbo 後，需考慮是否需要申請（由 LSHC 主動）或反對（若由 Turbo 主動）O.88 案件該部分的指示，使其繼續作為若以判決書開始的案件。這將主要取決於 Turbo 是否提出任何反對 LSHC 立場的证据。

If no such directions are required, the matter of priority between LSHC and Turbo would be able to be determined in what would be a 1-day substantive hearing.
若無此類指示的必要，則 LSHC 與 Turbo 之間的優先順序問題將能在一次 1 天的實質聽證中得以確定。

Priority under s.5 LRO
第 5 條 LRO 的優先順序

The analysis here is simple. LRO s.5 reads as follows:-
這裡的分析很簡單。LRO 條例第 5 條的內容如下：-

“All deeds, conveyances, and other instruments in writing, and judgments, which are duly registered within the respective times next mentioned, that is to say, all deeds, conveyances, and other instruments in writing which are registered within one month after the time of execution thereof respectively, and all judgments which are registered within one month after the entering up or recording thereof, shall severally be in like manner entitled to priority, and shall take effect respectively by relation to the date thereof only in the same manner as if this Ordinance had not been passed.” (emphasis added)
「所有行為、轉讓以及其他書面文件，以及判決，若在各自後面所提及的時間內正確登記，即謂所有行為、轉讓以及其他書面文件，若在其執行後一個月內登記，以及所有判決，若在其登錄或記錄後一個月內登記，均應分別以相同的方式享有優先權，並且應僅根據其日期分別生效，其方式與本條例未通過時相同。」（強調加註）

It is well-established that the “time of execution” of an instrument¹¹ may be different from the date of the instrument stated on its face:-
大家普遍認為，一項文件的「執行時間」可能與其表面所列的日期不同：-

As held in Browne v Burton (1847) 17 LJQB 49 at 50 per Patterson J:-
如布朗對巴頓案（1847 年）17 LJQB 49 頁第 50 頁帕特森法官所言：-

“[A] deed or other writing must be taken to speak from the time of the execution and not from the date apparent on the face of it. That date is indeed to be taken prima facie as the true time of execution; but as soon as the contrary appears, the apparent date is to be utterly disregarded.”
“[A] 契約行為或其他書面文件應被認為是從其成立時起發生效力，而非從文件表面所示日期起。該日期確實應被初步認定為真正的成立時間；但一旦出現相反證據，應完全不考慮表面所示日期。”

The date on the document will be presumed to be the correct date, but the presumption may be rebutted and extrinsic evidence may be adduced to show the correct date: see (1) Lam Suk-fan v Choy Ying-keung Kenny [2001] 3 HKC 428 at 436D-437C per HHJ Carlson (as he then was), referring to Browne v Burton (supra); (2) Xiamen International Finance Co Ltd v Ysui Tai Yan [1987] HKLR 977 at 979G per Godfrey J (as he then was); and (3) Halsbury’s Laws of England, Volume 32 (2023), §391.¹²
文件上的日期將被推定為正確日期，但此推定可被反駁，並可提出外在證據以證明正確日期：見 (1) Lam Suk-fan 與 Choy Ying-keung Kenny [2001] 3 HKC 428 at 436D-437C 按 HHJ Carlson（當時的稱謂）的意見，提及 Browne v Burton（上訴）；(2) Xiamen International Finance Co Ltd 與 Ysui Tai Yan [1987] HKLR 977 at 979G 按 Godfrey J（當時的稱謂）的意見；以及 (3) Halsbury’s Laws of England, Volume 32 (2023), §391。 ¹²

It is well-established that to “execute” a document is to do what the law requires to be done to give validity to the document: Butterworths Hong Kong Conveyancing and Property Law Handbook (“C&P Handbook”) at §13.19 (citing Re Estate of Williams (deceased) (1984) 36 SASR 423 at 425 per King CJ). In particular:-
已確立的是，“執行”一份文件是指為賦予文件效力而法律要求完成的事項：Butterworths Hong Kong Conveyancing and Property Law Handbook（“C&P Handbook”）§13.19（引述 Re Estate of Williams（已故）(1984) 36 SASR 423 at 425 按 King CJ 的意見）。特別是：

A legal mortgage of land or of an interest in land must be made by way of legal charge by deed: s.44(1) of the Conveyancing and Property Ordinance (Cap. 219) (“CPO”).
一個土地或土地權益的法律抵押必須以法律擔保的方式，透過公證書進行：傳託及產業條例（第 219 章）第 44(1)條（簡稱「傳產條例」）。

A deed is a document which has been executed under seal. The requirements for the due execution of a deed by individuals are set out in s.19 of the CPO: C&P Handbook at §4.07.
公證書是一份經過蓋印的文件。個人正確執行公證書的要求，載於傳產條例第 19 條：傳產手冊§4.07。

S.19 of the CPO provides that (1) a deed by an individual shall be signed by him; and (2) a document shall be presumed to have been sealed by an individual if the document signed by him states that it has been sealed.
傳產條例第 19 條規定：(1) 個人的公證書應由本人簽署；(2) 若一份文件由本人簽署並聲明已蓋印，該文件應被推定為已經本人蓋印。

Mutual execution is not required. Hong Kong Building and Loan Agency Ltd v Pang Ko Fai [2000] 4 HKC 602 is an example where the date of execution of a mortgage by the first defendant was considered as the relevant date for the purpose of s.5 of the LRO (see 606B-D per Sakhrani J).
互相同意簽署並非必要。香港建屋貸款有限公司 v 方國輝 [2000] 4 HKC 602 是一個例子，其中第一被告抵押的執行日期被認為是適用法律融資條例第 5 條的相關日期（見 Sakhrani J 的見解，606B-D）。

On the available evidence before us, it appears to be clear that LSHC’s First Legal Charge was executed on or before 20^th May 2022. This is expressly stated in C&Y’s 20 May 2022 Letter issued to LSHC [6/75].¹³ This is a letter from a solicitor reporting back to his own client. It is unlikely that a solicitor, being an officer of the court, would include statements which are false or untrue or materially inaccurate in a letter issued by him/his firm to his own client.
根據目前我們所掌握的證據，顯然 LSHC 的第一份法律控訴書是在或於 2022 年 5 月 20 日之前執行的。這在 C&Y 於 2022 年 5 月 20 日發給 LSHC 的信函中明確說明 [6/75] ¹³ 。這是一封律師發給其客户的回覆信函。由於律師是法院的官員，不太可能在其律師事務所發給客户的信函中包含虛假或不實或具有重大不準確性的陳述。

As a matter of prudence, LSHC may wish to (1) make enquiries with C&Y to confirm this; and (2) cross-check the evidence already filed in the O.88 Proceedings for consistency or inconsistency as to the same.¹⁴ Yet, on the face of C&Y’s 20 May 2022 Letter, it does amount to weighty and probative evidence that LSHC’s First Legal Charge was already executed by 20^th May 2022.
為了謹慎起見，LSHC 或許希望(1)向 C&Y 確認此事；(2)核對已提交至 O.88 訴訟程序中的證據，以確認其一致性或矛盾之處。 ¹⁴ 然而，從 C&Y 的 2022 年 5 月 20 日信函表面來看，它確實構成有力且具有說服力的證據，證明 LSHC 的第一份法律控訴書已在 2022 年 5 月 20 日之前執行。

On the available evidence before us, it appears to be clear that Turbo’s Second Mortgage was executed no earlier than 23^rd May 2022, and likely on 25th May 2022:-
根據目前我們所掌握的證據，顯然 Turbo 的第二順位抵押權是在 2022 年 5 月 23 日之後執行的，且可能在 2022 年 5 月 25 日執行：-

Turbo’s Second Mortgage was registered on 22^nd June 2022. This means the earliest execution date Turbo can rely on in order to invoke LRO s.5 is 22^nd May 2022.¹⁵
Turbo 的第二順位抵押權是在 2022 年 6 月 22 日登記的。這意味著 Turbo 為援引 LRO 第 5 條所能依據的最早執行日期是 2022 年 5 月 22 日。 ^{n d 15}

In any event, the clear evidence is that Turbo’s Mortgage was executed on 25^th May 2022:-
在任何情況下，明確的证据顯示 Turbo 的房屋貨款是在 2022 年 5 月 25 日簽訂的：-

The contemporaneous evidence of the WhatsApp exchange between Ms. Chan of the Broker and the Husband shows that the documents relating to Turbo’s Loan were signed during a meeting at Turbo’s TST Office on 25^th May 2022, at 11:00am [55/462-463].
Broker 的 Chan 女士與丈夫之間的 WhatsApp 交談的當時证据顯示，Turbo 的貸款相關文件是在 2022 年 5 月 25 日 11:00 上午在 Turbo 的 TST 辦公室會議中簽署的[55/462-463]。

This is corroborated by Clause 19 of Turbo’s Loan Agreement and §15 of the First Schedule thereto [10/127], and the Husband’s affidavit evidence in the O.88 Proceedings (see §25 of the 8^th Affidavit of Yip Chun Wai (“Husband 8^th”) [54/435]).
這點被 Turbo 的貸款協議第 19 條及其第一附表第 15 條[10/127]所证实，並且還有丈夫在 O.88 程序中的宣誓证据（見第 8 ^th Yip Chun Wai 的宣誓書第 25 條（“丈夫 8 ^th ”）[54/435]）。

On this basis, as a starting point under LRO s.5, LSHC’s First Legal Charge clearly has priority over Turbo’s Second Mortgage.
基於此，作為 LRO s.5 的起點，LSHC 的第一份法律指控明顯優先於 Turbo 的第二份房屋貨款。

For the avoidance of doubt, the analysis above assumes that LSHC’s First Legal Charge was not executed prior to 30^th April 2022 (being the earliest execution date LSHC can rely on in order to invoke LRO s.5), even though the Borrower/Husband signed LSHC’s Facility Letter on 25^th April 2022.
為避免疑義，上述分析假設 LSHC 的第一法律債權並未於 2022 年 4 月 30 日之前執行（此為 LSHC 可依據的最早執行日期，以便援引 LRO 條例第 5 條），即使借款人/丈夫於 2022 年 4 月 25 日簽署了 LSHC 的設施信。

Priority under Equitable Subrogation
公平代位權下的優先權

In light of the analysis above, it is unnecessary for LSHC to invoke the principles of equitable subrogation to assert priority over Turbo’s Second Mortgage.
基於上述分析，LSHC 無需援引公平代位權原則以主張優先權於 Turbo 的第二抵押權。

However, it is likely that Turbo will attempt to invoke the doctrine and therefore the issue will be raised in any event.
然而，Turbo 可能會嘗試援引該原則，因此該問題無論如何都會被提出。

In this regard:-
有關於此：-

The priority rules under the LRO do not exclude inquiry into the underlying transaction which was the subject matter of the registration: see Hong Kong Chinese Bank Ltd v Sky Phone Ltd [2001] 1 HKC 50 at 54D-F, 55B-E per DHCJ Muttrie (concerning s.3 of the LRO).
LRO 下的優先權規則並未排除對登記主題的基礎交易進行調查：見香港中國銀行有限公司 v 天空電話有限公司 [2001] 1 HKC 50 at 54D-F, 55B-E，依 DHCJ Muttrie 意見（有關 LRO 第 3 條）。

The fact that a lender of money gets some security does not prevent him from claiming to be subrogated to another security: see (1) Kingsway Finance Ltd v Wang Qingyi [2015] 1 HKLRD 260 at 269, §23 per Cheung CJHC (as he then was); and (2) Cheltenham & Gloucester plc v Appleyard [2004] EWCA Civ 291 at §37 per Neuberger LJ (as he then was).
一個放款人獲得一些擔保並不妨礙他主張自己被轉讓至另一個擔保：見 (1) Kingsway Finance 有限公司 v 王清揚 [2015] 1 HKLRD 260 at 269, §23，依 Cheung CJHC 意見（當時的職位）；以及 (2) Cheltenham & Gloucester 有限公司 v Appleyard [2004] EWCA Civ 291 at §37，依 Neuberger LJ 意見（當時的職位）。

In this case, the transaction documents regarding both LSHC’s Loan and Turbo Loan disclosed no contractual right for subrogation on LSHC’s part.¹⁶ Therefore, the following analysis is based on equitable subrogation.
在本案中，有關 LSHC 借款和 Turbo 借款的事務文件均未披露 LSHC 方面的轉讓契約權利。 ¹⁶ 因此，以下分析基於衡平法上的轉讓。

Applicable legal principles
適用之法律原則

As held in Kingsway (supra) at 266-267, §17 per Cheung CJHC (as he then was) (citing Burston Finance Ltd v Speirway Ltd (in liquidation) [1974] 1 WLR 1948 at 1652B-D per Walton J):-
如 Kingsway (前註) 第 266-267 頁，第 17 條依 Cheung CJHC (當時) 之見解（引述 Burston Finance Ltd v Speirway Ltd (破產) [1974] 1 WLR 1948 第 1652B-D 頁依 Walton J 之見解）：

“What is the basis of the doctrine of subrogation? It is simply that, where A’s money is used to pay off the claim of B, who is a secured creditor, A is entitled to be regarded in equity as having had an assignment to him of B’s rights as a secured creditor. … It finds one of its chief uses in the situation where one person advances money on the understanding that he is to have certain security for the money he has advanced, and, for one reason or another, he does not receive the promised security. In such a case he is nevertheless to be subrogated to the rights of any other person who at the relevant time had any security over the same property and whose debts have been discharged, in whole or in part, by the money so provided by him, but of course only to the extent to which his money has, in fact, discharged their claims.” (Emphasis added)
「讓渡權之基礎為何？簡單來說，當 A 之金錢用於支付債權人 B 之債權，而 B 為有擔保之債權人時，A 在正義上應被認為已獲得 B 作為有擔保之債權人之權利之讓渡。… 它主要用於此種情況：某人貸款時認為自己將獲得某種擔保，但因某種原因未收到承諾之擔保。在此情況下，他仍應讓渡給在相關時間對相同財產有任何擔保且其債務已全部或部分由其提供的金錢所清償之任何人之權利，但當然僅限於其金錢實際上已清償其債權之範圍。」（加強調）

The prevailing judicial view is that equitable subrogation is an equitable remedy which serves to prevent or reverse the unjust enrichment of the defendant at the plaintiff's expense. It is a means by which the court regulates the legal relationships between a plaintiff and a defendant/defendants: Banque Financière de la Cité v Parc (Battersea) Ltd [1999] 1 AC 221 at 231H-G, 236E-G per Lord Hoffmann.
當前司法見解認為，衡平法上的代位權是一種衡平救濟，旨在防止或糾正被告在原告的代價下獲得不當得利。它是法院調整原告與被告之間法律關係的手段：Banque Financière de la Cité v Parc (Battersea) Ltd [1999] 1 AC 221 at 231H-G, 236E-G per Lord Hoffmann。

The requirements of unjust enrichment for the purpose of equitable subrogation are as follows:-
為了實現衡平法上的代位權，不當得利的要求如下：-

Enrichment: The defendant is enriched if his financial position is materially improved, usually as here where the defendant is relieved of a financial burden.
得利：如果被告的財務狀況顯著改善，就構成得利，通常如本例中，被告免除了財務負擔。

At the expense of: The enrichment will be at the expense of the claimant if in reality it was the claimant’s money which effected the improvement. 
在原告的代價下：如果實際上改善是由原告的錢所帶來的，那麼得利就發生在原告的代價下。

Unjust factor: The factor that renders the enrichment unjust is the non-fulfilment of the lender’s expectation as to the security, which formed the basis of its decision to advance funds. In considering whether the lender got what it bargained for, the bargain is to be interpreted in ‘the wider sense of “the envisaged transaction”’.
不公因素：導致利益獲得不公的因素，在於債權人對於擔保的期望未能實現，這是債權人決定貸款時的基礎。在考慮債權人是否得到其所交易的內容時，該交易應該在「更廣泛的『預期交易』」意義上被解釋。

See: (1) Kingsway (supra) at 267-269, §§19-20 per Cheung CJHC (as he then was); and (2) Credit One Finance Ltd v Lok Pak Fung [2025] 3 HKC 75 at 80B-F, §§6-7 per Wilson Chan J.
參見：(1) Kingsway (上訴) 第 267-269 頁，第 19-20 條，由 Cheung CJHC（當時）提出；以及 (2) Credit One Finance Ltd v Lok Pak Fung [2025] 3 HKC 75 第 80B-F 頁，第 6-7 條，由 Wilson Chan J 提出。

Consistently, as clarified by the English Supreme Court in Swynson Ltd v Lowick Rose LLP (in liq) [2018] AC 313:-
一致地，正如英國最高法院在 Swynson Ltd v Lowick Rose LLP (in liq) [2018] AC 313 中所阐明：

The real basis of the rule is the defeat of an expectation of benefit which was the basis of the payer's consent to the payment of the money for the relevant purpose (at 329E-330B, §30 per Lord Sumption).
該規則的真正基礎，在於支付者同意為相關目的支付金錢的基礎——即對利益之期望的落空（第 329E-330B 頁，第 30 條，由 Lord Sumption 提出）。

The role of the law of unjust enrichment in such cases is to characterise the resultant enrichment of the defendant as unjust, because the absence of the stipulated benefit disrupted a relevant expectation about the transaction under which the money was paid. The role of equitable subrogation is to replicate as far as possible that element of the transaction whose absence made it defective. This is why subrogation cannot be allowed to confer a greater benefit on the claimants than he has bargained for (at 330C-D, §31 per Lord Sumption).
法律上不當得利在這些案例中的角色是將被告所獲得的利益定性為不當，因為未提供約定的利益破壞了有關支付金錢的交易中相關的期望。衡平法上的代位權的角色是盡可能重現那使交易有缺陷的元素。這就是為何代位權不能允許賠償人獲得超過其協商對價的利益（參照 330C-D 頁，蘇銘大法官在第 31 節中提到）。

Courts have repeatedly emphasized the flexibility of such remedy:-
法院一再強調此種救濟的靈活性：-

The remedy is flexible and adaptable to produce a just result. Within this framework, the remedy is discretionary in the sense that at each stage it is a matter of judgment whether on the facts the necessary elements are fulfilled: Filby v Mortgage Express (No 2) Ltd [2004] EWCA Civ 759 at §62 per May LJ, cited in Kingsway (supra) at 268-269, §20 per Cheung CJHC (as he then was).
此救濟是靈活且能適應以產生公正的結果。在此框架下，此救濟是權責的，因為在每一階段，都需要根據事實判斷必要的元素是否已滿足：Filby v Mortgage Express (No 2) Ltd [2004] EWCA Civ 759 在第 62 節中，梅大法官提到，在 Kingsway（上訴）第 268-269 頁，第 20 節中，張首席法官當時提到。

The court does not have to decide whether or not a lender is generally subrogated to a particular security as against the world. It can, for instance, decide that a lender is subrogated to a particular security as against some third parties, but not as against others: Cheltenham (supra) at §48 per Neuberger LJ (as he then was).
法院無須判斷貸款人是否一般地對特定擔保權利人對全世界有代位權。例如，法院可以判斷貸款人對某些第三人有代位權，但對其他人則沒有：Cheltenham（上訴）第 48 節，Neuberger LJ（當時的他）的看法。

Analysis
分析

LSHC

As a matter of analysis, LSHC can clearly satisfy the requirements for equitable subrogation vis-à-vis Turbo.
就分析而言，LSHC 明確可以滿足對 Turbo 的衡平法代位權的要求。

Enrichment: It can be argued that Turbo is enriched as its financial position was materially improved by a substantial reduction of the indebtedness secured by Sonic’s First Mortgage. In this regard:-
豐富性：可以主張 Turbo 的財務狀況因為 Sonic 第一順位抵押權所擔保的負債大幅減少而顯著改善。關於這一點：-

Turbo’s Second Mortgage is expressly subjected to Sonic’s First Mortgage: see e.g. Clause 3.01 [11/138].
Turbo 的第二順位抵押權明確地受到 Sonic 第一順位抵押權的優先保障：例如參見條款 3.01 [11/138]。

LSHC’s Loan in the sum of HK$22,400,000 were used to partially discharge the Borrower’s indebtedness to Sonic, which was in turn secured by Sonic’s First Mortgage.
LSHC 的貸款金額 HK$22,400,000 用於部分償還貸款人對 Sonic 的負債，而這項負債同樣受到 Sonic 第一順位抵押權的擔保。

The advancement of LSHC’s Loan therefore improved Turbo’s financial position by increasing the value of Turbo’s Second Mortgage. This is analogous to the situation in Banque Financiere (supra), where OOL’s second charge over a property was “made more valuable” by reason of a reduction of the debt secured by a first charge over the same property (using the plaintiff’s loan): see 239B-G per Lord Hutton. It is worth noting that the plaintiff bank in that case only partially refinanced the indebtedness in question.
LSHC 的貸款撥付因此通過增加 Turbo 的第二順位抵押權價值來改善 Turbo 的財務狀況。這與 Banque Financiere（前述）的情況類似，在那個案件中，OOL 對某項房地產的第二順位抵押權因為同一房地產上第一順位抵押權所擔保的負債減少而「價值增加」（使用原告的貸款）：見 239B-G 段按 Lord Hutton 的說法。值得注意的是，在那個案件中的原告銀行僅部分重新融資了相關的負債。

At the expense of: It can be argued that the enrichment was at LSHC’s expense as it was LSHC’s Loan which effected the improvement. That LSHC’s Loan was used to partially discharge Sonic’s First Mortgage is evidenced by, inter alia:-
付出成本：可以主張豐富化是 LSHC 的代價，因為是 LSHC 的貸款促成了改善。LSHC 的貸款用於部分償還 Sonic 的第一順位抵押，證據包括但不限於：-

The cheque dated 27^th May 2022 in the sum of HK$22,400,000 issued for and on behalf of C&Y’s client account, representing funds from LSHC’s Loan [26/250].
2022 年 5 月 27 日簽發的 22,400,000 港幣支票，代表來自 LSHC 貸款的資金[26/250]，由 C&Y 的客戶帳戶發出並代表其發出。

The correspondence between C&Y and WKLL as to the Borrower’s intention to use LSHC’s Loan to repay the indebtedness owed to Sonic, and the arrangements in relation to the same.
C&Y 與 WKLL 之間的往來信函，關於借款人打算使用 LSHC 貸款償還對 Sonic 的債務，以及相關安排。

Unjust factor: There is evidence suggesting that LSHC’s expectation in making LSHC’s Loan was that its rights would be protected by an unencumbered security, a first-ranking legal charge foll0wng the discharge of Sonic’s First Mortgage, which was not fulfilled:-
不當因素：有證據顯示，LSHC 發出 LSHC 貸款時的期望是，其權利將由無擔保的擔保品保護，在 Sonic 的第一順位抵押償還後，為第一順位法律擔保，這一點並未實現：-

The starting point is the transaction documents. As recognised in Credit One (supra) at 80G-82E, §§9-11 per Wilson Chan J, they are “the strongest possible evidence as to the terms of the bargain”:-
起點是交易文件。正如在 Credit One（前註）第 80G-82E 頁所認識到的，根據 Wilson Chan 法官在第 9-11 條的見解，它們是「關於交易條款的最高證據」：-

LSHC’s Facility Letter provides that the securities of the Loan include a “First Legal Charge on the Property”, and that such charge is an “ALL MONIES” charge [3/15].
LSHC 的融資信函規定，貸款所包含的證券包括一項「對該房地產的首次法律擔保」，且該擔保是一項「所有金錢」擔保[3/15]。

LSHC’s First Legal Charge provides that the Borrower represents warrants, covenants, undertakes and agrees with LSHC that:-
LSHC 的首次法律擔保規定，借款人代表保證、契約、承諾並同意與 LSHC：-

Clause 7.01(iii): “the Borrower has good right title and power to charge the Property in manner aforesaid free from all incumbrances” (emphasis added) [4/32-33].
條款 7.01(iii)：「借款人擁有良好的權利、所有權和權力，可以按照上述方式對該房地產進行擔保，且不受到任何擔保的影響」（加粗字）[4/32-33]。

Clause 7.01(xviii): “during the continuance of this security the Borrower will not assign, mortgage, charge or otherwise dispose… of the Property … or any interest therein … or cause or permit any second or further legal charge or mortgage to be effected … or in any way encumber assign or otherwise dispose of the equity of redemption therein or diminish, jeopardise or prejudice the security hereby created to the Lender or permit the same to be done without the prior written consent of the Lender” (emphasis added) [4/36-37].
條款 7.01(xviii)：「在本擔保權存續期間，借款人不得將、抵押、設質或以其他方式處分…該房地產…或其內任何權利…或造成或容許任何第二或進一步的法律抵押或抵押權得以設定…或以任何方式擔保、讓與或以其他方式處分該回購權益，或減損、危害或損害此處為貸款人創設之擔保權，或容許無經貸款人事先書面同意即為此項行為」(加粗字) [4/36-37]。

Consistently, after the discovery of Turbo’s Second Mortgage which allegedly took priority over LSHC’s First Legal Charge, James Chan of LSHC protested to the Husband by WhatsApp messages [45/307].
同樣地，在發現據稱優先於 LSHC 優先法律擔保的 Turbo 第二抵押後，LSHC 的 James Chan 透過 WhatsApp 訊息向先生抗議 [45/307]。

It would be helpful to ascertain other contemporaneous documentary evidence which shows that the making of LSHC’s Loan was conditional upon LSHC obtaining a first legal charge over the Property, including any communications between James and the Husband to such effect.
若能確認其他同時期的文書證據，顯示 LSHC 的貸款設定是以 LSHC 對該房地產取得優先法律擔保為條件，包括 James 與先生之間任何具有此意涵的溝通，將會有所幫助。

Further, while unilateral defeated expectations can be sufficient, defeated bilateral expectations are a prime source of such liability: Banque Financiere (supra) at 227F-G per Lord Steyn. Here, there is prima facie evidence suggesting that Turbo was in fact aware of LSHC’s expectation, thereby strengthening LSHC’s case of unjust enrichment against Turbo. By way of examples (and see further in §26 below):-
此外，雖然單方面落空的期望足以構成責任，但雙方落空的期望是這種責任的主要來源：Banque Financiere（見前註）第 227F-G 頁，史登大法官指出。在此，有初步證據表明 Turbo 事實上已知情 LSHC 的期望，從而加強了 LSHC 對 Turbo 提起不當得利訴訟的立場。以下為例（並參考下文§26）：-

In the course of arranging Turbo to be the lender, the Broker requested from the Husband various documents, including LSHC’s offer letter or signed contracts [55/459], presumably including LSHC’s Facility Letter. There is no evidence suggesting that the same was not passed to Turbo or that the Broker was otherwise concealing such information from Turbo.
在安排 Turbo 作為貸款人的過程中，經紀向先生索取了多份文件，包括 LSHC 的提議信或簽署的合約[55/459]，推測包含 LSHC 的設施信。沒有證據表明這些文件未交付給 Turbo，或經紀向 Turbo 隱瞞了這類信息。

Turbo’s Loan Agreement provides for a “Second Legal Charge” [10/127]. Given that only Sonic’s First Mortgage was registered, the natural implication here is that the “Second” Legal Charge was made in view of LSHC’s “First” Legal Charge as provided for in LSHC’s Facility Letter, which was provided to Turbo via the Broker.
Turbo 的貸款協議規定了一項「第二法律抵押權」[10/127]。由於只有 Sonic 的第一順位抵押權已登記，這裡的自然含義是，「第二」法律抵押權是基於 LSHC 設施信中規定的「第一」法律抵押權而設立，該設施信是透過經紀交付給 Turbo 的。

Turbo

Turning to Turbo, it would appear readily arguable that (1) LSHC is enriched in the sense that Sonic’s First Mortgage was discharged (or by reason of a reduction of the indebtedness secured by Sonic’s First Mortgage); and (2) such enrichment was at the expense of Turbo as it was Turbo’s Loan which effected the discharge/improvement.
轉向 Turbo，顯然可以合理主張：(1) LSHC 在這方面是豐富的，因為 Sonic 的第一次抵押貸款已經被清償（或由於 Sonic 的第一次抵押貸款擔保的債務減少）；(2) 這種豐富性是 Turbo 的代價，因為是 Turbo 的貸款促成了清償/改善。

However, the following suggest that what Turbo bargained for was not an unencumbered interest in the Property (i.e. Turbo’s Encumbered Bargain):-
然而，以下情況表明 Turbo 所交易的並非無擔負的物權（即 Turbo 的擔負交易）：-

First, the terms of Turbo’s Loan Agreement point towards an encumbered interest:-
首先，Turbo 貸款協議的條款指向一項擔負的物權：-

It expressly acknowledged that the Property was subject to Sonic’s First Mortgage: §2 of Second Schedule [10/128].
它明確承認該物業受到 Sonic 的第一次抵押貸款擔保：第二附錄§2 [10/128]。

Whilst it specifies that the Borrower will repay Sonic, it does not state that Sonic’s First Mortgage must be discharged or that the debt owed to Sonic must be repaid before Turbo’s Loan is granted: clause 6 of Turbo’s Loan Agreement [10/122].
雖然它規定借款人將向 Sonic 償還，但並未明確表示 Sonic 的第一順位抵押權必須解除，也沒有說明在 Turbo 的貸款獲得前，必須先償還對 Sonic 的債務：Turbo 貸款協議的條款 6 [10/122]。

It equally does not specify that Turbo’s Loan must be used to discharge Sonic’s First Mortgage.
它同樣沒有規定 Turbo 的貸款必須用於解除 Sonic 的第一順位抵押權。

It only provides for a “Second Legal Charge” [10/127], which shows that what Turbo bargained for was an encumbered right.
它僅提供了「第二法律抵押權」[10/127]，這表明 Turbo 所爭取的是一項已設抵押的權利。

Second, the wider context in which Turbo’s Loan was made points strongly towards it being simply a bridging loan without registered security:-
其次，Turbo 貸款發放的更廣泛背景強烈指向它僅僅是一筆無登記擔保的過橋貸款：

The outstanding indebtedness owed to Sonic was over HK$25 million. It was clear that the Borrower was in need of funds/liquidity. Turbo could only offer HK$2.2 million.
應付給 Sonic 的債務餘額超過港幣 2500 萬元。顯然貸款人需要資金/流動性。Turbo 只能提供港幣 220 萬元。

Turbo’s Loan was of a very short duration (3 months) and high interest rate (36%): §§10, 13 of First Schedule to Turbo’s Loan Agreement [10/125, 127].
Turbo 的貸款期限非常短（3 個月）且利率很高（36%）：Turbo 貸款協議第一附表第 10 條、第 13 條[10/125, 127]。

Before Turbo’s Loan was granted, specific inquiries were made by Ms. Chan of the Broker as to the Borrower/Husband’s capability to repay: [55/461].¹⁷
在 Turbo 的貸款獲批前，經紀的 Chan 女士就貸款人/丈夫的還款能力進行了具體詢問：[55/461]。 ¹⁷

The nature of legal charge to be granted to Turbo was expressly stated to be “non-register”: §11 of First Schedule to Turbo’s Loan Agreement [10/127]. It was clearly envisaged that Turbo would not register its mortgage/charge and thus abandoning the right to assert priority.
授予 Turbo 的法律抵押權的性質明確註明為「不登記」：Turbo 貸款協議第一附表第 11 條[10/127]。明顯預期 Turbo 不會登記其抵押權/留置權，從而放棄主張優先權。

In fact, Turbo’s Loan was not secured by the whole of the Property but only the House: §12 of First Schedule to Turbo’s Loan Agreement [10/127].
事實上，Turbo 的貸款並非以整棟房地產作為擔保，僅僅是房屋：Turbo 貸款協議第一附表§12 [10/127]。

Third, there is evidence suggesting that LSHC’s First Legal Charge was made known to Turbo through the Broker and that Turbo’s Second Mortgage was not intended to be registered:-
第三，有證據顯示，LSHC 的第一個法律抵押權是透過經紀人告知 Turbo，且 Turbo 的第二順位抵押貸款並無意登記：-

The contemporaneous WhatsApp exchange between Ms. Chan of the Broker and the Husband shows that information regarding LSHC’s Loan and/or LSHC’s Facility Letter was passed to The Broker which was liaising with the Borrower with respect to Turbo’s Loan-
經紀人 Chan 女士與夫君之間的當時 WhatsApp 交談顯示，有關 LSHC 貸款及/或 LSHC 設施信的資訊已傳遞給正在與貸款人協商 Turbo 貸款的經紀人-

The Broker expressly requested from the Husband LSHC’s offer letter or signed contracts [55/459].
經紀人明確向夫君要求 LSHC 的出價信或簽署的合約 [55/459]。

Subject to any contrary evidence from Turbo, it would appear that the Broker was a party nominated by/agent of Turbo.¹⁸ There is no evidence suggesting that the above was not passed to Turbo or that the Broker was otherwise acting improperly in any way.
依據 Turbo 提供的相反證據，看起來經紀人似乎是 Turbo 所提名的當事人或其代理人。 ¹⁸ 沒有證據顯示上述內容未傳達給 Turbo，或經紀人在任何方面有其他不當行為。

Indeed, subsequent communications between Ms. Chan of the Broker and the Husband made multiple references to LSHC [55/462, 464-465],¹⁹ suggesting that the Broker/ Turbo was well aware of LSHC’s Loan and LSHC’s First Legal Charge.
事實上，經紀人 Chan 女士與丈夫之間的後續溝通多次提及 LSHC [55/462, 464-465]， ¹⁹ 顯示經紀人/Turbo 對於 LSHC 的貸款及 LSHC 的第一順位法律抵押有充分的認知。

The above is further corroborated by the Borrower/Husband’s evidence on oath/submissions in the O.88 Proceedings.
上述說法更由借款人/丈夫在 O.88 程序中的宣誓證詞/陳述所印證。

As stated at Husband 8^th at §23 (see also §§24-25) [54/435]:-
如丈夫 8 所述 ^th §23（另見§§24-25）[54/435]:-

“From the outset, we verbally made it clear to Ms. Chan of Dr. Mortgage that two mortgages with [LSHC] and [EF] had already been arranged. Dr. Mortgage would thus help find a financial institution who was willing to lend a loan of around HK$ 2 million with a “空中釘”– such charge would not be registered with the Lands Registry.”
從一開始，我們就口頭上向房屋融資的陳小姐說明，[LSHC]和[EF]兩筆房屋融資已經安排好了。因此，房屋融資的醫生會幫忙找到一家願意貸款約 HK$2 千萬的金融機構，並且會有一個「空中釘」——這項費用不會在土地登記處登記。”

As stated in the letter of the Borrower/Husband to the Court dated 9^th October 2023 at §33(1)(c) [55/366]:-
如借據/丈夫於 2023 年 10 月 9 日第 9/0/9 日致法院的信函中§33(1)(c) [55/366]所述：-

“Our all-along understanding was that the [LSHC] would be the first legal chargee and [EF] the second. Turbo would not be a registered charge.”
「我們一直以來的理解是，[LSHC]會是第一個法律抵押權人，而[EF]則是第二個。Turbo 不會是一個已登記的抵押權人。」

As such, we consider that Turbo’s case on equitable subrogation is prima facie weak. As a general rule, a lender cannot claim subrogation if he obtains all the security which he bargained for: see Cheltenham (supra) at §38 per Neuberger LJ (as he then was). Here, Turbo’s Encumbered Bargain is fulfilled.²⁰
因此，我們認為 Turbo 在公平代位權方面的案件是初步上比較弱的。一般來說，如果貸款人獲得了他所協商的所有擔保，他就不能主張代位權：見 Cheltenham（上訴）§38 中 Neuberger LJ（當時的狀況）的意見。在此，Turbo 的擔保協議已經完成。 ²⁰

Nonetheless, we do note that LSHC has no knowledge of the precise arrangements, communications and/or dealings between the Borrower/Husband and the Broker/Turbo. Hence, there may be evidence or matters concerning Turbo’s expectation/intention which is currently unknown to LSHC.
不過，我們也注意到，LSHC 對借款人/先生與經紀人/Turbo 之間的確切安排、溝通和/或交易並無所知。因此，可能存在有關 Turbo 的期望/意圖之證據或事項，而這些目前對 LSHC 來說尚為未知。

Solely for completeness, we will set out below our preliminary observations as to Turbo’s case/the possible arguments Turbo might advance (in support of its claim for equitable subrogation or in opposition to LSHC’s claim for the same), based on the available materials before us.²¹
僅為完整起見，我們將以下列舉我們對 Turbo 的情況/可能的爭點 Turbo 可能提出（以支持其公平代位權的主張或反對 LSHC 就相同事實提出的主張），基於我們目前掌握的資料。 ²¹

First, Turbo may attempt rely on, inter alia, the various declarations/undertakings/covenants of the Borrower in Turbo’s Loan Agreement and/or Turbo’s Second Mortgage, to the effect that Turbo’s Second Mortgage was subject to no further encumbrances other than Sonic’s First Mortgage: see Clause 6²² of Turbo’s Loan Agreement and §4 of the Second Schedule²³ thereto; Clause 7.01(b)²⁴ and (m)²⁵ of Turbo’s Second Mortgage. To this end:-
首先，Turbo 可能嘗試依賴，例如，借款人在 Turbo 貸款協議和/或 Turbo 第二次抵押中的各項聲明/承諾/契約，表明 Turbo 的第二次抵押除 Sonic 的第一順位抵押權外，不負擔任何其他擔保權：見 Turbo 貸款協議第 6 條 ²² 和該協議第二附表第 4 條 ²³ ；Turbo 第二次抵押第 7.01(b)條 ²⁴ 和(m)條 ²⁵ 。為此：-

The proper inference of Turbo’s intention/expectation to be drawn from those transaction documents would likely depend on Turbo’s evidence.
從這些交易文件中推斷 Turbo 的意圖/期望，應該取決於 Turbo 的證據。

However, whatever terms which Turbo attempts to cite must be viewed in light of the analysis at §26 above as to Turbo’s Encumbered Bargain.
然而，無論 Turbo 試圖引用何種條款，都必須參照上述§26 有關 Turbo 的負擔交易的分析來看待。

Further and in any event, the evidence of the Borrower/Husband in the O.88 Proceedings would appear useful to counteract any evidence from Turbo. In particular, they gave evidence to the effect that (1) Turbo’s Loan was made on the basis that Turbo would not register the mortgage against the House, and that (2) Turbo’s subsequent registration of Turbo’s Second Mortgage was due to a “change of mind”.²⁶
此外，無論如何，借入人/丈夫在 O.88 審理程序中的證據似乎有助於抵銷 Turbo 的任何證據。具體來說，他們提供了證據表明：(1) Turbo 的貸款是基於 Turbo 不會對房屋登記抵押權的基礎上進行的，以及(2) Turbo 隨後登記 Turbo 的第二順位抵押權是因為「改變了主意」。 ²⁶

Second, even if Turbo could make out a case for equitable subrogation, its claim is subject to 2 limits:-
其次，即使 Turbo 可以主張公平代位權的案例，其主張也受到兩項限制：

Turbo’s Second Mortgage only covers the House but not the Parking Space (see footnote 7 above). As such, Turbo’s claim is only limited to proceeds of sale of the Property attributable to that of the House.
Turbo 的第二順位抵押權僅涵蓋房屋，但不涵蓋停車位（見上述腳註 7）。因此，Turbo 的主張僅限於屬於房屋的房地產售出收益。

Turbo’s claim is limited to the amount of Turbo’s Loan which was in fact used to discharge Sonic’s First Mortgage (see §16 above), being HK$1,594,656.46 [26/250] as opposed to the whole Turbo Loan in the sum of HK$2,200,000 [10/125].
Turbo 的聲明僅限於 Turbo 貸款中實際用於清償 Sonic 第一順位抵押權的金额（見上§16），為港幣 1,594,656.46 [26/250]，而非整筆 Turbo 貸款總額港幣 2,200,000 [10/125]。

Third, Turbo may argue that it obtained Turbo’s Second Mortgage “in good faith and for value without knowledge or notice of any right” of subrogation on LSHC’s part.²⁷ In this regard:-
第三，Turbo 可能主張其取得 Turbo 第二順位抵押權「善意且已付對價，且不知悉或未察覺 LSHC 有任何代位權」。 ²⁷ 關於這一點：-

As a matter of fact, Turbo may have difficulty establishing such facts, in light of the matters set out in §26(c) above.
事實上，Turbo 在考慮上§26(c)所述事項的情況下，可能難以證明這些事實。

As a matter of law, it is unclear how such argument would assist Turbo. While the fact that a defendant has given consideration for the “windfall” is relevant (see Swynson (supra) at §28), it can be argued that the consideration for which Turbo gave value was a “Second Legal Charge” but not a first legal charge. As such, if Turbo is to convert that into a first legal charge, it will be unjustly enriched: Sky Phone (supra) at 55H-56A.
法律上，不清楚這樣的主張會如何幫助 Turbo。雖然被告已對「意外之財」給予對價的事實相關（見 Swynson（上訴）§28），但可以主張 Turbo 給予的對價是一個「第二法律擔保」，而不是第一法律擔保。因此，如果 Turbo 要將其轉換為第一法律擔保，將會造成不當得利：Sky Phone（上訴）第 55H-56A 頁。

Fourth, Turbo may argue that LSHC failed to raise the subrogation argument earlier in the parties’ correspondence or in the O.88 Proceedings,²⁸ and is thus barred from arguing the same in its new action against Turbo. This argument would unlikely fly. It has been held that “mortgage possessions should be kept as simple and cheap as possible, and that, while each case has to be determined on its own facts, a mortgagee should not normally be penalised for having sensibly limited the points it raises in a mortgage possession application”: Cheltenham (supra) at §§94-95.
第四，Turbo 可能會主張，LSHC 未曾在當事人之間的通信或 O.88 審理程序中提出代位權爭議， ²⁸ 因此不得在對 Turbo 的新訴訟中提出相同的主張。此論點不太可能成立。法院曾認為「抵押權擔保應盡量保持簡單且低廉，雖然每個案件必須根據其具體事實來裁判，但抵押權人通常不應因其明智地限制在抵押權擔保申請中提出的主張而受到懲罰」：Cheltenham（上訴）§§94-95。

In short, on the evidence before us, there is a strongly arguable case that LSHC’s First Legal Charge has priority over Turbo’s Second Mortgage under the principles of equitable subrogation.²⁹ However, as a disclaimer, this may be subject to evidence which may emerge as the dispute progresses.
簡而言之，根據我們目前掌握的证据，有強有力的理由主張，根據公平代位權原則，LSHC 的第一法律債權優先於 Turbo 的第二抵押權。 ²⁹ 然而，需要聲明的是，這可能會受到隨著爭議進展可能出現的证据的影響。

The Next Steps
下一步

On the basis of the available evidence before us, we are of the view that LSHC is likely to be able to obtain a judgment / order to the effect that LSHC’s First Legal Charge enjoys priority over Turbo’s Second Mortgage.
基於我們目前掌握的证据，我們認為 LSHC 很可能能夠獲得判決/命令，認定 LSHC 的第一法律債權優先於 Turbo 的第二抵押權。

In terms of immediate next steps, we recommend that LSHC first issue a pre-action letter to Turbo setting out LSHC’s strong position (whilst replying to the previous letters sent by ASC), ³⁰ incorporating the legal and evidential analysis herein on (1) application of LRO s.5; and (2) equitable subrogation and Turbo’s Encumbered Bargain.
就立即下一步的行動而言，我們建議 LSHC 首先向 Turbo 發出一封事先行動信函，闡述 LSHC 強烈的立場（同時回覆 ASC 所發送的先前信函）， ³⁰ 並包含本文件中對於 (1) LRO 條例第 5 條的適用；以及 (2) 公平代位權和 Turbo 的擔保契約的法律及證據分析。

LSHC could then apply in the existing O.88 Proceedings to join Turbo as the 3^rd Defendant, on the basis of an amended originating summons seeking a declaration that LSHC’s First Legal Charge has priority over Turbo’s Second Mortgage. This is procedurally viable:-
然後，LSHC 可以在現有的 O.88 裁判程序中申請將 Turbo 列為第 3 ^rd 被告，基於一紙修正的起訴狀，尋求判斷 LSHC 的第一次法律債權優先於 Turbo 的第二次抵押。這在程序上是可行的：-

In Standard Chartered Bank (Hong Kong) Ltd v Wonggenos Enterprises Co Ltd [2019] HKDC 1466 (28^th October 2019), the mortgage action was initially commenced against the 1^st and 2^nd defendants for payment and vacant possession. The plaintiff later (after discovery in another High Court action) applied to the 3^rd defendant as a party and to amend the originating summons seeking declaratory relief against him, being “declarations to the effect that the plaintiff’s legal interest in the Property has priority over and ranks ahead of the 3rd defendant’s equitable interest”. Leave was granted by the Court (see §§7-9, 37, 45 per HHJ Winnie Tsui (as she then was)).
在渣打銀行（香港）有限公司 v 翁金寧企業有限公司 [2019] HKDC 1466 (28 ^th 2019 年 10 月 28 日)，抵押行動最初是對 1 ^st 和 2 ^nd 被告提起，要求支付空置權。原告後來（在另一高等法院行動中發現後）申請將 3 ^rd 被告作為當事人，並修改起訴狀，尋求對他的判斷緩解，即「判斷原告在房地產的法律利益優先於並高於 3 號被告的衡平利益」。法院批准了申請（見§7-9、37、45，根據 HHJ Winnie Tsui（當時的她）的意見）。

More recently, Recorder Maurellet SC in Zhongcai Finance Ltd v Tang Man Ho Herman [2025] HKCFI 2636 (6^th June 2025) clarified at §6 (among other things) that:-
最近，馬勒列特法官 SC 在中彩金融有限公司 v 唐文豪赫爾曼 [2025] HKCFI 2636 (6 ^th 2025 年 6 月 6 日)中，在第 6 節（以及其他方面）中闡明了：-

Order 88 of the Rules of the High Court (Cap. 4A) (“RHC”) applies to any action by a mortgagee or mortgagor or by any other person having the right to foreclose or redeem any mortgage, being an action in which there is a claim for, inter alia, claiming of money secured by the mortgage and delivery of possession to the mortgagee by the mortgagor (see Order 88, rule 1(a) and Order 88, rule 1(d)).
第 88 條高等法院規則（第 4A 章）("RHC") 适用于任何抵押權人或債務人，或任何有權宣告抵押權或回購抵押權的其他人的行為，該行為中包含要求，例如要求以抵押權擔保的款項，以及債務人將物權交付給抵押權人（見第 88 條第 1(a)條和第 88 條第 1(d)條）。

The fact that an Order 88 proceeding is engaged simply means that more protection is afforded to the mortgagor defendants. It does not exclude other claims that can be brought by originating summons.
一個第 88 條程序被啟動，僅僅意味著對債務人被告提供了更多的保護。它不排除可以通過原訴提出的其他訴求。

There are indeed cases where declaratory reliefs concerning priority over proceeds of sale of a property were sought in an originating summons procedure: see e.g. Gain Hero Finance Ltd v Winland Finance Ltd [2019] 2 HKLRD 503 at §33 per DHCJ Keith Yeung SC (as he then was) (albeit this was not a mortgage action).
確實存在一些案例，在原訴程序中尋求關於優先權的救濟，該優先權涉及房地產拍賣收益：例如，Gain Hero Finance Ltd v Winland Finance Ltd [2019] 2 HKLRD 503 at §33 per DHCJ Keith Yeung SC（儘管這並非一個抵押行為）。

For completeness, the fact that LSHC has now obtained possession of the Property should not affect the Court’s jurisdiction. The action remains a mortgage action so long as the monies claimed remain “secured by the mortgage”, not to mention the Court has jurisdiction to deal with the originating summons under RHC O.28 in any event: Zhongcai Finance (supra) at §§9, 11.
為了完整起見，LSHC 現已取得不動產的事實，不應影響法院的管轄權。只要所索求的金錢仍然「由抵押權擔保」，此訴訟就仍然是一個抵押權訴訟，更不用說在任何情況下，法院都有管轄權處理根據 RHC O.28 提出的起訴狀：Zhongcai Finance（上訴）§§9, 11。

Upon joinder of Turbo, depending largely on the defences and evidence (if any) raised by Turbo, LSHC could then consider the appropriate directions/applications to be sought or opposed (if sought by Turbo):-
在 Turbo 加入後，主要取決於 Turbo 所提出的防禦和證據（如果有），LSHC 可以考慮尋求或反對適當的指示/申請（如果由 Turbo 提出）：-

If Turbo fails to raise any triable defence, LSHC may consider seeking summary disposal: RHC O.24 r.4; see also Hong Kong White Book (2025) (“HKWB”) at §28/4/2. This has been applied to O.88 actions: e.g. Wing Hang Bank Ltd v Liu Kam Ying [2002] 2 HKC 57 at §§7, 10 per Ma J (as he then was).
如果 Turbo 沒有提出任何可審理的防禦，LSHC 可以考慮尋求簡易判決：RHC O.24 r.4；另見香港白皮書（2025）（「HKWB」）§28/4/2。這已經應用於 O.88 訴訟：例如 Wing Hang Bank Ltd v Liu Kam Ying [2002] 2 HKC 57 §§7, 10 per Ma J（當時為 Ma 法官）。

Where there are genuine, substantial factual disputes that cannot be resolved on affidavit evidence, the Court may either give direction under O.28 r.4(3) for evidence to be taken orally, or under O.28 r.8 that the proceedings be continued as if the cause or matter had been begun by writ: HKWB at §28/4/4. Upon reviewing Turbo’s evidence (if any), LSHC could decide whether to make such application(s) or oppose the same (if instigated by Turbo).
若存在真實且重大的事實爭議，無法依宣誓證據解決時，法院可依 O.28 r.4(3)規定，指示以口頭方式調查證據，或依 O.28 r.8 規定，認定程序繼續進行，如同訴訟或事件係以書面起訴書開始：HKWB §28/4/4。在審查 Turbo 的證據（若有）後，LSHC 可決定是否提出此類申請，或反對 Turbo 所提之申請。

If no such directions are required, the matter of priority between LSHC and Turbo would be able to be determined in what would be a 1-day substantive hearing.
若無此類指示需求，則 LSHC 與 Turbo 之優先順序問題將能在一次为期一天的實質聽證中確定。

Conclusion
結論

Our conclusions are as summarized at §3 above. We will be happy to clarify any aspect of this advice as necessary.
我們的結論如 §3 上所述。我們將樂於在必要時釐清此建議的任何方面。

2^nd July 2025
2 ^nd 2025 年 7 月

CHRISTOPHER CHAIN SC   REGINA YIP

Des Voeux Chambers    Des Voeux Chambers