A TREATISE IN  一部论著
THE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE
知识社会学
by Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann
作者 彼得·L·伯杰 和 托马斯·卢克曼

DOUBLEDAY & COMPANY, INC. GARDEN CITY, NEW YORK 1966
道布尔戴公司，纽约花园城市 1966 年

Since our purpose in this treatise is a sociological analysis of the reality of everyday life, more precisely, of knowledge that guides conduct in everyday life, and we are only tangentially interested in how this reality may appear in various theoretical perspectives to intellectuals, we must begin by a clarification of that reality as it is available to the commonsense of the ordinary members of society. How that commonsense reality may be influenced by the theoretical constructions of intellectuals and other merchants of ideas is a further question. Ours is thus an enterprise that, although theoretical in character, is geared to the understanding of a reality that forms the subject matter of the empirical science of sociology, that is, the world of everyday life.
鉴于本论述的目的在于对日常生活现实进行社会学分析，更准确地说，是对指导日常生活行为的知识进行分析，而我们仅对这现实如何在知识分子的各种理论视角中呈现略感兴趣，我们必须首先澄清这现实在普通社会成员的常识中是如何呈现的。常识现实如何受到知识分子及其他思想传播者的理论建构影响，则是另一个问题。因此，我们的工作虽然具有理论性质，但旨在理解构成经验社会学科学研究对象的现实，即日常生活的世界。
It should be evident, then, that our purpose is not to engage in philosophy. All the same, if the reality of everyday life is to be understood, account must be taken of its intrinsic character before we can proceed with sociological analysis proper. Everyday life presents itself as a reality interpreted by men and subjectively meaningful to them as a coherent world. As sociologists we take this reality as the object of our analyses. Within the frame of reference of sociology as an empirical science it is possible to take this reality as given, to take as data particular phenomena arising within it, without further inquiring about the foundations of this reality, which is a philosophical task. However, given the particular purpose of the present treatise, we cannot completely by-pass the philosophical problem. The world of everyday life is not only taken for granted as reality by the ordinary members of society in the sub-
那么，很明显，我们的目的不是从事哲学研究。尽管如此，如果要理解日常生活的现实，就必须先考虑其内在特性，然后才能进行适当的社会学分析。日常生活呈现为一种被人们解释并对他们具有主观意义的连贯世界。作为社会学家，我们将这种现实作为分析的对象。在作为一门经验科学的社会学参考框架内，可以将这种现实视为既定事实，将其中出现的特定现象作为数据，而无需进一步探究这种现实的基础问题，因为那是哲学的任务。然而，鉴于本论述的特殊目的，我们不能完全回避哲学问题。日常生活的世界不仅被社会普通成员视为理所当然的现实，且在子-
_ jectively meaningful conduct of their lives. It is a world that originates in their thoughts and actions, and is maintained as real by these. Before turning to our main task we must, therefore, attempt to clarify the foundations of knowledge in everyday life, to wit, the
他们生活中具有客观意义的行为。这是一个起源于他们的思想和行动的世界，并通过这些思想和行动维持其现实性。因此，在转向我们的主要任务之前，我们必须尝试澄清日常生活中知识的基础，即
objectivations of subjective processes (and meanings) by which the intersubjective commonsense world is constructed.
主观过程（及其意义）的客观化，通过这些过程构建了人际间的常识世界。

For the purpose at hand, this is a preliminary task, and we can do no more than sketch the main features of what we believe to be an adequate solution to the philosophical problem-adequate, let us hasten to add, only in the sense that it can serve as a starting point for sociological analysis. The considerations immediately following are, therefore, of the nature of philosophical prolegomena and, in themselves, presociological. The method we consider best suited to clarify the foundations of knowledge in everyday life is that of phenomenological analysis, a purely descriptive method and, as such, “empirical” but not “scientific”-as we understand the nature of the empirical sciences. ${}^1$${}^1$^(1){ }^{1}
就当前目的而言，这是一个初步任务，我们只能勾勒出我们认为对哲学问题的适当解决方案的主要特征——我们急忙补充，这种适当仅意味着它可以作为社会学分析的起点。因此，接下来的考虑本质上是哲学的序言性质，本身属于社会学之前的范畴。我们认为最适合澄清日常生活中知识基础的方法是现象学分析，这是一种纯描述性的方法，因此是“经验的”，但不是“科学的”——按照我们对经验科学本质的理解。 ${}^1$${}^1$^(1){ }^{1}

The phenomenological analysis of everyday life, or rather of the subjective experience of everyday life, refrains from any causal or genetic hypotheses, as well as from assertions about the ontological status of the phenomena analyzed. It is important to remember this. Commonsense contains innumerable pre- and quasi-scientific interpretations about everyday reality, which it takes for granted. If we are to describe the reality of commonsense we must refer to these interpretations, just as we must take account of its taken-forgranted character-but we do so within phenomenological brackets.
对日常生活的现象学分析，或者更确切地说，对日常生活的主观体验的分析，避免任何因果或生成的假设，也避免对所分析现象的本体论地位作出断言。这一点非常重要。常识包含无数关于日常现实的预先和准科学解释，这些解释被视为理所当然。如果我们要描述常识的现实，就必须参考这些解释，正如我们必须考虑其理所当然的特性一样——但我们是在现象学的括号内这样做的。
Consciousness is always intentional; it always intends or is directed toward objects. We can never apprehend some putative substratum of consciousness as such, only consciousness of something or other. This is so regardless of whether the object of consciousness is experienced as belonging to an external physical world or apprehended as an element of an inward subjective reality. Whether I (the first person singular, here as in the following illustrations, standing for ordinary self-consciousness in everyday life) am viewing the panorama of New York City or whether I become conscious of an inner anxiety, the processes of consciousness involved are intentional in both instances. The point need not be belabored that the consciousness of the Empire State Building differs from the awareness of anxiety. A detailed phenomenological analysis would uncover the various layers of experience, and the different structures of meaning involved in, say, being bitten by a dog, remembering having been bitten by a dog, having a phobia about all dogs, and so forth. What interests us here is the common intentional character of all consciousness.
意识总是有意向性的；它总是意图或指向某些对象。我们永远无法把意识本身作为某种假定的基质来把握，只能把握对某物的意识。无论意识的对象是被体验为属于外部物理世界，还是被理解为内在主观现实的一个元素，情况都是如此。无论我（第一人称单数，这里及以下例子中代表日常生活中的普通自我意识）是在观看纽约市的全景，还是意识到内心的焦虑，所涉及的意识过程在这两种情况下都是有意向性的。无需过多强调的是，对帝国大厦的意识与对焦虑的觉察是不同的。详细的现象学分析会揭示各种体验层次，以及涉及的不同意义结构，比如被狗咬、记得被狗咬过、对所有狗产生恐惧症等等。我们这里关注的是所有意识的共同意向性特征。
(Different objects present themselves to consciousness as constituents of different spheres of realityl I recognize the fellowmen I must deal with in the course of everyday life as pertaining to a reality quite different from the disembodied figures that appear in my dreams. The two sets of objects introduce quite different tensions into my consciousness and I am attentive to them in quite different ways. My consciousness, then, is capable of moving through different spheres of reality. Put differently, I am conscious of the world as consisting of multiple realities. As I move from one reality to another, I experience the transition as a kind of shock. This shock is to be understood as caused by the shift in attentiveness that the transition entails. Waking up from a dream illustrates this shift most simply.
（不同的对象以不同的现实领域的组成部分呈现在意识中。我认识到，在日常生活中必须打交道的同胞属于一种与我梦中出现的无实体人物截然不同的现实。这两组对象在我的意识中引入了完全不同的张力，我以完全不同的方式关注它们。因此，我的意识能够穿越不同的现实领域。换句话说，我意识到世界由多重现实组成。当我从一个现实转向另一个现实时，我体验到这种转变如同一种震撼。这种震撼应被理解为由转变所带来的注意力转移引起的。醒来脱离梦境最简单地说明了这种转变。）
Among the multiple realities there is one that presents itself as the reality par excellence. This is the reality of everyday life. Its privileged position entitles it to the designation of paramount reality The tension of consciousness is highest in everyday life, that is, the latter imposes itself upon consciousness in the most massive, urgent and intense manner. It is impossible to ignore, difficult even to weaken in its imperative presence, Consequently, it forces me to be attentive to it in the fullest way. I experience everyday life in the state of being wide-awake.) This wide-awake state of existing in and apprehending the reality of everyday life is taken by me to be normal and self-evident, that is, it constitutes my natural attitude.
在众多现实中，有一种现实被视为卓越的现实。这就是日常生活的现实。它的特殊地位使其被称为至高无上的现实。意识的紧张度在日常生活中达到最高，也就是说，日常生活以最强烈、最紧迫、最密集的方式强加于意识。它无法被忽视，甚至难以在其强制性存在中减弱。因此，它迫使我以最充分的方式关注它。我在清醒的状态下体验日常生活。这种清醒的存在状态以及对日常生活现实的感知被我视为正常且不言自明的，也就是说，它构成了我的自然态度。
/ apprehend the reality of everyday life as an ordered reality. Its phenomena are prearranged in patterns that seem to be independent of my apprehension of them and that impose themselves upon the latter. The reality of everyday life appears already objectified, that is, constituted by an order of objects that have been designated as objects before my appearance on the scene. The language used in everyday life continuously provides me with the necessary objectifications and posits the order within which these make sense and within which everyday life has meaning for me. I live in a place that is geographically designated; I employ tools, from can openers to sports cars, which are designated in the technical vocabulary of my society; I live within a web of human relationships, from my chess club to the United States of America, which are also ordered by means of vocabulary. In this manner language marks the co-ordinates of my life in society and fills that life with meaningful objects.
/ 理解日常生活的现实为一种有序的现实。其现象预先排列成模式，似乎独立于我对它们的理解，并强加于我的理解之上。日常生活的现实看起来已经被客观化，也就是说，由一系列在我出现之前就已被指定为对象的秩序所构成。日常生活中使用的语言不断为我提供必要的客观化，并确立这些客观化所依赖的秩序，以及日常生活对我而言具有意义的秩序。我生活在一个地理上被指定的地方；我使用从开罐器到跑车的工具，这些工具在我社会的技术词汇中被指定；我生活在一个人际关系网络中，从我的国际象棋俱乐部到美利坚合众国，这些关系也通过词汇被有序地组织起来。通过这种方式，语言标示了我在社会生活中的坐标，并赋予这生活以有意义的对象。

The reality of everyday life is organized around the “here” of my body and the “now” of my present. This “here and now” is the focus of my attention to the reality of everyday life. What is “here and now” presented to me in everyday life is the realissimum of my
日常生活的现实围绕着我身体的“此处”和我当下的“现在”组织起来。这个“此时此地”是我关注日常生活现实的焦点。日常生活中呈现在我面前的“此时此地”是我现实的最真实部分。
(5) consciousness. The reality of everyday life is not, however, exhausted by these immediate presences, but embraces phenomena that are not present "here and now.) This means that I experience everyday life in terms of differing degrees of closeness and remoteness, both spatially and temporally. Closest to me is the zone of everyday life that is directly accessible to my bodily manipulation. This zone contains the world within my reach, the world in which I act so as to modify its reality, or the world in which I work. In this world of working my consciousness is dominated by the pragmatic motive, that is, my attention to this world is mainly determined by what I am doing, have done or plan to do in it. In this way it is $my$$my$mym y world par excellence. I know, of course, that the feality of everyday life contains zones that are not accessible to me in this manner.) But either I have no pragmatic interest in these zones or my interest in them is indirect insofar as they may be, potentially, manipulative zones for me. Typically, my interest in the far zones is less intense and certainly less urgent, I am intensely interested in the cluster of objects involved in my daily occupation-say, the world of the garage, if I am a mechanic. I am interested, though less directly, in what goes on in the testing laboratories of the automobile industry in Detroit-I am unlikely ever to be in one of these laboratories, but the work done there will eventually affect my everyday life. I may also be interested in what goes on at Cape Kennedy or in outer space, but this interest is a matter of private, “leisure-time” choice rather than an urgent necessity of my everyday life.
(5) 意识。然而，日常生活的现实并不局限于这些直接的存在，而是包含了那些“不在此时此地”的现象。这意味着我以不同的空间和时间上的亲近与遥远程度来体验日常生活。离我最近的是日常生活中我能够直接用身体操作的区域。这个区域包含了我触手可及的世界，是我通过行动来改变其现实的世界，或者说是我工作的世界。在这个工作的世界中，我的意识被实用动机所主导，也就是说，我对这个世界的关注主要取决于我正在做、已经做过或计划要做的事情。这样，它就是名副其实的 $my$$my$mym y 世界。当然，我知道日常生活的现实包含一些我无法以这种方式接触的区域。但要么我对这些区域没有实用兴趣，要么我的兴趣是间接的，因为它们可能潜在地成为我可以操作的区域。 通常，我对远处区域的兴趣较为淡薄，当然也不那么迫切。我对与我日常工作相关的一组事物非常感兴趣——比如说，如果我是机械师，我会对车库的世界特别关注。虽然不那么直接，我也对底特律汽车工业的测试实验室里发生的事情感兴趣——我很可能永远不会进入这些实验室，但那里进行的工作最终会影响我的日常生活。我可能也会对肯尼迪角或外太空发生的事情感兴趣，但这种兴趣更多是私人“闲暇时间”的选择，而非我日常生活中的迫切需要。
The reality of everyday life further presents itself to me as an intersubjective world, a world that I share with others. This intersubjectivity sharply differentiates everyday life from other realities of which I am conscious. I am alone in the world of my dreams, but I know that the world of everyday life is as real to others as it is to myself. Indeed, I cannot exist in everyday life without continually interacting and communicating with others, I know that my natural attitude to this world corresponds to the natural attitude of others, that they also comprehend the objectifications by which this world is ordered, that they also organize this world around the “here and now” of their being in it and have projects for working in
日常生活的现实进一步向我呈现为一个主体间的世界，一个我与他人共享的世界。这种主体间性将日常生活与我意识到的其他现实鲜明地区分开来。我在梦境的世界中是孤独的，但我知道日常生活的世界对他人来说和对我自己一样真实。事实上，没有不断地与他人互动和交流，我无法存在于日常生活中。我知道我对这个世界的自然态度与他人的自然态度相对应，他们也理解使这个世界有序的客观化，他们也围绕自己存在于其中的“此时此地”来组织这个世界，并有在其中工作的计划。
it. I also know, of course, that the others have a perspective on this common world that is not identical with mine. My “here” is their “there.” My “now” does not fully overlap with theirs. My projects differ from and may even conflict with theirs. All the same, I know that I live with them in a common world.(Most importantly, I know that there is an ongoing correspondence between $my$$my$mym y meanings and their meanings in this world, that we share a common sense about its reality) The natural attitude is the attitude of commonsense consciousness precisely because it refers to a world that is common to many men. Commonsense knowledge is the knowledge I share with others in the normal, self-evident routines of everyday life.
我当然也知道，其他人对这个共同世界的看法并不完全与我相同。我的“这里”是他们的“那里”。我的“现在”并不完全与他们重叠。我的计划与他们不同，甚至可能与他们冲突。尽管如此，我知道我与他们生活在一个共同的世界中。（最重要的是，我知道在这个世界中， $my$$my$mym y 的意义与他们的意义之间存在持续的对应关系，我们对其现实性有共同的理解）自然态度正是常识意识的态度，因为它指向一个许多人共有的世界。常识知识是我在日常生活中与他人共享的、正常且不言自明的常规知识。
The reality of everyday life is taken for granted as reality. It does not require additional verification over and beyond its simple presence. It is simply there, as self-evident and compelling facticity. I know that it is real. While I am capable of engaging in doubt about its reality, I am obliged to suspend such doubt as I routinely exist in everyday life. This suspension of doubt is so firm that to abandon it, as I might want to do, say, in theoretical or religious contemplation, I have to make an extreme transition. The world of everyday life proclaims itself and, when I want to challenge the proclamation, I must engage in a deliberate, by no means easy effort. The transition from the natural attitude to the theoretical attitude of the philosopher or scientist illustrates this point. But not all aspects of this reality are equally unproblematic! Everyday life is divided into sectors that are apprehended routinely, and others that present me with problems of one kind or another, Suppose that I am an automobile mechanic who is highly knowledgeable about all American-made cars. Everything that pertains to the latter is a routine, unproblematic facet of my everyday life. But one day someone appears in the garage and asks me to repair his Volkswagen. I am now compelled to enter the problematic world of foreign-made cars. I may do so reluctantly or with professional curiosity, but in either case I am now faced with problems that I have not yet routinized. At the same time, of course, I do not leave the reality of everyday life. Indeed, the latter becomes enriched as I begin to incorporate into it the knowledge and skills required for the repair of foreign-made cars. The reality of everyday life encompasses both kinds-of sectors, as long as what appears as a problem does not pertain to a different reality altogether) (say, the reality of theoretical physics, or of night-
日常生活的现实被视为理所当然的现实。它不需要超出其简单存在之外的额外验证。它就在那里，作为不言自明且令人信服的事实性。我知道它是真实的。虽然我能够对其真实性产生怀疑，但在日常生活中我必须暂停这种怀疑。这种怀疑的暂停是如此坚定，以至于如果我想放弃它，比如在理论或宗教沉思中，我必须做出极端的转变。日常生活的世界自我宣告，当我想挑战这种宣告时，必须进行一场刻意且绝非轻松的努力。从自然态度转向哲学家或科学家的理论态度就说明了这一点。但并非所有现实的方面都同样无可争议！日常生活被划分为常规感知的领域，以及那些以某种方式给我带来问题的领域。假设我是一个对所有美国产汽车都非常了解的汽车修理工。与后者相关的一切都是我日常生活中常规且无问题的方面。 但有一天，有人出现在车库，要求我修理他的大众汽车。我现在被迫进入外国制造汽车的复杂世界。我可能是勉强为之，或是出于职业好奇，但无论哪种情况，我现在面临的是尚未形成常规的问题。当然，与此同时，我并没有离开日常生活的现实。事实上，随着我开始将修理外国制造汽车所需的知识和技能融入其中，日常生活的现实变得更加丰富。日常生活的现实涵盖了这两种领域，只要所出现的问题不属于完全不同的现实（比如理论物理的现实，或夜晚的现实——
mares). As long as the routines of everyday life continue without interruption they are apprehended as unproblematic.
母马）。只要日常生活的常规不被打断，人们就会将其视为理所当然，不加质疑。

But even the unproblematic sector of everyday reality is so only until further notice, that is, until its continuity is interrupted by the appearance of a problem.) When this happens, the reality of everyday life seeks to integrate the problematic sector into what is already unproblematic. Commonsense knowledge contains a variety of instructions as to how this is to be done. For instance, the others with whom I work are unproblematic to me as long as they perform their familiar, taken-for-granted routines-say, typing away at desks next to mine in my office. They become problematic if they interrupt these routines-say, huddling together in a corner and talking in whispers. As I inquire about the meaning of this unusual activity, there is a variety of possibilities that my commonsense knowledge is capable of reintegrating into the unproblematic routines of everyday life: they may be consulting on how to fix a broken typewriter, or one of them may have some urgent instructions from the boss, and so on. On the other hand, I may find that they are discussing a union directive to go on strike, something as yet outside my experience but still well within the range of problems with which my commonsense knowledge can deal. It will deal with it, though, as a problem, rather than simply reintegrating it into the unproblematic sector of everyday life. If, however, I come to the conclusion that my colleagues have gone collectively mad, the problem that presents itself is of yet another kind. I am now faced with a problem that transcends the boundaries of the reality of everyday life and points to an altogether different reality. Indeed, my conclusion that my colleagues have gone mad implies ipso facto that they have gone off into a world that is no longer the common world of everyday life.
但即使是日常现实中无问题的部分，也只是暂时如此，即直到其连续性被问题的出现所打断为止。）当这种情况发生时，日常生活的现实会试图将有问题的部分整合进已经无问题的部分。常识知识包含了各种关于如何完成这一整合的指示。例如，只要与我共事的其他人在执行他们熟悉且理所当然的日常工作——比如在我办公室里我旁边的桌子上敲打键盘——他们对我来说就是无问题的。如果他们打断这些日常工作——比如聚集在角落里低声交谈——他们就变得有问题。当我询问这种异常活动的含义时，我的常识知识能够将多种可能性重新整合进日常生活的无问题常规中：他们可能在商讨如何修理坏掉的打字机，或者其中一人可能接到了老板的紧急指示，诸如此类。 另一方面，我可能会发现他们正在讨论一项罢工的工会指令，这在我经验之外，但仍然属于我的常识知识能够处理的问题范围内。它会将其作为一个问题来处理，而不是简单地将其重新纳入日常生活中无问题的范畴。然而，如果我得出结论认为我的同事们集体发疯了，那么呈现出来的问题则是另一种类型。我现在面临的是一个超越日常生活现实界限的问题，指向一个完全不同的现实。事实上，我得出同事们发疯的结论，意味着他们已经进入了一个不再是日常生活共同世界的世界。
Compared to the reality of everyday life, other realities appear as finite provinces of meaning, enclaves within the paramount reality marked by circumscribed meanings and modes of experiencel The paramount reality envelops them on all sides, as it were, and consciousness always returns to the paramount reality as from an excursion.) This is evident from the illustrations already given, as in the reality of dreams or that of theoretical thought. Similar “commutations” take place between the world of everyday life and the world of play, both the playing of children and, even more sharply, of adults. The theater provides an excellent illustration of such
与日常生活的现实相比，其他现实显得像是有限的意义领域，是在至高现实中的飞地，这些飞地具有有限的意义和体验方式。至高现实仿佛从各个方面包围着它们，意识总是像从一次短暂的出游中返回一样回到至高现实中。）这从前面给出的例子中已经显现出来，比如梦境的现实或理论思维的现实。类似的“转换”也发生在日常生活世界与游戏世界之间，无论是儿童的游戏，还是更为明显的成人游戏。戏剧就是这种情况的一个极好例证。
playing on the part of adults. The transition between realities is marked by the rising and falling of the curtain. As the curtain rises, the spectator is “transported to another world,” with its own meanings and an order that may or may not have much to do with the order of everyday life. As the curtain falls, the spectator “returns to reality” that is, to the paramount reality of everyday life by comparison with which the reality presented on the stage now appears tenuous and ephemeral, however vivid the presentation may have been a few moments previously. Aesthetic and religious experience is rich in producing transitions of this kind, inasmuch as art and religion are endemic producers of finite provinces of meaning.
成人扮演的角色。现实之间的转换由幕布的升降标志着。当幕布升起时，观众被“带入另一个世界”，这个世界有其自身的意义和秩序，这些秩序可能与日常生活的秩序有很大不同。当幕布落下时，观众“回归现实”，也就是说，回归与舞台上呈现的现实相比更为重要的日常生活现实，而舞台上呈现的现实无论之前多么生动，此时都显得脆弱而短暂。美学和宗教体验在产生此类转换方面极为丰富，因为艺术和宗教本质上是有限意义领域的创造者。
All finite provinces of meaning are characterized by a turning away of attention from the reality of everyday life. While there are, of course, shifts in attention within everyday life, the shift to a finite province of meaning is of a much more radical kind, A radical change takes place in the tension of consciousness. In the context of religious experience this has been aptly called “leaping.” It is important to stress, however, that the reality of everyday life retains its paramount status even as such “leaps” take place. If nothing else, language makes sure of this. The (common language available to me for the objectification of my experiences is grounded in everyday life and keeps pointing back to it even as I employ it to interpret experiences in finite provinces of meaning.) Typically, therefore, I “distort” the reality of the latter as soon as I begin to use the common language in interpreting them, that is, I “translate” the noneveryday experiences back into the paramount reality of everyday life. This may be readily seen in terms of dreams, but is also typical of those trying to report about theoretical, aesthetic or religious worlds of meaning. The theoretical physicist tells us that his concept of space cannot be conveyed linguistically, just as the artist does with regard to the meaning of his creations and the mystic with regard to his encounters with the divine. Yet all these-dreamer, physicist, artist and mystic-also live in the reality of everyday life. Indeed, one of their important problems is to interpret the coexistence of this reality with the reality enclaves into which they have ventured.
所有有限意义领域的特征是注意力从日常生活的现实中转移开来。当然，日常生活中注意力也会发生转移，但转向有限意义领域的转变则是更为根本的。在意识的张力中发生了根本性的变化。在宗教体验的语境中，这种变化被恰当地称为“跳跃”。然而，重要的是要强调，即使发生了这种“跳跃”，日常生活的现实仍然保持其至高无上的地位。至少，语言确保了这一点。（我用来客观化自己经验的通用语言是基于日常生活的，即使我用它来解释有限意义领域中的体验，它也不断指向日常生活。）因此，通常情况下，我一旦开始用通用语言解释这些体验，就会“扭曲”后者的现实，也就是说，我将非日常的体验“翻译”回日常生活的至高现实。这一点在梦境中尤为明显，同时也典型地出现在那些试图报告理论、美学或宗教意义世界的人们中。 理论物理学家告诉我们，他对空间的概念无法用语言表达，正如艺术家无法用语言表达其创作的意义，神秘主义者也无法用语言表达他与神圣相遇的体验。然而，这些人——梦想家、物理学家、艺术家和神秘主义者——都生活在日常生活的现实中。事实上，他们面临的一个重要问题是如何解释这种现实与他们所进入的现实飞地的共存。
The world of everyday life is structured both spatially and temporally. The spatial structure is quite peripheral to our present considerations. Suffice it to point out that it, too, has a social dimension by virtue of the fact that my manipulatory zone inter-
日常生活的世界在空间和时间上都有结构。空间结构与我们当前的讨论关系不大。只需指出，它也具有社会维度，因为我的操作区域与他人的操作区域相交。
sects with that of others. More important for our present purpose is the temporal structure of everyday life.
对我们当前的目的来说，更重要的是日常生活的时间结构。

Temporality is an intrinsic property of consciousness) The stream of consciousness is always ordered temporally. It is possible to differentiate between different levels of this temporality as it is intrasubjectively available(Every individual is conscious of an inner flow of time, which in turn is founded on the physiological rhythms of the organism though it is not identical with these. It would greatly exceed the scope of these prolegomena to enter into a detailed analysis of these levels of intrasubjective temporality. As we have indicated, however, intersubjectivity in everyday life also has a temporal dimension. The world of everyday life has its own standard time, which is intersubjectively available This standard time may be understood as the intersection between cosmic time and its socially established calendar, based on the temporal sequences of nature, and inner time, in its afore-mentioned differentiations. There can never be full simultaneity between these various levels of temporality, as the experience of waiting indicates most clearly. Both my organism and my society impose upon me, and upon my inner time, certain sequences of events that involve waiting. I may want to take part in a sports event, but I must wait for my bruised knee to heal. Or again, I must wait until certain papers are processed so that my qualification for the event may be officially established. It may readily be seen that the temporal structure of everyday life is exceedingly complex, because the different levels of empirically present temporality must be ongoingly correlated.
时间性是意识的内在属性。意识流总是按时间顺序排列的。可以区分这种时间性的不同层次，因为它在主体内是可感知的（每个人都能意识到内在的时间流，这种时间流又建立在有机体的生理节律之上，尽管它与这些节律并不完全相同）。对这些主体内时间性层次进行详细分析将远远超出这些绪论的范围。然而，正如我们所指出的，日常生活中的主体间性也具有时间维度。日常生活的世界有其自身的标准时间，这种时间是主体间可感知的。该标准时间可以理解为宇宙时间与其社会建立的日历之间的交汇点，后者基于自然的时间序列，以及前述的内在时间的不同层次。这些不同时间性层次之间永远不可能完全同步，等待的体验最清楚地表明了这一点。我的有机体和我的社会都对我以及我的内在时间施加了某些事件序列，这些序列涉及等待。 我可能想参加一项体育赛事，但必须等我的膝盖瘀伤痊愈。或者，我必须等某些文件处理完毕，以便我的赛事资格能够正式确立。很容易看出，日常生活的时间结构极其复杂，因为不同层次的经验时间性必须持续地相互关联。

The temporal structure of everyday life confronts me as a facticity with which I must reckon, that is, with which I must try to synchronize my own projects. ( encounter time in everyday reality as continuous and finite.) All my existence in this world is continuously ordered by its time, is indeed enveloped by it. My own life is an episode in the externally factitious stream of time. It was there before I was born and it will be there after I die. The knowledge of my inevitable death makes this time finite for me. I have only a certain amount of time available for the realization of my projects, and the knowledge of this affects my attitude to these projects. Also, since I do not want to die, this knowledge injects an underlying anxiety into my projects. Thus I cannot endlessly repeat my participation in sports events. I know that I am getting older. It may even be that this is the last occasion on which I have the chance to par-
日常生活的时间结构以一种事实性呈现在我面前，我必须与之对抗，也就是说，我必须尝试使自己的计划与之同步。（在日常现实中遇到时间是连续且有限的。）我在这个世界上的全部存在都被它的时间持续地安排着，实际上被它包裹着。我的生命是外在人为时间流中的一个片段。时间在我出生之前就存在，且在我死后仍将存在。对我来说，意识到自己必然的死亡使这段时间变得有限。我只有一定的时间来实现我的计划，而这种认识影响了我对这些计划的态度。此外，由于我不想死，这种认识在我的计划中注入了一种潜在的焦虑。因此，我不能无休止地重复参加体育赛事。我知道自己在变老。甚至可能这是我最后一次有机会参加的场合。
ticipate. My waiting will be anxious to the degree in which the finitude of time impinges upon the project.
我的等待将因时间的有限性对计划的影响程度而充满焦虑。

The same temporal structure, as has already been indicated, is coercive. I cannot reverse at will the sequences imposed by it"first things first" is an essential element of my knowledge of everyday life. Thus I cannot take a certain examination before I have passed through certain educational programs, I cannot practice my profession before I have taken this examination, and so on. Also, the (same temporal structure provides the historicity that determines my situation in the world of everyday life. I was born on a certain date, entered school on another, started working as a professional on another, and so on. These dates, however, are all “located” within a much more comprehensive history, and this “location” decisively shapes my situation. Thus I was born in the year of the great bank crash in which my father lost his wealth, I entered school just before the revolution, I began to work just after the great war broke out, and so forth. The temporal structure of everyday life not only imposes prearranged sequences upon the “agenda” of any single day but also imposes itself upon my biography as a whole. Within the co-ordinates set by this temporal structure I apprehend both daily “agenda” and overall biography. Clock and calendar ensure that, indeed, I am a “man of my time.” Only within this temporal structure does everyday life retain for me its accent of reality. Thus in cases where I may be “disoriented” for one reason or another (say, I have been in an automobile accident in which I was knocked unconscious), I feel an almost instinctive urge to “reorient” myself within the temporal structure of everyday life. I look at my watch and try to recall what day it is. By these acts alone I re-enter the reality of everyday life.
正如前面所指出的，相同的时间结构具有强制性。我不能随意颠倒它所规定的顺序，“先做重要的事”是我对日常生活认知的一个基本要素。因此，我不能在通过某些教育课程之前参加某个考试，不能在通过该考试之前从事我的职业，诸如此类。此外，相同的时间结构还提供了决定我在日常生活世界中处境的历史性。我出生在某个特定的日期，上学是在另一个日期，作为专业人士开始工作又是在另一个日期，诸如此类。然而，这些日期都“定位”在一个更为广泛的历史之中，而这种“定位”决定性地塑造了我的处境。比如，我出生在那场导致我父亲失去财富的重大银行崩溃之年，我上学是在革命前夕，我开始工作是在大战爆发之后，等等。日常生活的时间结构不仅对任何一天的“日程”强加了预先安排的顺序，而且还强加于我的整个传记之上。 在这个时间结构所设定的坐标内，我既把握了每日的“日程”，也把握了整体的传记。时钟和日历确保了我确实是一个“属于我时代的人”。只有在这个时间结构内，日常生活才对我保持其现实的色彩。因此，在某些情况下，当我因某种原因“迷失方向”（比如，我遭遇了一场汽车事故，昏迷不醒），我会感到一种几乎是本能的冲动，想要在日常生活的时间结构中“重新定位”自己。我看一看手表，试图回忆今天是星期几。仅凭这些行为，我便重新进入了日常生活的现实。

The reality of everyday life is shared with others. But how are these others themselves experienced in everyday life? Again, it is possible to differentiate between several modes of such experience.
日常生活的现实是与他人共享的。但这些他人在日常生活中又是如何被体验的呢？同样，可以区分几种此类体验的模式。

The (most important experience of others takes place in the face-to-face situation, which is the prototypical case of social interaction.) All other cases are derivatives of it.
（对他人的最重要体验发生在面对面的情境中，这是社会互动的典型案例。）所有其他情况都是它的衍生形式。

In the face-to-face situation the other is appresented to me in a
在面对面的情境中，另一个人以一种
vivid present shared by both of us. I know that in the same vivid present I am appresented to him. (My and his “here and now” continuously impinge on each other as long as the face-to-face situation continues, As a result, there is a continuous interchange of my expressivity and his. I see him smile, then react to my frown by stopping the smile, then smiling again as I smile, and so on. Every expression of mine is oriented toward him, and vice versa, and this continuous reciprocity of expressive acts is simultaneously available to both of us. This means that, (in the face-to-face situation, the other’s subjectivity is available to me through a maximum of symptoms.) To be sure, I may misinterpret some of these symptoms. I may think that the other is smiling while in fact he is smirking. Nevertheless, no other form of social relating can reproduce the plenitude of symptoms of subjectivity present in the face-to-face situation. Only here is the other’s subjectivity emphatically “close.” All other forms of relating to the other are, in varying degrees, “remote.”
生动的当下呈现在我面前，这个当下是我们共同分享的。我知道，在同一个生动的当下，我也被他呈现出来。（我和他的“此时此地”在面对面情境持续的过程中不断相互影响，结果是，我的表达性和他的表达性不断交换。我看到他微笑，然后他对我的皱眉作出反应，停止微笑，接着当我微笑时他又再次微笑，诸如此类。我的每一个表情都是针对他的，反之亦然，这种表达行为的持续互惠同时对我们双方都是可见的。这意味着，（在面对面的情境中，另一个人的主观性通过最多的症状对我开放。）当然，我可能会误解其中一些症状。我可能认为对方在微笑，实际上他是在讥笑。然而，没有其他任何形式的社会交往能够再现面对面情境中主观性症状的丰富性。只有在这里，另一个人的主观性才是明确地“亲近”的。所有其他形式的与他人的关系，在不同程度上都是“遥远”的。）

In the face-to-face situation the other is fully real. This reality is part of the overall reality of everyday life, and as such massive and compelling. To be sure, another may be real to me without my having encountered him face to face-by reputation, say, or by having corresponded with him. Nevertheless, he becomes real to me in the fullest sense of the word only when I meet him face to face. Indeed, it may be argued that the other in the face-to-face situation is more real to me than I myself. Of course I “know myself better” than I can ever know him/My subjectivity is accessible to me in a way his can never be, no matter how “close” our relationship.)My past is available to me in memory in a fullness with which I can never reconstruct his, however much he may tell me about it. But this “better knowledge” of myself requires reflection. It is not immediately appresented to me. The other, however, is so appresented in the face-to-face situation. “What he is,” therefore, is ongoingly available to me. This availability is continuous and prereflective. On the other hand, “What I am” is not so available. To make it available requires that I stop, arrest the continuous spontaneity of my experience, and deliberately turn my attention back upon myself. What is more, such reflection about myself is typically occasioned by the attitude toward me that the other exhibits. It is typically a “mirror” response to attitudes of the other.
在面对面的情境中，另一个人是完全真实的。这种现实是日常生活整体现实的一部分，因此是庞大而令人信服的。当然，另一个人可能在我未曾面对面遇见他时就对我是真实的——比如通过名声，或者通过与他通信。然而，他只有在我与他面对面相遇时，才以最完整的意义对我变得真实。事实上，可以说，在面对面的情境中，另一个人对我来说比我自己更真实。当然，我“比任何时候都更了解自己”——我的主观性对我来说是可接近的，而无论我们的关系多么“亲密”，他的主观性永远无法被我完全了解。我的过去可以通过记忆完整地呈现给我，而无论他告诉我多少，我都无法如此完整地重构他的过去。但这种对自我的“更好了解”需要反思。它并非立即显现于我面前。然而，在面对面的情境中，另一个人却是如此显现于我面前。因此，“他是什么”对我来说是持续可得的。这种可得性是连续的、先于反思的。另一方面，“我是什么”则并非如此可得。 要使其成为可能，我必须停止，阻止我经验的持续自发性，并有意识地将注意力转回自己身上。更重要的是，这种对自我的反思通常是由他人对我表现出的态度引发的。它通常是对他人态度的一种“镜像”反应。
It follows that relations with others in the face-to-face situation
因此，在面对面的情境中与他人的关系
are highly flexible. Put negatively, it is comparatively difficult to impose rigid patterns upon face-to-face interaction. Whatever patterns are introduced will be continuously modified through the exceedingly variegated and subtle interchange of subjective meanings) that goes on. For instance, I may view the other as someone inherently unfriendly to me and act toward him within a pattern of “unfriendly relations” as understood by me. In the face-to-face situation, however, the other may confront me with attitudes and acts that contradict this pattern, perhaps up to a point where I am led to abandon the pattern as inapplicable and to view him as friendly. In other words, ( the pattern cannot sustain the massive evidence of the other’s subjectivity that is available to me in the face-to-face situation.) By contrast, it is much easier for me to ignore such evidence as long as I do not encounter the other face to face. Even in such a relatively “close” relation as may be maintained by correspondence I can more successfully dismiss the other’s protestations of friendship as not actually representing his subjective attitude to me, simply because in correspondence I lack the immediate, continuous and massively real presence of his expressivity. It is, to be ṣure, possible for me to misinterpret the other’s meanings even in the face-to-face situation, as it is possible for him “hypocritically” to hide his meanings. All the same, both misinterpretation and “hypocrisy” are more difficult to sustain in face-to-face interaction than in less “close” forms of social relations.
具有高度的灵活性。换句话说，面对面的互动中相对较难强加固定的模式。无论引入何种模式，都会通过极其多样且微妙的主观意义交流不断被修改。例如，我可能将对方视为天生对我不友好的人，并按照我理解的“敌对关系”模式对待他。然而，在面对面的情境中，对方可能会以与该模式相矛盾的态度和行为面对我，甚至可能使我放弃该模式，转而将他视为友好。换言之，（该模式无法维系面对面情境中我所能获得的对方主观性的海量证据。）相比之下，只要不与对方面对面，我更容易忽视这些证据。 即使是在通过通信维持的这样一种相对“亲密”的关系中，我也更容易将对方的友谊表白视为并不真正代表他对我的主观态度，仅仅因为在通信中我缺乏他表达情感的即时、持续且极为真实的存在。当然，即使在面对面的情况下，我也可能误解对方的意思，就像他可能“虚伪”地隐藏自己的意图一样。尽管如此，无论是误解还是“虚伪”，在面对面的互动中都比在较不“亲密”的社会关系形式中更难维持。

On the other hand, I apprehend the other by means of typificatory schemes even in the face-to-face situation, although these schemes are more “vulnerable” to his interference than in “remoter” forms of interaction. Put differently, while it is comparatively diffcult to impose rigid patterns on face-to-face interaction, even it is patterned from the beginning if it takes place within the routines of everyday life. (We can leave aside for later consideration cases of interaction between complete strangers who have no common background of everyday life.) The (reality of everyday life contains typificatory schemes in terms of which others are apprehended and “dealt with” in face-to-face encounters. Thus I apprehend the other as “a man,” “a European,” “a buyer,” “a jovial type,” and so on. All these typifications ongoingly affect my interaction with him as, say, I decide to show him a good time on the town before trying to sell him my product. Our face-to-face interaction will be patterned by these typifications as long as they do not become problematic
另一方面，即使在面对面的情境中，我也通过典型化的模式来理解他人，尽管这些模式比起“更远距离”的互动形式更容易受到他人干扰。换句话说，虽然在面对面互动中强加僵硬的模式相对困难，但只要这种互动发生在日常生活的惯例之中，它从一开始就是有模式的。（我们可以暂且不考虑那些完全陌生、没有共同日常生活背景的人的互动情况。）日常生活的现实包含了典型化的模式，根据这些模式他人在面对面交往中被理解和“处理”。因此，我将他人理解为“一个男人”、“一个欧洲人”、“一个买家”、“一个开朗的人”等等。所有这些典型化不断影响着我与他的互动，比如我决定先带他去城里玩得开心，然后再试图向他推销我的产品。只要这些典型化不成为问题，我们的面对面互动就会被这些典型化所模式化。
through interference on his part. Thus he may come up with evidence that, although “a man,” “a European” and “a buyer,” he is also a self-righteous moralist, and that what appeared first as joviality is actually an expression of contempt for Americans in general and American salesmen in particular. At this point, of course, my typificatory scheme will have to be modified, and the evening planned differently in accordance with this modification/Unless thus challenged, though, the typifications will hold until further notice and will determine my actions in the situation.)
通过他的干预。因此，他可能会提出证据，表明虽然他是“一个人”、“一个欧洲人”和“一个买家”，但他也是一个自以为是的道德家，而最初看似的欢快实际上是对美国人总体以及美国推销员特别的蔑视。当然，在这一点上，我的典型化方案将不得不进行修改，并根据这一修改重新安排晚上的计划。除非受到这样的挑战，否则这些典型化将持续有效，直到另行通知，并将决定我在该情境中的行为。

The typificatory schemes entering into face-to-face situations are, of course, reciprocal. The other also apprehends me in a typified way-as “a man,” “an American,” “a salesman,” “an ingratiating fellow,” and so on. The other’s typifications are as susceptible to my interference as mine are to his. In other words, the two typificatory schemes enter into an ongoing “negotiation” in the face-to-face situation. In eyeryday life such “negotiation” is itself likely to be prearranged in a typical manner-as in the typical bargaining process between buyers and salesmen. Thus, most of the time, my encounters with others in everyday life are typical in a double sense-I apprehend the other as a type and I interact with him in a situation that is itself typical.
进入面对面情境的典型化方案当然是相互的。对方也以典型化的方式理解我——作为“一个男人”、“一个美国人”、“一个推销员”、“一个讨人喜欢的家伙”等等。对方的典型化同样容易受到我的干扰，就像我的典型化会受到他的影响一样。换句话说，这两种典型化方案在面对面情境中进入一种持续的“协商”状态。在日常生活中，这种“协商”本身很可能以典型的方式预先安排——比如买家和推销员之间典型的讨价还价过程。因此，大多数时候，我在日常生活中与他人的相遇具有双重典型性——我将对方视为一个类型，同时我与他互动的情境本身也是典型的。
The typifications of social interaction become progressively anonymous the farther away they are from the face-to-face situation. Every typification, of course, entails incipient anonymity) If I typify my friend Henry as a member of category X (say, as an Englishman), I ipso facto interpret at least certain aspects of his conduct as resulting from this typification-for instance, his tastes in food are typical of Englishmen, as are his manners, certain of his emotional reactions, and so on. This implies, though, that these characteristics and actions of my friend Henry appertain to anyone in the category of Englishman, that is, I apprehend these aspects of his being in anonymous terms. Nevertheless, (as long as my friend Henry is available in the plenitude of expressivity of the face-to-face situation, he will constantly break through my type of anonymous Englishman and manifest himself as a unique and therefore atypical individual -to wit, as my friend Henry. (The anonymity of the type is obviously less susceptible to this kind of individualization when face-to-face interaction is a matter of the past (my friend Henry, the Englishman, whom I knew when I was a college student), or is of a superficial and transient kind (the Englishman with whom I have a
社会互动的类型化随着距离面对面情境的远近而逐渐变得匿名化。当然，每一种类型化都包含初步的匿名性。如果我将我的朋友亨利类型化为某一类别 X 的成员（比如，作为一个英国人），我就必然会将他行为的某些方面解释为源于这种类型化——例如，他的饮食偏好是典型的英国人，他的举止、某些情感反应也是如此。这意味着，我朋友亨利的这些特征和行为属于任何英国人类别中的人，也就是说，我以匿名的方式理解他存在的这些方面。然而，（只要我的朋友亨利在面对面情境中充分表达自己，他就会不断突破我对匿名英国人的类型化，展现出他作为一个独特且因此非典型的个体——也就是，我的朋友亨利。） （当面对面交流成为过去时，类型的匿名性显然不太容易受到这种个性化的影响（我大学时认识的英国朋友亨利），或者交流只是表面且短暂的（我所认识的那位英国人））
brief conversation on a train), or has never taken place (my business competitors in England).
简短的火车上的对话），或者从未发生过（我在英格兰的商业竞争对手）。

An important aspect of the experience of others in everyday life is thus the directness or indirectness of such experience. At any given time it is possible to distinguish between consociates with whom I interact in face-to-face situations and others who are mere contemporaries, of whom I have only more or less detailed recollections, or of whom I know merely by hearsay. In face-to-face situations I have direct evidence of my fellowman, of his actions, his attributes, and so on. Not so in the case of contemporaries-of them I have more or less reliable knowledge. Furthermore, I must take account of my fellowmen in face-to-face situations, while I may, but need not, turn my thoughts to mere contemporaries. Anonymity increases as I go from the former to the latter, because the anonymity of the typifications by means of which I apprehend fellowmen in face-to-face situations is constantly “filled in” by the multiplicity of vivid symptoms referring to a concrete human being.
他人在日常生活中的体验的一个重要方面是这种体验的直接性或间接性。在任何特定时刻，都可以区分我在面对面情境中互动的同伴和那些仅仅是同时代的人，我对他们只有或多或少详细的回忆，或者只是听说过。在面对面情境中，我有关于同伴、他们的行为、属性等的直接证据。而对于同时代的人则不然——我对他们的了解或多或少是可靠的。此外，我必须考虑在面对面情境中的同伴，而对于仅仅是同时代的人，我可以考虑，也可以不考虑。随着从前者转向后者，匿名性增加，因为我通过类型化来理解面对面同伴时的匿名性，常常被指向具体人的多种生动迹象所“填补”。

This, of course, is not the whole story. There are obvious differences in my experiences of mere contemporaries. Some I have experienced again and again in face-to-face situations and expect to meet again regularly (my friend Henry); others I recollect as concrete human beings from a past meeting (the blonde I passed on the street), but the meeting was brief and, most likely, will not be repeated. Still others I know of as concrete human beings, but I can apprehend them only by means of more or less anonymous intersecting typifications (my British business competitors, the Queen of England). Among the latter one could again distinguish between likely partners in face-to-face situations (my British business competitors), and potential but unlikely partners (the Queen of England).
当然，这还不是全部情况。我与普通同时代人的经历存在明显差异。有些人我在面对面交流中反复遇见，并期望定期再见（我的朋友亨利）；有些人我记得是过去见过的具体人物（我在街上擦肩而过的金发女郎），但那次见面很短暂，很可能不会再有下一次。还有一些人我知道是具体的人，但我只能通过或多或少匿名的交叉类型化来认识他们（我的英国商业竞争对手，英国女王）。在后者中，还可以区分可能在面对面场合成为伙伴的人（我的英国商业竞争对手）和潜在但不太可能成为伙伴的人（英国女王）。

The (degree of anonymity characterizing the experience of others in everyday life depends, however, upon another factor too) I see the newspaper vendor on the street corner as regularly as I see my wife. But he is less important to me and I am not on intimate terms with him. He may remain relatively anonymous to me. The degree of $6d$$6d$6d6 d interest and the degree of intimacy may combine to increase or decrease anonymity of experience). They may also influence it independently. I can be on fairly intimate terms with a number of the fellow-members of a tennis club and on very formal terms with my boss. Yet the former, while by no means completely anonymous,
（他人在日常生活中体验到的匿名程度，然而，还取决于另一个因素）我在街角看到报贩的频率和看到我妻子的频率一样。但他对我来说不那么重要，我和他没有亲密关系。他对我来说可能仍然相对匿名。 $6d$$6d$6d6 d 兴趣的程度和亲密程度可能结合起来增加或减少体验的匿名性）。它们也可能独立地影响匿名性。我可以和网球俱乐部的许多成员保持相当亲密的关系，而与我的老板则保持非常正式的关系。然而，前者虽然绝非完全匿名，
may merge into “that bunch at the courts” while the latter stands out as a unique individual. And finally, anonymity may become near-total with certain typifications that are not intended ever to become individualized-such as the “typical reader of the London Times.” Finally, the “scope” of the typification-and thereby its anonymity-can be further increased by speaking of “British public opinion.”
可能会融入“球场上的那群人”，而后者则作为一个独特的个体突出存在。最后，匿名性可能在某些类型化中几乎达到完全——这些类型化并不打算被个性化，比如“伦敦时报的典型读者”。最后，通过谈论“英国公众舆论”，类型化的“范围”——从而其匿名性——可以进一步扩大。

The focial reality of everyday life is thus apprehended in a continuum of typifications, which are progressively anonymous as they are removed from the “here and now” of the face-to-face situations At one pole of the continuum are those others with whom I frequently and intensively interact in face-to-face situations-my “inner circle,” as it were. At the other pole are highly anonymous abstractions, which by their very nature can never be available in face-to-face interaction. Social structure is the sum total of these typifications and of the recurrent patterns of interaction established by means of them As such, social structure is an essential element of the reality of everyday life.
日常生活的社会现实因此被理解为一系列类型化的连续体，这些类型化随着它们远离面对面情境的“此时此地”而逐渐变得匿名。在连续体的一端，是那些我经常且密切在面对面情境中互动的他人——可以称之为我的“内圈”。在另一端，是高度匿名的抽象概念，它们本质上永远无法在面对面互动中出现。社会结构是这些类型化及其所建立的反复出现的互动模式的总和。因此，社会结构是日常生活现实的一个基本要素。

One further point ought to be made here, though we cannot elaborate it. My relations with others are not limited to consociates and contemporaries. I also relate to predecessors and successors, to those others who have preceded and will follow me in the encompassing history of my society. Except for those who are past consociates (my dead friend Henry), I relate to my predecessors through highly anonymous typifications-“my immigrant great-grandparents,” and even more, “the Founding Fathers.” My successors, for understandable reasons, are typified in an even more anonymous manner-“my children’s children,” or “future generations.” These typifications are substantively empty projections, almost completely devoid of individualized content, whereas the typifications of predecessors have at least some such content, albeit of a highly mythical sort. The anonymity of both these sets of typifications, however, does not prevent their entering as elements into the reality of everyday life, sometimes in a very decisive way. After all, I may sacrifice my life in loyalty to the Founding Fathers-or, for that matter, on behalf of future generations.
这里还应提出一点，尽管我们无法详细阐述。我的人际关系不仅限于同伴和同时代的人。我还与前辈和后继者相关联，即那些在我所处社会的整体历史中先于我和将继我而来的人。除了那些已故的同伴（我已故的朋友亨利）之外，我通过高度匿名的类型化与前辈相关联——“我的移民曾祖父母”，甚至更多的是“开国元勋”。出于可以理解的原因，我的后继者则以更为匿名的方式被类型化——“我的子孙”或“未来的世代”。这些类型化本质上是空洞的投射，几乎完全缺乏个性化内容，而前辈的类型化至少包含一些内容，尽管是高度神话化的。然而，这两类类型化的匿名性并不妨碍它们作为元素进入日常生活的现实，有时甚至以非常决定性的方式。毕竟，我可能会为了忠诚于开国元勋——或者说，为了未来的世代而牺牲自己的生命。

Human expressivity is capable of objectivation, that is, it manifests itself in products of human activity that are available both to their producers and to other men as elements of a common world. Such objectivations serve as more or less enduring indices of the subjective processes of their producers, allowing their availability to extend beyond the face-to-face situation in which they can be directly apprehended. For instance, a subjective attitude of anger is directly expressed in the face-to-face situation by a variety of bodily indices-facial mien, general stance of the body, specific movements of arms and feet, and so on. These indices are continuously available in the face-to-face situation, which is precisely why it affords me the optimal situation for gaining access to another’s subjectivity. The same indices are incapable of surviving beyond the vivid present of the face-to-face situation. Anger, however, can be objectivated by means of a weapon. Say, I have had an altercation with another man, who has given me ample expressive evidence of his anger against me. That night I wake up with a knife embedded in the wall above my bed. The knife qua object expresses my adversary’s anger. It affords me access to his subjectivity even though I was sleeping when he threw it and never saw him because he fled after his near-hit. Indeed, if I leave the object where it is, I can look at it again the following morning, and again it expresses to me the anger of the man who threw it. What is more, other men can come and look at it and arrive at the same conclusion. In other words, the knife in my wall has become an objectively available constituent of the reality I share with my adversary and with other men. Presumably, this knife was not produced for the exclusive purpose of being thrown at me. But it expresses a subjective intention of violence, whether motivated by anger or by utilitarian considerations, such as killing for food. The weapon qua object in the real world continues to express a general Intention to commit violence that is recognizable by anyone who knows what a weapon is. The weapon, then, is both a human prodyct and an objectivation of human subjectivity.
人的表达能力能够实现客观化，也就是说，它表现为人类活动的产物，这些产物不仅对其创造者可见，也对其他人作为共同世界的元素可见。这些客观化产物作为其创造者主观过程的或多或少持久的标志，使得它们的可用性超越了面对面情境中可以直接感知的范围。例如，愤怒的主观态度在面对面情境中通过各种身体标志直接表达——面部表情、身体的整体姿态、手臂和脚的特定动作等等。这些标志在面对面情境中持续可见，这正是它为我提供了接触他人主观性的最佳情境的原因。同样的标志无法超越面对面情境的鲜活当下而存在。然而，愤怒可以通过武器实现客观化。比如，我与另一个人发生了争执，他向我充分表达了对我的愤怒。那天晚上，我醒来时发现床头墙上插着一把刀。 刀作为物品表达了我对手的愤怒。尽管我在他扔刀时正在睡觉，且从未见过他，因为他在险些击中我后逃走了，但这把刀让我得以接触到他的主观性。事实上，如果我把刀留在原处，第二天早上我还能再次看到它，它依然向我传达着那个扔刀的人的愤怒。更重要的是，其他人也可以来看它，并得出同样的结论。换句话说，插在我墙上的刀已经成为我与对手及其他人共享现实中的一个客观存在的组成部分。可以推测，这把刀并非专门为了扔向我而制造。但它表达了一种主观的暴力意图，无论这种意图是出于愤怒还是出于实用考虑，比如为了食物而杀戮。作为现实世界中的物品，这件武器持续表达了一种普遍的暴力意图，任何知道武器是什么的人都能识别出来。因此，武器既是人类的产物，也是人类主观性的客观化。
The reality of everyday life is not only filled with objectivations; it is only possible because of them. I am constantly surrounded by objects that “proclaim” the subjective intentions of my fellowmen,
日常生活的现实不仅充满了客观化；它的存在也正是因为这些客观化。我不断被那些“宣示”我同胞主观意图的物品所包围，
although I may sometimes have difficulty being quite sure just what it is that a particular object is “proclaiming,” especially if it was produced by men whom I have not known well or at all in face-to-face situations. Every ethnologist or archaeologist will readily testify to such difficulties, but the very fact that he can overcome them and reconstruct from an artifact the subjective intentions of men whose society may have been extinct for millennia is eloquent proof of the enduring power of human objectivations.
尽管有时我可能很难确切知道某个特定物品到底在“宣示”什么，尤其是当它是由我不熟悉或根本未曾面对面接触过的人制造的。每位民族学家或考古学家都会轻易证明这种困难，但他能够克服这些困难，并从一件文物中重建出那个社会可能已经消亡数千年的人的主观意图，这一事实有力地证明了人类客观化的持久力量。
(A special but crucially important case of objectivation is signification, that is, the human production of signs, A sign may be distinguished from other objectivations by /ts explicit intention to serve as an index of subjective meanings.) To be sure, all objectivations are susceptible of utilization as signs, even though they were not originally produced with this intention. For instance, a weapon may have been originally produced for the purpose of hunting animals, but may then (say, in ceremonial usage) become a sign for aggressiveness and violence in general: But there are certain objectivations originally and explicitly intended to serve as signs. For instance, instead of throwing a knife at me (an act that was presumably intended to kill me, but that might conceivably have been intended merely to signify this possibility), my adversary could have painted a black X-mark on my door, a sign, let us assume, that we are now officially in a state of enmity. Such a sign, which has no purpose beyond indicating the subjective meaning of the one who made it, is also objectively available in the common reality he and I share with other men. I recognize its meaning, as do other men, and indeed it is available to its producer as an objective “reminder” of his original intention in making it. It will be clear from the above that there is a good deal of fluidity between the instrumental and the significatory uses of certain objectivations. The special case of magic, in which there is a very interesting merging of these two uses, need not concern us here.
（客观化的一个特殊但极其重要的案例是符号化，即人类对符号的创造。符号可以通过其明确的意图作为主观意义的指示标志来区别于其他客观化。）当然，所有的客观化都可能被用作符号，尽管它们最初并非出于这一目的而产生。例如，一件武器最初可能是为了狩猎动物而制造，但后来（比如在仪式使用中）可能成为攻击性和暴力的一般象征：但有些客观化是最初明确意图作为符号使用的。例如，我的对手本可以在我的门上画一个黑色的 X 标记，这个符号，假设表示我们现在正式处于敌对状态，而不是向我投掷一把刀（这一行为可能本意是杀死我，但也可能仅仅是为了表示这种可能性）。这样的符号，除了指示制造者的主观意义外，没有其他目的，同时在他和我与其他人共享的共同现实中也是客观存在的。 我能理解它的含义，其他人也是如此，实际上它对其制作者来说也是一个客观的“提醒”，提醒他制作时的最初意图。从上述内容可以看出，某些客观化的工具性用途和符号性用途之间存在相当大的流动性。魔法的特殊情况中，这两种用途有一个非常有趣的融合，但这里我们无需讨论。

In the face-to-face situation language possesses an inherent quality of reciprocity that distinguishes it from any other sign system. The ongoing production of vocal signs in conversation can be sensitively synchronized with the ongoing subjective intentions of the conversants. I speak as I think; so does my partner in the conversation. Both of us hear what each says at virtually the same instant, which makes possible a continuous, synchronized, reciprocal access to our two subjectivities, an intersubjective closeness in the face-toface situation that no other sign system can duplicate. What is more, I hear myself as I speak; my own subjective meanings are made objectively and continuously available to me and ipso facto become “more real” to me. Another way of putting this is to recall the previous point about my “better knowledge” of the other as against my knowledge of myself in the face-to-face situation. This apparently paradoxical fact has been previously explained by the massive, continuous and prereflective availability of the other’s being in the face-to-face situation, as against the requirement of reflection for the availability of my own. Now, however, as I objectivate my own being by means of language, my own being becomes massively and continuously available to myself at the same time that it is so available to him, and I can spontaneously respond to it without the “interruption” of deliberate reflection. It can, therefore, be said that language makes “more real” my subjectivity not only to my conversation partner but also to myself. This capacity of language to crystallize and stabilize for me my own subjectivity is retained (albeit with modifications) as language is detached from the face-to-face situation. 'This very important characteristic of language is well caught in the saying that men must talk about themselves until they know themselves.
在面对面交流的情境中，语言具有一种内在的互惠特性，这使其区别于任何其他符号系统。对话中声音符号的持续产生可以与交谈者的主观意图敏感地同步。我说话时就是在思考；我的对话伙伴也是如此。我们几乎在同一时刻听到对方所说的话，这使得我们能够持续、同步、互惠地接触彼此的主观性，在面对面交流中形成一种其他符号系统无法复制的主体间亲密感。更重要的是，我在说话时也能听到自己；我自己的主观意义被客观且持续地呈现给我，因此对我来说变得“更加真实”。换句话说，可以回想之前提到的关于我在面对面情境中对他人的“更好认知”与对自己的认知之间的区别。这个看似矛盾的事实，之前已被解释为：在面对面情境中，另一方的存在是大量、持续且先于反思地可获得的，而我自身的存在则需要通过反思才能被感知。 然而，现在，当我通过语言将自身存在客观化时，我的存在不仅对他人如此可见，同时也大量且持续地对我自己可见，我可以自发地对其作出反应，而无需“中断”进行刻意反思。因此，可以说语言不仅使我的主观性对谈话伙伴“更真实”，也使其对我自己“更真实”。语言这种将我自身主观性凝结并稳定下来的能力，即使在语言脱离面对面情境时（尽管有所变化）依然保留。正如那句谚语所言，人们必须谈论自己，直到了解自己，这一语言的重要特性得到了很好的体现。

Language originates in and has its primary reference to everyday life; it refers above all to the reality I experience in wide-awake consciousness, which is dominated by the pragmatic motive (that is, the cluster of meanings directly pertaining to present or future actions) and which I share with others in a taken-for-granted manner, Al though language can also be employed to refer to other realities, which will be discussed further in a moment, it even then retains its rootage in the commonsense reality of everyday life. As a sign sys-
语言起源于日常生活，并以此作为其主要参照；它首先指向我在清醒意识中所体验的现实，这种意识受实用动机支配（即直接与当前或未来行动相关的一组意义），并且我与他人以理所当然的方式共享这种现实。尽管语言也可以用来指代其他现实，稍后将进一步讨论，但即便如此，它仍然根植于日常生活的常识现实中。作为一种符号系统—
tem, language has the quality of objectivity. I encounter language as a facticity external to myself and it is coercive in its effect on me. Language forces me into its patterns. I cannot use the rules of German syntax when I speak English; I cannot use words invented by my three-year-old son if I want to communicate outside the family; I must take into account prevailing standards of proper speech for various occasions, even if I would prefer my private “improper” ones. Language provides me with a ready-made possibility for the ongoing objectification of my unfolding experience. Put differently, language is pliantly expansive so as to allow me to objectify a great variety of experiences coming my way in the course of my life. Language also typifies experiences, allowing me to subsume them under broad categories in terms of which they have meaning not only to myself but also to my fellowmen. As it typifies, it also anonymizes experiences, for the typified experience can, in principle, be duplicated by anyone falling into the category in question. For instance, I have a quarrel with my mother-in-law. This concrete and subjectively unique experience is typified linguistically under the category of “mother-inlaw trouble.” In this typification it makes sense to myself, to others, and, presumably, to my mother-in-law. The same typification, however, entails anonymity. Not only I but anyone (more accurately, anyone in the category of son-in-law) can have “mother-in-law trouble.” In this way, my biographical experiences are ongoingly subsumed under general orders of meaning that are both objectively and subjectively real.
语言具有客观性的特质。我遇到语言时，它作为一种外在于我自身的事实存在，并且对我具有强制性的影响。语言迫使我遵循它的模式。当我说英语时，不能使用德语语法规则；如果我想在家庭之外进行交流，就不能使用我三岁儿子发明的词语；我必须考虑各种场合下流行的正确语言标准，即使我更喜欢自己私下的“非正式”用法。语言为我提供了一种现成的可能性，使我能够持续地将自己不断展开的经验客观化。换句话说，语言具有灵活扩展的特性，允许我将生活中遇到的各种经验加以客观化。语言还对经验进行类型化，使我能够将其归入广泛的类别，这些类别不仅对我自己有意义，也对我的同胞们有意义。正因为类型化，语言也使经验匿名化，因为被类型化的经验原则上可以被任何属于该类别的人复制。例如，我与我的岳母发生争吵。 这种具体且主观独特的经历在语言上被归类为“婆媳矛盾”。在这种归类中，它对我自己、他人以及大概对我的婆婆来说都是有意义的。然而，同样的归类也意味着匿名性。不仅是我，任何人（更准确地说，任何属于女婿类别的人）都可能有“婆媳矛盾”。通过这种方式，我的个人经历不断被纳入既客观又主观真实的一般意义秩序之中。

Because of its capacity to transcend the “here and now,” language $✓$$✓$✓\checkmark bridges different zones within the reality of everyday life and integrates them into a meaningful whole. The transcendences have spatial, temporal and social dimensions. Through language I can transcend the gap between my manipulatory zone and that of the other; I can synchronize my biographical time sequence with his; and I can converse with him about individuals and collectivities with whom we are not at present in face-to-face interaction. As a result of these transcendences language is capable of “making present” a variety of objects that are spatially, temporally and socially absent from the “here and now.” Ipso facto a vast accumulation of experiences and meanings can become objectified in the "here and now. Put simply, through language an entire world can be actual ized at any moment. This transcending and integrating power of language is retained when I am not actually conversing with
由于语言具有超越“此时此地”的能力，语言 $✓$$✓$✓\checkmark 架起了日常生活现实中不同区域之间的桥梁，并将它们整合成一个有意义的整体。这种超越具有空间、时间和社会维度。通过语言，我可以超越我与他人操作区域之间的鸿沟；我可以将我的个人时间序列与他的同步；我可以与他讨论我们当前并非面对面互动的个人和集体。由于这些超越，语言能够“使存在”各种在空间、时间和社会上远离“此时此地”的对象。因此，大量的经验和意义可以在“此时此地”被客观化。简单来说，通过语言，整个世界可以在任何时刻被实现。这种超越和整合的语言力量在我不实际交谈时依然存在
another. (Through linguistic objectification, even when “talking to myself” in solitary thought, an entire world can be appresented to me at any moment. As far as social relations are concerned, language “makes present” for me not only fellowmen who are physically absent at the moment, but fellowmen in the remembered or reconstructed past, as well as fellowmen projected as imaginary figures into the future. All these “presences” can be highly meaningful, of course, in the ongoing reality of everyday life.
另一个。（通过语言的客观化，即使在孤独的思考中“自言自语”，整个世界也可以在任何时刻向我呈现。就社会关系而言，语言不仅“使我呈现”那些此刻身体上不在场的同胞，还包括记忆中或重构的过去的同胞，以及被投射为未来想象中的人物的同胞。当然，所有这些“存在”在日常生活的持续现实中都可以具有高度的意义。）

Moreover, language is capable of transcending the reality of everyday life altogether. It can refer to experiences pertaining to finite provinces of meaning, and it can span discrete spheres of reality. For instance, I can interpret “the meaning” of a dream by integrating it linguistically within the order of everyday life. Such integration transposes the discrete reality of the dream into the reality of everyday life by making it an enclave within the latter. The dream is now meaningful in terms of the reality of everyday life rather than of its own discrete reality. Enclaves produced by such transposition belong, in a sense, to both spheres of reality. They are “located” in one reality, but “refer” to another.
此外，语言能够完全超越日常生活的现实。它可以指涉有限意义领域的体验，也可以跨越不同的现实领域。例如，我可以通过将梦的“意义”在语言上整合到日常生活的秩序中来解读它。这种整合将梦的独立现实转移到日常生活的现实中，使其成为后者中的一个飞地。梦现在在日常生活的现实中具有意义，而不是在其自身的独立现实中。由这种转移产生的飞地在某种意义上属于两个现实领域。它们“位于”一个现实中，但“指向”另一个现实。

Any significative theme that thus spans spheres of reality may be defined as a symbol, and the linguistic mode by which such transcendence is achieved may be called lsymbolic language. On the level of symbolism, then, (inguistic signification attains the maximum detachment from the “here and now” of everyday life, and language soars into regions that are not only de facto but a priori unavailable to everyday experience) Language now constructs immense edifices of symbolic representations that appear to tower over the reality of everyday life like gigantic presences from another world. Religion, philosophy, art, and science are the historically most important symbol systems of this kind. To name these is already to say that, despite the maximal detachment from everyday experience that the construction of these systems requires, they can be of very great importance indeed for the reality of everyday life. Language is capable not only of constructing symbols that are highly abstracted from everyday experience, but also of “bringing back” these symbols and appresenting them as objectively real elements in everyday life. In this manner, symbolism and symbolic language become essential constituents of the reality of everyday life and of the commonsense apprehension of this reality. I live in a world of signs and symbols every day.
任何跨越现实领域的重要主题都可以被定义为象征，而实现这种超越的语言方式可以称为象征性语言。在象征层面上，（语言符号的意义达到了与日常生活“此时此地”最大程度的脱离，语言因此飞升到不仅事实上而且先验上对日常经验不可及的领域）语言现在构建了庞大的象征性表征体系，这些体系如同来自另一个世界的巨大存在，似乎高耸于日常生活的现实之上。宗教、哲学、艺术和科学是历史上最重要的此类象征系统。提及这些系统，已经说明尽管构建这些系统需要与日常经验最大程度的脱离，但它们对日常生活的现实确实具有极其重要的意义。语言不仅能够构建高度抽象于日常经验的象征，还能够“带回”这些象征，并将其作为客观真实的元素呈现在日常生活中。 以这种方式，象征主义和象征语言成为日常生活现实及对这一现实的常识性理解的基本组成部分。我每天生活在一个充满符号和象征的世界中。

Language builds up semantic fields or zones of meaning that are linguistically circumscribed. Vocabulary, grammar and syntax are geared to the organization of these semantic fields. Thus language builds up classification schemes to differentiate objects by “gender” (a quite different matter from sex, of course) or by number; forms to make statements of action as against statements of being; modes of indicating degrees of social intimacy, and so on. For example, in languages that distinguish intimate and formal discourse by means of pronouns (such as $tu$$tu$tut u and vous in French, or $du$$du$dud u and Sie in German) this distinction marks the co-ordinates of a semantic field that could be called the zone of intimacy. (Here lies the world of tutoiement or of Bruderschaft, with a rich collection of meanings that are continually available to me for the ordering of my social experience) Such a semantic field, of course, also exists for the English speaker, though it is more circumscribed linguistically. Or, to take another example, the sum of lingusitic objectifications pertaining to my occupation constitutes another semantic field, which meaningfully orders all the routine events I encounter in my daily work. Within the semantic fields thus built up it is possible for both biographical and historical experience to be objectified, retained and accumulated The accumulation, of course, is selective, with the semantic fields determining what will be retained and what “forgotten” of the total experience of both the individual and the society. By virtue of this accumulation a social stock of knowledge is constituted, which is transmitted from generation to generation and which is available to the individual in everyday life. I live in the commonsense world of everyday life equipped with specific bodies of knowledge. What is more, I know that others share at least part of this knowledge, and they know that I know this Aly interaction with others in everyday life is, therefore, constantly affected by our common participation in the available social stock of knowledge.
语言构建了语义场或意义区域，这些区域在语言上是有界定的。词汇、语法和句法都围绕这些语义场的组织而设计。因此，语言建立了分类体系，以通过“性别”（当然，这与生物性别完全不同）或数量来区分对象；通过形式来表达动作陈述与存在陈述的区别；通过方式来指示社会亲密程度的不同，等等。例如，在通过代词区分亲密和正式话语的语言中（如法语中的 $tu$$tu$tut u 和 vous，或德语中的 $du$$du$dud u 和 Sie），这种区分标志着一个可以称为亲密区的语义场坐标。（这里存在着 tutoiement 或 Bruderschaft 的世界，拥有丰富的意义集合，这些意义不断地为我组织社会经验提供便利）当然，这样的语义场对于英语使用者来说也存在，尽管在语言上更为有限。 或者，举另一个例子，关于我职业的语言客体化的总和构成了另一个语义场，这个语义场有意义地组织了我在日常工作中遇到的所有常规事件。在这样构建起来的语义场中，既可以将传记经验也可以将历史经验客体化、保留和积累。当然，这种积累是有选择性的，语义场决定了个体和社会的全部经验中哪些会被保留，哪些会被“遗忘”。凭借这种积累，形成了一个社会知识库，这个知识库代代相传，并且在日常生活中为个体所用。我生活在配备了特定知识体系的日常常识世界中。更重要的是，我知道他人至少共享部分这些知识，他们也知道我知道这些。因此，日常生活中与他人的所有互动，都会不断受到我们共同参与现有社会知识库的影响。

The social stock of knowledge includes knowledge of my situation and its limits. For instance, I know that I am poor and that, therefore, I cannot expect to live in a fashionable suburb. This knowledge is, of course, shared both by those who are poor theme selves and those who are in a more privileged situation. Participation in the social stock of knowledge thus permits the “location” of individuals in society and the “handling” of them in the appropriate manner. This is not possible for one who does not participate in this knowledge, such as a foreigner, who may not recognize me as
社会知识储备包括对我自身处境及其局限的了解。例如，我知道自己贫穷，因此不能指望住在时尚的郊区。当然，这种知识既为贫穷者自身所共有，也为处于更优越地位的人所共有。参与社会知识储备因此使得个体能够在社会中被“定位”，并以适当的方式被“对待”。而对于不参与这种知识的人来说，这是不可能的，比如一个外国人，可能无法认出我作为…
poor at all, perhaps because the criteria of poverty are quite different in his society-how can I be poor, when I wear shoes and do not seem to be hungry?
一点也不穷，或许是因为他所在社会的贫困标准完全不同——我穿着鞋子，看起来也不饿，怎么可能穷呢？

Since everyday life is dominated by the pragmatic motive, recipe Knowledge, that is, knowledge limited to pragmatic competence in routine performances, occupies a prominent place in the social stock of knowledge. For example, I use the telephone every day for specific pragmatic purposes of my own. I know how to do this. I also know what to do if my telephone fails to function-which does not mean that I know how to repair it, but that I know whom to call on for assistance. My knowledge of the telephone also includes broader information on the system of telephonic communication-for instance, I know that some people have unlisted numbers, that under special circumstances I can get a simultaneous hook-up with two long-distance parties, that I must figure on the time difference if I want to call up somebody in Hongkong, and so forth. All of this telephonic lore is recipe knowledge since it does not concern anything except what I have to know for my present and possible future pragmatic purposes. I am not interested in why the telephone works this way, in the enormous body of scientific and engineering knowledge that makes it possible to construct telephones. Nor am I interested in uses of the telephone that lie outside my purposes, say in combination with short-wave radio for the purpose of marine communication. Similarly, I have recipe knowledge of the workings of human relationships. For example, I know what I must do to apply for a passport. All I am interested in is getting the passport at the end of a certain waiting period. I do not care, and do not know, how my application is processed in government offices, by whom and after what steps approval is given, who puts which stamp in the document. I am not making a study of government bureaucracy-I just want to go on a vacation abroad. My interest in the hidden workings of the passport-getting procedure will be aroused only if I fail to get my passport in the end. At that point, very much as I call on a telephone-repair expert after my telephone has broken down, I call on an expert in passport-getting-a lawyer, say, or my Congressman, or the American Civil Liberties Union. Mutatis mutandis, a large part of the social stock of knowledge consists of recipes for the mastery of routine problems. Typically, I have little interest in going beyond this pragmatically necessary knowledge as long as the problems can indeed be mastered thereby.
由于日常生活以实用动机为主导，经验性知识，即仅限于日常行为中实用能力的知识，在社会知识库中占据重要地位。例如，我每天都为了自己的具体实用目的使用电话。我知道如何使用电话。我也知道如果电话无法使用该怎么办——这并不意味着我知道如何修理电话，而是我知道该找谁帮忙。我的电话知识还包括关于电话通信系统的更广泛信息——例如，我知道有些人有未公开的电话号码，在特殊情况下我可以同时接通两个长途电话，如果我要打电话给香港的人必须考虑时差，等等。所有这些电话知识都是经验性知识，因为它只涉及我为当前和未来可能的实用目的必须知道的内容。我对电话为何这样工作的原因不感兴趣，也不关心使制造电话成为可能的庞大科学和工程知识体系。 我对电话的使用也不感兴趣，尤其是那些超出我目的范围的用途，比如与短波无线电结合用于海洋通信。同样，我对人际关系的运作也只是有一些经验性的了解。例如，我知道申请护照时必须做什么。我关心的只是经过一定等待时间后能拿到护照。我不关心，也不知道我的申请在政府部门是如何处理的，由谁经过哪些步骤批准，谁在文件上盖了哪个章。我并不是在研究政府官僚机构——我只是想去国外度假。只有当我最终未能拿到护照时，我才会对护照办理程序的隐秘运作产生兴趣。那时，就像电话坏了我会找电话维修专家一样，我会找护照办理方面的专家——比如律师、我的国会议员，或者美国公民自由联盟。类比而言，社会知识的大部分内容都是解决日常问题的经验方法。 通常，只要问题确实能够通过这些务实必要的知识来解决，我对超出这些知识范围的内容几乎不感兴趣。

The social stock of knowledge differentiates reality by degrees of familiarity. It provides complex and detailed information concerning those sectors of everyday life with which I must frequently deal. It provides much more general and imprecise information on remoter sectors. Thus (my knowledge of my own occupation and its world is very rich and specific, while I have only very sketchy knowledge of the occupational worlds of others, The social stock of knowledge further supplies me with the typificatory schemes required for the major routines of everyday life, not only the typifications of others that have been discussed before, but typifications of all sorts of events and experiences, both social and natural. Thus I live in a world of relatives, fellow-workers and recognizable public functionaries. In this world, consequently, I experience family gatherings, professional meetings and encounters with the traffic police. The natural “backdrop” of these events is also typified within the stock of knowledge. My world is structured in terms of routines applying in good or bad weather, in the hayfever season and in situations when a speck of dirt gets caught under my eyelid. “I know what to do” with regard to all these others and all these events within my everyday life. By presenting itself to me as an integrated whole the social stock of knowledge also provides me with the means to integrate discrete elements of my own knowledge. In other words, “what everybody knows” has its own logic, and the same logic can be applied to order various things that I know. For example, I know that my friend Henry is an Englishman, and I know that he is always very punctual in keeping appointments. Since “everybody knows” that punctuality is an English trait, I can now integrate these two elements of my knowledge of Henry into a typification that is meaningful in terms of the social stock of knowledge.
社会知识储备通过熟悉程度区分现实。它提供了关于我必须经常处理的日常生活领域的复杂且详细的信息。对于较为遥远的领域，它则提供了更为一般且不精确的信息。因此（我对自己职业及其世界的了解非常丰富且具体，而对他人职业世界的了解则非常粗略）。社会知识储备还为我提供了日常生活主要常规所需的典型化方案，不仅包括之前讨论过的对他人的典型化，还包括各种社会和自然事件与经历的典型化。因此，我生活在一个由亲戚、同事和可识别的公共职能人员组成的世界中。在这个世界里，我经历家庭聚会、专业会议以及与交警的遭遇。这些事件的自然“背景”也在知识储备中被典型化。我的世界是按照适用于好坏天气、花粉季节以及眼睑下夹着一粒尘埃等情况的常规来构建的。 关于我日常生活中的所有这些他人和事件，我“知道该怎么做”。社会知识库以一个整体的形式呈现给我，同时也为我整合自己知识中的各个独立元素提供了手段。换句话说，“人人皆知”的东西有其自身的逻辑，而同样的逻辑也可以用来整理我所知道的各种事物。例如，我知道我的朋友亨利是英国人，我也知道他总是非常准时地赴约。既然“人人皆知”准时是英国人的特征，我现在就可以将这两个关于亨利的知识元素整合成一个符合社会知识库意义的典型化认知。

The validity of my knowledge of everyday life is taken for granted by myself and by others until further notice, that is, until a problem arises that cannot be solved in terms of it. (As long as my knowledge works satisfactorily, I am generally ready to suspend doubts about it) In certain attitudes detached from everyday reality-telling a joke, at the theater or in church, or engaging in philosophical speculation -I may perhaps doubt elements of it. But these doubts are “not to be taken seriously.” For instance, as a businessman I know that it pays to be inconsiderate of others. I may laugh at a joke in which this maxim leads to failure, I may be moved by an actor or a preacher extolling the virtues of consideration, and I may concede in a philo-
我对日常生活知识的有效性，自己和他人都默认其有效，直到另有通知，也就是说，直到出现一个无法用这些知识解决的问题。（只要我的知识运作良好，我通常愿意暂时搁置对它的怀疑）在某些与日常现实无关的态度中——讲笑话、在剧院或教堂，或进行哲学思考——我或许会怀疑其中的某些元素。但这些怀疑“并不被当真”。例如，作为一名商人，我知道无视他人是有利可图的。我可能会对一个因这一准则而失败的笑话发笑，我可能会被一位演员或传教士赞扬体贴美德的言辞所感动，我也可能在哲学上承认——
sophical mood that all social relations should be governed by the Golden Rule. Having laughed, having been moved and having philosophized, I return to the “serious” world of business, once more recognize the logic of its maxims, and act accordingly. Only when my maxims fail “to deliver the goods” in the world to which they are intended to apply are they likely to become problematic to me “in earnest.”
哲学上的情绪认为所有社会关系都应遵循黄金法则。在笑过、感动过并进行哲学思考之后，我回到了“严肃”的商业世界，再次认识到其格言的逻辑，并据此行事。只有当我的格言未能在其预期适用的世界中“实现效果”时，它们才可能真正对我构成“严重”的问题。
Although the social stock of knowledge appresents the everyday world in an integrated manner, differentiated according to zones of familiarity and remoteness, it leaves the totality of that world opaque. Put differently, (the reality of everyday life always appears as a zone of lucidity behind which there is a background of darkness. As some zones of reality are illuminated, others are adumbrated. I leamnot know everything there is to know about this reality. Even if, for instance, I am a seemingly all-powerful despot in my family, and know this, I cannot know all the factors that go into the continuing success of my despotism. I know that my orders are always obeyed, but I cannot be sure of all the steps and all the motives that lie between the issuance and the execution of my orders. There are always things that go on “behind my back.” This is true a fortiori when social relationships more complex than those of the family are involved-and explains, incidentally, why despots are endemically nervous. My knowledge of everyday life has the quality of an instrument that cuts a path through a forest and, as it does so, projects a narrow cone of light on what lies just ahead and immediately around; on all sides of the path there continues to be darkness. This image pertains even more, of course, to the multiple realities in which everyday life is continually transcended. This latter statement can be paraphrased, poetically if not exhaustively, by saying that the reality of everyday life is overcast by the penumbras of our dreams.
尽管社会知识储备以一种整合的方式呈现日常世界，并根据熟悉与疏远的区域进行区分，但它使得那个世界的整体性变得模糊。换句话说，（日常生活的现实总是显现为一片清晰的区域，而其背后则是一片黑暗的背景。当某些现实区域被照亮时，其他区域则被隐约勾勒。我无法知道关于这现实的一切。即使，例如，我在家庭中看似是一个全能的专制者，并且知道这一点，我也无法了解维持我专制统治持续成功的所有因素。我知道我的命令总是被服从，但我无法确定从命令发布到执行之间所有的步骤和动机。总有一些事情是在“我背后”发生的。当涉及比家庭更复杂的社会关系时，这一点尤为真实——顺便说一句，这也解释了为什么专制者总是神经紧张。） 我对日常生活的认识就像一把在森林中开辟道路的工具，在开辟道路的同时，它投射出一束狭窄的光锥，照亮前方和周围的区域；而道路两旁依然是一片黑暗。当然，这一形象更适用于日常生活不断被超越的多重现实。后者的说法可以用诗意的方式表达，虽然不够详尽，那就是日常生活的现实被我们梦想的半影所笼罩。
My knowledge of everyday life is structured in terms of relevances. Some of these are determined by immediate pragmatic interests of mine, others by my general situation in society. It is irrelevant to me how my wife goes about cooking my favorite goulash as long as it turns out the way I like it. It is irrelevant to me that the stock of a company is falling, if I do not own such stock; or that Catholics are modernizing their doctrine, if I am an atheist; or that it is now possible to fly non-stop to Africa, if I do not want to go there. However, my relevance structures intersect with the relevance structures of others at many points, as a result of which we have “interesting”
我对日常生活的认知是以相关性为结构的。其中一些由我当前的实际利益决定，另一些则由我在社会中的总体处境决定。只要我喜欢，我妻子如何烹饪我最喜欢的古拉什对我来说无关紧要。如果我不持有某公司的股票，那么该公司股票下跌对我来说无关紧要；如果我是无神论者，那么天主教徒正在现代化他们的教义对我来说无关紧要；如果我不想去非洲，那么现在可以直飞非洲对我来说无关紧要。然而，我的相关性结构在许多方面与他人的相关性结构相交，因此我们才有了“有趣”的地方。
things to say to each other. An important element of my knowledge of everyday life is the knowledge of the relevance structures of others. Thus I “know better” than to tell my doctor about my investment problems, my lawyer about my ulcer pains, or my accountant about my quest for religious truth. The basic relevance structures referring to (everyday life are presented to me ready-made by the social stock of knowledge itself. $\lambda$$\lambda$lambda\lambda know that “woman talk” is irrelevant to me as a man, that “idle speculation” is irrelevant to me as a man of action, and so forth. Finally, the social stock of knowledge as a whole has its own relevance structure. Thus, in terms of the stock of knowledge objectivated in American society, it is irrelevant to study the movements of the stars to predict the stock market, but it is relevant to study an individual’s slips of the tongue to find out about his sex life, and so on. Conversely, in other societies, astrology may be highly relevant for economics, speech analysis quite irreleyant for erotic curiosity, and so on.
彼此之间有许多话要说。我对日常生活的知识中一个重要的元素是对他人相关性结构的了解。因此，我“更明白”不该向医生诉说我的投资问题，不该向律师诉说我的溃疡疼痛，也不该向会计师诉说我对宗教真理的追求。关于日常生活的基本相关性结构是由社会知识库本身现成地呈现给我的。我知道“女性谈话”对我这个男人来说是无关紧要的，“无谓的猜测”对我这个行动派来说是无关紧要的，诸如此类。最后，整个社会知识库本身也有其自身的相关性结构。因此，就美国社会客观化的知识库而言，研究星体运动以预测股市是无关紧要的，但研究个人口误以了解其性生活则是相关的，诸如此类。相反，在其他社会中，占星术可能对经济学非常相关，而语音分析对色情好奇则完全无关，诸如此类。
One final point should be made here about the social distribution of knowledge.’ I encounter knowledge in everyday life as socially distributed, that is, as possessed differently by different individuals and types of individuals. I do not share my knowledge equally with all my fellowmen, and there may be some knowledge that I share with no one. I share my professional expertise with colleagues, but not with my family, and I may share with nobody my knowledge of how to cheat at cards. The social distribution of knowledge of certain elements of everyday reality can become highly complex and even confusing to the outsider. I not only do not possess the knowledge supposedly required to cure me of a physical ailment, I may even lack the knowledge of which one of a bewildering variety of medical specialists claims jurisdiction over what ails me. In such cases, I require not only the advice of experts, but the prior advice of experts on experts. The social distribution of knowledge thus begins with the simple fact that I do not know everything known to my fellowmen, and vice versa, and culminates in exceedingly complex and esoteric systems of expertise. Knowledge of how the socially available stock of knowledge is distributed, at least in outline, is an important element of that same stock of knowledge. In everyday life I know, at least roughly, what I can hide from whom, whom I can turn to for information on what I do not know, and generally which types of individuals may be expected to have which types of knowledge.
这里还应指出关于知识的社会分布的最后一点。我在日常生活中遇到的知识是社会分布的，也就是说，不同的个体和不同类型的个体拥有不同的知识。我不会与所有同胞平等分享我的知识，有些知识我甚至不与任何人分享。我会与同事分享我的专业知识，但不会与家人分享，甚至可能没有人知道我如何在牌局中作弊。某些日常现实元素的知识的社会分布可能变得极其复杂，甚至对外人来说令人困惑。我不仅不具备据说能治愈我身体疾病的知识，甚至可能不知道在众多令人眼花缭乱的医学专家中，哪一位专家声称对我的病症拥有管辖权。在这种情况下，我不仅需要专家的建议，还需要关于专家的专家的先行建议。知识的社会分布因此始于一个简单的事实：我不知道我的同胞所知道的一切，反之亦然，并最终发展成极其复杂且深奥的专业体系。 对社会上可获得的知识储备如何分布的了解，至少是大致的了解，是同一知识储备的重要组成部分。在日常生活中，我至少大致知道可以向谁隐瞒什么，可以向谁寻求我不了解的信息，以及一般来说，哪类人可能掌握哪类知识。