I am convinced, therefore, that Korean politics will not be reformed unless the standards of the people are raised, a change of generations is promoted, the contents of elections are studied, and an open system for the procurement of political funds is worked out by means of consistent policies.
因此，我相信，除非提高人民的标准，促进代际更替，研究选举内容，并通过一致的政策制定一个公开的政治资金筹集系统，否则韩国政治不会改革。

Have we earned the right to continue to demand … continued trust and confidence in us? Unless we can confidently answer these questions, we dare not proceed. … Now is the time to cut off the infected parts of society from active public life, before they endanger the entire body politic.
我们是否赢得了继续要求……对我们的持续信任和信心的权利？除非我们能够自信地回答这些问题，否则我们不敢继续前进。……现在是将社会中受感染的部分与活跃的公共生活隔离开来的时候，以免它们危及整个政治体。

When the Hanbo Steel Company of South Korea went bankrupt in early 1997, an inquest discovered that at least two billion dollars had evaporated from its accounts, most likely ending up in the pockets of political or business elites. ${}^1$${}^1$^(1){ }^{1} Upon his arrest for bribery, Hanbo’s chairman, Chung Taesoo, privately let it be known that if the government pressed its case against him too vigorously he would unleash an “atomic bomb” (poktan) and implicate bankers and politicians who had been involved with Hanbo over the years. ${}^2$${}^2$^(2){ }^{2} Chung was convicted, although the case was not pursued with particular vigor. While numerous observers professed to be shocked Shocked! - at the revelations, in reality such scandals are a recurrent theme in Korean political history, and the exchange of money for political influence has been not just an open secret, it has been common knowledge. Since independence in 1948, Korea has seen a seemingly endless flow of
当韩国汉堡钢铁公司在 1997 年初破产时，调查发现至少有 20 亿美元从其账户中消失，最有可能落入政治或商业精英的口袋。 ${}^1$${}^1$^(1){ }^{1} 在因贿赂被捕后，汉堡的董事长郑泰秀私下透露，如果政府对他采取过于强硬的措施，他将释放一颗“原子弹”（poktan），并牵连与汉堡有过往的银行家和政治家。 ${}^2$${}^2$^(2){ }^{2} 郑泰秀被定罪，尽管此案并未受到特别强烈的追究。尽管许多观察者声称对这些揭露感到震惊，实际上这样的丑闻在韩国政治历史中屡见不鲜，金钱与政治影响的交换不仅是一个公开的秘密，更是常识。自 1948 年独立以来，韩国经历了似乎无尽的资金流动。

corruption scandals bring down scores of elites. Among those who have served time in jail or been exiled are former presidents Chun Doo-hwan and Roh Tae-woo, members of many presidential staffs, and a slew of military officers, politicians, bureaucrats, bankers, businessmen, and tax collectors. ${}^3$${}^3$^(3){ }^{3}
腐败丑闻使众多精英垮台。曾入狱或被流放的包括前总统全斗焕和卢泰愚，许多总统幕僚，以及一大批军官、政治家、官僚、银行家、商人和税务员。 ${}^3$${}^3$^(3){ }^{3}

For decades the scholarly literature largely ignored the prevalence of money politics as inconsequential or as peripheral to the “real story” of South Korea: economic growth led by meritocratic technocrats and austere military generals. Growth was so spectacular that the reality of corruption was concealed or was dismissed out of hand. The rapid growth of the Asian economies evoked a mixture of wonder and fear. Sometimes called miracles, or Tigers, countries such as Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and Hong Kong leapt from poverty to riches within a generation. And until late November 1997 and the stunning fall of the Korean won, observers argued that better government in Asia was a prime reason for that region’s spectacular growth. This perspective held up Asia’s seemingly neutral bureaucracies, effective politicians, and hardworking businessmen as central factors in economic growth. ${}^4$${}^4$^(4){ }^{4}
几十年来，学术文献在很大程度上忽视了金钱政治的普遍性，认为其无关紧要或是韩国“真实故事”的边缘：由精英技术官僚和严谨的军方将领主导的经济增长。增长如此惊人，以至于腐败的现实被掩盖或被当场驳回。亚洲经济的快速增长引发了惊奇与恐惧的混合情感。有时被称为奇迹或老虎的国家，如韩国、台湾、新加坡和香港，在一代人内从贫困跃升至富裕。直到 1997 年 11 月底和韩元的惊人贬值，观察者们仍然认为，亚洲更好的政府是该地区惊人增长的主要原因。这一观点将亚洲看似中立的官僚机构、有效的政治家和勤奋的商人视为经济增长的核心因素。

In contrast, scholars have held up the Philippines as the paradigmatic corrupt state, typified by its former president Ferdinand Marcos. The Philippines failed to develop rapidly because of government meddling, powerful business sectors that reaped windfall gains from government largess, and incompetent civil servants. The entire world knows about Imelda Marcos’s 2,000 pairs of shoes and about the abuses that occurred at the Malacañang presidential palace. The Philippines, to this day, has a public image of cronyism, corruption, and bad government retarding its development.
相对而言，学者们将菲律宾视为典型的腐败国家，以其前总统费迪南德·马科斯为代表。由于政府干预、强大的商业部门从政府的慷慨中获得意外收益以及无能的公务员，菲律宾未能快速发展。全世界都知道伊梅尔达·马科斯的 2000 双鞋子以及在马拉卡宁宫发生的滥用行为。直到今天，菲律宾仍然有着裙带关系、腐败和糟糕政府阻碍其发展的公众形象。

The Asian financial crisis of late 1997 abruptly changed the West’s view of Asia. Overnight, Korea was lumped in with the Philippines and roundly criticized for cozy government-business relationships that - in the pierc-
1997 年末的亚洲金融危机突然改变了西方对亚洲的看法。韩国一夜之间被与菲律宾归为一类，并因其政府与企业之间密切的关系而受到严厉批评。

ing hindsight of instant experts - were obviously corrupt, inefficient, and backward. Focused only on explaining successful outcomes, the conventional model provided no analytic way to make sense of the 1997 crisis. Countries previously regarded as miracles now were nothing more than havens for crony capitalists who got rich the easy way. The result was a scramble to reinterpret the newly industrializing countries. But the pendulum may have swung too far - from excessive praise for the Asian juggernaut in the 1980s to excessive contempt for Asian business practices in the 1990s.
回顾瞬间专家的观点——显然是腐败、低效和落后的。仅仅专注于解释成功的结果，传统模型没有提供任何分析方法来理解 1997 年的危机。以前被视为奇迹的国家现在不过是为那些轻松致富的裙带资本家提供的避风港。结果是对新兴工业化国家的重新解读。但摆动的钟摆可能已经过于偏向——从 1980 年代对亚洲巨头的过度赞美，到 1990 年代对亚洲商业实践的过度蔑视。

How can we reconcile rapid growth in East Asia before 1997 with reports of extensive money politics in those same countries in 1998 and 1999? How do we explain extensive money politics in Asia? How does money politics affect our understanding of the developmental state?
我们如何调和 1997 年之前东亚的快速增长与 1998 年和 1999 年这些国家广泛存在的金钱政治报告？我们如何解释亚洲的广泛金钱政治？金钱政治如何影响我们对发展型国家的理解？

Politics is central to the answer. In this study I make two arguments. First, both Korea and the Philippines experienced significant corruption throughout the postindependence era. Second, political - not economic considerations dominated policy making in both countries. Focusing on the exchange of favors for bribes between state and business, I argue that politics drove policy choices, that bureaucrats were not autonomous from political interference in setting policy, and that business and political elites wrestled with each other over who would reap the rents to be had. Even in Korea, corruption was far greater than the conventional wisdom allows - so rampant was corruption that we cannot dismiss it; rather, we need to explain it.
政治是答案的核心。在这项研究中，我提出两个论点。首先，韩国和菲律宾在独立后的时代都经历了显著的腐败。其次，政治而非经济因素主导了两国的政策制定。关注国家与商业之间以贿赂交换好处的现象，我认为政治驱动了政策选择，官僚在政策制定中并未脱离政治干预，商业和政治精英之间争夺着可以获得的利益。即使在韩国，腐败的程度也远超传统智慧所允许的——腐败如此猖獗，以至于我们无法忽视它；相反，我们需要对此进行解释。

Although money politics - corruption and cronyism - is generally seen as inhibiting economic growth, there are certain conditions in which it can actually be beneficial. Developing countries typically have weak institutional structures. In that case, if there is a balance of power among a small and stable set of government and business elites, money politics can actually reduce transaction costs and make long-term agreements and investments more efficient, even while enriching those fortunate few who collude together. ${}^5$${}^5$^(5){ }^{5}
尽管金钱政治——腐败和裙带关系——通常被视为抑制经济增长，但在某些情况下，它实际上可能是有益的。发展中国家通常具有薄弱的制度结构。在这种情况下，如果政府和商业精英之间存在小而稳定的权力平衡，金钱政治实际上可以降低交易成本，使长期协议和投资更加高效，即使这会使那些勾结在一起的幸运少数人更加富裕。

This political hypothesis can differentiate Korea and the Philippines while also bridging the boom years and the crisis. ${}^6$${}^6$^(6){ }^{6} For too long scholars have focused on bureaucrats and on outcomes. To understand the contrasting economic outcomes of Korea and the Philippines, one must directly address corruption and politics.
这个政治假设可以区分韩国和菲律宾，同时也连接了繁荣时期和危机。 ${}^6$${}^6$^(6){ }^{6} 学者们太长时间以来一直关注官僚和结果。要理解韩国和菲律宾截然不同的经济结果，必须直接解决腐败和政治问题。

The crisis was not caused overnight, and the historical structures that led to the crisis will endure long after the events of 1997 have faded from memory. Using Korea and the Philippines as case studies, I explore the politics of the developmental state by focusing on the interplay of institutions and money politics. In both countries, growth and corruption existed side by side for decades. Even in the period of rapid Korean growth, a political calculus, not economic efficiency, was the crucial factor in determining economic policy. But the configuration of actors that facilitated rapid growth in Korea in the 1960s was undermined by its very success and eventually led to the crisis of 1997. In the Philippines, a different configuration of actors retarded development for decades. It seems finally to have altered, and perhaps the strong growth of the 1990s is the beginning of an upward trend.
危机并非一夜之间造成的，导致危机的历史结构将在 1997 年事件淡出记忆后仍然存在。以韩国和菲律宾为案例，我通过关注制度与金钱政治的相互作用来探讨发展型国家的政治。在这两个国家，增长与腐败并存了几十年。即使在韩国快速增长的时期，决定经济政策的关键因素是政治计算，而非经济效率。然而，促成 1960 年代韩国快速增长的参与者配置因其成功而受到削弱，最终导致了 1997 年的危机。在菲律宾，不同的参与者配置则阻碍了数十年的发展。它似乎终于发生了改变，也许 1990 年代的强劲增长是一个上升趋势的开始。

The political hypothesis advanced in this study suggests a new direction for our research about the developmental state. Situated at the intersection of international relations and comparative politics, and comprising a set of ideas about institutional arrangements and policy choices, the developmental-state perspective held up Asia’s seemingly neutral bureaucracies, effective politicians, and consistent trade policies as central factors in economic growth. ${}^7$${}^7$^(7){ }^{7}
本研究提出的政治假设为我们关于发展型国家的研究指明了新的方向。该假设位于国际关系与比较政治的交汇处，包含了一系列关于制度安排和政策选择的观点，发展型国家的视角将亚洲看似中立的官僚机构、有效的政治家和一致的贸易政策视为经济增长的核心因素。 ${}^7$${}^7$^(7){ }^{7}

However, the literature on the developmental state led us down the wrong analytic path. This literature implied that corruption and growth simply cannot coexist. As a result, our view of Asia has become excessively focused on explaining either why these countries were not corrupt or why growth was not as spectacular as popularly believed. ${}^8$${}^8$^(8){ }^{8} South Korea has reported phenomenal growth over the past thirty-five years; the Philippines has not. Working backward from successful economic outcomes, one easily falls into the presumption that Korea must have had less corruption and better government than the Philippines merely because it had such rapid growth. ${}^9$${}^9$^(9){ }^{9}
然而，关于发展型国家的文献引导我们走上了错误的分析路径。这些文献暗示腐败和增长根本无法共存。因此，我们对亚洲的看法过于集中于解释这些国家为何不腐败或为何增长没有普遍认为的那么显著。 ${}^8$${}^8$^(8){ }^{8} 韩国在过去三十五年中报告了惊人的增长；而菲律宾则没有。从成功的经济结果向后推理，人们很容易陷入这样的假设：仅仅因为韩国增长如此迅速，它就一定比菲律宾腐败更少、政府更好。 ${}^9$${}^9$^(9){ }^{9}

This is not to argue that there has been no scholarship on Asian corruption. Especially in the wake of the 1997 financial crisis, the past few years have seen a number of studies that have begun to address the issue of corruption in Asia. These works, however, have tended to concentrate on two areas of research that have generally not responded to each other. The first area has focused on explaining different types of corruption, with only passing reference to how this affects our understanding of economic growth. ${}^{10}$${}^{10}$^(10){ }^{10} The second area has largely been focused on assessing whether and to what extent corruption was a factor contributing to the 1997
这并不是说对亚洲腐败没有学术研究。特别是在 1997 年金融危机之后，过去几年出现了一些开始关注亚洲腐败问题的研究。然而，这些研究往往集中在两个相互之间通常没有回应的研究领域。第一个领域专注于解释不同类型的腐败，仅对这如何影响我们对经济增长的理解做了简要提及。 ${}^{10}$${}^{10}$^(10){ }^{10} 第二个领域则主要集中在评估腐败是否以及在多大程度上是导致 1997 年危机的一个因素。
“Institutions and Economic Performance in South Korea and Taiwan,” p. 152; and Ziya Önis, “The Logic of the Developmental State,” Comparative Politics 24 (1991): 114. The major policy focus is on export-oriented industrialization, with a state that “in direct exchange for subsidies . . . exacts performance standards from firms.” Amsden, Asia’s Next Giant, p. 146.
《韩国和台湾的制度与经济表现》，第 152 页；以及 Ziya Önis，《发展国家的逻辑》，《比较政治》24（1991）：114。主要政策重点是以出口为导向的工业化，国家“直接以补贴交换……向企业要求绩效标准。”Amsden，《亚洲下一个巨人》，第 146 页。
${}^8$${}^8$^(8){ }^{8} On rent seeking, see James Buchanan, Robert Tollison, and Gordon Tullock, eds., Towards a Theory of the Rent-Seeking Society (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1980); and Anne O. Krueger, “The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society,” American Economic Review 64 (1974): 291-303. For a revisionist view of Asian growth, see Alwyn Young, Lessons from the East Asian NICS: A Contrarian View (NBER Working Paper 4482, 1993).
关于寻租行为，参见詹姆斯·布坎南、罗伯特·托利森和戈登·图洛克主编的《寻租社会理论》（德克萨斯州 A&M 大学出版社，1980 年）；以及安妮·O·克鲁格的“寻租社会的政治经济学”，《美国经济评论》64（1974 年）：291-303。关于亚洲增长的修正主义观点，参见阿尔温·杨的《来自东亚新兴工业化国家的教训：一种反对观点》（NBER 工作论文 4482，1993 年）。
${}^9$${}^9$^(9){ }^{9} “If $H$$H$HH, then $I.I$$I.I$I.II . I is true, therefore $H$$H$HH is true.” Carl Hempel, Pbilosophy of Natural Science (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1966), p. 7. On selection bias, see Gary King, Robert Keohane, and Sidney Verba, Designing Social Inquiry (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994).
${}^9$${}^9$^(9){ }^{9} “如果 $H$$H$HH ，那么 $I.I$$I.I$I.II . I 是真的，因此 $H$$H$HH 是真的。” 卡尔·亨佩尔，《自然科学的哲学》（新泽西州恩格尔伍德悬崖：普伦蒂斯霍尔，1966 年），第 7 页。关于选择偏差，见加里·金、罗伯特·凯欧汉和西德尼·维尔巴，《社会研究设计》（普林斯顿：普林斯顿大学出版社，1994 年）。
${}^{10}$${}^{10}$^(10){ }^{10} See Byeong-Seog Park, “Political Corruption in South Korea: Concentrating on the Dynamics of Party Politics,” Asian Perspective 19 (Spring/Summer 1995): 163-193; Beatrice Weder, Model, Myth, or Miracle: Reassessing the Role of Governments in the East Asian Experience (New York: United Nations University Press, 1999); Richard Mitchell, Political Bribery in Japan (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1996); and Jeffrey A. Winters, “Suharto’s Indonesia: Prosperity and Freedom for the Few,” Current History 94 (1995): 420-424.
${}^{10}$${}^{10}$^(10){ }^{10} 见朴炳锡，“韩国的政治腐败：集中于政党政治的动态”，《亚洲视角》19（1995 年春/夏）：163-193；比阿特丽斯·韦德尔，《模式、神话或奇迹：重新评估政府在东亚经验中的角色》（纽约：联合国大学出版社，1999 年）；理查德·米切尔，《日本的政治贿赂》（檀香山：夏威夷大学出版社，1996 年）；以及杰弗里·A·温特斯，“苏哈托的印度尼西亚：少数人的繁荣与自由”，《当前历史》94（1995 年）：420-424。
financial crisis. ${}^{11}$${}^{11}$^(11){ }^{11} For example, Stephan Haggard writes that "in Western commentary, these [causes] are frequently reduced to corruption, cronyism, and nepotism . . . but the sources of vulnerability . . . sprang from the political commitments of governments. ${}^{12}$${}^{12}$^(12){ }^{12} But this body of literature tends not to explore how the Asian countries experienced rapid growth in the first place. Whereas both strands of research are important, an extended dialogue about the relationship between money politics and Asian development has only begun to occur, and a comprehensive treatment of the issue has yet to appear. ${}^{13}$${}^{13}$^(13){ }^{13}
金融危机。 ${}^{11}$${}^{11}$^(11){ }^{11} 例如，斯蒂芬·哈加德写道：“在西方评论中，这些[原因]常常被简化为腐败、裙带关系和任人唯亲……但脆弱性的来源……源于政府的政治承诺。” ${}^{12}$${}^{12}$^(12){ }^{12} 但这部分文献往往没有探讨亚洲国家最初是如何经历快速增长的。虽然这两方面的研究都很重要，但关于金钱政治与亚洲发展的关系的深入对话才刚刚开始出现，而对这一问题的全面处理尚未出现。 ${}^{13}$${}^{13}$^(13){ }^{13}

The Korean and Philippine experiences suggest broader implications for the study of government-business relations in developing countries. Most important, a model of politics is central to understanding the developmental state. We cannot assume benevolence on the part of the developmental state. A “hard” view of the developmental state - that the state is neutral, picks winners, and provides public goods because the civil service is insulated from social influences - is difficult to sustain empirically. However, even the “soft” view - that governments can have a beneficial effect however government action is attained - needs a political explanation. The Korean state was developmental - it provided public goods, fostered investment, and created infrastructure. But this study shows that this was not necessarily intentional. Corruption was rampant in Korea, and the state intervened in the way that it did because its doing so was in the interests of a small group of business and political elites. The production of public goods was often the fortunate by-product of actors’ competing to gain the private benefits of state resources.
韩国和菲律宾的经验对发展中国家政府与商业关系的研究具有更广泛的启示。最重要的是，政治模型对于理解发展型国家至关重要。我们不能假设发展型国家是出于善意。对发展型国家的“硬”看法——即国家是中立的，选择赢家，并提供公共产品，因为公务员不受社会影响——在实证上是难以维持的。然而，即使是“软”看法——即政府无论如何采取行动都能产生积极影响——也需要政治解释。韩国的国家是发展型的——它提供公共产品，促进投资，并创造基础设施。但这项研究表明，这并不一定是出于意图。腐败在韩国猖獗，国家之所以以这种方式干预，是因为这样做符合一小部分商业和政治精英的利益。公共产品的生产往往是参与者竞争获取国家资源私利的幸运副产品。

It is unwise to focus on individual policy choices (for example, exportoriented industrialization, or EOI) or specific institutional arrangements (the bureaucracy) as isolated issues. Institutions and policies are intervening variables, and the larger institutional environment - in this instance the government-business relationship - affects any specific issue. ${}^{14}$${}^{14}$^(14){ }^{14} Both institutions and policies comprise a wide range of issues. Institutions are more than just the organization of the state - they can be legal or corporate as well - whereas policies comprise trade, regulatory and financial policies. A distorted picture will emerge if we focus mainly on state institutions and ignore industrial organization, or if we focus on trade policy and ignore lax regulatory and financial policies. The case studies in this book show that political and economic entrepreneurs are quite resourceful and that institutional design or policy choices are subject to manipulation, evasion, and modification. ${}^{15}$${}^{15}$^(15){ }^{15}
将注意力集中在单一政策选择（例如，出口导向型工业化，或 EOI）或特定的制度安排（官僚机构）作为孤立问题是明智的。制度和政策是干预变量，而更大的制度环境——在这种情况下是政府与企业的关系——影响任何特定问题。 ${}^{14}$${}^{14}$^(14){ }^{14} 制度和政策包含广泛的问题。制度不仅仅是国家的组织——它们也可以是法律或企业的——而政策则包括贸易、监管和金融政策。如果我们主要关注国家机构而忽视工业组织，或者如果我们关注贸易政策而忽视宽松的监管和金融政策，就会出现扭曲的图景。本书中的案例研究表明，政治和经济企业家非常有资源，制度设计或政策选择是可以被操控、规避和修改的。 ${}^{15}$${}^{15}$^(15){ }^{15}

Additionally, transaction costs - the costs of making, monitoring, and enforcing agreements between actors - are affected by the larger institutional environment. This study shows that certain configurations of government and business elites (what I call “mutual hostages”) can reduce transaction costs and actually promote growth. The argument that follows suggests that to understand policy making in developing countries, one must first understand, for each country, the particular political challenges faced by individual leaders, and their close supporters, and the manner in which business attempts to influence policies. The strategic allocation of economic policy and benefits is an important political resource. The relationship between government and business elites differs in each country, and another source of constraints is the international system. Different countries face different international pressures, and not all countries race from the same starting line nor run under similar conditions. Most important in the international system are the external threats that can cause leaders to pay more attention to growth and efficiency.
此外，交易成本——即在参与者之间达成、监控和执行协议的成本——受到更大制度环境的影响。本研究表明，某些政府和商业精英的配置（我称之为“相互人质”）可以降低交易成本，并实际促进增长。接下来的论点表明，要理解发展中国家的政策制定，首先必须理解每个国家个别领导人及其密切支持者所面临的特定政治挑战，以及商业如何试图影响政策。经济政策和利益的战略分配是一个重要的政治资源。各国政府与商业精英之间的关系各不相同，另一个约束来源是国际体系。不同国家面临不同的国际压力，并非所有国家都从同一起跑线出发，也不是在相似的条件下竞争。在国际体系中，最重要的是外部威胁，这可能导致领导人更加关注增长和效率。

One reason that scholars have not dealt with these issues in detail has been an overwhelming preoccupation with explaining economic outcomes. Those analysts who are not trying to explain growth tend to paint a far
学者们没有详细处理这些问题的一个原因是过于专注于解释经济结果。那些不试图解释增长的分析师往往描绘出一个更远的图景。

darker and more abusive picture of Korean politics than those trying to explain why what was essentially gangster rule in Korea was actually good for growth. Mark Clifford describes Korea as a “culture of rage,” Gregory Henderson depicts Park Chung-hee’s rule as a swirl of factions unable to cohere, and Bruce Cumings sees a pattern of authoritarian strongmen. ${}^{16}$${}^{16}$^(16){ }^{16} Although it may be difficult to describe Korean politics in such pejorative terms and then explain Korea’s remarkable economic outcomes, we must avoid falling into the trap of deciding a priori that Korean politics cannot have been corrupt because the country experienced strong growth. Alternatively, we need to explain the pattern of money politics in the Philippines, not just assert its existence.
比起那些试图解释为什么在韩国本质上是黑帮统治的情况实际上对经济增长有利的观点，关于韩国政治的描述更为阴暗和虐待。马克·克利福德将韩国形容为“愤怒的文化”，格雷戈里·亨德森描绘朴正熙的统治为无法凝聚的派系漩涡，而布鲁斯·卡明斯则看到了一种威权强人的模式。 ${}^{16}$${}^{16}$^(16){ }^{16} 尽管用如此贬义的词汇来描述韩国政治并解释韩国显著的经济成果可能很困难，但我们必须避免陷入先入为主的陷阱，认为韩国政治不可能腐败，因为这个国家经历了强劲的增长。相反，我们需要解释菲律宾的金钱政治模式，而不仅仅是断言其存在。

I begin with an overview of Korea and the Philippines in which I emphasize both similarities and differences between the two countries. Domestic politics, the organization of society in both countries, has been more similar than is generally recognized, and much of the early economics in both countries was also similar. However, Korea and the Philippines differ in how both colonialism and the external environment at independence affected them. In Korea, Japanese and U.S. influences tended to disrupt the old order, and a severe threat from North Korea provided an impetus for growth. In contrast, in the Philippines, Spanish and American colonialism tended to reinforce traditional political and economic patterns, and the absence of any realistic threat provided Philippine leaders with little incentive to alter the existing arrangements.
我首先概述韩国和菲律宾，强调两国之间的相似性和差异性。两国的国内政治和社会组织比一般认为的更为相似，两国早期的经济也有很多相似之处。然而，韩国和菲律宾在殖民主义和独立时外部环境对它们的影响上存在差异。在韩国，日本和美国的影响往往打乱了旧秩序，而来自北韩的严重威胁则推动了经济增长。相比之下，在菲律宾，西班牙和美国的殖民主义往往强化了传统的政治和经济模式，而缺乏任何现实威胁使菲律宾领导人几乎没有动力去改变现有的安排。

This study next focuses on the role of the bureaucracy. One of the core tenets of the developmental-state perspective is the important role of the bureaucracy. However, the bureaucracy under Park Chung-hee was not substantially more autonomous or coherent than that under Syngman Rhee or Ferdinand Marcos. In addition, Korea did not have a “pilot ministry” directing development. Finally, government subsidies were not exchanged for performance standards - the endemic overcapacity of Korean industry is prima facie evidence that economic policy decisions were made for political reasons. In contrast, the Philippine bureaucracy was far more competent than is popularly believed. In both Korea and the Philippines rulers have reigned and ruled, and the bureaucracy has not been autonomous from political regime interests. The difference in quality
本研究接下来关注官僚机构的角色。发展国家视角的核心原则之一是官僚机构的重要作用。然而，朴正熙时期的官僚机构并没有比李承晚或费迪南德·马科斯时期的官僚机构更具自主性或一致性。此外，韩国并没有一个“试点部委”来指导发展。最后，政府补贴并没有与绩效标准相交换——韩国工业的普遍过剩是经济政策决策出于政治原因的初步证据。相比之下，菲律宾的官僚机构远比普遍认为的更为称职。在韩国和菲律宾，统治者一直在统治，而官僚机构并没有脱离政治体制的利益。质量上的差异

between the Philippine and Korean bureaucracies is overstated. Although the Philippines suffers from poor political leadership, the bureaucrats themselves are well-trained and dedicated.
菲律宾和韩国官僚机构之间的差距被夸大了。尽管菲律宾在政治领导方面表现不佳，但官僚们本身训练有素且敬业。

I then turn to domestic politics. The relative strength of the state and the business sector determines the form and level of money politics, which in turn has an impact on a country’s development trajectory. I provide a model built upon an analogy with the economic example of markets to describe the pattern of corruption in Korea and that in the Philippines. This highly stylized model of corruption relies on the analogy between state/business to producers/consumers. Looking at the business sector as either concentrated or dispersed, and at political leadership as either coherent or fractured, leads to a matrix that predicts levels and types of corruption. In the most interesting combination, both state and business are strong and concentrated, leading to a situation of “mutual hostages” where both sides potentially benefit, and opportunism and exploitation are constrained.
我接着谈论国内政治。国家与商业部门的相对力量决定了金钱政治的形式和水平，而这又对一个国家的发展轨迹产生影响。我提供了一个基于市场经济例子的模型，以描述韩国和菲律宾的腐败模式。这个高度概括的腐败模型依赖于国家/商业与生产者/消费者之间的类比。将商业部门视为集中或分散，以及将政治领导视为一致或分裂，形成了一个预测腐败水平和类型的矩阵。在最有趣的组合中，国家和商业都强大且集中，导致一种“相互人质”的局面，双方都有潜在的利益，机会主义和剥削受到限制。

Governments engage in three generic types of economic policy: trade policy, financial policy, and regulatory policy. In Korea, although trade policy in the 1960s was generally supportive of exports, financial and regulatory policies tended to work at cross-purposes. State control of the financial sector created incentives for business to focus on expansion over efficiency, and extensive and contradictory regulatory and tax policies gave the state discretionary power over the firms. The few dominant firms in Korea (the chaebol) thus nurtured their political connections as an important component of business strategy. The coherence of the state and the business sector prevented either from dictating events, and although money politics existed, it was constrained.
政府参与三种通用的经济政策：贸易政策、金融政策和监管政策。在韩国，尽管 1960 年代的贸易政策普遍支持出口，但金融和监管政策往往相互矛盾。国家对金融部门的控制激励企业关注扩张而非效率，而广泛且矛盾的监管和税收政策则赋予国家对企业的自由裁量权。因此，韩国少数主导企业（财阀）将其政治关系作为商业战略的重要组成部分。国家与商业部门的协调性防止了任何一方主导事件，尽管存在金钱政治，但其受到限制。

Understanding policy decisions requires understanding the political incentive structure within which actors make economic decisions. Political leaders use both pork and public goods strategically: neither pork nor policy is preordained, and both have political benefits and costs. Korea under Park may not have been different from Korea under Syngman Rhee in the extent to which the bureaucracy was politicized. However, whereas Korea has plenty of corruption and politicization in public works contracts and loan allocations, pockets of the bureaucracy were staffed with educated and trained people recruited through a competitive examination process. Park Chung-hee created a bifurcated bureaucracy that allowed him to meet his patronage requirements and still pursue economic efficiency. Such a bifurcation allowed Park to follow both an internal agenda
理解政策决策需要理解行为者在其中做出经济决策的政治激励结构。政治领导人战略性地使用了猪肉和公共物品：无论是猪肉还是政策都不是注定的，两者都有政治利益和成本。在朴正熙领导下的韩国与李承晚领导下的韩国在官僚机构政治化程度上可能没有太大不同。然而，尽管韩国在公共工程合同和贷款分配中存在大量腐败和政治化，但官僚机构的某些部分却由通过竞争性考试程序招募的受过教育和培训的人士组成。朴正熙创建了一个分化的官僚机构，使他能够满足他的任人唯亲要求，同时仍然追求经济效率。这种分化使朴正熙能够同时遵循内部议程。
aimed at retaining political power and “buying off” supporters and an external agenda focused on economic development.
旨在维持政治权力和“收买”支持者，以及一个专注于经济发展的外部议程。

Although the Philippines has exhibited some of the classic traits of a weak and predatory state, important distinctions also exist. The democratic era in the Philippines saw corruption, jurisdictional battles between the executive and the legislature, and a bureaucracy permeated by outside interests. The state was unable to formulate consistent or coherent economic policies. Under Marcos, however, the state became both more coherent and more autonomous from social interest groups. The problem under martial law was not a lack of state strength but the uses to which such strength was put. Marcos, like Park, followed an explicit political strategy, destroying the most potentially dangerous elite families, coopting others, and ignoring the rest. Marcos’s strategy temporarily succeeded; there was substantial acquiescence to his rule for the first half of martial law. However, Philippine governmental policies always remained subject to manipulation, with trade policies focused on import substitution, financial policies never consistently implemented, and regulatory policies often a contradictory mix of special dispensations to favored cronies.
尽管菲律宾表现出一些典型的弱国和掠夺性国家的特征，但也存在重要的区别。菲律宾的民主时代见证了腐败、行政与立法之间的管辖权斗争，以及被外部利益渗透的官僚机构。然而，在马科斯统治下，国家变得更加一致，并且在社会利益集团中更加自主。戒严法下的问题不是国家力量的缺乏，而是这种力量的使用。马科斯像朴正熙一样，采取了明确的政治策略，摧毁了最具潜在危险的精英家庭，拉拢其他家庭，忽视其余家庭。马科斯的策略暂时成功；在戒严法的前半段，他的统治得到了相当大的默许。然而，菲律宾的政府政策始终受到操控，贸易政策侧重于进口替代，金融政策从未得到一致实施，监管政策往往是对特权朋友的特殊豁免的矛盾混合。

The pattern of Philippine money politics swung like a pendulum from excessive bottom-up rent seeking by society during the democratic period, to excessive top-down predation by Marcos and his cronies under martial law. From 1946 to 1972, particularistic demands from business overwhelmed the ability of the state to meet them, leading to corruption and incoherent policy making. With martial law beginning in 1972, the direction of corruption reversed, and Marcos used the power of the state to expropriate wealth for himself and his associates. Under Marcos, the Philippines had the potential to pursue a more disciplined developmental path, with a coherent bureaucracy and considerable state power. But Marcos lacked any constraint on his excesses, and as a result the Philippines lost its opportunity to grow rapidly.
菲律宾政治金钱的模式像钟摆一样摆动，从民主时期社会的过度自下而上的寻租，到马科斯及其同伙在戒严法下的过度自上而下的掠夺。从 1946 年到 1972 年，商业的特殊要求压倒了国家满足这些要求的能力，导致腐败和不连贯的政策制定。1972 年戒严法开始后，腐败的方向发生了逆转，马科斯利用国家的权力为自己和他的同伙征用财富。在马科斯的统治下，菲律宾有潜力追求更有纪律的发展道路，拥有一个连贯的官僚机构和相当的国家权力。但马科斯缺乏对其过度行为的任何约束，因此菲律宾失去了快速增长的机会。

The patterns in both Korea and the Philippines changed significantly with their democratic transitions in the mid-1980s. In Korea, the transition to democracy in 1987 diffused the power of the state. This led to increased demands for political payoffs as politicians began to genuinely compete for electoral support and to decreased ability of the state to resist or contain the demands of the business sector. The small number of massive Korean firms, unrestrained by any market forces because of their size, made increasingly risky decisions. Thus “too much” democracy com-
在 1980 年代中期，韩国和菲律宾的模式随着它们的民主转型发生了显著变化。在韩国，1987 年的民主转型削弱了国家的权力。这导致了对政治回报的需求增加，因为政治家们开始真正竞争选民支持，同时国家抵制或遏制商业部门需求的能力下降。由于规模庞大的少数韩国企业不受市场力量的约束，做出了越来越冒险的决策。因此，“过多”的民主导致了

bined with a still collusive business-government relationship resulted in increasingly ineffectual policy making, and the Asian financial crisis of 1997 brought this to light.
与仍然存在的勾结的商业与政府关系相结合，导致政策制定越来越无效，而 1997 年的亚洲金融危机揭示了这一点。

In contrast, by the early 1980s Ferdinand Marcos had run the Philippines into the ground. The dramatic uprising of “People Power” in 1986 leveled the playing field for both state and business. As the Philippines slowly recovered, state and business were less powerful and less coherent, leading the Philippines in the early 1990s to begin a painful restructuring process. The Philippines was less affected by the crisis of 1997 because some of those collusive government-business ties had been broken by the downfall of Marcos, speeding the process of reform. Largely owing to policy reforms and increased regulation of the financial sector, the Philippines fared relatively well in the crisis of 1997. The prospect for continued economic and political growth appears, if not inevitable, quite likely.
相比之下，到 1980 年代初，费迪南德·马科斯已将菲律宾拖入困境。1986 年“人民力量”的戏剧性起义为国家和商业创造了一个公平的竞争环境。随着菲律宾缓慢恢复，国家和商业的力量减弱且不再一致，导致菲律宾在 1990 年代初开始了一场痛苦的重组过程。由于一些勾结的政府与商业关系在马科斯倒台后被打破，菲律宾在 1997 年的危机中受到的影响较小，加速了改革进程。由于政策改革和对金融部门监管的加强，菲律宾在 1997 年的危机中表现相对良好。持续的经济和政治增长的前景似乎，如果不是不可避免的，至少是相当可能的。

This book is about politics, and it centers on explaining the patterns of money politics. The argument adduced here, however, leads naturally to a question about economic growth. If both Korea and the Philippines experienced extensive corruption, why did Korea grow much faster than the Philippines? In the concluding section of the book I shift the emphasis from explaining money politics to exploring the relationship between money politics and development. Simply put, the balance of power among elites in Korea reduced transaction costs, while bandwagoning politics in the Philippines raised transaction costs. Although an imbalance between economic and political elites can lead to corruption spiraling out of control and choking off growth, where a rough balance does exist, corruption is contained. However, corruption is only one of many variables that affect development, and to answer the larger question of why Korea has developed but the Philippines has not we must be sensitive to a number of other factors that existed in Korea but not in the Philippines, including an external threat, extensive U.S. aid, and land reform, in addition to the balance that limited corruption and that is described in this book.
这本书是关于政治的，重点解释了金钱政治的模式。然而，这里提出的论点自然引出了一个关于经济增长的问题。如果韩国和菲律宾都经历了广泛的腐败，为什么韩国的增长速度远快于菲律宾？在书的结尾部分，我将重点从解释金钱政治转向探索金钱政治与发展的关系。简单来说，韩国精英之间的权力平衡降低了交易成本，而菲律宾的跟风政治则提高了交易成本。尽管经济精英和政治精英之间的不平衡可能导致腐败失控并扼杀增长，但在存在大致平衡的情况下，腐败是可以被控制的。 然而，腐败只是影响发展的众多变量之一，要回答为什么韩国发展而菲律宾没有的发展问题，我们必须关注一些在韩国存在但在菲律宾不存在的其他因素，包括外部威胁、大量美国援助和土地改革，以及限制腐败的平衡，这在本书中有描述。

Leaders of states make deliberate choices about whether to constrain their ability to steal domestic capital. Standing at the intersection of domestic and international politics, and restrained by domestic institutions and international pressures, the leaders must deal with foreign countries, survive in domestic politics, and also craft economic policies. In making sense of why Korea initially succeeded, but the Philippines did not, we have to understand the broad contours of the relationship between big business and the state. By comparing the two countries, this book not only
国家领导人会有意识地选择是否限制他们窃取国内资本的能力。站在国内政治和国际政治的交汇点上，受到国内制度和国际压力的制约，领导人必须处理与外国的关系，在国内政治中生存，并制定经济政策。在理解为什么韩国最初成功而菲律宾没有时，我们必须了解大企业与国家之间关系的广泛轮廓。通过比较这两个国家，本书不仅
sharpens our perspective on the individual countries but also leads to further comparative research on politics, corruption, and development.
不仅加深了我们对各个国家的认识，还推动了对政治、腐败和发展的进一步比较研究。

I focus on the rent seeking and corruption that occur between public and private actors. At the heart of the model is the idea that those actors with excessive power will tend to abuse it. The dependent variable is the exchange between state and business of favors for bribes. The independent variable is the relationship between state and business. My analytic focus is on this larger institutional environment - the actual institutions of governance all exist within this larger relationship, and each specific institution is affected by this environment.
我关注公共和私人行为者之间发生的寻租和腐败。模型的核心思想是，拥有过度权力的行为者往往会滥用这种权力。因变量是国家与企业之间以贿赂交换好处的关系。自变量是国家与企业之间的关系。我的分析重点是这个更大的制度环境——所有治理的实际制度都存在于这个更大的关系中，每个具体制度都受到这个环境的影响。

I use the term “money politics” because it is less normative than “corruption” and also because it highlights public-private interaction. Both “corruption” and “rent seeking” are broader terms, describing activities that can occur at the private-private level as well as vis-à-vis the state. James Buchanan defines “rent seeking” as "that part of the payment to an owner of resources over and above that which those resources could command in any alternative use. ${}^{17}$${}^{17}$^(17){ }^{17} Thus rents are created when an actor manipulates prices and causes them to diverge from competitive levels, and the existence of rents can lead to corruption by various actors attempting to gain access to the rents. By manipulating prices, the actor himself, or some other actor on whose behalf the price manipulator is acting as an agent, is able to reap “excess profits.” ${}^{18}$${}^{18}$^(18){ }^{18}
我使用“金钱政治”这个术语，因为它比“腐败”更少规范性，并且它突出了公共与私人之间的互动。“腐败”和“寻租”都是更广泛的术语，描述可以在私人与私人之间以及与国家之间发生的活动。詹姆斯·布坎南将“寻租”定义为“对资源所有者的支付部分，超过这些资源在任何替代用途中能够获得的报酬。因此，当一个行为者操纵价格并导致其偏离竞争水平时，就会产生租金，而租金的存在可能导致各种行为者试图获得租金而引发腐败。通过操纵价格，行为者本人或代表价格操纵者作为代理人行事的其他行为者，能够获得“超额利润。”

Rents can be created in a number of ways, but a principal way is through state intervention. ${}^{19}$${}^{19}$^(19){ }^{19} The state uses its power to manipulate prices and
租金可以通过多种方式产生，但主要方式是通过国家干预。 ${}^{19}$${}^{19}$^(19){ }^{19} 国家利用其权力来操纵价格和

markets to generate rents. For example, import licenses confer rents by restricting the amount of goods that come into a country; actors who can import the restricted goods are able to sell those goods at a higher than market price, thereby obtaining rents. ${}^{20}$${}^{20}$^(20){ }^{20} By intervening, the government creates incentives for business to try to influence policy decisions. Corruption occurs when businessmen use bribery, personal connections, or some other means to attempt to influence policy decisions and gain rents. The distribution and volume of rents are thus a function of the relative strengths of the state and the business sector.
市场产生租金。例如，进口许可证通过限制进入一个国家的商品数量来赋予租金；能够进口受限商品的参与者能够以高于市场价格出售这些商品，从而获得租金。 ${}^{20}$${}^{20}$^(20){ }^{20} 通过干预，政府为企业创造了影响政策决策的激励。当商人利用贿赂、个人关系或其他手段试图影响政策决策并获得租金时，就会发生腐败。因此，租金的分配和数量是国家与商业部门相对实力的函数。

Were there no government distributing rents, there would be no corruption, and thus a key issue is how to model the government-business relationship. In examining both the supply and the demand for political corruption, this simplified model of the government-business relationship necessarily abstracts from a rich reality.
如果没有政府分配租金，就不会有腐败，因此一个关键问题是如何建模政府与商业的关系。在考察政治腐败的供给和需求时，这一简化的政府与商业关系模型必然抽象了丰富的现实。

Following Shleifer and Vishney, a state can range from coherent to fractured. ${}^{21}$${}^{21}$^(21){ }^{21} A state is coherent if it can formulate preferences independent of social influences and if political leaders have internal control over their bureaucrats. ${}^{22}$${}^{22}$^(22){ }^{22} Although there are many possible configurations of the relationship among political leaders, bureaucrats, and political organizations (domestic politics: parties, associations, etc.), for the sake of simplicity I
根据 Shleifer 和 Vishney 的观点，一个国家可以从一致到破碎。 ${}^{21}$${}^{21}$^(21){ }^{21} 如果一个国家能够独立于社会影响制定偏好，并且政治领导人对其官僚有内部控制，那么这个国家就是一致的。 ${}^{22}$${}^{22}$^(22){ }^{22} 尽管政治领导人、官僚和政治组织（国内政治：政党、协会等）之间的关系有许多可能的配置，但为了简单起见，我

focus on only two polar cases. The most coherent situation exists when political leaders have full control over their political organizations and their bureaucrats, and in this case leaders actively use domestic politics as a means of ensuring continued rule. At the other pole, the most fractured situation exists when leaders survive only tenuously, when they engage in constant conflict with political organizations over the form and content of the state, and bureaucrats can play off “multiple principals” to their own advantage. ${}^{23}$${}^{23}$^(23){ }^{23} At the heart is the question of control.
仅关注两个极端情况。当政治领导人对其政治组织及其官僚拥有完全控制时，最一致的情况就存在，在这种情况下，领导人积极利用国内政治作为确保持续统治的手段。在另一个极端，最分裂的情况是领导人仅勉强生存，他们与政治组织在国家的形式和内容上进行持续冲突，官僚可以利用“多个首要”来谋取自身利益。 ${}^{23}$${}^{23}$^(23){ }^{23} 核心问题是控制。

It is the interaction of government and business that is of interest, however, and we therefore need to understand business organization as well as government organization. My view of the business sector builds on the work of Michael Shafer. ${}^{24}$${}^{24}$^(24){ }^{24} He argues that the organizational characteristics of the predominant economic sector (e.g., mining or agriculture) have different implications for its relationship to the state. In sectors with high asset specificity and high production inflexibility, companies will be less responsive to market signals, and it will be harder for them to adjust quickly to exogenous shocks, either political or economic. These types of firms will have more incentive to resist attempts by the state to intervene. Alternatively, in sectors with low asset specificity, low production inflexibility, and low factor inflexibility, firms will be more easily influenced by exogenous forces.
然而，政府与商业的互动才是我们关注的重点，因此我们需要理解商业组织和政府组织。我对商业部门的看法建立在迈克尔·谢弗的研究基础上。 ${}^{24}$${}^{24}$^(24){ }^{24} 他认为，主导经济部门（例如，采矿或农业）的组织特征对其与国家的关系有不同的影响。在资产特定性高和生产不灵活性高的部门，公司对市场信号的反应会较弱，且在面对外部冲击（无论是政治的还是经济的）时，调整的速度会更慢。这类公司更有动力抵制国家的干预尝试。相反，在资产特定性低、生产不灵活性低和要素不灵活性低的部门，企业更容易受到外部力量的影响。

The approach used here examines business more broadly than does Shafer. In this model, a strong concentrated business sector is the diversified business group, comprised of well-organized firms that cover many sectors of the economy. ${}^{25}$${}^{25}$^(25){ }^{25} As Ben Ross Schneider puts it, "big (and encompassing) is beautiful. ${}^{226}$${}^{226}$^(226){ }^{226} This definition of diversified firms is one in which companies cover many sectors rather than one, may have importcompeting subsidiaries as well as export-oriented subsidiaries, and may have agricultural and urban firms. Given their cross-ownership of various subsidiaries and the range of their interests, these firms’ interests cannot be neatly categorized. In addition, the larger that diversified business
这里使用的方法比 Shafer 的更广泛地考察商业。在这个模型中，强大的集中商业部门是多元化的商业集团，由覆盖经济多个部门的组织良好的公司组成。 ${}^{25}$${}^{25}$^(25){ }^{25} 正如 Ben Ross Schneider 所说，“大（且包容）就是美。” ${}^{226}$${}^{226}$^(226){ }^{226} 这个多元化公司的定义是，企业覆盖多个部门而不是一个，可能拥有与进口竞争的子公司以及以出口为导向的子公司，并可能拥有农业和城市公司。鉴于它们对各种子公司的交叉持股和广泛的利益，这些公司的利益无法被简单地分类。此外，越大的多元化商业

PD = Prisoner’s Dilemma  PD = 囚徒困境
Figure 1.1. The Four Types of Corruption
图 1.1. 四种腐败类型
groups are relative to the economy as a whole, the more they are likely to attempt to influence government policy and the more they are likely to wield political influence. These conglomerates can be differentiated from single-sector, smaller, and less-diversified firms. On a spectrum, we might put individual artisans at one end, with Japanese keiretsu, Korean chaebol, Philippine family conglomerates, and Mexican grupos at the other end. ${}^{27}$${}^{27}$^(27){ }^{27}
集团与整体经济相关，它们越有可能试图影响政府政策，越有可能施加政治影响。这些企业集团可以与单一行业、规模较小且多样性较低的公司区分开来。在一个光谱上，我们可以将个体工匠放在一端，而将日本的财阀、韩国的财阀、菲律宾的家族企业集团和墨西哥的集团放在另一端。 ${}^{27}$${}^{27}$^(27){ }^{27}

We can now build the analogy for politics and corruption, with a coherent/fractured state along one axis and a concentrated/dispersed business sector along the other (Figure 1.1). In this model I take as given the initial distribution of rights and the type of actors. These are exogenous to the model, and I remain agnostic as to why and how society came to look a certain way.
我们现在可以建立政治与腐败的类比，一条轴线上是连贯/破碎的国家，另一条轴线上是集中/分散的商业部门（图 1.1）。在这个模型中，我假设权利的初始分配和参与者的类型是给定的。这些是模型的外生变量，我对社会为何以及如何呈现某种状态保持中立态度。

Although the model is a simplified abstraction of the government-business relationship, it allows us to parsimoniously capture the underlying dynamics of how corruption occurs. There are two analytically distinct types of
尽管该模型是对政府与商业关系的简化抽象，但它使我们能够简洁地捕捉腐败发生的潜在动态。分析上有两种不同类型的

corruption: the top-down predation by a strong state on society, and the bottom-up rent seeking of powerful groups that overwhelm the ability of the state to contain and channel their demands. Neither one of these is analytically prior to the other, and both can occur under the right circumstances.
腐败：强大国家对社会的自上而下的掠夺，以及强大群体自下而上的寻租，这些都压倒了国家控制和引导其需求的能力。这两者在分析上并没有优先关系，并且在适当的情况下都可以发生。

Top-down corruption has been best explicated in the notion of a “predatory” state. ${}^{28}$${}^{28}$^(28){ }^{28} The predatory state is one in which the state takes advantage of a dispersed and weak business sector. Political elites pursue outright expropriation; they also solicit “donations” from businessmen who in turn are either “shaken down” by the regime or who volunteer bribes in return for favors, and employ other means as well. ${}^{29}$${}^{29}$^(29){ }^{29} In contrast, bottom-up corruption occurs when social actors have the power to overwhelm the state. When the strength of the business sector is enough to force concessions from the state, rent seeking behavior results. Potential state influence over economic life is vast, and those businessmen or groups privileged enough to receive low-interest loans or import quotas will benefit at the expense of others. ${}^{30}$${}^{30}$^(30){ }^{30} Indeed, a typical problem in developing countries is being able to resist society’s demands on the state. ${}^{31}$${}^{31}$^(31){ }^{31} When rent seeking demands become too onerous, the state is incapable of implementing decisions and growth is stifled.
自上而下的腐败在“掠夺性”国家的概念中得到了最好的阐释。掠夺性国家是指国家利用分散且弱小的商业部门。政治精英追求彻底的征用；他们还向商人索取“捐款”，这些商人要么被政权“敲诈”，要么自愿行贿以换取好处，并采用其他手段。相比之下，自下而上的腐败发生在社会行为者有能力压倒国家时。当商业部门的力量足以迫使国家做出让步时，寻租行为就会产生。国家对经济生活的潜在影响是巨大的，那些有特权的商人或团体能够获得低息贷款或进口配额，将会以其他人的利益为代价而受益。事实上，发展中国家的一个典型问题是能够抵制社会对国家的要求。当寻租要求变得过于繁重时，国家将无法实施决策，经济增长受到抑制。

The first two possibilities I consider are analogous to either a predatory state or a rent-seeking business sector. The typical case is that some group or segment of society has far more access to power than others, as in Cell III. When a country has a coherent state and a dispersed business sector, the result is predatory behavior by the state (top-down behavior) in which political elites can scrape off rents in a predatory manner. Political elites presiding over a coherent state will have the opportunity to take advantage of a fractured business sector.
我考虑的前两种可能性类似于掠夺性国家或寻租商业部门。典型的情况是，社会中的某个群体或部分对权力的获取远远超过其他群体，就像在第三类中一样。当一个国家拥有一个连贯的国家和一个分散的商业部门时，结果就是国家的掠夺性行为（自上而下的行为），政治精英可以以掠夺的方式获取租金。掌握连贯国家的政治精英将有机会利用一个破碎的商业部门。

Alternatively, when a concentrated business sector and a fragmented state exist, as in Cell II, the result is rent seeking (bottom-up behavior).
另外，当存在一个集中的商业部门和一个分散的国家时，如在第二单元中，结果就是寻租（自下而上的行为）。
${}^{28}$${}^{28}$^(28){ }^{28} Levi, Of Rule and Revenue, pp. 32-45.
${}^{28}$${}^{28}$^(28){ }^{28} 利维，《规则与收入》，第 32-45 页。
${}^{29}$${}^{29}$^(29){ }^{29} Charles Tilly, “The State as Organized Crime,” in Bringing the State Back In, edited by Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985).
${}^{29}$${}^{29}$^(29){ }^{29} 查尔斯·蒂利，《国家作为有组织犯罪》，收录于彼得·B·埃文斯、迪特里希·鲁斯切梅耶和西达·斯科奇波尔编辑的《国家回归》（剑桥：剑桥大学出版社，1985 年）。
${}^{30}$${}^{30}$^(30){ }^{30} For an interesting discussion along these lines, see Milgrom and Roberts, “Bargaining Costs, Influence Costs, and the Organization of Economic Activity”; and Chang, The Political Economy of Industrial Policy.
${}^{30}$${}^{30}$^(30){ }^{30} 有关这些方面的有趣讨论，请参见 Milgrom 和 Roberts 的《谈判成本、影响成本与经济活动的组织》；以及 Chang 的《工业政策的政治经济学》。
${}^{31}$${}^{31}$^(31){ }^{31} Joel Migdal, Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988).
${}^{31}$${}^{31}$^(31){ }^{31} 乔尔·米格达尔，《强大的社会与脆弱的国家：第三世界的国家-社会关系与国家能力》（普林斯顿：普林斯顿大学出版社，1988 年）。

Here rents created by the state flow to business, because the latter has colonized the former and transformed it into a sort of “executive committee.” A business sector composed of strong interest groups may overwhelm the state with its various demands, leading to either policy incoherence or policy indecision. Many analyses of third-world countries emphasize that the state is a relatively recent, and hence weak, addition to the political scene. Strong interest groups may be able to capture control of the state and use the power of the state for their own ends.
这里由国家创造的租金流向企业，因为后者已经殖民了前者，并将其转变为一种“执行委员会”。由强大利益集团组成的商业部门可能会以其各种需求压倒国家，导致政策不一致或政策犹豫。许多对第三世界国家的分析强调，国家是政治舞台上相对较新，因此较弱的组成部分。强大的利益集团可能能够控制国家，并利用国家的权力为自己的目的服务。

Two other possibilities exist. In Cell IV there are numerous interest groups and diffuse power within the state. In this situation, no single group could have too much influence, and the “political market” would come close to clearing. This builds on Susan Rose-Ackerman’s notion that “the role of competitive pressures in preventing corruption may be an important aspect of a strategy to deter bribery.” ${}^{32}$${}^{32}$^(32){ }^{32} When both state and business are weak, rents are all but eliminated. Neither state nor business is powerful enough to take advantage of the other, and so exploitation is difficult. Many of the advanced industrial democracies - at least when compared with less-developed countries (LDCs) - may approximate this situation. As bureaucrats compete with each other to offer policy, thus driving the cost of a bribe toward zero, numerous capitalists also compete with each other for the policy, also driving the price toward zero. In Cell IV, corruption is lowest.
还有两种可能性。在 IV 单元中，存在众多利益集团和分散的权力。在这种情况下，没有任何单一集团能够拥有过多的影响力，“政治市场”将接近清算。这建立在苏珊·罗斯-阿克曼的观点上，即“竞争压力在防止腐败中的作用可能是遏制贿赂战略的重要方面。” ${}^{32}$${}^{32}$^(32){ }^{32} 当国家和商业都处于弱势时，租金几乎被消除。国家和商业都没有足够的力量来利用对方，因此剥削变得困难。许多先进的工业民主国家——至少与欠发达国家（LDCs）相比——可能接近这种情况。当官僚们相互竞争以提供政策，从而将贿赂的成本压向零时，众多资本家也相互竞争以获得政策，同样将价格压向零。在 IV 单元中，腐败程度最低。

The final and most interesting case is Cell I, where both government and business are equally strong: there is a relatively coherent state but also a small number of powerful interest groups. In this instance, the level of rents is limited and the division relatively equitable. The result is “mutual hostages” in which the state and those powerful groups may collude with one another, but neither has the advantage. Cell I reflects the old saw: “If you owe the bank a little money, the bank owns you. If you owe the bank a lot of money, you own the bank.” In this mutual hostage situation, both the political and economic elites are powerful enough to harm the other but are deterred from such actions by the damage that the other side can
最终且最有趣的案例是单元 I，在这里政府和商业同样强大：国家相对连贯，但也有少数强大的利益集团。在这种情况下，租金水平有限，分配相对公平。结果是“相互人质”，在这种情况下，国家和那些强大的集团可能会相互勾结，但双方都没有优势。单元 I 反映了老话：“如果你欠银行一点钱，银行就拥有你。如果你欠银行很多钱，你就拥有银行。”在这种相互人质的情况下，政治和经济精英都足够强大，可以伤害对方，但又因对方可能造成的损害而受到威慑。

inflict. ${}^{33}$${}^{33}$^(33){ }^{33} As will be argued more fully in Chapter 7, this situation reduces transaction costs for both government and business elites.
施加。 ${}^{33}$${}^{33}$^(33){ }^{33} 正如第七章将更全面地论证的，这种情况降低了政府和商业精英的交易成本。

In Cell I, rents can be had and corruption can occur, but the level of rents is constrained by the power of the other group. Small-N (business concentration) reduces transaction costs, and hence rent seeking, because a small-N eases monitoring and enforcement costs. In this situation, although there are rents to be earned by both business and state, the amount will be less than in the polar cases where one group dominates the other, and more than in the case where both groups are dispersed into a large number of small actors.
在单元格 I 中，租金可以获得，腐败也可能发生，但租金水平受到另一组权力的制约。小-N（商业集中）降低了交易成本，从而减少了寻租，因为小-N 减轻了监控和执行成本。在这种情况下，尽管商业和国家都可以获得租金，但其数量将少于一个集团主导另一个集团的极端情况，也多于两个集团分散成大量小参与者的情况。

In this sense, strategic interaction between state and business corresponds to a prisoner’s dilemma. Although in the short run either actor may be better off by defecting and gaining all the rents, the other actor retains the ability to punish defection over time, and thus grudging cooperation may ensue. ${}^{34}$${}^{34}$^(34){ }^{34} Cooperation in the strong/strong (Cell I) is not automatic. As in a prisoner’s dilemma, both sides are better off defecting and grabbing all the rents for themselves. Indeed, Cell I could lead to a war of attrition, with both sides slugging it out. Even without active cooperation, however, exploitation will be limited by the power of the other side. In the Korean example, we will see that Park initially tried to take advantage of the business sector but then realized he was unable to do so. ${}^{35}$${}^{35}$^(35){ }^{35}
在这个意义上，国家与商业之间的战略互动对应于囚徒困境。尽管在短期内，任何一方通过背叛并获得所有收益可能会更好，但另一方保留了随着时间推移惩罚背叛的能力，因此可能会出现勉强的合作。 ${}^{34}$${}^{34}$^(34){ }^{34} 在强/强（第一象限）的合作并不是自动的。正如在囚徒困境中，双方都更倾向于背叛并将所有收益据为己有。实际上，第一象限可能导致消耗战，双方互相争斗。然而，即使没有积极的合作，剥削也会受到另一方力量的限制。在韩国的例子中，我们将看到朴初期试图利用商业部门，但随后意识到他无法做到这一点。 ${}^{35}$${}^{35}$^(35){ }^{35}

Thus the least corruption would occur in situations where both state and business are weak and disorganized, for neither group could take advantage of the other and all the groups would compete against each other, driving the price of corruption close to zero. The most corruption would occur when only one side is coherent, either state or business. A middle position exists when both state and business are strong and can take partial but not total advantage of each other.
因此，腐败最少的情况发生在国家和商业都弱小且无序的情况下，因为双方都无法利用对方，所有群体将相互竞争，使腐败的价格接近于零。腐败最多的情况发生在只有一方（国家或商业）是连贯的。当国家和商业都强大并能够部分但不是完全利用对方时，存在一种中间状态。

The theoretical concepts in this book are widely accepted and used in the social sciences, even though the difficulty in measuring them is also widely
本书中的理论概念在社会科学中被广泛接受和使用，尽管测量它们的难度也被广泛认可

acknowledged. ${}^{36}$${}^{36}$^(36){ }^{36} Recognizing this difficulty, in this study I focus on the polar cases in an attempt to lay out the ranges of the variables and test the model’s plausibility.
已确认。 ${}^{36}$${}^{36}$^(36){ }^{36} 鉴于这一困难，在本研究中我专注于极端案例，试图列出变量的范围并测试模型的合理性。

Measuring the dependent variable of corruption and influence peddling is difficult. By their very nature these are acts that their actors wish to keep hidden. Although other scholars have used as evidence polls of perceptions of corruption, traced one pattern of corruption, or relied on corruption scandals, there is no comprehensive indicator of corruption. ${}^{37}$${}^{37}$^(37){ }^{37} But a variety of indicators can give us a sense of the size and pattern of corruption. ${}^{38}$${}^{38}$^(38){ }^{38} Occasional scandals reveal the pattern of influence. Estimates of campaign spending, kickbacks, and secret funds are useful first approximations. Tracing patronage and cronyism requires deep ethnographic knowledge.
测量腐败和影响贿赂的因变量是困难的。这些行为本质上是其参与者希望保持隐秘的。尽管其他学者使用腐败感知的民意调查、追踪一种腐败模式或依赖腐败丑闻作为证据，但没有一个全面的腐败指标。 ${}^{37}$${}^{37}$^(37){ }^{37} 但是各种指标可以让我们了解腐败的规模和模式。 ${}^{38}$${}^{38}$^(38){ }^{38} 偶尔的丑闻揭示了影响的模式。对竞选支出、回扣和秘密资金的估计是有用的初步近似。追踪庇护和裙带关系需要深入的民族志知识。

Measuring the independent variables is only marginally easier. To measure the strength of the business sector I focus on a series of indicators, including sectoral concentration, employment, sales, and peak associations. Firms’ value added as a proportion of gross domestic product (GDP) gives an indicator of their market and political power, and the
测量独立变量仅稍微容易一些。为了衡量商业部门的实力，我关注一系列指标，包括行业集中度、就业、销售和高峰协会。企业的增加值占国内生产总值（GDP）的比例提供了它们市场和政治力量的一个指标，和

composition and concentration of their bank loans indicate the firms’ vulnerability to the state and other actors. Measuring state strength is necessarily more qualitative. To measure state coherence and low agency costs, I rely mainly on detailed case studies that follow the process of policy making, and I do not attempt to provide a single quantifiable measure for the variables. Case studies can reveal whether leaders act on their parties and domestic politics or whether they respond to them. Process tracing of both policy decisions and institutional origins can reveal whether there is agency slack between leaders and bureaucrats.
他们的银行贷款的组成和集中度表明了公司对国家和其他参与者的脆弱性。衡量国家实力必然更具定性。为了衡量国家的一致性和低代理成本，我主要依赖详细的案例研究，这些研究跟踪政策制定的过程，我并不试图为这些变量提供单一的可量化指标。案例研究可以揭示领导者是根据他们的政党和国内政治行事，还是对其做出反应。对政策决策和制度起源的过程追踪可以揭示领导者与官僚之间是否存在代理松弛。

Korea and the Philippines both had extensive corruption that permeated the normal politics of elections, economic policy making, taxation, and the day-to-day running of the country, and similar institutional structures led to similar patterns of money in both countries. However, Korea and the Philippines had different social organizations and different constraints and incentives that affected their pattern of money politics. Corruption in Korea, although endemic, was constrained by the collusion of a powerful business class and a coherent state. Each major group was able to benefit from its close relationship with the other, but neither could ever gain the upper hand. Despite each group’s constant bemoaning of its counterpart’s utter lack of qualifications, each needed and relied upon the other. In contrast, corruption in the Philippines swung like a pendulum. As one group or the other gained predominant power, it would busily set about lining its own pockets, aware that in the next round its fortunes might well be reversed.
韩国和菲律宾都存在广泛的腐败，这种腐败渗透到选举、经济政策制定、税收和国家日常运作的正常政治中，类似的制度结构导致了两国相似的金钱模式。然而，韩国和菲律宾的社会组织不同，约束和激励也不同，这影响了它们的金钱政治模式。尽管韩国的腐败是普遍存在的，但受到强大商业阶层和一个连贯国家的勾结所限制。每个主要群体都能够从与另一个群体的密切关系中获益，但双方都无法占据上风。尽管每个群体不断抱怨对方完全缺乏资格，但彼此都需要并依赖对方。相比之下，菲律宾的腐败则像摆钟一样摇摆。当一个群体获得主导权时，它会忙于填满自己的口袋，意识到在下一轮中，它的命运可能会被逆转。

The key to understanding patterns of money politics is the governmentbusiness relationship. Too much power in the hands of either political or economic elites invites abuses in the form of rent seeking and corruption. A balance between elites allows less discretion and less abuse. To explore the abstract propositions presented in this chapter, we now turn to a detailed study of Korea and the Philippines.
理解金钱政治模式的关键在于政府与商业的关系。政治或经济精英手中掌握过多权力会导致寻租和腐败等滥用现象。精英之间的平衡可以减少自由裁量权和滥用行为。为了探讨本章提出的抽象命题，我们现在转向对韩国和菲律宾的详细研究。